Contact Author International Terrorism Saving the Future
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The truce engineered for Najaf and Kufa is not holding. The American commander suggests that the sadrists may not have been clear as to whether it should affect Kufa as well as Najaf. There is also a difference in interpretation. The Americans interpret the agreement to say that any armed Mahdist is fair game; the sadrists seem to think that they can have arms as long as they do not fire them first. Keep tuned. The Times discusses at length the rise of the Sunni clergy as a force in their own right. In the absence of politicians (at least in public) the clergy have become de facto politicians who are virulent in their denunciation of the Americans. One problem is that the sunni clergy is divided into many factions, so can hardly operate as a united front (The shi'a, in spite of their divisions, have historically had more of a sense of hierarchical organization of the clergy than have the sunni, and each of the ayatollas has his own "built-in" following. The Times continues to be bothered by the way in which the interim government is being chosen, describing today at length the loss of control of the process by the United Nations envoy, Brahimi. Supposedly, he is now letting the United States and the Governing Council call the shots. I find this a little incredible. Brahimi has been regarded as strong person with backing from the top of the United Nations, and therefore much of the world. Why he would be truckling under to the Americans is quite unclear. It may just be possible that he is still trying to put together the best candidates that will both be acceptable to Iraqis and be able to govern, and in the process he is listening to America's quite knowledgeable representatives and those of the Governing Council. |
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The New York Times recently responded to liberal and international criticism of media coverage that supposedly allowed the Administration to take the country to war with Iraq on the basis of evidence that Saddam had stockpiled and was ready to use weapons of mass destruction (WMD). It did a special editorial and then later a special ombudsman column admitting the error of their ways. Their point was that they had carelessly allowed claims for the existence of WMD in Iraq and claims of pre-war contacts with al-Qaida to enter their pages without making clear that their sources were in the Administration and that the evidence had not been independently checked. Unfortunately, in making this mea culpa the Times has done more to undermine its credibility than to restore it. It is saying, in effect: "We had a point of view, reported from this point of view; now we have another point of view, now we need to expunge the paper trail that represents our former position." As a careful reader of the Times, I was never convinced by reports in the Times before or after our invasion that Saddam had stockpiled weapons of mass destruction. Some reports from administration sources said they did, but it was clear what the sources were. Other reports and commentary in the Times pointed out the likelihood that "evidence" of Iraqi WMD or cooperation with al-Qaida was manufactured in whole or in part by persons in government or in the Iraqi exile community that wanted the United States to intervene. The Times did not lead me astray. Instead, I was glad that its pages contained both accounts reporting the evidence supporting Administration views and accounts casting doubt on this evidence. I was allowed to choose. I hope I always have that opportunity. This is, of course, a larger problem than the Times and its internal and external critics. The accusation is now general a general one against the American media, an accusation that simply does not accord with my experience. |
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The casualty figures are out for May. Using the same system that we used last month, there were 82 total and 78 American. This represents a considerable decline from April, but leaving April aside it is still well above the figures for any other months except November, 2003 and April and March 2003 (during the offensive). So no one should proclaim a positive trend yet. Two notes. First, the figures given in this analysis for wounded run in the 4000 range. Yet in a responsible television broadcast discussing the wounded passing through Germany, the figure of 12,000 wounded in Iraq was given. No idea of why the discrepancy. Second, I do not understand why the dead in Iraq should be more important than those in Afghanistan. The Lehrer shows regularly shows in silence the pictures on the service men and women most recently killed in Iraq. Last night on 60 Minutes for Memorial Day, we were shown all 800 plus killed in Iraq, but again nothing on Afghanistan. This is clearly the forgotten war. (Actually I believe we have more troops there than we have ever had.) Fatalities are given at about eighty, which seems low, but this is only an impression. |
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The last two days have brought confusing news, and yet there may be daylight ahead. The agreement with the sadrists in Najaf and Kufa does not seem as secure as yesterday, particularly in Kufa. Of course, both sides blame the other for continued violence. But for now no one says the pause is over. On the road between Mahmudiya and Iskanderiya (south of Baghdad) more people are killed, this time Japanese. This Sunni area seems to remain uncontrolled. Clearly as we make agreements elsewhere we should shift more forces here for it is a major artery. Progress continues on the membership of the "Interim Government" that will replace the present "Governing Council". The latter had felt shut out of the process, but it may now have taken it over. As of today the new premier is to be Iyad Alawi, a secular shi'a who is presently a member of the Governing Council. He is also a leader of one of the two groups that the United States had worked closely together with in its planning the Iraq adventure. (The other group was led by Chalabi, the favorite of another branch of the American government. He is now said to be an opponent of Alawi.) Alawi is a former Baathist who led an attempted revolt against the government in the 1990s. He believes that former Baathists and former generals should have a larger role in the new Iraq. He apparently is a good politician and this choice may work out. It seems to me the Times did a disservice in emphasizing in several discussions his former closeness to the CIA. After all, anyone who was an enemy of Saddam and wanted change in Iraq in the nineties would have found it difficult not to work with the CIA. This should not condemn him. |
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The last couple of days have brought news of an agreement engineered by the Iraqis that will bring at least a tenuous peace between the Americans and sadrists in Najaf and apparently Kufa (in Karbala there was already such a agreement in practice). This does not yet affect the battles between the sadrists and Americans in "Sadr City" area of Baghdad. It represents a considerable backing down by the Americans, similar in some respects to what happened in Falluja with a somewhat different cast. If the agreement holds, the Americans will help bring peace to the embattled holy cities and, one hopes, the recovery of authority in them by more moderate elements. The role of the Iraqis is significant. For all in all, what we are seeing is a progressive Iraqization of authority in the country so that July appears more and more likely to actually mean a transfer of significant power. For their part, the Americans are becoming more comfortable with letting Iraqis take the lead, so they may in fact fade away slowly in the aftermath. However, there are still many hurdles, and the United States and its allies will continue for some time to have thousands of soldiers and civilians exposed to attack throughout the country. In the next few months unless the Iraqis can control the rate of attacks against these persons (leave alone against Iraqis), the Americans will remain tempted to push aside developing national forces in an attempt to crush their tormentors. |
