Iraq and Afghanistan

As I have argued recently in these postings, the strength and health of the United States has an important influence on the near-term health of the world. This brings us to today's column by Kristof on what he calls the "Captains of Piracy". The compensation of top executives in American firms is now out of hand. If this pattern continues, the competitive position of the United States, and ultimately its economy, will be down the tubes. Kristof reports that the bonuses for CEOs rose last year by 46%, often irrespective of the performance of their institutions. Since 1993, the average pay of CEOs for the top 500 companies in Standard and Poors tripled to $10 million (many other countries, including Japan, Great Britain and Germany continue to pay much less). Paying such compensation is not a trivial expense, even for large companies. A recent Harvard study found that public companies today devote about 10% of their profits to compensating their top five executives, up from 6% in the mid 1990s. If we look at long term trends in the relation of ordinary worker pay to that of top executives we will find that in 1980 it was 42/1, in 1990 85/1, while today it stands at 301/1. These comparisons suggest that the United States is no longer either socially or economically competitive with the rest of the world. The insistence of the current Administration that even in the face of these great disparities, the country should reduce the tax burden on the richest of the rich is mind boggling.

It has been argued that the greatest strength of America is its "soft power", a term that some in the Administration pretend not to understand. Soft power is the power of example, the power that comes from being the society that the rest of the world wants to imitate. Anything that lessens the attractiveness of American society in the eyes of the world reduces the country's soft power. Ultimately this means that America will no longer be the country that everyone wants to move to, or at least be educated in. Our "superpower" status will be stripped of everything aside from the sheer military power that we can put into the field. As the economy sours as debt overcomes it and the dollar weakens, the forces we can field will no longer be so exceptional: we will no longer be able to play our role. And with no country in a position to replace us, the world will relapse into a melange of warring states, each trying to become "Number One".

The new Homelands Security Department under Michael Chertoff seems to be making a good start. The Department has come up with a reasonable list of the most likely terrorist and natural disasters that the country will have to face. Natural disasters are included in the list because they will have to be responded to in ways analogous to responses to terrorist attacks. Fifteen representative "nightmares" are defined, the casualties estimated, and the economic impact predicted. Some nightmares produce only fatalities and wounded, others have primarily, or in one case only, economic impact. The nightmares are: the detonation of a nuclear device in a large city; aerosolized anthrax released in several cities simultaneously; a flu pandemic spreading from China (not terrorist); pneumonic plague released in city facilities; chemical blister agent sprayed over a football stadium during a game; attack on oil refineries releasing massive amounts of toxic gas; release of sarin gas into the ventilation system of a large city; infiltration of an industrial storage facility leading to the blowing up of tank containing chlorine gas (17,500 dead); 7.2 magnitude earthquake on a fault running through a major city; category 5 hurricane hits major city; bombs set off with radioactive caesium at several points in a city; handmade bombs and suicide vehicles are used to attack a sports stadium and emergency room; liquid anthrax is used to contaminate ground beef; terrorists infect farm animals with foot and mouth disease at several locations (huge loss of livestock); cyber attacks on financial institutions over several weeks. One could argue with the list. But at least it is an attempt to consider a variety of dangers and then presumably game the responses of the many local and federal agencies that would be involved. One hopes that as far as the human-caused events are concerned the lists will help with developing counter strategies and tactics. One can only hope that such lists do not put ideas in the heads of potential terrorists whose response might be "Why didn't we think of that?" This is a danger that must be weighed, and we can only hope it was.

This list brings to mind the fact that we have not had a major attack in the country since 9/11. It is a very frightening list, for it would appear that many of the possible terrorist acts, and many others they bring to mind, would just not be that hard to organize and finance. Why, given the size of the Muslim community in this country (Arabs and otherwise), has not al-Qaida been able to recruit in this country the extremely small numbers necessary for terrorism or slip them through our still quite open borders? (This is not a statement that any significant part of the Arab or Muslim community should be thought to be potential traitors. If there are one and a half million Arabs in the country, I assume that not more than one percent, 15,000, would be open to radical Jihadist arguments, with one hundredth of one percent, or 150 persons, actually recruitable.) Yet as far as the pubic knows plans for such attacks in the United States have seldom if ever been discovered since 9/11. On the other hand, many such plots have been discovered in Spain recently, and some in France and elsewhere in Europe (although often these are more targeted, traditional terrorist attacks rather than ones meant to simply cause fatalities and destruction). This suggests that terrorist plots along some of these lines might have been discovered in this country since 9/11 without being publicized. Perhaps Spain is simply more up front about the achievements of their security forces.

