Sunday, June 05, 2005
Comparing Outside Support for Insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan
The insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan continue in their bloody ways. Taken together, and they should generally be, they constitute a major drain on American resources and attention. As long as they continue to require our presence, the ability of the United States to take an active role in other violent contests in the world is limited.
So let us compare them. In both cases, one reason for insurgent success is the continuation of support from outside. In both cases, the struggle of Muslim extremists against what they regard as infidels and traitors to Islam is central to the motivation of the persons involved. In both cases, Al-Qaeda and its off-shoots play a major role. In both cases, the insurgency is confined largely to the one ethnic group, with the other groups either supportive of the government or have interests of their own that do not affect the insurgency.
But there are also important differences. The insurgency in Afghanistan is both nationalist and religious, with the emphasis on the latter. As such, it represents a continuation of the Taliban movement that once ruled most of the country. In Iraq, the religious side of the insurgency is not related to previous rule, for Saddam was a secularist. However, the former Baath members that are critical to the insurgency represent the previous ruling system.
The ranks of both insurgencies are filled from the outside to some degree. However, in Iraq, these outsiders serve primarily as suicide bombers. Native Iraqi insurgents seem to very seldom agree to play such a role. Perhaps less than a tenth of the insurgents are from outside. Those that do come in, however, can be easily identified by their accents as non-Iraqis. Because of their small numbers and specialized but critical role, stopping the route of entry for outsiders into the insurgency seems feasible. They are vulnerable to interdiction as they come in because they essentially follow the Euphrates, which gives them a narrow path, and they must make several stops before they are utilized. (The fact they enter unarmed makes them harder to spot, however, than in Afghanistan where they generally come with their arms.)When Iraqi insurgents are killed or captured in large numbers, the insurgency cannot easily replace them from outside. On the other hand, the Taliban movement was from the beginning a Pashto (Pathan, Pushtu) movement that recruited from a large alliance of tribes inhabiting both sides of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. This has not changed. The result is that the insurgents from Pakistan speak the same dialect as the Pashtos with whom they are intermixed. An armed people, as most rural Afghans are, they are able to quickly replace any insurgents that the Americans recruit with fresh blood. This makes the defeat of the insurgency in Afghanistan essentially impossible, although under many conditions, it could "wind down".
So let us compare them. In both cases, one reason for insurgent success is the continuation of support from outside. In both cases, the struggle of Muslim extremists against what they regard as infidels and traitors to Islam is central to the motivation of the persons involved. In both cases, Al-Qaeda and its off-shoots play a major role. In both cases, the insurgency is confined largely to the one ethnic group, with the other groups either supportive of the government or have interests of their own that do not affect the insurgency.
But there are also important differences. The insurgency in Afghanistan is both nationalist and religious, with the emphasis on the latter. As such, it represents a continuation of the Taliban movement that once ruled most of the country. In Iraq, the religious side of the insurgency is not related to previous rule, for Saddam was a secularist. However, the former Baath members that are critical to the insurgency represent the previous ruling system.
The ranks of both insurgencies are filled from the outside to some degree. However, in Iraq, these outsiders serve primarily as suicide bombers. Native Iraqi insurgents seem to very seldom agree to play such a role. Perhaps less than a tenth of the insurgents are from outside. Those that do come in, however, can be easily identified by their accents as non-Iraqis. Because of their small numbers and specialized but critical role, stopping the route of entry for outsiders into the insurgency seems feasible. They are vulnerable to interdiction as they come in because they essentially follow the Euphrates, which gives them a narrow path, and they must make several stops before they are utilized. (The fact they enter unarmed makes them harder to spot, however, than in Afghanistan where they generally come with their arms.)When Iraqi insurgents are killed or captured in large numbers, the insurgency cannot easily replace them from outside. On the other hand, the Taliban movement was from the beginning a Pashto (Pathan, Pushtu) movement that recruited from a large alliance of tribes inhabiting both sides of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. This has not changed. The result is that the insurgents from Pakistan speak the same dialect as the Pashtos with whom they are intermixed. An armed people, as most rural Afghans are, they are able to quickly replace any insurgents that the Americans recruit with fresh blood. This makes the defeat of the insurgency in Afghanistan essentially impossible, although under many conditions, it could "wind down".
Update on Iraq Situation
The June 3 NYT offered the most recent version of the series of remarkable updates on the situation in Iraq that have bee offered by two researchers at the Brookings Institution. In a concise format they report information from a wide variety of sources. These include military and economic statistics, as well as polling results. The data is reported in the form of a time series (in this case May 2003, June 2004, and May 2005).