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Today's paper reports a coming together of themes and realties that were perhaps inherent in the Iraq situation from the beginning. There is seeming lament that John Kerry and George W. seem to be coming together rather than moving apart as the campaign season heats up. Bush is becoming more internationalist, Kerry remains internationalist with a little more emphasis on sharing the burden with NATO as well as the United Nations. Both are facing limited options because of a sense of responsibility and the pressure of the electorate at home. Both have long records of adapting their views to situations as they develop in spite of superficial appearance of intransigence. The same mood is reflected in an Op-Ed by the well-known Arab-American Professor of Middle Eastern Studies Fouad Ajami. He has very much wanted the Bush dream to succeed in Iraq in spite of the difficulties, but today he heads his remarks with "Iraq May Survive, but the Dream is Dead". Ajami is despondent that in his latest speeches and actions Bush seems to be ceding Iraq to the United Nations and, after that, to the Iraqis themselves. He ends with these words, "In its modern history, Iraq has not been kind or gentle to its people. Perhaps it was folly to think that it was under any obligation to be kinder to strangers." Most of us might actually welcome what these two trends reflect. For both indicate that the chances of a functioning political system free of outside control emerging in the near future in Iraq seems rather better than appeared a couple of months ago. The selection of the new interim government appears to be going well, and the results should be acceptable to most of the parties involved (at least that is the American perspective). The result might not be the holding of fully free and fair elections producing a facsimile of a Western European democracy. But this was always an idealistic and over-optimistic expectation. We simply have not put enough resources into the effort nor will the Iraqis give us enough time to make such an outcome probable. Outside of the traditionally democratic areas, democracy has evolved everywhere in fits and starts, with many setbacks. It took most of Latin America well over a century to institutionalize democracy. Most of the rest of the world's democracies have developed directly out of British colonial experience, generations of training that have produced the biggest and many of the smallest of the world's democracies. We did transform the Axis powers into democracies after World War II, but they all already had more democratic tradition than Iraq, our tutelage was much more extended, our assistance more generous. But if Iraq holds together through the elections, we may end up with a start, a platform on which the Iraqis can build. Remember that observers have long pointed to the Kurdish areas as oases of light in Iraq. These areas are spoken of as though they are democracies. yet they have never been. They are essentially fiefdoms under the control of two old line tribal chieftains. They do allow their people reasonable freedoms, as long is they do not threaten the leadership. In spite of this, their example is one other groups in Iraq might emulate. When it comes to voting, there may be few people who are actually able to vote without looking over their shoulder. One can still hope that the end result is better than it has been in Nigeria where democratic forms have come and gone, and been perverted by leaders at all levels. Yet the democratic forms have persisted in Nigeria, and it has offered its people, Africa, and the international community a level of governance and freedom far better than that offered by Saddam Hussein. |
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Without wanting to seem pollyannish, it would appear as though we may be doing somewhat better in Iraq, better enough to make possible an eventual "withdrawal with honor", assuming Iraq holds together enough during the transition period that our departure does not look like we are being chased out. There are still violent incidents every day. But the momentum of anti-American attacks appears to have been lost since April. (Let not tomorrow prove me wrong!) Two other indications look good. First, we seem to have withdrawn successfully from Karbala without destroying the important shrines. We are now using Iraqis to do at least part of the security, and shops are reopening. We also seem to have been able to go a long way toward retaking Kufa, the main base of the Sadrists outside of the Sadr City area of Baghdad. In both cases we have been able to inflict very one-sided casualties on the Sadrists, and they may be discouraged. This backs up the general rule that guerrillas make a mistake when they engage in pitched battles with an occupying power. Pitched battles partly worked for a different sort of guerrilla in Falluja. But it appears as though the people in Karbala were really glad to see their guerrillas go, and this may have made the difference. Second, NYT reporters and others sense that the general feeling of Iraqis today is one of sullen acceptance of the American presence. They want the Americans to go, but they fear chaos in the aftermath. The result may be a growing unwillingness to push harder on the Americans. It is significant that the main complaint against the Americans in most of the country seems to be that the Americans have failed to guarantee security and have failed in their promises of development. Deep down the average Iraqi realizes that neither of these problems is likely to get better if the Americans leave now. An eerie aspect of the situation is that while the Americans beat themselves up over the their egregious torture of detainees this does not seem to have had a great effect in Iraq itself. Partly this is because the Iraqis who really hate us expected no better of us, so are not disappointed. Those, on the other hand, who see the Americans as the only reed to cling to do not wish to damage their crutch further. Perhaps my impression results from misreporting, perhaps there is a new upwelling of hatred over the torture that will lead to a new cascade of attacks. Certainly our actions have had a negative effect is in the Arab Middle East and Europe, but we hear little of it in Iraq itself. |
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Friedman's Op-Ed today proposes that we should turn over the control of security in Iraq to the Iraqis for a rather strange reason. He seems convinced that most of the suicide bombers in the country are fanatical Muslims from outside Iraq. Their depredations can then only be controlled by Iraqis who can tell from their accents and other subtle differences that they are outsiders, a task Americans cannot perform. He seems to have no special source of information, and he seems blissfully unaware of the fact that many suicide bombers, for example those in Sri Lanka, have no religious motivation at all. There is actually no reason to believe that Iraqi nationalism in some groups, groups taught an extreme form of Iraqi nationalism for many years, could not be recruited to take part in these attacks against Americans and anyone else who seems to accept the American presence. Of course, religion is important to many Iraqis. But I do not believe that we should accept the easy proposition that what we are fighting in Iraq and everywhere in this "war against terrorism" is a wave of Islamic terrorism. Most guerrilla activity, most terrorism is local and has local roots, a fact we should remember in spite of the preachings of al-Qaida. |
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Today's New York Times Magazine brings us Susan Sontag's take on the Iraq abuse scandal. Her emphasis is on the pictures which she correctly states are responsible for the Administration's response. Without the pictures there would have been little outcry and the Red Cross and human rights groups would have continued crying in the wilderness. Her article makes two important points (not original but well made). (1) The most embarrassing thing for Americans is the obvious pleasure the American participants in the pictures had in their activities. They reveled in what was occurring and in their part in it. Obviously they thought what they were doing was not wrong. She also points out that the photographing was essentially pornography. It was the sexual aspect that interested the picture takers. In the collection of pictures that have been analyzed, there are a few of other forms of torture. Although such actions were probably much more common than sexual humiliation, such actions were not considered interesting enough to record. Incidentally, scattered among the pictures are pictures of Americans having sex with one another as well. She relates the behavior of the young Americans and their delight in taking the pictures to the diet of video games and pornography that has become a part of their life back in the states. (2) She points out that if one looks at all the pictures in the collection, and she has evidently seen much more than most of us, and if one looks at uncut versions of the pictures, he will note that there are many more people involved than in the publicized pictures. In the full version of the pyramid of naked prisoners, for example, there are many people standing around, walking by, some apparently not paying much attention. This suggests two facts to her. First, the actions were widespread and well-known (one report is even of the pyramid picture being used as a screen saver). There were many people higher up who knew what was going on. Sontag's purpose appears to be not in this criticism itself. It is rather in showing that this was the inevitable result of the kind of war we were waging. This is certainly not so. American troops have been in many wars without this kind of humiliation of prisoners. Soldiers also hate Germans and Japanese in World War II, sometimes for unspeakable crimes. Yet the treatment of prisoners in camps did not break down to this extent. The British colonialists fought explicit colonial wars without this result. No, the mistakes of the war policy, the way it was fought, the poor training of the troops, the random killings of GIs by Iraqis, these all contributed to frustration and played a part. But Abu Ghraib and the other mistreatments in this war and in Afghanistan should be considered and condemned in their own right, not as part of a general condemnation of the war. |
