Friday, December 15, 2006
The Futility of the Baghdad Surge
It appears today that the strategy of bringing in several thousand troops, and especially of adding 20,000 Americans to the forces in Baghdad for a three-month "surge" to retake the city, is now favored to win out in the strategy battles in Washington after the publication of the Iraq Study Group Report (that rejected this alternative). Several objections have been made to the more troops approach by its critics, including the difficulty the Pentagon would have in providing the forces. But it is gaining favor because the Baker report has been interpreted as as a defeatist approach and President Bush and his circle are desperate to avoid defeat in Iraq.
Unfortunately, the alternative Iraq strategy of providing more troops for a three-month "surge" that would lead to the control of Baghdad has more against it than the strain it would place on the American military. It is too often forgotten that our military forces have no experience with putting down an established insurgency in a major city. The experience of the Vietnam War will not help us here, for South Vietnam's only real city, Saigon, never posed an insurgency problem. There was never a need for a "green zone" in Saigon. With the exception of a few days during the Tet offensive and the day of the final assault by North Vietnamese tanks, Americans and Vietnamese moved about freely in the city and its immediate environs. The nearest parallel to what we appear to be planning to do in Iraq is our campaign in Falluja. We used 10,000 American and 2000 Iraqi troops and a great deal of airpower to overwhelm a city of 300,000. This suggests that to subdue Baghdad with a population of six million, we would need 200,000 American soldiers and 40,000 Iraqi troops.
It took us six weeks to win in Falluja, although at the expense of destroying the city. Most of the insurgents in the city eventually escaped before our victory to fight on elsewhere in the country. Today, Falluja does remain largely quiet. But half of its population has not returned. And the surrounding Anbar province is one of the least controlled areas in the country.
I am sure there would be less force-intensive ways to carry out the pacification of Baghdad, but I am not confident that the military has the plans, the trained personnel, or the time for such an effort.
Tuesday, December 12, 2006
An Iran - Iraq Project for an International University
A recent article has discussed the attempt to raise money throughout Asia for an international university in northern India that would recapture the glory of learning in that area in medieval times. The university is conceptualized as a rebirth of Nalanda University, one of the leading universities in the world during its medieval existence from the fifth to twelfth centuries. It was established to be a center of Buddhist studies but developed programs in the fine arts, medicine, mathematics, astronomy and politics. This effort, which is being funded from across South and East Asia, reminded me of a similar, more modest but equally high-minded undertaking, the establishment of the University of Central Asia. Begun in the nineties, the university now has campuses in Tajikistan, the Kyrgyz Republic, and Kazakhstan. It is both private and secular. The inspiration came and basic resources were provided by the Aga Khan and the President of Tajikistan. Its creation reminds us that Central Asia was once the crossroads of civilization, an area that once gave birth to an intense intellectual and cultural life.
This led me to thinking of the remarkable center of learning established by the Sassanian (Iranian) king in the fifth century: Jundi-Shapur in what is now Iranian Khuzistan. Originally seen as a center for medical studies. its curricula and research came to cover many fields. It was a center where scholars from India, Greece, and Syria could work together and exchange information. The original impetus was apparently the expulsion of the Nestorian Christians from the Christian lands to the west. Nestorian scholars were the primary students and translators of the Greek legacy at the time and the Persians wished to profit from their knowledge. Jundi-Shapur established as their new home. Some scholars claim that at the time of the Arab conquest Jundi-Shapur was the leading university in the world. It continued to function for many years after the Arab conquest. But when the Abbassid Caliphate was set up in Baghdad, many of the university's scholars were brought to Baghdad. Eventually a new university was established in Baghdad for these transplants, a university sometimes referred to as the Bayt al-Hikmah (House of Wisdom). It was in the setting of these two linked universities that the most authoritative translations of the Greek texts into Arabic were undertaken. Greeks, Christians, Jews, Indians, Arabs and Persians worked together on this common scholarly undertaking.
The Iranians have always taken an interest in what is now Iraq, particularly since the capital of their Sassanian Empire was at Ctesiphon near modern Baghdad. (Ctesiphon may have been the largest city in the world in the sixth century.) Their continued interest is suggested by the recent offer of the Iranians to help rebuild the great arch at Ctesiphon. It now occurs to me that sophisticated Iraqis and Iranians might be interested in cooperating on the building of a great international university in or near Baghdad that would be understood to be a direct descendant of both Jundi-Shapur (said to be founded on the model of the Alexandrian academy) and the Bayt al-Hikma. It could be seen as a gift from Iran to the Iraqi people, or perhaps the gulf states could be involved. It should be seen as an attempt to establish an institution that would rise above the sectarian, religious, and nationalist controversies of the day. Obviously, this is not a project to be organized in a day. It might not be acceptable in the sense described here to any of the major players in the current scene. But Iraq and its neighbors need a vision, a future goal that might lift the spirits of those intellectuals who have practically abandoned all hope for the country. Fortunately, there is enough oil money in the area to make the project feasible without significant money from the West.
