Tuesday, April 12, 2005
The Future of the Iraq Insurgency
A recent posting gave an incorrect picture of the insurgency situation. Although many more civilians and Iraqi security personnel are being killed than members of the Coalition forces, according to the latest American figures it is still true that the majority of attacks are directed against Coalition forces. Nevertheless, it is also true, as that posting stated, that the number of attacks has been declining since the elections.
This brings us back to the question of where the insurgency is going. A few days ago, Muqtada al-Sadr took his people into the streets again after a long rest, denouncing Americans and demanding that they pull out. The event was in Baghdad. The numbers were impressive, but not as great as the organizers had hoped. Its organizers managed to keep their people nonviolent. It was probably just an attempt to show that the Mahdi Army was still a group that had to be reckoned with, and not really a turn toward supporting the insurgency.
Meanwhile, with fits and starts the politicians seem to be getting their act together. A major Sunni Arab leader went to see the Ayatollah Sistani to thank him for his attempts to avoid Shi'a attacks against Sunnis. This leader was not part of the die-hard Sunni Arab faction, but still a good step. The Iraqi security forces seem to be steadily becoming more and more active and effective. Talk of immediate American withdrawal has generally quietened
All of which leads to the question of how the insurgency will be able to preserve itself. It is still remarkably effective. But for how long? The fanatic Muslim side of the effort continues to get reenforcements from outside the country. But the old Baathist officers who have had most of the money and probably been the most effective militarily must be thinning out through killing and capture. Their sources of funds in Syria are sure to dry up eventually.
To be sustainable at a high level, insurgencies generally need outside support, or at least a fairly open highway for support to flow in. In spite of some accusations, the only side that has been shown to provide regular access is the Syrian. One doubts if it is in the long-range interest of Syria to allow this to continue at the level it has in the past. Syria's leaders belong to a relatively secular Allawi sect of Shiism, one with little love for the Ithna 'Ashariya Iraqi type. Only a general dislike of "the foreigner" motivates them to go along with the insurgency traffic. One can only assume that sooner or later other considerations are likely to change the balance against continuing support for the insurgency.
Which brings us back to the young men willing to risk their lives continuing the fight. Do they still have a theory of victory? It is hard to imagine. About the only fairly coherent one I can think of would be based on the hope that the three major ethnic groups will break apart over the writing of the constitution and the insurgency with its forces already in the field will be able to pick up the pieces. First, one can assume the Americans, disappointed with this result and unwilling to fight the ethnic groups to hold together a disintegrating Iraq, will decide to leave. Then, the insurgency will again establish its supremacy over the Sunni Arab community. Then it will go on to subdue the Shi'a in Baghdad and the south. Finally it will be the turn of the Kurds in the north
The Muslims extremists associated with Zarqawi have a more diffuse goal. They just want to kill the "enemies of Islam", whether they be Americans or Iraqis. Iraq seems to be as good a place to do this as anywhere. They may have hoped to inflict a major defeat on the American devils in Iraq. As this hope fails to be realized, they can be sustained by the more general faith in their righteousness. But if their secular allies desert them and the Iraqi community becomes more hostile to their presence, their effectiveness and long-term viability as a movement in Iraq will diminish.
One can only hope that the Americans and the new system of government in Iraq can understand the hopes and fears and strategies of the insurgency in such a way as to hasten its withering into insignificance.
This brings us back to the question of where the insurgency is going. A few days ago, Muqtada al-Sadr took his people into the streets again after a long rest, denouncing Americans and demanding that they pull out. The event was in Baghdad. The numbers were impressive, but not as great as the organizers had hoped. Its organizers managed to keep their people nonviolent. It was probably just an attempt to show that the Mahdi Army was still a group that had to be reckoned with, and not really a turn toward supporting the insurgency.
Meanwhile, with fits and starts the politicians seem to be getting their act together. A major Sunni Arab leader went to see the Ayatollah Sistani to thank him for his attempts to avoid Shi'a attacks against Sunnis. This leader was not part of the die-hard Sunni Arab faction, but still a good step. The Iraqi security forces seem to be steadily becoming more and more active and effective. Talk of immediate American withdrawal has generally quietened
All of which leads to the question of how the insurgency will be able to preserve itself. It is still remarkably effective. But for how long? The fanatic Muslim side of the effort continues to get reenforcements from outside the country. But the old Baathist officers who have had most of the money and probably been the most effective militarily must be thinning out through killing and capture. Their sources of funds in Syria are sure to dry up eventually.
To be sustainable at a high level, insurgencies generally need outside support, or at least a fairly open highway for support to flow in. In spite of some accusations, the only side that has been shown to provide regular access is the Syrian. One doubts if it is in the long-range interest of Syria to allow this to continue at the level it has in the past. Syria's leaders belong to a relatively secular Allawi sect of Shiism, one with little love for the Ithna 'Ashariya Iraqi type. Only a general dislike of "the foreigner" motivates them to go along with the insurgency traffic. One can only assume that sooner or later other considerations are likely to change the balance against continuing support for the insurgency.
Which brings us back to the young men willing to risk their lives continuing the fight. Do they still have a theory of victory? It is hard to imagine. About the only fairly coherent one I can think of would be based on the hope that the three major ethnic groups will break apart over the writing of the constitution and the insurgency with its forces already in the field will be able to pick up the pieces. First, one can assume the Americans, disappointed with this result and unwilling to fight the ethnic groups to hold together a disintegrating Iraq, will decide to leave. Then, the insurgency will again establish its supremacy over the Sunni Arab community. Then it will go on to subdue the Shi'a in Baghdad and the south. Finally it will be the turn of the Kurds in the north
The Muslims extremists associated with Zarqawi have a more diffuse goal. They just want to kill the "enemies of Islam", whether they be Americans or Iraqis. Iraq seems to be as good a place to do this as anywhere. They may have hoped to inflict a major defeat on the American devils in Iraq. As this hope fails to be realized, they can be sustained by the more general faith in their righteousness. But if their secular allies desert them and the Iraqi community becomes more hostile to their presence, their effectiveness and long-term viability as a movement in Iraq will diminish.
One can only hope that the Americans and the new system of government in Iraq can understand the hopes and fears and strategies of the insurgency in such a way as to hasten its withering into insignificance.