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The United States military has been trying to adapt the Falluja approach to Karbala. The army has been withdrawn a couple of times, but then strong patrols have been sent back in. The attempt is to turn security over to Iraqi forces, an attempt that still seems to be in doubt. Even if this fails, it might be a good idea to just let the Sadrists control much of the town. The shi'a divines have asked all military forces to cease action in the holy cities. If we are clearly the ones who accept this request, then we will look relatively good, at least in their eyes. It seems to me that our interim goal should be to secure as much of the country as seems relatively easy, allowing a few places to be controlled by other forces for a while. This should reduce the confrontation, and losses on all sides, without seriously undermining our position. We will see if we are willing and able to undertake this approach, and whether it will be possible to really stabilize things on this knife edge. |
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It appears that the famous pictures of mistreating prisoners in Iraq are only the tip of the iceberg. There were many other cases of mistreatment, in Afghanistan and elsewhere in Iraq. About eight murder investigations are being pursued. Yet it also appears that the level and flagrancy of mistreatment in a small area of Abu Ghraib was quite unusual. Clearly those directly involved in this, and activity, and this includes military intelligence officers, as well as perhaps CIA and contract persons, should be punished. Their immediate superiors and others that should have known what was going on should also get more than a slap on the wrist. Beyond this it all gets murkier. There is documentary evidence that after 9/11 the government, specifically the Department of Justice, tried to develop ways to end run the Geneva Conventions. These efforts apparently infected the CIA, the FBI, and military intelligence. The result was the development of new interrogation limits that were applied in Afghanistan, later in Iraq (and one imagines Guantanamo Bay although little about this has come out). Such things as unclothing detainees, putting hoods on for long periods, many kinds of threats, use of dogs (at least as an implied threats) became accepted procedures � or it came to seem so for some of those involved. The military's JAG corps, which had been regularly present in interrogations in the first Gulf War, were excluded from interrogations in the second. They voiced complaints and fears and brought these to the New York Bar Association. All of this surely happened, but it was a "cultural development" and indicting persons for a cultural development may prove difficult. Incidentally, as Kristof explains in today's Op-Ed, no matter how much we may detest Secretary Rumsfeld he appears not to be a major player, nor does the President himself. Yet I do not doubt that from the top to the bottom there was a sense of "Get the information, everything else is secondary." How this played out for some in lower ranks we now know. |
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The raid on the offices and house of Ahmad Chalabi is curious and confusing to all concerned. Chalabi has had the strongest of supporters and detractors from the first time his name surfaced as one of the leaders in the attack Iraq brigade. He seems to still have support in some quarters � one general says Chalabi's people have regularly provided useful tactical intelligence. Recently Chalabi had seemed to turn against American support for a plan to transfer power to a new interim government rather than the one the Bremer established and of which he is a member. He claims his open criticism of the plan is the reason for the raid. I do not know. One could be paranoid and believe it is all a devious plot engineered by Chalabi himself to make him more acceptable to Iraqis as power in the country drifts away from the Americans. Turning back to the charges, it is true that Chalabi has been developing links with the Iranians (he is a secular shi'a), links that might actually make the preservation of order easier in the unstable next months. He is accused of getting so close that he passed classified information to them, and perhaps he did. His people are also accused of economic crimes, and perhaps this is enough of an explanation. Unfortunately, whatever the explanation, it does not look good to the world, Iraqis, or the American Congress to have a person who has been supported this long, and who many see as one of the main movers of the war agenda, be now attacked and humiliated by the very people who were paying his bills up until a few days ago. Unless they accept the devious explanation, most observers will fall back on the simple explanation that U.S. reliance on, and support of, Chalabi was a major mistake. In other words, in this too our government was simply incompetent. |
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The forty killed near the Syrian border may or may not have been a "wedding party". But the event is much too similar to another supposed wedding party in Afghanistan and many other less well reported apparent mistakes. Such mistakes will always occur. But in wars like this they are especially costly. Renewed effort should be made to reduce their frequency. Someday I would hope that we once again revisit treaty limits on the use of "non-lethal" or incapacitating agents in warfare. The Pentagon is interested in the issue. Unfortunately, the heavy weight of academic and world opinion against anything of the kind would make such an introduction at this point in this war counterproductive, no matter how many lives might be saved. So this reconsideration will have to wait for another war. Right now the obvious approach would be to place a higher priority on distinguishing between targets that need to be hit immediately (for example, because the persons targeted are immediately threatening or are in the process of escaping) and those that do not require immediate response. In both the best-known cases (this one and that wedding in Afghanistan) it would seem that immediate action was not actually necessary. I suspect a higher number of targets could be placed in the "let's look more closely" category than has been the case. We have excellent means of surveillance and equipment that can "see in the dark". Let us use it more often and let us have interpreters of the results that are familiar with both the enemy and the culture of the area we are operating in. Careful consideration of a series of such mistakes may well lead to still more creative and carefully designed means of lessening such mistakes. If this consideration is being urgently undertaken as these lines are written, we can all be thankful. |