This led me to thinking of the remarkable center of learning established by the Sassanian (Iranian) king in the fifth century: Jundi-Shapur in what is now Iranian Khuzistan. Originally seen as a center for medical studies. its curricula and research came to cover many fields. It was a center where scholars from India, Greece, and Syria could work together and exchange information. The original impetus was apparently the expulsion of the Nestorian Christians from the Christian lands to the west. Nestorian scholars were the primary students and translators of the Greek legacy at the time and the Persians wished to profit from their knowledge. Jundi-Shapur established as their new home. Some scholars claim that at the time of the Arab conquest Jundi-Shapur was the leading university in the world. It continued to function for many years after the Arab conquest. But when the Abbassid Caliphate was set up in Baghdad, many of the university's scholars were brought to Baghdad. Eventually a new university was established in Baghdad for these transplants, a university sometimes referred to as the Bayt al-Hikmah (House of Wisdom). It was in the setting of these two linked universities that the most authoritative translations of the Greek texts into Arabic were undertaken. Greeks, Christians, Jews, Indians, Arabs and Persians worked together on this common scholarly undertaking.
The Iranians have always taken an interest in what is now Iraq, particularly since the capital of their Sassanian Empire was at Ctesiphon near modern Baghdad. (Ctesiphon may have been the largest city in the world in the sixth century.) Their continued interest is suggested by the recent offer of the Iranians to help rebuild the great arch at Ctesiphon. It now occurs to me that sophisticated Iraqis and Iranians might be interested in cooperating on the building of a great international university in or near Baghdad that would be understood to be a direct descendant of both Jundi-Shapur (said to be founded on the model of the Alexandrian academy) and the Bayt al-Hikma. It could be seen as a gift from Iran to the Iraqi people, or perhaps the gulf states could be involved. It should be seen as an attempt to establish an institution that would rise above the sectarian, religious, and nationalist controversies of the day. Obviously, this is not a project to be organized in a day. It might not be acceptable in the sense described here to any of the major players in the current scene. But Iraq and its neighbors need a vision, a future goal that might lift the spirits of those intellectuals who have practically abandoned all hope for the country. Fortunately, there is enough oil money in the area to make the project feasible without significant money from the West.
Monday, December 11, 2006
The Iraq Study Group Report: Partial Evaluation
For the last several days many of those concerned with Iraq have been commenting on the Study Group report with its 79 recommendations. It is a short report, easy to read on-line. It is moderate, middle of the road, and yet immediately produced bitter criticisms, particularly from the right. Bush doesn't like it; the Iraqi government doesn't like it; the neocons don't like it. I'd say they must have it about right.
My most general conclusion is that it does a good job of pointing out problems in our present performance and in describing the state of affairs in Iraq. In making military and political suggestions of what to do in Iraq it does not get us very far beyond "stay the course". It does, however, suggest diplomatic initiatives that would offer a hope of escape from the present impasse.
As a way into a more detailed analysis, I begin with reference to the New York Times December 10 editorial on the report and a group of 12 mini-Op-Eds on the report by knowledgeable persons that the paper published the same day. The New York Times emphasizes the report's call for greater openness through making the budget process more transparent, and through intelligence reporting that gives a clearer picture of what is actually happening ( it refers especially to an underreporting of Iraqi casualties). It also calls for the creation of an "environment" in which senior military officers feel free to offer independent advice to civilian leaders.
Several of the mini-Op-Eds had useful thoughts. Larry Diamond, who has been a political advisor in Iraq, emphasizes the recommendation that we should make clear to the Iraqis that we do not seek permanent military bases. His experience is that too many Iraqis believe we are there as an occupying power. He believes that if we make clear we are leaving, and take other steps the Report recommends -- a generous amnesty, a rollback of de-Baathification, and a fixed system for the allocation of oil revenues -- we will have a basis to negotiate effectively with the leaders of the Sunni insurgency. Diamond evidently feels that our essential opponent is the nationalist insurgency and not the internecine struggles of the militias.
