Saturday, February 26, 2005
President Bush and the Campaign for Democracy
Almost inadvertently Bush has become the "democracy president", or perhaps better "the world campaign for democracy president". He has done more to harm than help the fundamental concepts and assumptions of democracy in this country. Yet he strides the international stage as the great hero of democratization. It is an inadvertent role because without 9/11 the small group of neocons in the White House that loom so large today would not have played a major role in his administration, except perhaps for a part in strengthening the pro-Israeli inclinations of the government.
After 9/11, Bush managed with the help of local warlords to drive the Taliban into a minor role in Afghanistan. The new government in Kabul is not firmly in power, but it has done well in the circumstances and Karzai has been legitimately elected President. In Iraq, at great cost to all concerned Bush has managed to bring the country out from under the control of a monstrous dictatorship, hold elections, and proceed on a road toward democracy. There may be many ruts still to navigate in this road. But so far we and the great majority of the Iraqi people are moving forward.
He has used this motion, and the reverberations of his own simplistic rhetoric, to expand his goals to the democratization of the Middle East, and beyond that to the democratization of the world. He goes, for example, to Europe to mend fences with his insulted and recalcitrant allies and the even more difficult Russians. He succeeds in some measure. But beyond this he makes the theme of his trip support for democratization, with an appeal to the Europeans to join with him. He then lectures Putin on the ways in which he has not lived up to the democratic ideals that he expects to characterize European states. He ties this discussion together in a way that suggests that Putin and Russia should be accepted as full-fledged participants in Europe if they do live up to these ideals. He has developed an approach to foreign aid to the underdeveloped world that is meant to reward countries that control corruption and move in a democratic direction. (Of course, he includes in his definition of democracy a "free market" and other shibboleths of his ideology.)
In the Middle East, reports from many countries indicate that the hatred engendered by the attack on Iraq has been partly replaced by growing interest in democratic reforms in many countries. Saudi Arabia has held local elections, a small step but an important one for them. The Palestinians have held the most democratic election in their history. And relations between Palestine and Israel are again on an upswing. In Lebanon, the assassination of a leader has led to a massive movement bent on restoring democracy to the country. This morning we read that Rice has refused to attend a planned meeting in Egypt because of the recent jailing of an Egyptian opposition leader. Gestures such as this will play well in much of the region, inspiring hope that American rhetoric is more than simply propaganda.
The emerging reality is that President Bush could go down in history as the American who democratized the world. If so, his performance will echo that of Reagan, for like Reagan he has been disparaged by the knowledgeable for his foolishness and his ideological blinders. With all these failings, and perhaps partly because of them, he accomplished great things on the world stage (taking the principal steps that led to the dissolution of the USSR). If we do begin a sustainable movement toward universal democracy under Bush, it will confuse and infuriate many Democrats, including myself. How can the actions of such a simpleton, such a liar, a person who misled the American people and tried to mislead the world end up benefiting humankind? Perhaps we better let the future sort this out.
A major reason for Bush's success is the fact that we are more than most Americans realize actually the only superpower, the only state that the rest of the world needs to take seriously. The leading states of the past seem pretty feckless today. On the shore of the Atlantic, some of them have put together Europe, which is good for them, but the effort has sapped their international energies. Japan is still a great economic power, but beyond that it carries little weight. The comers, China, and later India, have not yet reached the point where they can have competitive influence on the international stage. Thus, Bush and his successors may continue for some years to be able to make peoples everywhere respond to their every word. Carried forward responsibly, an era under our hegemony could be good for all peoples. But this era will have continuity only if we can maintain the basis at home that makes it possible. If the Administration fails to live up to its financial, economic, and social responsibilities, a crisis of confidence will spread at home and abroad. If the home base of this great superpower falters because of a combination of debt and inadequate spending, its overseas adventures and marvels may wither as the base that makes them possible shrinks.
After 9/11, Bush managed with the help of local warlords to drive the Taliban into a minor role in Afghanistan. The new government in Kabul is not firmly in power, but it has done well in the circumstances and Karzai has been legitimately elected President. In Iraq, at great cost to all concerned Bush has managed to bring the country out from under the control of a monstrous dictatorship, hold elections, and proceed on a road toward democracy. There may be many ruts still to navigate in this road. But so far we and the great majority of the Iraqi people are moving forward.
He has used this motion, and the reverberations of his own simplistic rhetoric, to expand his goals to the democratization of the Middle East, and beyond that to the democratization of the world. He goes, for example, to Europe to mend fences with his insulted and recalcitrant allies and the even more difficult Russians. He succeeds in some measure. But beyond this he makes the theme of his trip support for democratization, with an appeal to the Europeans to join with him. He then lectures Putin on the ways in which he has not lived up to the democratic ideals that he expects to characterize European states. He ties this discussion together in a way that suggests that Putin and Russia should be accepted as full-fledged participants in Europe if they do live up to these ideals. He has developed an approach to foreign aid to the underdeveloped world that is meant to reward countries that control corruption and move in a democratic direction. (Of course, he includes in his definition of democracy a "free market" and other shibboleths of his ideology.)
