Saturday, November 25, 2006
Understanding Iraqis
When I was doing field work in Shiraz in 1958, interviewing a wide variety of people on aspects of Iranian culture, I was often frustrated by the evident unwillingness of my informants to tell me what they really thought. One of my worst experiences was when I set up a meeting between a friend of mine and a Foundation scout looking for likely prospects for a psychology scholarship at an American university. I had spent a lot of time with this thoroughly secularized Persian scholar. He had impressed on me that this was the kind of opportunity he was looking for. But when the meeting took place, he refused to acknowledge that he might be at all interested in such an opportunity. One day I asked the local university librarian why I was having this difficulty. His answer was that it would be hard for me to really understand the centuries that Iranians had suffered under an endless series of oppressors. This national experience had led them to distrust everyone, particularly outsiders who asked questions. One never knew how the answers might be used.
I thought of this exchange when I read NYTimes Op-Eds recounting the experience of Iraqis who had tried to work with Americans, but had been forced to back off. One Iraqi translator concluded: "America did well to liberate Iraq. But Iraqis were used to tyranny and afraid of freedom. The Americans entered Iraq without a psychological program for dealing with this fact. Iraqis had been programmed according to another system of thought and feeling. America should have considered that." Another Iraqi who had tried to explain journalistically to the Iraqis what the American were doing wrote: " The American policy people wanted to give us democracy and liberty the same way you give me a shirt, so I can wear it right away. But a common Iraqi view is that America went into Iraq to terminate Islam and Muslims. Those who aren't so extreme say that America invaded Iraq only to steal the oil. The American army destroyed everything and thought they could rebuild from scratch. Maybe this could have worked if people loved Americans or understood what they were doing. But by this time the people already hated America."
This author goes on to say that we should have removed Hussein and installed another dictatorship, albeit a new dictatorship. It could have imposed martial law and done what the Americans were not able to do by cutting power away from the old leaders and their followers. Four or eight years later there could have been an election and then Iraqi society could "take baby steps down the long road to democracy and liberty". Now, he concludes, experience with "American democracy" will make the process of attaining real liberty a much longer road.
Sunday, November 19, 2006
Understanding Iraq's Neighbors: Our Negotiating Partners?
The present discussion of how we might escape unscathed from Iraq centers around two issues: a possible increase in troop strength and negotiating more and more effectively with Iraq's neighbors.
Turning to the second issue, it would likely be helpful to involve all Iraq's neighboring stakeholders in the emergence of the future Iraq state (or group of states). Every neighbor has important interests and every neighbor has ways in which it can assist our efforts. All want a peaceful Iraq and all want (in greater or lesser degree) the Americans to leave. But what the objectives and abilities of each neighbor might be have yet to be tested.
As background to what we might say to leaders of these states as we attempt to involve them in our effort, let us consider the interests of neighboring states serially.
Beginning with Iran, we know that it has been involved with several Shi'a groups both before and during the present conflict. Iran approaches the issue from its unique background. Its leaders remember a long and ancient history of dominating what is now Iraq. Iran has a large and restive Kurdish population, and it is this Kurdish area of Iraq that has been most often under Iranian control. Iran has also frequently dominated the Basra region of the south; recent reports suggest that it has used its control over some militias to establish renewed influence in that area. While Iran has helped several Shiite militias in Iraq, its goals and those of Moqtada al-Sadr and his Mahdi Army are probably most closely aligned. The more traditional Iraqi Shi'a militias, such as the Badr Brigade, are directed by leaders who answer indirectly to al-Sistani, who is considered in Iraq, and probably in the Shi'a world as a whole, to be primer inter pares among Shi'a theologians. Al Sistani has spent his career in opposition to a political Islam, criticizing leaders such as Khomeini who believed that theologians should directly interfere in polities, a belief that Khomeini tried to enshrine in the Iranian system. Although there are democratic elements in the present Iranian system, Iranian leaders might regard a fully functioning liberal democracy in Iraq to be a bad example for their own dissidents.
Kuwait and the Gulf states want stability in Iraq, but they also want a state that will never again threaten them. Kuwait must always be nervous, because the claims of Iraq to Kuwait were not made of whole cloth. They are also not enamored of the idea of an effective liberal democracy on their door step. Saudi Arabia feels much the same way about democracy. In addition, Saudi Arabia fears a Shi'a dominated Iraq state, whether liberal or not. They have a restless Shi'a province in the north that does not need more outside support. Bahrain's Shi'a majority is held down by a Sunni royal house; Bahrain has also been a Persian possession several times in the past.