Leslie Gelb points out that after its gloomy assessment of the situation, the Report fails to outline a strategy that really responds to the seriousness of this assessment. We can't just urge reconciliation; we have to have a plan to make it feasible, which probably means a federal solution with power and revenue sharing spelled out more credibly than it has been. Gelb is the only commentator I have seen who makes the obvious suggestion that we should provide funds and protection for any Iraqis who want to relocate. (Our newspapers regularly report a massive and unaddressed internal and international refugee problem. I assume the Report suggests nothing to alleviate the problem because taking ethnic segregation seriously would be too defeatist.) He then goes on to say that once we make clear our intention to leave we should ally with Sunni Baathists to crush the "terrorist" in central Iraq, a job he believes the Baathists can do better than we. (Strange use of "terrorist" here; he means "the other guys".)
Note that both Diamond and Gelb appear to believe that the Baathists can extricate themselves from their temporary alliances with Jihadists, foreigners etc. and set about bringing order to the country with our assistance. I like the idea. It turns everything on its head, but just such a dramatic rethinking is what we need. The Report says our intelligence has been terrible and a new report has just come out that maintains we know remarkably little about the enemy we are facing. The take of Gelb and Diamond on the situation is probably as good as any.
One recommendation in the Report that has come in for a great deal of criticism is that we should make it clear to the Iraqi government that we will not continue to assist them if they do not make greater efforts to overcome the military and political problems we both face. This recommendation is criticized first because it seems to contradict the statement elsewhere in the report that we should not set a definite time for leaving, with the Bush-like implication that we will only leave when the "job is done". Second, it is criticized because it implicitly insults the Iraqis and particularly their Prime Minister. It implies that all would be well if they only "tried harder". Some believe this approach will make anything Maliki does seem like buckling to the demands of the Americans. One mini-Op-Ed writer in this group advocates a position opposite to that of the Report: he argues that to find a successful exit we must support Maliki or his successor no matter what they do. This is the only way to give the regime a chance to stand on its own feet in the eyes of Iraqis and the world.
This foregoing recommendation that we should hold the Iraqi government to account was singled out in the stinging critique of the Report by Iraq's President Talabani (reported in today's paper). Talabani raised a number of other questions that undercut the effectiveness of the Report. Much of his anger echoes what Barzani and other Kurds are saying in response to the Report's implication that we should decide now, without a plebiscite, on who owns Kirkuk and who gets the revenue from oil found in and around that city. This is just sectarian dueling. But what cuts deeper is his rejection of the idea that our military should emphasize training and assistance primarily through embedding large numbers of men and officers in Iraqi units so that they might fight more effectively (and be less sectarian). Talabani rejects this as an attempt to destroy the independence of Iraq's security forces. If other Iraqis see it this way, then this major recommendation will be impossible to carry out.
Another part of the Report that the critics have zeroed in on are the recommendations that negotiations be opened with all of Iraq's neighbors. There is a suggestion of one to one negotiation, but generally the discussion is of a region-wide meeting organized by the Americans. The clash of the approach to foreign affairs of the Study Group (particularly Baker) and the Bush administration is most evident in this area. Baker (indirectly in the report and personally in comments since it came out) believes that a nation negotiates with nations with which it has problems. If there were not problems in the relationship, there would be little sense in the negotiation. He does not think preconditions for negotiation are helpful. The Bush people have taken the position that a nation should negotiate primarily with countries with which it is comfortable. They regularly suggest that they would be glad to negotiate with Iran, Syria, Hamas etc. as soon as they accepted our point of view on key questions (such as nuclear development in the case of Iran). A couple of the Op-Eds support the Bush position, but more seem to welcome the open approach of the Report to negotiations.
Outside this framework, most other Op-Eds and discussions of the Report are very much in the doom and gloom category. Their comments may be summed up: "We lost, let's just get out. America does not want another American or even another Iraqi (in so far as we are directly involved) to die because of this war." Some read the Report as a clever papering over of this conclusion. Even the recommendation that we negotiate with neighboring states, including the recommendation that we must solve the Israeli-Palestinian dispute before we can make any progress in the Middle East, appear to rest on an unstated belief that the rest of the Report is merely window dressing for an as-far-as-possible graceful exit.
To me, the Report's greatest weakness is its inability to fully understand the depth of the hatred of many Iraqis for the Americans. Even those who initially welcomed us believe we have far overstayed our welcome, and have come to disbelieve in our promises of economic assistance in rebuilding. They see us as feckless and dangerous. They have found democracy to be too costly; their elected leaders to be as unaccountable as the unelected leaders before them. Diamond and Gelb sense this basic fact, and have organized their thoughts around it.
But with all this, how do we actually know where we are? I certainly believe that the situation is pretty hopeless. But is it unredeemable? Could unforeseen weaknesses in the forces arrayed against us come suddenly to light? It is now common wisdom that a country should not lightly decide on war. There are simply too many imponderables. This must also be true of our thinking about how to respond to this tragedy.