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The NYT Op-Ed editor, Nicholas Kristof, follows up on his pleasant experiences in Iran with a warning that no matter how pro-American its people are today, they will still resent any heavy-handed attempt by the United States to force Iran to abandon its nuclear weapons program. He believes that such an attempt would cement the power of the ayatollahs and fail to achieve its objectives. It is too bad that nationalism should lead Iran to this point, but it makes sense for Middle Easterners when they consider that Israel has nuclear weapons and we say nothing about them � not to mention the weapons we are tacitly accept for Pakistan and India. Kristof would like to see us enter into a "grand bargain" that would include reestablishing diplomatic relations, business investment, tourism, and educational exchanges. (This is remarkably similar to the more urgent bargain proposed with North Korea, so far with no results. Still, the Iranian regime should not be compared to North Korea's.) He believes that an evolving "Islamic democracy", headquartered in Tehran, could become the center of Middle Eastern democratic transformation if Baghdad does not pan out. All of which reminds us that what we do in Iraq has potential repercussions in Iran and vice-versa. I say potential, for what is remarkable is that so far our fumbling in Iraq has cost us little in Iranian public opinion. If this is not simply a matter of reporting, this grace period may not last. It should be remembered that for Iranians, the vast majority of whom are Shi'as, the shrines of Ali and Hussein in Najaf and Karbala are the centers of the spiritual world, more important than shrines in Iran itself. The grand ayatollahs in Iraq have also been seen at least until recently as superior in status to any of those living in Iran. As we proceed with our efforts in Iraq, it is also important to note that the Kurds have had a national movement in Iran as well as Turkey, Iraq, Syria and elsewhere. While Kurds on the Iranian side of the border might welcome a semi-independent Kurdistan within Iraq, this will not be welcomed in Tehran nor Ankara. The Kurds have an appealing case for international recognition. They were turned down by the world community after World War I. They were sold out several times by American governments who found after supporting them for a while that they had larger considerations to consider. They were our best friends during our recent invasion of Iraq and their enclave remains the safest area for Americans. Yet we show little sign of commitment to their interests as a new Iraq evolves. Again, we are likely to have larger issues to attend to. But we should keep Kurdish interests at least at the back of our minds, attempting to work out as best we can a better deal for them in a new Iraq. Our friends are few enough in the area; it will be costly to alienate the Kurds once again. |
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Many years ago I wrote a research paper on Kurdish nationalist movements in the nineteenth century. Using the term "nationalist" was risky, for it was unclear whether the Kurds actually thought of themselves as a "nationality" at the time. Perhaps they were defined as "Kurds" by outsiders simply because they spoke one or another Kurdish dialect. The Kurdish national movement that exists now was largely a result of the spread of the idea of "nationality" to the region in the twentieth century. In any event, what I found was that the Kurdish movements of the nineteenth century against the Ottomans were actually movements led by one or another local leader for ostensibly "religious" reasons. This experience has come to mind when the media discuss nationalism and religion in Iraq today. To many, but hardly all, of the people labeled with one or another religious or ethnic label in Iraq the labels are symbols of group affiliation with a transient meaning akin to the affiliations of Westerners to athletic teams. When writing of Iraq, the media often write of the struggle of Shi'a and Sunni. These are, however, actually broad groupings of people, each divided into many subgroups, based on theological differences, identifications with particular religious leaders, or cross-cutting affiliations The Kurds, for example, are most Sunni. Yet commentators do not include them as "Sunni" when speaking of potential bases for conflict in the country. They assume that nationality trumps religion for most Kurds when political issues are involved. Yet the Kurds have historically been divided among themselves more than they have been together, divisions that for the moment they seem to have set aside. It "seems" as though what we are fighting in Iraq now is largely a nationalist movement deriving its primary strength from an intense desire to throw the Americans out. The fact that the movement uses suicide bombers suggests to some religious motivation, since to their minds only belief in a divine mission would justify such sacrifice. Yet recent studies have pointed out that suicide attacks are as likely to have nationalist as religious motivation, with the Tamil movement in Sri Lanka a case in point. The willingness of the Shi'a and Sunni groups to help one another in Falluja and now in the holy cities fits a nationalist pattern, as does the willingness of the Sadrist forces to endanger the country's holiest shrines in spite of repeated calls by Shi'a religious leaders to demilitarize the shrine areas. We also recall that the Baathist movement was an extreme nationalist movement modelled on Germany's National Socialist Party. The Baathists suppressed religious groups in general and were hated by conservative Muslims of all stripes, including for many years bin Ladin. There are today some foreigners fighting in Iraq, presumably for religious reasons. But here again, are they not more the product of an "Islamic Nationalism" or "Arab Nationalism" than of religious zealotry? Finally, there is the question of how powerful and lasting we imagine "Iraqi nationalism" itself to be. After all, Iraq's existence in modern times dates no further back than the end of World War I, and it was formed and maintained under British tutelage until the 1950s. We can be sure, I believe, that because of the extreme nationalist propaganda of the Baathist period, and the bloody struggle with Iran followed by the first and second wars with the United States and the sanctions of the 1990s that many Iraqis have rapidly developed a strong sense of national identification, one that for the time being the Kurdish leaders are willing to buy into. Yet we should be cautious. The world has had a great deal of experience lately with "failed" African countries formed during the colonialist period. It is hard to imagine that Iraq will end up falling into this pattern; it is perhaps too middle class for that. But the possibility remains. |
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Today's paper brings another condemnation by Krugman of the Bush enterprise in Iraq, concentrating as is his wont on an inability to face up to the expense of the Iraq undertaking. But more interesting is the thoughtful, perhaps wrong-headed, discussion by David Brooks of our "muddling through" strategy in Iraq. It has now occurred to him that the outcome of the too easily criticized course of events in Iraq may actually be a limited success. He is impressed, as I have been, that in spite of everything the situation has not spiraled out of control as quickly as it seemed likely only a few weeks back. He is cheered by the fact that whenever we run up against an obstacle we improvise, try something new. King Abdullah II of Jordan advises that what we need to manage the next few months in Iraq is a "strongman", probably a general from the former Iraqi army that commands widespread respect and is able to hold the country together until elections. We appear open enough to improvisation to accept the advice, as long as a face-saving transition to acceptance comes along. The problem right now would be the United Nations in the person of Brahimi. He is well along toward finding his own interim leaders, persons who may not fit in with this new "project". But keep tuned. |
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Today's paper "cuts the war down to size." The violent events of the previous 24 hours are essentially listed in a small article on page A-11. In condensed form, violence included: three Iraqi women killed because they worked for Americans. Two Iraqi fighters killed and 20 wounded in a fight on a bridge. Six Italian soldiers were wounded in a gun battle in Nasiriyah. Civilian staffers were then evacuated. In Basra, an Iraqi mortar attack killed four Iraqi civilians. An American soldier was killed when a bomb exploded by his vehicle. Later in the day came news that the head of the Iraqi Governing Council had been killed by a suicide attack in Baghdad. And then there was the alarming but still vague report that the Americans had bombed Karbala. The fighting had already been within a block of its most sacred shi'a shrine. Whether the supposed bombing was actually an escalation on our side is not clear. Muslim clerics were said to have come from Falluja to show their support for Muqtada al-Sadr's militia. A caravan of supplies for Sadrists also arrived at Kufa to show support for the Sadrists. The Sadrists have driven a significant Italian garrison out of Nasiriyah. (Opinion in Italy is turning sharply against the war because of the prison scandals and their losses in Iraq.) Sadrist strength seems to be growing in Najaf, Karbala and several other cities. Meanwhile, the more conservative clergy has taken the highly unusual step of closing the shrines to tourists in view of the situation. There is