There are some curious anomalies in the latest compilation. On the one hand, there has been a considerable increase in the rate at which American and Iraqi security forces and Iraqi civilians are being killed. The average number of insurgent attacks per day has increased. On the other hand fuel supplies available to the people have increased, while the number of telephone users and internet subscribers has increased dramatically. (Significantly, there were only 833,000 telephone users before the war, while there are 3,300,000 today.) The percentage of Iraqis supporting the government has risen to 75%. The number of well-equipped Iraqi security forces has increased rapidly to 50,000 (many other estimates exist, but this estimate is probably as good as any). The number of trained judges has also risen rapidly. The percentage of Sunni Arabs believing the country is headed in the right direction has risen, although not dramatically. At the same time, actual fuel production has fallen slightly, and electricity production has fallen more rapidly. The rising confidence of the people in the face of what objectively is a far from encouraging situation is remarkable.
One can only conclude that the situation is encouraging but quite fragile. People have evidently concluded that the political process offers the only hope for reestablishing and improving their way of life. They like the possibilities that are opening up under the new order. Yet I would suggest that if the confidence of the people is not sustained by progress in key economic areas and in security for the average person, there could be a rapid collapse in support for the system, as well as for American and Iraqi security forces.
There are some curious anomalies in the latest compilation. On the one hand, there has been a considerable increase in the rate at which American and Iraqi security forces and Iraqi civilians are being killed. The average number of insurgent attacks per day has increased. On the other hand fuel supplies available to the people have increased, while the number of telephone users and internet subscribers has increased dramatically. (Significantly, there were only 833,000 telephone users before the war, while there are 3,300,000 today.) The percentage of Iraqis supporting the government has risen to 75%. The number of well-equipped Iraqi security forces has increased rapidly to 50,000 (many other estimates exist, but this estimate is probably as good as any). The number of trained judges has also risen rapidly. The percentage of Sunni Arabs believing the country is headed in the right direction has risen, although not dramatically. At the same time, actual fuel production has fallen slightly, and electricity production has fallen more rapidly. The rising confidence of the people in the face of what objectively is a far from encouraging situation is remarkable.
One can only conclude that the situation is encouraging but quite fragile. People have evidently concluded that the political process offers the only hope for reestablishing and improving their way of life. They like the possibilities that are opening up under the new order. Yet I would suggest that if the confidence of the people is not sustained by progress in key economic areas and in security for the average person, there could be a rapid collapse in support for the system, as well as for American and Iraqi security forces.
Reporting Ideas on Terrorist Targets
A recent Op-Ed offered a serious analysis of the danger of a biological attack by terrorists on the nation's milk supply and offered useful suggestions for reducing this danger. It pointed out the many places in the milk delivery system in which there are obvious and easily exploited vulnerabilities. A recent discussion on television of the availability of high-powered rifles detailed how a sniper at a great distance might bring down airliners at the Los Angeles terminal. Other programs have pointed to the extreme difficulty of checking on the contents of the many containers that are brought into American ports every day. Unfortunately, warnings of this kind, however well-thought out and well-meaning, also increase the danger to the country by educating terrorists, both foreign and home-grown, in the vulnerabilities of our society and how they might be exploited. Yes, some terrorists may have already thought of these vulnerabilities and how to exploit them. But we cannot assume that they all have, or that they understand their potential opportunities as well as our many aggressive and competing antiterrorism experts can explain them.
A way to get around this dilemma would be for Congress to establish a well-publicized office to receive ideas and analyses of terrorist threats. (This office may already exist, but it is apparently not well known to the public, perhaps not even to the experts who are dreaming up and analyzing possible attacks.) Once received, the ideas would be dealt with on a "need-to-know" basis. The bipartisan staff of the suggested office should be organized in such a way that it is beholden to neither corporate nor bureaucratic (including Homeland Security) interests. Its job would be to analyze and winnow the information it receives and transmit what appears most important to those likely to make good use of it. Congress should be involved, because Congressional involvement in the background should make it less likely that the transmissions of this office would be ignored.
A way to get around this dilemma would be for Congress to establish a well-publicized office to receive ideas and analyses of terrorist threats. (This office may already exist, but it is apparently not well known to the public, perhaps not even to the experts who are dreaming up and analyzing possible attacks.) Once received, the ideas would be dealt with on a "need-to-know" basis. The bipartisan staff of the suggested office should be organized in such a way that it is beholden to neither corporate nor bureaucratic (including Homeland Security) interests. Its job would be to analyze and winnow the information it receives and transmit what appears most important to those likely to make good use of it. Congress should be involved, because Congressional involvement in the background should make it less likely that the transmissions of this office would be ignored.
