Iraq and Afghanistan

Excerpt from
Cordesman's CSIS report on the future of Iraq, "Iraq's Troubled Future: The
Uncertain Way Ahead", revised April 13, pages 4-5 PDF document.

Under the heading, "The American Civil-Military Threat to Iraq", Cordesman makes
the following points (quoted verbatim or paraphrased):

1. The US invaded Iraq without a valid understanding of the Iraqi government,
economy, and sectarian and ethnic differences. It did not have plans, staff, or
aid money to deal with the situation; and did not have the force strength to
provide security.

2. Our reaction to the problem was incompetent and
misdirected. We focused on national elections and paper constitutions, rather
than effective governance, and a massive aid program to "reconstruct" Iraq in
American terms. It failed to recruit, deploy, and retain competent civilians.

3. It took too long to realize that creating effective Iraqi security forces was a
critical element of stability. It rushed ill-prepared Iraqi Army units into
combat and local security missions.

4. The US military was ill=prepared for its
new focus on counterinsurgency, stability operations, and nation building. Its
military have been pushed into a wide range of new training and civil military
roles. It remains short of experts and fully qualified translators (where it may
still have less than 25% of its needs).

5.The US is only now is beginning to
understand the full limits of Iraq’s oil "wealth," the depth of the structural
problems in Iraq's economy, and the need to "reconstruct" in ways that take
account of the need for money to flow to Iraqis, rather than foreign
contractors.

6. Tactical victories and military efforts are pointless without
political success. The US supported a form of deBaathification that was bound to
alienate the Sunnis, and removed much of the nation's secular core from power.
The US insistence on national elections in a country without political parties
left a legacy of government divided along sectarian and ethnic lines. The US
pressure for a new constitution helped make "federalism" a key issue. Political
conciliation has been far more cosmetic than real, adding Arab Sunni versus Arab
Shi'ite, Shi’ite on Shi’ite, and Arab on Kurd tension and violence to the threat
posed by hard core Sunni Neo-Salafi led insurgency.

7. The "surge" strategy in
Baghdad is little more than a repeat of previous tactical efforts to bring local
security to the capital city. If it succeeds, it will probably be because the
Shi’ite militias stand down, and the US effectively helps a Shi'ite dominated
government "win." If it fails, it will probably be because US military friction
with the Shi’ite militias becomes violent. It is far from clear that the US
Congress will give either the current or the next President the necessary time
and resources to exploit "success", even if we achieve it.

8. As in Vietnam, the
US has created reporting systems designed to report success, not real progress
or the lack of it, for its Iraqi force development and political and economic
aid efforts. This reporting has slowly improved in some areas under the pressure
of events, but much of the US reporting on Iraqi force development and economic
aid efforts still lacks meaning and credibility. This includes basic data like
Iraqi force manpower, unit readiness, aid efforts relative to requirements, and
reporting on aid based on meaningful measures of effectiveness.

In Sunday's New York Times Magazine, Nir Rosen had an excellent piece on Iraqi refugees. There are now about two million outside the country, nearly all in the Middle East, and nearly as many displaced persons still within the country. The largest number is in Syria, and here the refugees have found the most welcoming situation. Syria is the only major state that welcomes Shiites, and it is the only state that has managed to reduce hostilities among competing groups from Iraq. It does this by trying to remain friendly to all, and by strongly discouraging any talk of sectarianism (a stance that also fits its internal balance of power requirements).

There are fascinating glimpses of the approaches of the factional leaders now in Syria. Originally, they saw the enemy as the Americans. But over time this has been changing. Now their most intransigent enemies are the al-Qaeda and Jihadist groups who have no real interest in Iraq or Iraqis. They distinguish sharply between the "honorable struggle" that targets only foreigners and the al-Qaeda approach that targets civilians as well. They are also coming to see the Iranians as a common enemy of Iraq. (It must be said that most of the conversations are with Sunnis). They also see Iraq under Hussein as being essentially non-sectarian, pointing out that the coup attempts against Hussein were almost entirely by Sunnis.