increasing confusion about the handing over of power at the end of June, yet it is my impression that many Iraqis are looking forward to it, no matter how unclear its meaning might be. The Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq has urged American forces to remain until order is restored. This shi'a group opposes the Sadrists, but how much power it now has is unclear. Incidentally the late leader of the Governing Council was also a leader of the Dawa party, the oldest and at one time most influential anti-Saddam shi'a political party. More information comes out on the way in which the Administration reacted to 9/11 by casting doubt on the continued applicability of the Geneva conventions "in some situations". This attitude may well have perculated throughout the system as Seymour Hersh is saying in his damning article in the New Yorker. We will see how many smoking guns will be discovered. From another perspective, reports on National Public Radio and in the New York Times suggest that the morale of our soldiers is so low and the confusion of the troops on the ground is so great as to what they are doing and how they are to react to Iraqis that many soldiers say they can well understand the abuse by guards of prisoners in the absence of clear and continuous monitoring of the guards' behavior by higher officers. |
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Friday's paper brought an excellent Op-Ed by Christopher Whitcomb on the problems of our intelligence agencies and how to reform them. Whitcomb has worked in the business both at the desk and in the field and brings this experience to his analysis. The main problem as he sees it is the myriad of agencies and divisions responsible for intelligence, each with a different mission. Unfortunately, his solution, making the CIA into an agency actually able to combine all the others into an integrated whole "with one mission", strikes me as likely to end up both more dangerous to our society and more inflexible than the patchwork that exists today. However, one of his examples suggests a possible avenue for improving the system significantly. He offers this example of a key problem:
"Let's say a C.I.A. asset in Syria attends a meeting in which terrorists talk about plans to detonate a dirty bomb in a mall in Iowa. Common sense might dictate that the case officer immediately pass this information on to the local police or the F.B.I. � but that could never happen." He then goes on to describe the many impediments. Police officers lack security clearances. Their actions might compromise the sources and methods of the CIA. Moreover, other agencies would want the information first, including the Department of Energy, the State department and FEMA, etc., etc. Simply deciding who gets access to this information could take hours. "Need to know" parameters would need to be established and so on. The example is chilling. Yet it suggests that the key problem here is not so much the lack of a superagency as the lack of a reliable system for channeling urgent information. It should possible to develop a computer-assisted methodology for almost instantaneously channeling any urgent information of this sort to first providers, such as the Iowa police. The information could be automatically and almost instantaneously cleansed of what they do not need to know, such as where it came from, the agency doing the providing etc. Initially, they need only to know the specificity as to time and place that is available, the magnitude and nature of the danger, and the degree of confidence the system has in the information. The rules requiring putting information into this rapid response system should be spelled out for all possible participants, including ordinary citizens using 911. |
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The steady drip of casualties on the structure of our Iraq adventure continues. One gets the impression that things are calming down, even as we pursue another offensive in Karbala. Let us then look at a chart of fatalities in the coalition forces: Military Fatalities: By Month:
These are fatalities. The wounded amount to about 4500. The Iraqi combatant loss may well be over 6000 by now. Civilian casualties are estimated at about 10,000. But these estimates are subject to great error. Perhaps it is enough to note that the daily reports generally report Iraqi combatant and civilian fatalities in numbers much larger than those for coalition forces. I have not seen an estimate for the number of non-Iraqi civilians that have been killed, but it has been growing. Turning back to the table, if the war is being won and the society is stabilizing, then the daily average should decline. We see highs at the beginning, last November, and this April (the worst since the general offensive at the beginning). We are being warned to expect another rise in fighting before the turning over of the civil administration to Iraqis in June. We will see what that means on the ground both for security and who governs. But watch the daily averages.
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The news from the several fronts, including Washington, continues to sour the mood of the country. It is coming out that as many suspected after 9/11 the government, with many misgivings even in the CIA, developed new standards for how they would interrogate prisoners, particularly al-Qaeda. These were apparently especially meant for Guantanamo. But they quickly became almost a norm in Afghanistan and Iraq, in many cases for prisoners with no relation to al-Qaeda. What the new rules exactly were and the degree to which persons in the field extemporized is not yet clear. But we do know that picture taking was apparently widespread, that nakedness and hoods were used as punishments, and that threats (for example of drowning) became a part of the package. Kicking and beating became common, although this might not have been in "the instructions". How much of the more serious sexual humiliation was just overlooked or actually promoted, we do not know at this time. In any event, it is clear that untrained, inexperienced people were asked to "soften up" the prisoners before they were questioned and that they spent whole night with them apparently with little supervision. (One wonders that if we had inexperienced people handling such matters this time around, how much better the situation will be in the future after the government "recruits volunteers" to replace the people who have been punished for these activities?). One can only hope that the result of this investigation is (1) adequate punishment of those officers who oversaw and planned these activities, (2) a rewritten set of regulations as to how information is to be obtained in the future under comparable conditions, and (3) the testing of any persons who will administer this process at any level in their understanding and acceptance of these new regulations. |
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Two of the top NYT Op-Ed writers came out clearly today for Kerry. Tom Friedman said explicitly that the only way out of Iraq was to have "regime change" in Washington. Sadly, he may be right. But he is wrong to make this assertion in print, for no one can afford to throw up their hands about the events of the next ten months or so. By the time Kerry comes to the White House, if he does, events in Iraq may have gone so far that whatever he does may be inconsequential. No, those who discuss these issues seriously have to write as though they can have an effect that could eventually color the decisions of the Republican Party and this administration. To the extent one is seen as little more than just another opposition hack, the ability to have any effect at all on the next few months is diminished. If by improving the performance of the Bush administration such a commentator helps put the President back in office, this cost must be paid. Preserving the ability of the United States to act effectively in the world is more important to this country and the world than who is elected this fall. In this regard, it should be remembered that regardless of what we may think of the performance of President Bush, he has certainly been open to change. Many of the positions he took at the beginning of his term have been abandoned; many of the positions his people have taken on what they would do or not do in Iraq have been changed, and changed again. In spite of the role of what many regard as fumblers and ideologues at the top, the President perforce leads an administration peopled by thousands of career officers in a myriad of governmental services. These officers are often of superior ability; in any event they will necessarily make up the vast bulk of any succeeding administration. |