Jordan is likely to have concerns similar to its Arab neighbors. However, its royal house and civilian leadership seems more likely to accept liberal trends in the near future at home, and thus also more likely to welcome them in Iraq. Jordan is the primary destination for Iraqis wanting to escape the current violence. Both Jordan and Syria are also routes for the entry of Jihadists into Iraq. Certainly the Jordan administration is unlikely to be encouraging this movement.
Syria is an awkward state. Syria and Iraq were the two Baathist states. Thus, they were led in the post-World War II years by the same nationalist and secular revolutionary party. However, this party split up and Hafez al-Assad and Saddam Hussein achieved absolute rule in their respective countries and became bitter enemies. Hafez has more recently been succeeded by his son. Complicating the picture is the fact that although most Syrians are Sunnis, the government has for many years been in the hands of the Alawites, a secret religious sect comparable to the Druse in Lebanon. They are classed as Muslims, but actually do not pray as Muslims and do not worship in mosques. Their religion contains many Persian elements, both pre-islamic and Shi'a. Other Muslims frequently regard them as heretics, more heretical than the Shi'a themselves. (It is important to note that Syria is ruled by a sect that makes up no more than 13% of the population, a fact that certainly casts doubt on the idea that if the Americans left, the Shi'a would inevitably win out in a struggle for ascendancy in Iraq.) It should also be mentioned that the Kurds dominate a small area in Syria's northeast and have long been considered a restless minority. We conclude that the real interests of Syria's ruling class may be as obscure as their religious beliefs.
Turkey has become a major outlet for what trade there is in and out of Iraq. It is a major avenue for the export of oil. Turkey also controls the main trade routes into and out of the semi-autonomous Kurdish area. There is a thriving trade along these routes, benefiting both sides. Turks are the leading investors in the growing Kurdish economy. On the other hand, because of the continuing struggle of Kurds for independence within Turkey, the government has opposed talk of an independent Kurdistan. Another reason for this stand is that Turkey sees itself as a guarantor of the rights of the Turkoman people, a minority group in Iraq, particularly numerous in the Mosul area and other areas along the fringes of Kurdish control.
Turning to the second issue, it would likely be helpful to involve all Iraq's neighboring stakeholders in the emergence of the future Iraq state (or group of states). Every neighbor has important interests and every neighbor has ways in which it can assist our efforts. All want a peaceful Iraq and all want (in greater or lesser degree) the Americans to leave. But what the objectives and abilities of each neighbor might be have yet to be tested.
As background to what we might say to leaders of these states as we attempt to involve them in our effort, let us consider the interests of neighboring states serially.
Beginning with Iran, we know that it has been involved with several Shi'a groups both before and during the present conflict. Iran approaches the issue from its unique background. Its leaders remember a long and ancient history of dominating what is now Iraq. Iran has a large and restive Kurdish population, and it is this Kurdish area of Iraq that has been most often under Iranian control. Iran has also frequently dominated the Basra region of the south; recent reports suggest that it has used its control over some militias to establish renewed influence in that area. While Iran has helped several Shiite militias in Iraq, its goals and those of Moqtada al-Sadr and his Mahdi Army are probably most closely aligned. The more traditional Iraqi Shi'a militias, such as the Badr Brigade, are directed by leaders who answer indirectly to al-Sistani, who is considered in Iraq, and probably in the Shi'a world as a whole, to be primer inter pares among Shi'a theologians. Al Sistani has spent his career in opposition to a political Islam, criticizing leaders such as Khomeini who believed that theologians should directly interfere in polities, a belief that Khomeini tried to enshrine in the Iranian system. Although there are democratic elements in the present Iranian system, Iranian leaders might regard a fully functioning liberal democracy in Iraq to be a bad example for their own dissidents.
Kuwait and the Gulf states want stability in Iraq, but they also want a state that will never again threaten them. Kuwait must always be nervous, because the claims of Iraq to Kuwait were not made of whole cloth. They are also not enamored of the idea of an effective liberal democracy on their door step. Saudi Arabia feels much the same way about democracy. In addition, Saudi Arabia fears a Shi'a dominated Iraq state, whether liberal or not. They have a restless Shi'a province in the north that does not need more outside support. Bahrain's Shi'a majority is held down by a Sunni royal house; Bahrain has also been a Persian possession several times in the past.
Jordan is likely to have concerns similar to its Arab neighbors. However, its royal house and civilian leadership seems more likely to accept liberal trends in the near future at home, and thus also more likely to welcome them in Iraq. Jordan is the primary destination for Iraqis wanting to escape the current violence. Both Jordan and Syria are also routes for the entry of Jihadists into Iraq. Certainly the Jordan administration is unlikely to be encouraging this movement.
