Thursday, April 07, 2005
The Treatment of Underdevelopment
Kristof is once again beating his fists against the indifference of the outside world to the crimes against humanity in the Darfur region of Sudan. Thousands of natives are killed and mutilated and starved to death while the world reactions hardly go beyond mincing steps that do little to change the situation. He is incensed in his latest column particularly by the rape of women and girls, rape that not only persists with little legal challenge but also destroys the girls involved socially and legally in ways not imagined in the West. The latest news is that the victims of rape in Darfur are being imprisoned for having illicit relations outside marriage. Before their arrests, they were already thrown out by their families and divorced by their husbands.
Kristof's solution is for the United States to put more pressure on its allies and the United Nations, to increase the size of intervention forces. He seems to forget the numerically worse horrors that have been going on in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of Congo now for some years. Unlike Darfur, the United Nations has had an army there for several years and has granted it a much more active mandate than the African Union force in Darfur. Yet those on the ground, such as representatives of Doctors without Borders people, report that violence remains the main danger for the people, that the effectiveness of the UN forces seldom extends beyond the major towns.
Instead of continuing to apply Band-Aid, the world needs to hold a major conference on Africa. Such a conference would not duplicate the Berlin Conference of the 19th century but it should be as far reaching. The conference should go beyond discussing modes of intervention. It should create the means and the will to occupy and administer those parts of Africa that are likely to remain festering sores indefinitely. There needs to be a form of recolonization, which was, in effect, what the UN Trusteeship system that dated back to the League of Nations was all about. In much of Africa, the colonial blueprint of the nineteenth century needs to be torn up, to be replaced by a new blueprint more in congruence with the divisions among African peoples. These new divisions must be wards of the international community, much in the way that Bosnia remains today.
The more generalized and longer term problem that Kristof addresses in his discussion of rape is the inhumanity of so many peoples, particular Muslims, in their treatment of their women. The formerly Muslim woman in the Netherlands who has recently stood up to her tradition, rejected it, and now wants the Western world to join her has made the point heroically and forcibly. She risks death for the cause of Muslim women and we should applaud and support her cause. Political correctness and multiculturalism should not cause anyone, liberal or not, to accept as unchangeable and worthy of respect customs and attitudes that are seriously demeaning to a segment of the population, whether this be an ethnic minority or women. We must be prepared, as the Turkish generals that transformed Turkey were prepared to do in the 1920s, to delegitimize such customs. Western campaigns against female circumcision seem to be having an effect, partially because this practice is not in the Quran or the most accepted hadith literature. Success against many of the other attitudes and practices demeaning women in Islam may also be successfully campaigned against for the same reason. Perhaps the "honor killings" of wives, daughters, or sisters may be delegitimized for without touching the most essential traditions. Unfortunately, some anti-feminine strictures, such as the idea that it takes the word of two women before a court to equal that of a man, exist in the general body of Muslim law. Any international campaign to right such wrongs must begin with the easier and move to the more difficult, but the world should develop a willingness to educate and retrain people away from moral underdevelopment as much as from material underdevelopment. This development strategy should also be introduced in the trusteeship period as described above. Such a use of "colonialism" was often practiced by the British, most famously by their prohibition of the Hindu suttee in India.
Kristof's solution is for the United States to put more pressure on its allies and the United Nations, to increase the size of intervention forces. He seems to forget the numerically worse horrors that have been going on in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of Congo now for some years. Unlike Darfur, the United Nations has had an army there for several years and has granted it a much more active mandate than the African Union force in Darfur. Yet those on the ground, such as representatives of Doctors without Borders people, report that violence remains the main danger for the people, that the effectiveness of the UN forces seldom extends beyond the major towns.
Instead of continuing to apply Band-Aid, the world needs to hold a major conference on Africa. Such a conference would not duplicate the Berlin Conference of the 19th century but it should be as far reaching. The conference should go beyond discussing modes of intervention. It should create the means and the will to occupy and administer those parts of Africa that are likely to remain festering sores indefinitely. There needs to be a form of recolonization, which was, in effect, what the UN Trusteeship system that dated back to the League of Nations was all about. In much of Africa, the colonial blueprint of the nineteenth century needs to be torn up, to be replaced by a new blueprint more in congruence with the divisions among African peoples. These new divisions must be wards of the international community, much in the way that Bosnia remains today.
The more generalized and longer term problem that Kristof addresses in his discussion of rape is the inhumanity of so many peoples, particular Muslims, in their treatment of their women. The formerly Muslim woman in the Netherlands who has recently stood up to her tradition, rejected it, and now wants the Western world to join her has made the point heroically and forcibly. She risks death for the cause of Muslim women and we should applaud and support her cause. Political correctness and multiculturalism should not cause anyone, liberal or not, to accept as unchangeable and worthy of respect customs and attitudes that are seriously demeaning to a segment of the population, whether this be an ethnic minority or women. We must be prepared, as the Turkish generals that transformed Turkey were prepared to do in the 1920s, to delegitimize such customs. Western campaigns against female circumcision seem to be having an effect, partially because this practice is not in the Quran or the most accepted hadith literature. Success against many of the other attitudes and practices demeaning women in Islam may also be successfully campaigned against for the same reason. Perhaps the "honor killings" of wives, daughters, or sisters may be delegitimized for without touching the most essential traditions. Unfortunately, some anti-feminine strictures, such as the idea that it takes the word of two women before a court to equal that of a man, exist in the general body of Muslim law. Any international campaign to right such wrongs must begin with the easier and move to the more difficult, but the world should develop a willingness to educate and retrain people away from moral underdevelopment as much as from material underdevelopment. This development strategy should also be introduced in the trusteeship period as described above. Such a use of "colonialism" was often practiced by the British, most famously by their prohibition of the Hindu suttee in India.