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In today's NYT a long investigative article details the inadequacy of CIA staff to handle the international scene once it has been enlivened by terrorism. After the Cold War, staff able to operate overseas decline regularly because of staffing cuts, morale, and perhaps simple inattention. This decline persisted until 9/11, but even after this event it has been hard to increase the agency's capabilities in terms of overseas agents with adequate linguistic capabilities. Many reasons are brought forward, but there seem to be few new ideas. Perhaps we need to take another look at our "go-it-alone" strategy in this area as well. If we could develop improved working relationships with the intelligence services of all responsible countries in the world, developed and developing, we could achieve much the same result as we could with a larger and more adequately trained American CIA. This attempt should, of course, be accompanied by a rethinking of the quality of the interface that exists between American and other agents in order to maximize the gains and minimize the dangers of such a change. The article laments the fact that the "official cover" given by embassies reduces the effectiveness of many officers. It suggests more full-time agents with unofficial cover. Another part of the solution would be to involve and give training to a larger number of Americans working overseas in a variety of roles. These would, in effect, be part-time agents. The CIA has always depended on such persons to some degree. But it may be useful to rethink and augment our approach in this area as well. Both of these approaches would be made more acceptable to the governments and private actors involved if the United States "joined the world" as a full-time player. This means taking a more supportive role in regard to many international agreements, particularly by becoming a party to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court International Court of Justice, or through reopening the discussion in such as way that we can be. |
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In his latest NYT Op-Ed, David Brooks argues that "For the Iraqis to Win, the U.S.Must Lose". He means that for the United States to leave behind a united and effective Iraq, the persons or parties that come to power in our wake must be seen to have thrown the Americans out. Brooks is right, but he could just as well have written "For the U.S. to Win, the Iraqis Must Win". For our job now is to simultaneously build up the credibility of Iraqis capable of governing the country and lay a basis for the restoration of the credibility of American and Coalition forces. In our discussions with past and present allies in the United Nations and NATO we must make clear that this is our course. And on the ground, we must keep sufficiently ahead of events that American troops can withdraw as needed without suffering serious defeat or causing unnecessary blood-letting on both sides. If our actions can be seen as part of an evolving master plan to restore sovereignty, then the end result will be understood in retrospect as a victory. As Brooks pointed out in another recent column, the worst result of defeat in Iraq will be the loss to the world of an America willing to effectively confront new security and human rights crises for a generation. Regardless of what we might think of this Administration and its errors, this is not an outcome that anyone should welcome. |
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Recent days have seemed, in spite of the "pictures", to have witnessed a slackening of the anti-U.S. war effort in Iraq. For the moment, Falluja remains out of the nightly news. Apparently the new Iraqi force in the city is calming things down, although just why and for whom is unclear. It is suspected that the Iraqi guerrillas will reemerge if the Americans really try to come back. The question is, "Why not just let the present situation ride?" Perhaps this is the answer many places. In his most recent blog pages, Professor Cole (see earlier reference) makes some interesting points. First, he suggests that one American mistake has been to assume that the Baathist regime was a military regime, that our enemy, therefore, has been and is the military. Actually, he points out, Saddam was never in the military. His movement was civilian. (This is similar to the relation of Hitler and the top Nazis to the regular German army.) Second, he points to the fact that the Shi'a have many different militias or potential militias, none of which are sympathetic to Muqtada al-Sadr. They may well be pleased to have the Americans going after Muqtada. It offers them more of an opening for the future. However, if Muqtada is killed by the Americans, many Shiites might turn against those groups that profited by American advances and join the Sadrist uprising. Muqtada has also been attempting to form a front with the Sunnis. Meanwhile, back in Baghdad, Cole's information is that the Sadrists are essentially in control of their part of Baghdad, man the road blocks, provide services etc. The morning paper today speaks of a major American effort to work with tribal chieftains and Shiite leaders in the south to reform and strengthen Iraqi security forces, somewhat on the model adopted for Falluja. The exact status of the effort is, like everything else, still unclear. But promising. Perhaps a temporary but manageable modus vivendi is emerging. This will consist of (1) areas under control of pro-Coalition or at least temporarily cooperative groups (most Kurdish areas are an obvious example), (2) areas under the control of less cooperative Iraqis content to manage and secure their own areas (Falluja perhaps, as well as eventually holy cities such as Najaf and Karbala), and (3) areas under the control of those who wish to maintain and enflame a larger fight. If areas defined as (3) do not interfere too much with transportation and development needs (civilian and military), then we may be able to stabilize the situation long enough to go through the stages of political transformation that have been suggested by the United States, the United Nations, and increasingly by interested Iraqi groups. As stated in a previous entry, elections could initially be held in the country in relatively secure areas (say areas defined as 1 or 2), with later elections held in areas defined as (3) if and when these areas are made a part of a functioning Iraqi political system under Iraqi control. The pace at which security responsibilities are transferred and the promised date on which the bulk of coalition forces will leave Iraq have to be carefully monitored and adjusted in tandem with the degree to which the suggested modus vivendi actually emerges and with changing estimates as to how long it can be held without the situation deteriorating once again. |
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A couple of days ago, David Brooks suggested that the greatest danger of American incompetence in Iraq will be a parting resolution by this and successive American Administrations of "never again" (at least for a while). The resulting world-wide security gap will be one that will be hard to fill. For the world is going to have other crises, other issues that have to be forcibly solved � and the United States will not be there to carry the torch. North Korea and the Sudan come to mind for the agenda next month, but there will surely be many to follow. Brooks thinks the United Nations is not up to the task. This is surely the case if we mean the United Nations as a primary actor. But the United Nations as the shell within which others can act is probably the best hope we have, and we must start work as soon as possible on strengthening the usability of this framework. Much of the way in which we and the world are able to act together to meet the future will depend on how we exit Iraq. In his front page editorial (actually it's on this Sunday's Week in Review front page and without being called an editorial it indubitably is), Roger Cohen suggests three exit strategies: (1) Announce an exit date in 2005, focusing Iraqi minds on taking over sexurity themselves, (2) make the United Nations the key player at an even earlier date, or (3) after making obeisance to the U.N., start a bitter campaign to crush the resistance. He finds all three solutions elusive. It appears to me that we will not make a decision, trying all three in turn. The latest news is that Sadr has started a new campaign against the British in the South. We will have to see how this works out. But right now I get the impression things are better than I would have thought they would be by now. The escalating erosion of our position on the ground has not seemed to be occurring; we seem to be succeeding in Najaf and Kerbala without ruining our record with the Ayatollahs. There is a serious discussion developing on the exact form the Brahimi-UN government will have. (Regardless of the controversy, the seriousness with which it is being taken is encouraging.) If we can work out alternative (2) along with a little of (1) and (3), then we may be able to leave in 2005 with a sense of success that will make the Brooks' longer-term prediction a little less likely. |