Syria is an awkward state. Syria and Iraq were the two Baathist states. Thus, they were led in the post-World War II years by the same nationalist and secular revolutionary party. However, this party split up and Hafez al-Assad and Saddam Hussein achieved absolute rule in their respective countries and became bitter enemies. Hafez has more recently been succeeded by his son. Complicating the picture is the fact that although most Syrians are Sunnis, the government has for many years been in the hands of the Alawites, a secret religious sect comparable to the Druse in Lebanon. They are classed as Muslims, but actually do not pray as Muslims and do not worship in mosques. Their religion contains many Persian elements, both pre-islamic and Shi'a. Other Muslims frequently regard them as heretics, more heretical than the Shi'a themselves. (It is important to note that Syria is ruled by a sect that makes up no more than 13% of the population, a fact that certainly casts doubt on the idea that if the Americans left, the Shi'a would inevitably win out in a struggle for ascendancy in Iraq.) It should also be mentioned that the Kurds dominate a small area in Syria's northeast and have long been considered a restless minority. We conclude that the real interests of Syria's ruling class may be as obscure as their religious beliefs.
Turkey has become a major outlet for what trade there is in and out of Iraq. It is a major avenue for the export of oil. Turkey also controls the main trade routes into and out of the semi-autonomous Kurdish area. There is a thriving trade along these routes, benefiting both sides. Turks are the leading investors in the growing Kurdish economy. On the other hand, because of the continuing struggle of Kurds for independence within Turkey, the government has opposed talk of an independent Kurdistan. Another reason for this stand is that Turkey sees itself as a guarantor of the rights of the Turkoman people, a minority group in Iraq, particularly numerous in the Mosul area and other areas along the fringes of Kurdish control.
Effective Reaction?
It has recently been announced that the Americans and their NATO allies have greatly increased the scale of their bombing and close air support efforts in Afghanistan. The Taliban challenge has been heating up on the ground recently, and the solution appears to be increased air activity because this is a form of warfare for which the Taliban have no answer. In Iraq after the recent large-scale kidnapping on a major highway, kidnapping that included several Americans, the Coalition has mounted a massive effort to kill or capture the perpetrators, and, hopefully, free the captives.
The problem for our forces is the more "effective" our reactions, the more negative the reactions of the people we are supposed to be helping. With more limited efforts, particularly on the ground, it is more easily believed that the foreigners are trying to protect local civilians. Larger, massive efforts, particularly when they are primarily responses to attacks on Americans or other coalition forces, can easily be interpreted as violence in defense of outsiders, actions that have little to do with the concerns and lives of the local people. These "effective reactions" are also more likely than more limited face to face encounters to lead to mistakes, to targeting, or at least arresting, persons who turn out to be innocent. And thereby reducing the size of the population that truly is innocent.
I read today of a man who joined the Confederate army in Mississippi early in the Civil War. The commentator wrote that this person was not concerned with larger questions such as slavery. He joined up simply because outsiders had attacked his state. Remember that when Shiite Iran fought with Iraq, many, including Saddam, expected that the oppressed Shiites would refuse to fight the Iranians. It turned out not to be so. Even to Shiite Iraqis, the Iranians were outsiders and that made them the enemy. This natural nativist reaction is a heavy burden that our forces must shoulder. It is one that gets heavier the longer we stay and the less our forces on the ground are able to develop direct relations with the people around them. I see little evidence that the extent of this heavy burden has been understood by Washington.
The problem for our forces is the more "effective" our reactions, the more negative the reactions of the people we are supposed to be helping. With more limited efforts, particularly on the ground, it is more easily believed that the foreigners are trying to protect local civilians. Larger, massive efforts, particularly when they are primarily responses to attacks on Americans or other coalition forces, can easily be interpreted as violence in defense of outsiders, actions that have little to do with the concerns and lives of the local people. These "effective reactions" are also more likely than more limited face to face encounters to lead to mistakes, to targeting, or at least arresting, persons who turn out to be innocent. And thereby reducing the size of the population that truly is innocent.
I read today of a man who joined the Confederate army in Mississippi early in the Civil War. The commentator wrote that this person was not concerned with larger questions such as slavery. He joined up simply because outsiders had attacked his state. Remember that when Shiite Iran fought with Iraq, many, including Saddam, expected that the oppressed Shiites would refuse to fight the Iranians. It turned out not to be so. Even to Shiite Iraqis, the Iranians were outsiders and that made them the enemy. This natural nativist reaction is a heavy burden that our forces must shoulder. It is one that gets heavier the longer we stay and the less our forces on the ground are able to develop direct relations with the people around them. I see little evidence that the extent of this heavy burden has been understood by Washington.