Another possibility is that Bin Ladin, in spite of the fearlessness of his rhetoric, is actually not pushing too hard for another spectacular in this country. It may be that our efforts in Afghanistan to catch or kill him are at an "acceptable level" right now. He can live with them in some security. But he knows that after another spectacular we would come after him with little regard for the niceties of respecting borders or avoiding casualties in tribal areas. So, ironically, we might just have an unspoken agreement with al-Qaida that protects both our homeland and theirs. This would be a form of bargaining with terrorists that I had not considered.

In today's Times, Thomas Friedman points to the many fallacies in the way in which the present Administration interacts with China. He sees the most pressing problem to be the financial insolvency that we have been led into. For short-term political gain, the American government has allowed our deficit to balloon. In this crisis China, has become the second largest holder of American debt and its share its likely to rise. If it called in the "bill" during a Taiwan or other confrontation, the U.S. government would be hard pressed to do anything other than default. He also points out that China's growing thirst for oil is what drives plans for more Alaskan oil. His sources suggest that eventually China and India will drive prices above 100$ a barrel, putting more and more money into the hands of "some of the world's worst governments". Meanwhile the Administration is cutting the budget of the National Science Foundation, thereby making America less competitive in another dimension. Friedman does not even get into a discussion of the destruction of American manufacturing through the much too generous free trade policy, that hears no evil and sees no evil when it comes to China's wage, benefit, and environmental policies, or China's unwillingness to control the stealing of intellectual property by its citizens.

Clearly, Friedman believes that we must put our house in order and regain scientific leadership. he suggests, among other things, that we place a $1 a gallon tax on gasoline to help close our budget gap and reduce dependence on the oil producing countries.

I would add another thought. We need to improve the balance in the world before our necessarily brief stint at the helm of affairs passes away. Here's one way. The United States has been improving its relations with India, offering, for example, help with a nuclear plant to improve its energy situation. At the same time, India is improving its relations with Iran and Pakistan. This latter has reached the point where there is an active plan to develop a gas pipeline across Pakistan, for the benefit of Iran, Pakistan and India. The United States opposes this out of its general hatred of Iran and its fear of its nuclear program (analogous to the programs that we have effectively now approved for Pakistan and India). The suggestion is that the United States make a conscious decision to strengthen South Asia as a counterweight to China. Pakistan and India are now in a friendly "cricket" phase. Both are deemphasizing their religious differences. We should make every effort to support this process, not heavy handedly, but quietly by our actions. This would be a major way to help support the development in a large part of the world while lessening the danger that China poses to all its neighbors, as well as the United States, in the long run.

A knowledgeable commentator on North Korea points out that none of its neighbors are pushing for change in its execrable political system any time soon. The reasons are many. First, there is no evidence that there are any individuals or institutions that would be able to take over if the current regime fell. There is practically no independent business class. The army is the favored institution, but its leaders have shown no managerial or creative capability. Everyone is so used to simply doing and saying what the government demands that it is doubtful that there could be any short-term adjustment. The most likely immediate result of a government collapse would be a worsening of the availability of food, medicines and other supplies, with no one equipped to receive or distribute what aid came in. For these reasons, and because of the past behavior of the North Koreans, South Korea and China, and to a lesser extent even Japan, can expect millions of destitute North Koreans to flood across the country's borders after a breakdown of the Kim family regime.