But the most discouraging section of the piece is that on the American response. We have done almost nothing for the refugees and do not intend to. Our position is that of Bolton, former ambassador to the UN. He told the author that Americans have no responsibility for the refugee problem "Our obligation was to give them new institutions and provide security. We have fulfilled that obligation." Another high-ranking official in the Bush State Department agreed, pointing out that "Refugees are created by repressive regimes -- the refugee problem was caused by Saddam Hussein". Thus, when we got rid of him, we had essentially "solved" the refugee problem.

It would seem as though many in this administration live in an alternate universe. There is no recognition that the chaos has been caused by faulty decisions, no matter how well intentioned they might have been. We have produced a mess from which the Iraqis flee. Of course, they are partly responsible, but the world believes and I believe that we are also responsible -- for ending the war and for what it has produced.

Two news items in the last few days have a deep psychological connection. The first tells of a Dutch force in Afghanistan in one of its most dangerous provinces that is trying to win the struggle with the Taliban by concentrating almost entirely on reconstruction projects. They are armed men, but their strategy is to use arms only when attacked, and to pull back out of a fight if possible. This way the people will see that they are positively affecting their lives and not negatively. Once they begin to trust the Dutch, they will get rid of the Taliban themselves. But today we read of a Dutch patrol nearly getting wiped out in an ambush. They are told that everyone in the village is with the Taliban.

The next item is a description of a huge Shi'a rally in Najaf demanding that the Americans get out of Iraq. Never mind that the Americans toppled their oppressor and set up a democratic system that will allow the Shi'a to rule Iraq. They want them out and now.

Why?

Two reasons come to mind. First, the people of Afghanistan and Iraq feel dishonored by having their country occupied by foreign troops. (To them, it seems like an occupation.) The fact that they have to live with the situation is unbearable, no matter what its advantages. Second, most people, and especially people in the developing world, simply do not believe in the goodness and well-meaning of others. Whatever they say or do, the Afghans are not going to be taken in. These Dutch have something to gain that we will eventually learn to our sorrow. We just haven't figured what it is yet. The Iraqis are even more sure that the Americans are up to no good. "They say they are here to project us. But who are they kidding? They are here to rob our oil or take away our religion or turn the country over to the Sunnis (Shi'a belief) or over to the Shi'a (Sunni belief)."

These are the realities. Outsiders can sometimes overcome them, but don't bank on it.

Because of other commitments, the reader should not expect additional posts to this blog for the next two weeks.

Juan Cole reprints in his blog the opinion of Professor Kahl of Minnesota on the apparent counterinsurgency strategies of the United States since the beginning of the Iraq war. Let me summarize briefly Professor Kahl's points. He divides the COIN operations into four phases.

Phase 1: Denial. Until April 2004, there was a general denial that an insurgency existed. The result was that the different commanders were pretty much on their own. Some concentrated on providing the population with protection, while others conducted aggressive search and destroy operations. This phase ended with the Fallujah uprising and the revolt of Moqtada al-Sadr.

Phase 2: Learning Curve. The military woke up to a problem and began developing new strategies and tactics. It took more seriously training Iraqi forces. Yet the bulk of the effort still went in to alienating search and destroy efforts. Only in early 2005, did the leaders begin to systematically learn from their mistakes.

Phase 3: Getting it. The military now began a number of experiments, especially in Tal Afar and Ramadi to place the emphasis on the protection of the people. This effort was, however, compromised by two other factors. First, the military had begun in 2004 to consolidate its basing by closing many of its smaller bases in the countryside. The was a natural development of the idea that we needed to reduce the Iraqi perception that their country was under occupation. But it also meant that the forces were less able to implement the people protection mission. The other problem was that we simply did not have enough forces for the hold strategy. We attempted to fill the gap with Iraqis. But this effort took more time than had been imagined.

Phase 4: Doing it. In January 2006, Bush announced a new strategy that would make possible the achievements foreseen in Phase 3. We would bring in more troops and we would assign more to population protection. Kahl notes that this was not actually a new strategy. The strategy had been created in Phase 3. But it was an effort to provide additional forces that might make the "clear, hold, and build" option actually work. But as Kahl further notes, this might be too little and too late.