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The torture complementing our mistakes has received enough publicity. My feeling is that it was due to a combination of low morale, overwork, a culture of disrespect, ignorance, confusion as to who was in charge, and an attempt by the "culprits" to satisfy repeated orders to "soften them up". The culprits "on the front line" had apparently received little or no training in what they were to do, although at least one had already had experience in U.S. prisons and a previous record of brutality in his marriage. One woman claims to have not heard of the Geneva Conventions. In any event, they clearly were not seriously exposed to such information. We are told now the purpose of taking the pictures was to have something to show to new prisoners when they were brought in, to give them more of a reason to cooperate. Whether the pictures were used this way or not, I do not know. But if it was understood that this was the purpose, it would help explain some of the poses � and would certainly implicate people much higher in the chain of command than the actors. One point that has not been made is the extreme gap between what young Americans today understand as proper sexual behavior and that accepted by conservative Iraqis. The culprits knew they were humiliating the Iraqis, indeed that is what they thought was wanted. But they did not understand that their behavior would be seen, or said to be seen, as depraved and evil. Exposed to a culture that regards sadistic sexual play, including tying up one another, as just another alternative way to enjoy life, it would have been difficult for some of them to see what they did as "so bad", especially when others suggested and abetted the practices. I certainly hope these front-line "culprits" are not the ones who receive the brunt of the punishment for their actions. I also read by today's paper that many "experts" say that torture, including such measures as the above, "never pays", that the information that is obtained in this way is generally worthless because unreliable. To me, this is just too neat. It would imply that rigorously following the Geneva Conventions is a "no brainer" that benefits everyone. Instead, although I have no doubt that some people come to enjoy torturing their victims, torture has been used down through history because it often does "work". So instead of accepting the easy "scientific" out, we should instead decide that even if torture is effective, it will not be used in the absence of specific judicial decisions about single, closely defined questions asked of specific individuals. If it is ever used outside these limits, the United States should stand ready to bring those involved before international courts. |
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In an otherwise excellent editorial on the need to radically reform and regroup in Iraq if we are not to be thrown out, Thomas Friedman (NYT Op-Ed, May 6) writes that if "we quit Iraq, it will then become Afghanistan-on-steroids, which will threaten everyone." Assuming that he means that Iraq would inevitably be transformed into a powerful al-Qaeda-Taliban base of operations, this is another example of that very American arrogance that Friedman so often deplores. It is true that a truly democratic Iraq under our tutelage would be good for Iraqis and good for America. But this does not mean that without our presence Iraqis cannot transform their country into a functioning society with far more respect for human rights than there was under Hussein. In spite of the "evil elements" that confront us now, Iraq has a large, relatively well-educated secular middle class, powerful and moderate shi'a leaders, and a functioning Kurdish enclave in the north. Events in Falluja suggest that out exit might lead to a resurrection of Iraq's army and the establishment of a nationalistic military regime. It might lead to a religiously oriented regime, with considerable power in the hands of the Ayatollahs. The final result might be federalist or highly centralized. Whatever the final outcome, there is certainly no inevitability in its becoming a terrorist base threatening American and European interests. |
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Today's paper brings a discussion by Kristof of his current visit to Iran. He prefaces it by saying that he has never been in a country that is so pro-American, even pro-Bush. They believe everything good about the Americans because they have adapted the defense mechanism of assuming that truth is the opposite of everything they see on their television. This must be an exaggeration, yet I have heard similar things from others in the last few years. As one who spent over a year in Iran on three trips back in the pre-Khomeini days I can attest to the good feelings of my generation of Iranians. One must remember that for many years there were more foreign students studying in the United States from Iran than from any other country. (There were so many, in fact, that at some places such as Utah State an Iranian could go through four years and learn very little English.) In my own work I interviewed all the Ayatollahs then in Shiraz (a southern city). In one on one conversations they were quite friendly, even though they varied from Marxism to extreme orthodoxy to mysticism. In the last couple of years I have had occasion to see several Iranian movies. What is remarkable about them is that most have been propagandistic, some rather heavy-handedly so. But the propaganda has consisted largely of feminist ideas imported from the West. Today I read that the most popular current film in Iran is a comedy that makes fun of the religious mullahs. It is past time that Americans, especially those in our establishment, come to realize the complexity of the Muslim world, and of countries such as Iran. We can oppose the most egregious anti-Western moves of the Iranian establishment, indeed such opposition is welcomed by many Iranians. But we should strive to develop more extensive relationships with Iranian people at every level. We should strive to take more seriously their culture, including its modern aspects, and become acquainted with its educational, social and economic needs. Iran in the last few years has teetered on the brink of fundamental change. The majority appears to have turned against the theocratic system that has been imposed on the country. (Remember that when the shah was driven out, half his opponents thought they were fighting for a liberal, even radical Iran. The subsequent theocratic system was imposed through a revolution within the revolution.) Today's opposition includes many clerics, some of whose leaders were opposed to theocracy much as Ayatollah Sistani in Iraq is today. The Iranian opposition, horrified by the violence of the previous revolutionary period and the bloody 1980s war with Iraq, has until now opted for nonviolence. But this will not always be so. If the theocracy does not back down and allow a free society, they will sooner or later be forced to increase once again state repression. The resulting explosion could be quick and easy or prolonged and vicious. As these events threaten to unfold, the United States and its allies could choose to play the part of careful and concerned observers. Our primary effort should be to help a peaceful transition. If this is not to be, then if we were to consider playing a greater role in bringing about a crisis, or in meddling in it once it occurs, this consideration should involve consultation with the best experts on the country and its evolution, with our allies, and with a representative and diverse sample of Iranians within and without the United States. Recent experience in Iraq should be taken to heart. If the end result turns out to be bloody, we should at least have developed plans well ahead of time for helping to rebuild the country after its convulsion. |