Meanwhile, there is some evidence that the North Koreans are at last beginning to get at least a little information on what is happening in the outside world. Yesterday's paper reports that cell phones are being used along the Chinese border by many people. (They bury them in their gardens when not in use to avoid police sweeps.) Chinese merchants smuggled thousands of used video recorders across the northern border after DVDs replaced them in Manchuria. Somehow tapes of South Korean movies and music have come in along with the video players. They have become so popular that Pyongyang has launched propaganda campaigns inveighing against the foreign styles in clothing, language, and other customs that people pick up from the tape recorders. This is, of course, all illegal. A favorite tactic of the police is to surround an area, cut off the electricity, and then move in. As a result they are able to arrest many whose video player stopped in the middle and they were unable to get the banned tapes out of them. The main effect that the tapes have, however, is not the transmission of styles but rather the transmission of backgrounds that show a society in the south that is infinitely better off than that in the north. The claim that North Korea has created a "worker's paradise" rings increasingly hollow.

It would seem to me that the Kim family regime cannot long remain in its present form. The next generation is coming on, and the "Dear Leader"'s three sons are said to be contesting the succession. Perhaps this is the opening for change. Military commanders, no matter how servile, have in other situations grabbed power in crises. This might also happen. A popular movement might suddenly arise around some incident leading quickly to uncontrollable crowds in the streets. This seems highly unlikely to experts, but it is still a possible route. History suggests that all it takes is for a repressive regime to lose its confidence in such a crisis, to hesitate. There is probably such a wealth of suppressed hatred among the North Korean people that any opening, any softening, ironically any showing of respect for human rights, could lead to an explosion. In any event, the United States should be engaged in urgent negotiations with all of North Korea's neighbors on the definition of possible transition scenarios and the ways in which the United States and neighboring states could most effectively respond during and after a transition crisis. It would be a sad commentary on the world if the streets of Pyongyang were one day running in blood while the rest of the world stood by timidly watching until the last resister was hunted down.

In the latest edition of IISS's "Strategic Comments" series, a summary is offered of the state of the Iraqi insurgency as well as thoughts on how well we are doing. Let me paraphrase, and comment on, what it has to say.

First, the insurgency is continuing at a vicious rate. (The viciousness is particularly serious for the Iraqis. To put our 1500 military deaths in perspective, I note that today's paper reminds us that in 35 days, 6800 marines were killed on Iwo Jima toward the end of World War II.) Deaths of Iraqis are a much more serious problem. Leaving aside those killed in the initial invasion, the figure is probably well above 25,000. Over 3000 Iraqi security personnel have been killed since last June. Other civilian casualties continue at a high rate, with attacks increasingly targeting the Shi'a. Infrastructure attacks have also been increasing recently. The summary also points out Iraq's extraordinary murder rate (killings not directly connected to the insurgency: 90 per 100,000 — the next highest rate in the region is Jordan's 7 per 100,000). One of the reasons the Iraqis have been so against us in many areas has been the rise in ordinary crime of all kinds.

Intelligence on the size and nature of insurgent forces remains very poor. The balance between the Islamists and the Baath is unclear, as is the difference this actually makes. Many participants are simply criminals doing it for the money (and pay per incident has been greatly inflated recently). But many are also suicide bombers, and these are presumably not doing it for the money.

Clearly, the United States has decided to shift the bulk of the fighting to the Iraqis, but it has not been very successful in doing this. They still have few effective units aside for the Kurdish Peshmerga. We would also like to "fight" the war politically. American commanders are apparently trying to negotiate in secret with the Baathists, but with what results we do not know. They apparently had more success with al-Sadr. Most commentators believe that we clearly need more troops. But in view of other commitments, we do not have excess forces to send to Iraq and this situation is not about to change.

We are now in a box that is hard to get out of. Soon we are likely to be asked to come home, both by the Iraqis and by American Congressmen. Yet we have a long way to go before the violence is sufficiently under control to turn it over to the Iraqis. A consoling thought is that the problems may be as severe on the other side. According to today's Times, the "al-Qaida in Iraq" (Zarqawi) organization on its web site shows increasing concern that the Iraqis are no longer understanding their mission. They repeatedly try to explain why they are still killing. Recent arrests of Baath leaders in Syria and the possible change in Syrian willingness to cooperate also offers a glimmer of hope.