In the Middle East, reports from many countries indicate that the hatred engendered by the attack on Iraq has been partly replaced by growing interest in democratic reforms in many countries. Saudi Arabia has held local elections, a small step but an important one for them. The Palestinians have held the most democratic election in their history. And relations between Palestine and Israel are again on an upswing. In Lebanon, the assassination of a leader has led to a massive movement bent on restoring democracy to the country. This morning we read that Rice has refused to attend a planned meeting in Egypt because of the recent jailing of an Egyptian opposition leader. Gestures such as this will play well in much of the region, inspiring hope that American rhetoric is more than simply propaganda.
The emerging reality is that President Bush could go down in history as the American who democratized the world. If so, his performance will echo that of Reagan, for like Reagan he has been disparaged by the knowledgeable for his foolishness and his ideological blinders. With all these failings, and perhaps partly because of them, he accomplished great things on the world stage (taking the principal steps that led to the dissolution of the USSR). If we do begin a sustainable movement toward universal democracy under Bush, it will confuse and infuriate many Democrats, including myself. How can the actions of such a simpleton, such a liar, a person who misled the American people and tried to mislead the world end up benefiting humankind? Perhaps we better let the future sort this out.
A major reason for Bush's success is the fact that we are more than most Americans realize actually the only superpower, the only state that the rest of the world needs to take seriously. The leading states of the past seem pretty feckless today. On the shore of the Atlantic, some of them have put together Europe, which is good for them, but the effort has sapped their international energies. Japan is still a great economic power, but beyond that it carries little weight. The comers, China, and later India, have not yet reached the point where they can have competitive influence on the international stage. Thus, Bush and his successors may continue for some years to be able to make peoples everywhere respond to their every word. Carried forward responsibly, an era under our hegemony could be good for all peoples. But this era will have continuity only if we can maintain the basis at home that makes it possible. If the Administration fails to live up to its financial, economic, and social responsibilities, a crisis of confidence will spread at home and abroad. If the home base of this great superpower falters because of a combination of debt and inadequate spending, its overseas adventures and marvels may wither as the base that makes them possible shrinks.
Wednesday, February 23, 2005
Massive Humanitarian Crimes and American Passivity
In today's paper, Kristof again attacks what he calls the genocide in Darfur, a province of western Sudan. He shows pictures and tells us again that as a country we must respond. He briefly lists what he calls the "technical answers", including trial of the leaders at the International Court at the Hague, sanctions against Sudan, freezing the assets of Sudanese leaders etc. But he argues that what we need to stop the genocide is not technical solutions but "indignation", an answer that he apparently expects to be expressed through letters to Congressmen.
My feeling is that no matter how terrible the crimes, indignation won't get us very far if we do not have an effective solution in mind. The problem in Rwanda was not just that the world was inattentive, but that Western leaders were understandably hesitant to start off on open-ended adventures in Africa, no matter how grounded and funded. It is significant that the problems in Rwanda were largely resolved only after Tutsi forces were able to retake the country. Serious fighting and crime continues across the border in the Congo (with perhaps more victims than in Darfur), but the level in Rwanda itself is acceptable. The international presence that has been established in Congo is insufficient to accomplish much; the troops sent in are so undisciplined that they have themselves become part of the problem.
This suggests to me that we must build solutions wherever possible around identifying a local actor and going with it, even if the actor is not perfect either morally or organizationally.
We should remember the Kurds we protected in their mountains in the 1990s with the no-fly zone and the Albanians we protected largely through the use of air power. Using such examples, we need to develop a set of strategies, accompanied by the identification of the necessary forces and matériel, that would be able to provide rapid protection to areas such as Darfur. In Kurdistan, our support worked because we stuck to our policy and the Kurds had enough forces on the ground to uphold their end. The Darfur independence movements are more doubtful. But they have been in the field for some years and they have a direct and real interest in the outcome. We should make a decision to both support them and protect them, with the commitment of no more than minimal American force on the ground. Use of air power here is difficult because of the distances, but relatively easy because of the lack of cover in the relatively treeless area. The "protection" would extend to the considerable international charitable work that is being carried on today in Darfur and Chad under very difficult conditions. Ideally, we would intervene with the assistance of NATO, the United Nations or the African Union. But the fact is these potential allies have a poor track record of actually doing anything. African forces are in Darfur now, but they are not doing much.
First, we would hope to stabilize the situation. Then we would food and medical assistance and local development reach a sustainable poverty level. The goal in the long run would be a vote for independence under outside supervision somewhat as happened in East Timor. To move forward effectively, we would need to mend or maintain fences with the larger African and Arab world. Their leaders condemn actions against an African state or a Muslim state etc. Our job would be to simply point out to them the gravity of the situation, reiterating that everyone affected is both African and Muslim (unlike what was happening in Southern Sudan).
