Saturday, February 24, 2007
British Withdrawals
The announcement that the British intended to evacuate nearly half of their forces cast a gloomy shadow over American plans. Commentators noted that several of the other coalition partners had plans to reduce their forces or leave completely in the near future. These were mostly small symbolic forces, but symbols are important.
Juan Cole tells us in the current Salon online magazine that in leaving Basra the British will be leaving a city that they have simply been unable to control. After a brave effort to bring the militias to heel early on, in recent months they have backed off and let the militias do most of the policing. Cole tells us that the Virtue Party (a Shi'a group with which I am not familiar) and SCIRI (whose leader's son the U.S. briefly detained on the Persian border) have both infiltrated the police to such an extent that they have divided up most of the city between their militias (in police uniforms). Both of these groups have enforced Taliban-like restrictions on dress, alcohol and so forth. The situation is complicated by the Marsh Arabs, many of whom have emerged in this area as criminal gangs. Most of Iraq's oil passes through Basra and its environs, and the local warfare is to a large extent over who gets the bulk of the massive pilferage of oil that goes on.
Basra is said to be a completely Shi'a area. Yet at least in the environs there is a tough Sunni community that has strived to preserve its own turf against repeated Shi'a inroads.
Cole points out that nearly all the supplies for the American army in the center of the country must come through the Basra area. As the British presence is reduced, the chance that the militias-police might gradually or abruptly choke off these supply lines must worry the Pentagon. It may force the Americans to place more troops along this supply line. In any event, holding power in this chokepoint increases the bargaining power of SCIRI and other Basra militias on the national scene. SCIRI is very close to the Iranians and is the most likely group to approve of increased Iranian involvement in Iraq. Some months back a reporter in Basra was telling us that the city was essentially in the hands of the Iranians through its client organizations. I have not heard this claim lately, but in the end it may come down to this.
In conclusion, the British withdrawal will be opening the country to even more Iranians presence and pressure. As I have said elsewhere, this certainly seems reasonable from their perspective, but, again, it is not reassuring to Americans who have a rather different perspective.
Friday, February 23, 2007
Viewing the Surge Positively
Yet recent reports suggest that there is a chance that I may once again be wrong. There seems to be some successes on the streets of Baghdad. The most likely explanation is that the insurgents and sectarian gangs are doing what always makes sense when facing a heavily armed regular force: get out of the way, lay low, find handy places to hide arms, and wait until the more powerful enemy goes away, as he must do sooner or later.
There are, however, other explanations or at least part explanations. I have repeatedly pointed out how our efforts are undermined by the growth of a natural hatred of the foreign occupier. Yet even this hate can burn out. I think I can detect a possible weariness of the Iraqi citizenry. They are tired of the killing. They want it to all go away. And if the Americans have been part of their problem, more may come reluctantly to agree that they can also be a part of their solution.
Let us break down the situation in terms of some hypotheticals. The population can be divided into activists and passivists. In most revolutionary situations the passivists are the larger group. This is often missed since by their nature they do not want to bring attention on themselves. Their actions and answers to survey questions depend entirely on who is doing the questioning. Their real opinions are kept very much to themselves. The population can also be divided into the Shi'a and Sunni, and lesser groups of Turkomans, Kurds, Christians, and secularists. The Kurds, Christians, and secularists (aside from Baath) have tended from the beginning to support the American cause. The attitude toward the American military of members of other groups will vary as situations vary. In many places, particularly in parts of Baghdad, the Americans have come to be seen by Sunnis as a necessary evil, for they alone are able to defend the Sunnis against the Shi'a, and Shi'a-infested Iraqi police. On the other hand, in some areas, particularly rural areas to the north and south of Baghdad, Shi'as have found themselves under heavy Sunni pressure, or even heavy extremist Shi'a pressure (north of Najaf). In these cases, it is the Shi'a who have been happy to see the Americans intervene.
So the Americans have a role to play in Iraq for those Iraqis who see no other way out of their difficulties. The problem for American commanders becomes then to expand this opening by setting aside larger goals of defeating "the enemy" while confining action to the narrower goal of protecting the people. There just might be a strategy here that would work..
Meanwhile . . .