Juan Cole leads us to consider some recent polls. A recent survey by the British Opinion Research Business (ORB) showed that Iraqis had remarkable confidence in spite of all that has happened. Support for Prime Minister Maliki was much more widespread than had been expected. In their polls, increase in support compared with September was quite dramatic. Not surprisingly more Shi'a preferred the present system to Saddam's, yet the difference was not as great as might have been expected (51% of Sunnis preferred the Baathist regime; 66% preferred Maliki). Only 15% of Shiites believed they were in a civil war, while 40% of Sunnis believed this. (I would note that this was a countrywide poll, and many of those reported as Sunni were in fact Sunni Kurds, a fact that should temper our surprise at the results.) Yet it might be discouraging to the surge folks that 53% nationwide thought that the security situation would improve after foreign troops left, while only 26% thought it would get worse.

According to Cole, the most recent USA Today poll showed that 83% of Shiites and 97% of Sunni Arabs oppose the presence of coalition forces in Iraq; 75% of Kurds support them. By more than 3 to 1, Iraqis say the presence of U.S. forces is making the security situation worse. The respondents want the foreigners out, but only 35% want them to leave immediately, perhaps six months to a year would be best. 40% of Shiites want a theocracy governed by Islamic law. 58% want a strongman to rule. Even 34% of Kurds reject democracy. This seems to contrast remarkably with the growing support for Maliki, who is, after all, the first person to come to power by a more or less democratic process in a long time. I think the association of a foreign occupation force with "democracy" has given the system a bad name for the moment. In any event, few Iraqis are likely to be willing to fight for democracy. What they are willing to fight for, other than security, is still up in the air.

In the last few days reports have reached us that severe fighting has broken out along the Afghan border (South Waziristan) between the traditional Pashtun tribal groups and a large group of Uzbek jihadists who have moved in from Central Asia in the last few years. The Uzbeks have a force of as many as 2000 fighters; they are said to form the backbone of the al-Qaeda forces in the area. For years now the Pashtuns have supported them for religious reasons, because they brought money with them from Central Asia, and because of the tribals' legendary support for guests. But the guests have outstayed their welcome. They are said to have killed 200 tribal elders in the last few years. So far the Pashtuns seem to have been successful in their campaign to rid themselves of theit guests. These battles seem to reinforce the argument of Rory Stewart (see Wednesday post) that in Afghanistan less may be more. Many problems would be best left to the locals leaders to sort out. They do not so much support islamic jihad and the taliban as they hate and detest foreigners who try to tell them what to do.

Rory Stewart, who works out of Kabul, is presently a guest Op-Ed writer for the New York Times. He has been making a concerted effort to tell us, and the West, to "back off"in Afghanistan. This is very counter-intuitive for me. I was one of those who counseled when we went to Afghanistan after 9/11 to be sure and "do it right" This meant to follow the post-World War II example of what we did in Germany and Japan: massive assistance, total occupation; reeducation on many levels etc. According to this analysis, we sent far too few troops to Afghanistan and spent far too little. We still might have been right, but Stewart makes one wonder. In the present environment of limited resources and reluctant publics in both Europe and America, he is certainly worth listening to.

His basic idea is that the Afghanis simply do not understand the priorities we place on our assistance. They increasingly feel that we have spent a lot of money and accomplished very little. Some are even nostalgic for the return of the Russians. "At least, they built bridges, roads and airports". Instead of talking in general terms about building democracy or reforming the economy, we should talk to the Afghans more, find out what they really want and need, and help them with that. He finds the Afghans have responded favorably to, "excellent models, from U.N. Habitat to the Aga Khan network, which has restored historic buildings, run rural health projects, and established a five-star hotel and Afghanistan’s mobile telephone network.". And he speaks of a functioning soap manufacturing business that an American woman has promoted.

In many areas we seem to be fighting the people instead of the terrorists. He finds that in many areas our opponents have no fixed political agenda; they are certainly uninterested in attacking Europe or the United States. He reports a Dutch experience in one area where they found that if left alone, the Taliban defeated themselves with their ideological preaching. He contrasts Dutch inaction to the British offensives in the South which accomplished little besides the alienation of large areas. He asserts that "Pacifying the tribal areas is a task for Afghans, working with Pakistan and Iran. It will involve moving from the overcentralized state and developing formal but flexible relationships with councils in all their varied village forms".