Revisiting Iraq
After a several days gap in postings, we should revisit the situation in Iraq. There has been a series of encouraging news items. The violence appears to be down. Coalition casualties are less than they were, although still substantial. The decline in coalition casualties also means a decline in Iraqi civilian casualties, although those caused by the insurgency remain at a high level. Another way of judging is by the number of incidents reported daily or weekly. These too seem to be down, although the military is worried by the size of some recent attacks, such as that on Abu Ghraib.
One of the most hopeful signs was a sermon by a leading Sunni opponent of the war telling young Sunni Arabs that they should join the new security services so that the community would not have to face so many evil people (read Kurds or Shi'a) in the new army and police forces. One could read this as no more than a plea for more insurgents to infiltrate these services, but no one seemed to read it that way.
On the political front, the parties seem to have finally gotten together so that the political process can move forward. They have selected a Sunni Arab speaker of the national assembly. They have selected a leader of the Kurdistan Alliance to be President, and a Sunni Arab (already in the interim government) and a Shi'a leader to be vice presidents. It is presumed that they will select al-Jaafari, a somewhat conservative Shi'a party leader, as the new Prime Minister.
These results have not gone over well with everyone. In spite of their lack of voting and consequent small representation in the Assembly, the Sunni Arabs seem to have gotten their share so far. The Kurds appear very happy, while others find this disturbing. They see the Kurds getting too much, which apparently means that they have gained some still not revealed assurances about the incorporation of the Kirkuk area and its oil into the Kurdish realm.
The greatest dissatisfaction is being expressed by those Shi'a and Kurds who demand that the interim government be replaced immediately by a government appointed by the new leadership. The reason is simmering hatred of the Allawi regime because it has allowed some of the old Baath members back into government positions. Their demands seem precipitous, coming before a new cabinet is established. More than that they reflect an unwillingness to accommodate the old ruling strata of the country, one of the primary groups behind the insurgency. For all its faults, the Allawi regime did hold out an olive branch to the Sunni Arabs, something these dissenters would evidently lop off.
Iraq is not in the clear yet, but it is getting there. The problems for the next few months are (1) resisting overly ambitious calls for American withdrawal, (2) writing a constitution giving the Kurds rights that they and the rest can live with, (3) finding an acceptable balance of secular/religious interests in the constitution, (4) reducing violence enough for the country's infrastructure to really make a recovery, and (5) holding a referendum on the new constitution (set for October, but it may be delayed), and then (6) electing a new assembly under the new constitution. The world wishes them well.
One of the most hopeful signs was a sermon by a leading Sunni opponent of the war telling young Sunni Arabs that they should join the new security services so that the community would not have to face so many evil people (read Kurds or Shi'a) in the new army and police forces. One could read this as no more than a plea for more insurgents to infiltrate these services, but no one seemed to read it that way.
On the political front, the parties seem to have finally gotten together so that the political process can move forward. They have selected a Sunni Arab speaker of the national assembly. They have selected a leader of the Kurdistan Alliance to be President, and a Sunni Arab (already in the interim government) and a Shi'a leader to be vice presidents. It is presumed that they will select al-Jaafari, a somewhat conservative Shi'a party leader, as the new Prime Minister.
These results have not gone over well with everyone. In spite of their lack of voting and consequent small representation in the Assembly, the Sunni Arabs seem to have gotten their share so far. The Kurds appear very happy, while others find this disturbing. They see the Kurds getting too much, which apparently means that they have gained some still not revealed assurances about the incorporation of the Kirkuk area and its oil into the Kurdish realm.
The greatest dissatisfaction is being expressed by those Shi'a and Kurds who demand that the interim government be replaced immediately by a government appointed by the new leadership. The reason is simmering hatred of the Allawi regime because it has allowed some of the old Baath members back into government positions. Their demands seem precipitous, coming before a new cabinet is established. More than that they reflect an unwillingness to accommodate the old ruling strata of the country, one of the primary groups behind the insurgency. For all its faults, the Allawi regime did hold out an olive branch to the Sunni Arabs, something these dissenters would evidently lop off.
Iraq is not in the clear yet, but it is getting there. The problems for the next few months are (1) resisting overly ambitious calls for American withdrawal, (2) writing a constitution giving the Kurds rights that they and the rest can live with, (3) finding an acceptable balance of secular/religious interests in the constitution, (4) reducing violence enough for the country's infrastructure to really make a recovery, and (5) holding a referendum on the new constitution (set for October, but it may be delayed), and then (6) electing a new assembly under the new constitution. The world wishes them well.