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Just finished Bruce Hoffman's Inside Terrorism. Since this review of the subject was completed a year or more before 9/11, it reminds us that in some circles terrorism was taken very seriously before the New York skyline was altered. Terrorists have been very active for a long time, and their efforts had been escalating since World War II. He makes some critical points about the approach of the terrorists and how this approach has been changing. Most important is the fact that terrorists have been primarily interested in the "press" that they get for their actions. They are playing to an audience, generally in one nation or area, but increasingly worldwide. They seldom kill just to be killing. They kill to make an impression. He argues that the more secular and nationalist the terrorists the more careful and directed their efforts are. Only religious (or "spiritual") terrorists single out large sections of humanity for destruction as enemies, for their objectives are not "practical" in the normal sense. Qaddafi's action against the Pan Am flight would seem to not fit this too accurately. As a state actor rather than a private group, Qaddafi was apparently more interested in deterring and avenging attacks rather than the publicity value of his actions. Hoffman also must resolve the difficulty of deciding whether something is actually religious or not. Many so-called religious disputes are more ethnic and nationalist than religious. A person's religion is used by most people as primarily a label. People seldom die for theology. An exception might be al-Qaeda and related groups. For them religion matters, at least in so far as life styles are religious. Al-Qaeda's use of means strictly prohibited in Islam, such as suicide and attacks on women and children, would seem to indicate that it is more interested in results than theological niceties (remembering that in Islam traditional legal rules on such matters are more central than what we might call theology in Christianity). Perhaps Hoffman's best-known contribution is his emphasis on the use of new technologies and the probable extension of this use by terrorists in the 21st century. I had forgotten how really dangerous the Aum Shinrikyo became in the eighties and nineties. At one time they had amassed as much as a billion dollars, had several research laboratories and thousands of members worldwide, including many Russians (and nuclear scientists). They carried out experimental incidents with bacteriological weapons. Nuclear weapons were being developed on a large acreage in Australia. They accumulated enough sarin gas to kill millions. They appear to botched both biological and nerve gas attacks, although the main subway sarin attack killed hundreds and could easily have killed many more. Hoffman believes that other groups will go much further than this in the future. Clearly al-Qaeda has tried but appears still far from success. The story of Aum Shinrikyo and their enigmatic leader also tends to support the idea that we are not in the midst of a religious war. Rather, outside of particular disputes (Basques, Tamils etc.), we seem to be facing a diffuse tendency of people aggrieved by what they feel is a loss of status (Japanese, Muslims) to strike out against those with more status (which means Western Civilization and particularly the United States). Aum was built on an odd mixture of modern ideas with Hinduism and Buddhism. It was virulently anti-American, accusing the United States of being intent on destroying Japan. It was also anti-humanitarian, envisaging loss of life in the hundreds of millions in the struggle against the sect's enemies. |
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The latest news from Iraq reminds me again of the remarkable incompetency of many of our leaders. The Iraq intervention was planned with the deliberate exclusion of those most knowledgeable about Iraq in the State department and academia. Military officers who predicted a need for a much larger force were ignored or dismissed. The first civilian brought in to oversee the transformation of the country to a developed democracy was dismissed after a few months to be replaced by Paul Bremer. Bremer soon issued commands to exclude all Baath party members from the development process and to disband Iraq's army. Falling later into difficulty, Bremer backtracked, now allowing the use of Baathists as long as they were not "too bad". Soon we were asking an Iraqi general to reorganize a segment of the old army to help us in Falluja. Yet the Marine officers who brought this man in to solve their problem were then told the general they had selected was not acceptable after all. Now we are told he will be replaced by another Iraqi officer the top American command likes more. We don't yet know the reaction of General Saleh and his forces in Falluja. But it can be imagined. Meanwhile, the overall reconstruction and security effort is being bungled by an overreliance on inexperienced and untrained reservists and foreign contingents brought in from many countries to show how much support our President has. Soldiers who were told they were to be sent home on a certain day were then told they would have to spend several more months. With this confusion and the low-scale but continual attacks on civilian and military targets throughout the country, morale has apparently fallen to a new low. Part of out security responsibility, including intelligence and interrogation, has been handed over to "private" American concerns who are less answerable to the officers who we thought were in charge. The latest scandal involving the egregious mistreatment of Iraqis has been the result of command confusion, dereliction of duty, and low standards of training and behavior on the bottom rungs. Low morale problem played a part in the disgusting American behavior as well. It is hard to say it, probably irresponsible, but recent news suggests that maybe we should just go home! While tragedy stalks the battlefield, our President rides joyfully from campaign stop to campaign stop. The administration has never taken this war seriously in terms of planning, allocation of sufficient troops and funds, or bringing the American people into the effort in a serious manner. They need to be told that tax cuts must be put on hold to support the forces we need. Today I read a serious call for a return of the draft as a means of nationalizing the effort. I do not like the draft, but the author is right that it would be a way need to get the country seriously involved. If the people thinks the cause is worth it, perhaps this is the way to go. If the people, following the lead of their President, do not, then let's admit it, and negotiate a withdrawal. |
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Michael Ignatieff warns us in Sunday's NY Times magazine that we may have to renounce some civil liberties and restraints on our intelligence services if we are to win "the war on terror". His argument is enlightening, but suffers from two grave and interconnected errors. He tacitly assumes (1) that we are waging a war against an ill-defined enemy named "terrorism" and (2) confuses the issue even further by considering the war in Iraq as though it were simply another encounter with our terrorist enemy. Admittedly, it is not always easy to keep straight where "we" and "they" are. But we must begin by identifying an enemy against which it is possible to fight a "war". Let me call this enemy "al-Qaeda". Although not a highly organized group consisting of "card-carrying" members, "al-Qaeda" can be used to refer to an organization with numerous branches and supporters throughout the world that has as its mission doing harm to the United States and its allies, and to their citizens wherever they are. Few if any of the members of the Basque ETA, the Chechnya rebels, or Sri Lanka's Tamils insurgent movement are members of al-Qaeda. Neither are the vast majority of the guerrilla warriors in Iraq who would not be killing Americans if we had stayed at home. (This last comment does not in itself mean we should not be in Iraq, but it does mean that we must not confuse the vast majority of the opponents we face there with either "international terrorism" or the al-Qaeda organization.) Drawing these distinctions is critical to our country's future. Ignatieff and others are suggesting that we must set aside some civil liberties and some constraints on torture and assassination for the duration of "our war against terrorism". To me, this means we are being asked to consider surrendering these rights and standards for all time, since "terrorism" is a concept, a class of action, that cannot be defeated no matter what we do. The enemy that I lump together loosely under the term "al-Qaeda", however, has a real if often indeterminate existence. As such, it can be attacked, its leaders tracked down, and its operatives dispersed or even induced to "retire" as the members of other terrorist organizations have in the past. For the period of the campaign against this "enemy", I could justify relaxing some liberal prohibitions within stated limits. Beyond this, in a "war" against a category, Ignatieff's approach would simply mean the permanent loss of freedoms and of the standards of behavior against opponents that we have tried (with notable failures) to uphold in the past. |
Contact Author International Terrorism Saving the Future