His conclusion is that we were more correct than we knew when we sent only limited forces into the country after 9/11. We may be making a mistake in trying to reverse this policy. I guess Afghanistan is not Iraq. (Or maybe it is?)

In the last few days the Times has given us a summary of the recent economic penetration by Iran into Iraq. We could view this negatively, as many in Washington are wont to do. But from the viewpoint of all but the hardest line Sunnis, it should be considered as a real harbinger of hope for the future.

The stores are full of Iranian produce, air conditioners, automobiles and much else. Several Iraqi cities, including Basra, depend on Iran for their electricity. Iran has loaned Iraq one billion dollars and is establishing a bank in Baghdad. Iran is helping to relieve a severe gasoline shortage in Iraq by bringing gasoline in from Turkmenistan. Iranian trade with the Kurdish region now amounts to one billion dollars a year. Iranian tourism, particularly to the shrines in Karbala and Najaf has added considerably to the economy in some areas. Iran has assisted in the building of tourist facilities in both cities.

Unfortunately, the only good strategy most democrats have for getting out of Iraq is a rewriting of the argument that we shouldn't have gotten in, and when we got in, we should have done x, y, and z. This is all true, but as David Brooks point out in today's Op-Ed, it doesn't add up to much. The Bush Republican's "more of the same" doesn't look that intelligent either, but at least it is a strategy that the observer can get his mind around.

The problem that Brooks points out is that the Democrats are looking for a middle strategy and the situation doesn't seem amenable to such a solution. Another problem is that there has been some improvement under the surge. Outside of Baghdad, Maliki has gone to Anbar Province for the first time and he seems to have one faction of Sunnis there that support the government. As strategies develop, mature and fade away, there will always be gains and losses, and at no time are we likely to be able to decide much more clearly than we do today.

Another difficulty is that those who want to leave, necessarily emphasize American losses. Losses, and grievous injury are always sad, but the number are still about a tenth of what happened in Vietnam when we had a smaller national population. This emphasis on American losses seems most hard-hearted in that it ignores the many many times greater Iraqi losses of life and property, losses that go on every day, and are likely to go on if we leave. No one can say whether this loss will be enhanced or reduced if we leave. And this inability necessarily holds the tongues of the democrats. The real possibility that leaving could make things worse, and they could certainly be worse, keeps the discussion returning to how many of our "boys and girls" have been damaged. This is not a very humane approach. If a Democrat could somehow come up with any strategy that guaranteed a reduction in these Iraqi losses, he or she should be canonized.

So what should the critic say and do? I do not know, but here are some points. We should agree:

(1) to emphasize the wishes of the Iraqi people, both as represented by the government and other political leaders, as well as regional, factional and militia leaders. Keep in continual contact with such leaders. Start to define and refine what we do in light of their feelings and desires. Do not take it upon ourselves, for example, to keep the Iranians out. If and when and where, Iraqis want help in keeping out Iranians, help them. If they want Iranian help elsewhere, welcome it.

(2) to let them structure their society as they wish. In particular, this means that we should not insist on the privatization of the oil industry. Most Iraqis see this as another plan to rob them of their heritage. It is not all that, but we should respond to their desires. More generally, we should not insist on a blueprint for the economy. They have a legislature. It is up to this body to make laws.

(3) Provide Iraqi institutions, civilian and military, with the best equipment as soon as we can -- and provide it with the maintenance facilities that go with it. For example, their troops should have our body armor and they should have the new trucks that cannot be blown up with roadside bombs. It would be best if such items were manufactured in Iraq.

(4) Encourage the operation of more government facilities and offices outside the Green Zone. It will be dangerous at first, but if they can develop with our assistance an ability to hold ministerial conferences and even parliamentary sessions outside this area, it would have great symbolic importance.

(5) Encourage agreements between violent groups and the government that will offer hope to the "enemies" that they can play a role in a new society. There are surely some enemies that this would not affect, but many others would no doubt be amenable to a believable offer.

(6) Accept and protect the separation of ethnic groups where this seems to be a better choice than trying to maintain mixed neighborhoods indefinitely. Help should be available for resulting redeployments of population, with some more creative solutions than simply refugee camps. Wherever possible work with the leaders of ethnic factions to define their minimum aims, so that they might be able to agree with their neighbors on "boundaries". Some groups will have no minimum aims, but many will.

