Sunday, November 12, 2006
A Nationalist, Strongman Solution for Iraq
Under the heading "What Baker Should Tell Bush", Joe Klein outlines in the most recent Time magazine what he believes the Baker Commission should tell Bush to do to turn around policy in Iraq. Essentially what he asks for is a re-Baathification policy that puts the remnants of Hussein's old power structure back in power. If this were merely a reestablishment of Sunni control, the Shiites would fight it bitterly. But Klein points out that some of the leaders of the Baath are actually Shi'ites. Allawi, the strongman who was put in charge by the Americans before the elections is a Shiite Baath party member. Klein tells us that we are now negotiating with some Baath leaders in Jordan. Both we and they, and probably most Sunnis, would like to get the insurgency out from under the cloud of cooperation with al-Qaeda.
In a similar vein, John Burns of the New York Times tells us that what Iraqis in the street want more than anything now is a strongman. They do not care if he plays a little rough, as long as he once again can force men with arms of all affiliations into obedience to a government. They are past caring about democracy. They have had elections and have seen little benefit from them. In fact, the elections seem to have driven people apart, reaffirming their sectarian allegiances. The American military on the ground seems to be more disaffected with the current Iraqi administration than the Iraqi public. We have invested so much political capital locally and internationally in the elected government that it would be a blow to both countries if we should take this route. Yet Burns writes that we must bite the bullet. Both believe that the most effective civilian and military leaders are from the old Baathist structure. Many are insurgency leaders, but that they can be turned. .
The problem with this diagnosis, as Burns himself realizes, is that we may not have the capacity now to accomplish this end even if we wanted to. How precisely would we do it? There are no elected or electable leaders that would be more desirable than Maliki. So it would mean that we would have to back a "man or horseback" who could come riding out of the insurgency into the embrace of the Iraq people and the American army. The best solution might start out as a covert operation.
Here are some steps. (1) We develop a nonpublic general understanding with Baath nationalists that we will help them take control of the country if they agree to certain preconditions. (2) Nationalist leaders will make a widely publicized declaration that the elected government has unfortunately failed to serve the needs of the Iraqi people. Nationalist leaders soon announce the formation of a National Resistance Front (NRF) with its own military and police forces. NRF will begin negotiations with militia, government, and other leaders throughout Iraq. The governing NRF council will elect a military leader to be the interim president of the country. (3) We publicly announce a time table for withdrawals, with the first withdrawals from Sunni provinces such as Anbar. (4) As we withdraw, NRF units will move in to take security duties over from the Coalition. This will be an implicit rather than explicit policy. Where they meet opposition from unacceptable Iraqi elements, Coalition forces will assist NRF units on the ground. As the NRF movement gathers strength, armed units of all kinds will be welcomed into its ranks. (5) We hold public meeting with NRF leaders legitimating their control over the country. We announce that at the request of the NRF we are now removing all foreign troops from the country, except for a small unit that the Kurdish government has asked us to maintain. (6) The NRF moves to assert control over all of the country except for the Kurdish enclave, rapidly moving against the remaining government and militia units. (7) Fighting dies down as the new authoritarian regime takes over, promising elections in five years.
In a similar vein, John Burns of the New York Times tells us that what Iraqis in the street want more than anything now is a strongman. They do not care if he plays a little rough, as long as he once again can force men with arms of all affiliations into obedience to a government. They are past caring about democracy. They have had elections and have seen little benefit from them. In fact, the elections seem to have driven people apart, reaffirming their sectarian allegiances. The American military on the ground seems to be more disaffected with the current Iraqi administration than the Iraqi public. We have invested so much political capital locally and internationally in the elected government that it would be a blow to both countries if we should take this route. Yet Burns writes that we must bite the bullet. Both believe that the most effective civilian and military leaders are from the old Baathist structure. Many are insurgency leaders, but that they can be turned. .
The problem with this diagnosis, as Burns himself realizes, is that we may not have the capacity now to accomplish this end even if we wanted to. How precisely would we do it? There are no elected or electable leaders that would be more desirable than Maliki. So it would mean that we would have to back a "man or horseback" who could come riding out of the insurgency into the embrace of the Iraq people and the American army. The best solution might start out as a covert operation.
Here are some steps. (1) We develop a nonpublic general understanding with Baath nationalists that we will help them take control of the country if they agree to certain preconditions. (2) Nationalist leaders will make a widely publicized declaration that the elected government has unfortunately failed to serve the needs of the Iraqi people. Nationalist leaders soon announce the formation of a National Resistance Front (NRF) with its own military and police forces. NRF will begin negotiations with militia, government, and other leaders throughout Iraq. The governing NRF council will elect a military leader to be the interim president of the country. (3) We publicly announce a time table for withdrawals, with the first withdrawals from Sunni provinces such as Anbar. (4) As we withdraw, NRF units will move in to take security duties over from the Coalition. This will be an implicit rather than explicit policy. Where they meet opposition from unacceptable Iraqi elements, Coalition forces will assist NRF units on the ground. As the NRF movement gathers strength, armed units of all kinds will be welcomed into its ranks. (5) We hold public meeting with NRF leaders legitimating their control over the country. We announce that at the request of the NRF we are now removing all foreign troops from the country, except for a small unit that the Kurdish government has asked us to maintain. (6) The NRF moves to assert control over all of the country except for the Kurdish enclave, rapidly moving against the remaining government and militia units. (7) Fighting dies down as the new authoritarian regime takes over, promising elections in five years.