(7) Encourage the development of protected zones in the less dangerous parts of the country which could serve as magnets for those Iraqis who would like to return to the country. Emphasizing using our forces to protect such areas.

(8) In general, deemphasize aggressive campaigns and air strikes where these serve the purposes of the Americans in terms of our concepts of how to fight the war. In many cases, where the Iraqis clearly want and need such support, it should be given, but this should be their responsibility, not ours.

In a recent Op-Ed, Rory Stewart who runs the Turquoise Mountain Foundation in Kabul and has been much involved In Afghan and Iraq affairs lashes out at what he sees as the foolishness and pretension involved in our project to make Afghanistan into a fully functioning democracy in the next few years. He claims that few Afghans have any idea of what democracy is, and even if they knew, they have many other items higher on their agenda. He is contemptuous of the frequent assertions that the people prefer democracy to shari'a law. Repeating the claim doesn't make it so. In many areas they prefer to have Taliban rather than foreign troops in control. Elsewhere, warlords are often in power locally because the people prefer them to the alternatives. He attacks our misconceptions only because they lead to poor policy.

This is not to say that the American amd NATO effort has had no achievements. The streets of Kabul are relatively quiet, the Hazara minority nearby is more secure and prosperous than it has ever been. With the right kind of international assistance the country can become more humane, prosperous and stable.

The difficulty with Stewart's analysis is that it leaves the United States and NATO with no overarching ideological objectives. We have defined success in terms of democracy. We have not given ourselves an alternative. As I have written elsewhere, such an alternative is badly needed. We need to realize that many countries in the world are much higher on the scales of human happiness without democracy than are others with democracy. We should not be apologetic about supporting Musharref, a military dictator next door in Pakistan. He deserves our support because he is able to hold a fractious country together and resist the siren song of Islamic fundamentalism. By doing so, he is able to support a higher level of human rights in many regards than would be possible if the true opinions of Pakistanis were to be heard through the ballot box. Likewise, we may well end up in Afghanistan with a "controlled democracy" that does not allow enough dissent to really become democratic, but which is able to preserve the peace, cut down on dependence on opium, and improve the educational standards of the people, particularly the women.

The announcement that the British intended to evacuate nearly half of their forces cast a gloomy shadow over American plans. Commentators noted that several of the other coalition partners had plans to reduce their forces or leave completely in the near future. These were mostly small symbolic forces, but symbols are important.

Juan Cole tells us in the current Salon online magazine that in leaving Basra the British will be leaving a city that they have simply been unable to control. After a brave effort to bring the militias to heel early on, in recent months they have backed off and let the militias do most of the policing. Cole tells us that the Virtue Party (a Shi'a group with which I am not familiar) and SCIRI (whose leader's son the U.S. briefly detained on the Persian border) have both infiltrated the police to such an extent that they have divided up most of the city between their militias (in police uniforms). Both of these groups have enforced Taliban-like restrictions on dress, alcohol and so forth. The situation is complicated by the Marsh Arabs, many of whom have emerged in this area as criminal gangs. Most of Iraq's oil passes through Basra and its environs, and the local warfare is to a large extent over who gets the bulk of the massive pilferage of oil that goes on.

Basra is said to be a completely Shi'a area. Yet at least in the environs there is a tough Sunni community that has strived to preserve its own turf against repeated Shi'a inroads.

Cole points out that nearly all the supplies for the American army in the center of the country must come through the Basra area. As the British presence is reduced, the chance that the militias-police might gradually or abruptly choke off these supply lines must worry the Pentagon. It may force the Americans to place more troops along this supply line. In any event, holding power in this chokepoint increases the bargaining power of SCIRI and other Basra militias on the national scene. SCIRI is very close to the Iranians and is the most likely group to approve of increased Iranian involvement in Iraq. Some months back a reporter in Basra was telling us that the city was essentially in the hands of the Iranians through its client organizations. I have not heard this claim lately, but in the end it may come down to this.

In conclusion, the British withdrawal will be opening the country to even more Iranians presence and pressure. As I have said elsewhere, this certainly seems reasonable from their perspective, but, again, it is not reassuring to Americans who have a rather different perspective.