One should note that we should regularly draw clear policy distinctions between situations that "deserve" outside intervention because of the gravity of the crimes against the people. The Taliban invited our intervention by their record, even leaving aside 9/11. In a sense Saddam did deserve what he got. Certainly the leaders of North Korea will deserve whatever happens to them. (The feckless leaders of the Congos deserve intervention but not for the same reasons.) We should make clear that only a very high level of inhumane behavior will cause the United States to intervene. (This certainly does not include situations like that in Iran. Iran's leaders are not torturing and killing en masse or willfully neglecting the interests of their people.) We need by our actions and pronouncements over a period of years to develop these distinctions, so that when we need the world leaders to believe what we say our purposes are when we intervene, enough of them will.
My feeling is that no matter how terrible the crimes, indignation won't get us very far if we do not have an effective solution in mind. The problem in Rwanda was not just that the world was inattentive, but that Western leaders were understandably hesitant to start off on open-ended adventures in Africa, no matter how grounded and funded. It is significant that the problems in Rwanda were largely resolved only after Tutsi forces were able to retake the country. Serious fighting and crime continues across the border in the Congo (with perhaps more victims than in Darfur), but the level in Rwanda itself is acceptable. The international presence that has been established in Congo is insufficient to accomplish much; the troops sent in are so undisciplined that they have themselves become part of the problem.
This suggests to me that we must build solutions wherever possible around identifying a local actor and going with it, even if the actor is not perfect either morally or organizationally.
We should remember the Kurds we protected in their mountains in the 1990s with the no-fly zone and the Albanians we protected largely through the use of air power. Using such examples, we need to develop a set of strategies, accompanied by the identification of the necessary forces and matériel, that would be able to provide rapid protection to areas such as Darfur. In Kurdistan, our support worked because we stuck to our policy and the Kurds had enough forces on the ground to uphold their end. The Darfur independence movements are more doubtful. But they have been in the field for some years and they have a direct and real interest in the outcome. We should make a decision to both support them and protect them, with the commitment of no more than minimal American force on the ground. Use of air power here is difficult because of the distances, but relatively easy because of the lack of cover in the relatively treeless area. The "protection" would extend to the considerable international charitable work that is being carried on today in Darfur and Chad under very difficult conditions. Ideally, we would intervene with the assistance of NATO, the United Nations or the African Union. But the fact is these potential allies have a poor track record of actually doing anything. African forces are in Darfur now, but they are not doing much.
First, we would hope to stabilize the situation. Then we would food and medical assistance and local development reach a sustainable poverty level. The goal in the long run would be a vote for independence under outside supervision somewhat as happened in East Timor. To move forward effectively, we would need to mend or maintain fences with the larger African and Arab world. Their leaders condemn actions against an African state or a Muslim state etc. Our job would be to simply point out to them the gravity of the situation, reiterating that everyone affected is both African and Muslim (unlike what was happening in Southern Sudan).
One should note that we should regularly draw clear policy distinctions between situations that "deserve" outside intervention because of the gravity of the crimes against the people. The Taliban invited our intervention by their record, even leaving aside 9/11. In a sense Saddam did deserve what he got. Certainly the leaders of North Korea will deserve whatever happens to them. (The feckless leaders of the Congos deserve intervention but not for the same reasons.) We should make clear that only a very high level of inhumane behavior will cause the United States to intervene. (This certainly does not include situations like that in Iran. Iran's leaders are not torturing and killing en masse or willfully neglecting the interests of their people.) We need by our actions and pronouncements over a period of years to develop these distinctions, so that when we need the world leaders to believe what we say our purposes are when we intervene, enough of them will.
Tuesday, February 22, 2005
Iraq: The Insurgency's Continuing Success
Yesterday's newspaper offered some sobering information on the state of the insurgency. A Brooking's Institute analysis of the state of the war, regularly updated with new information, shows that in most economic, opinion, and casualty measures, there has been remarkably little gain. Of course, this is looking at January as the last data entry point and so fails to record much that is relevant about the election period and its immediate aftermath. Nevertheless, fuel availability and electricity supply have declined over the last few months. Iraqi civilian casualties have gone up. The percentage of Iraqis wanting the Americans to withdraw quickly has gone up while optimism has gone down (again this does not reflect the election results adequately). The only remarkable improvements have been in consumer items such as increases in telephone subscribers and car traffic. There has been a modest increase in the estimate of the number of actually effective Iraqi security forces. Yet the number of insurgent leaders still at large has declined only slightly.
This analysis dovetails with another report in the same paper that the insurgency has changed its focus. Concentration is now on destroying infrastructure, especially water and electricity, in Baghdad and its environs. They are striking simultaneously at so many points that it is hard for the government to keep up. All agree theirs is a markedly successful and well-planned effort, probably advised by Saddam's former officials in these sectors. Defense against this kind of attack is notably difficult and the government and American side seem somewhat confused as to how to respond. In addition to these strikes, the suicide bomb campaign now focuses mainly on Shiites, particularly those frequenting mosques. This is apparently the work of the Jihadists, intent on starting a religious war which they are sure they would win. The simultaneous reduction in attacks on Americans probably results in part from the fact that casualties taken in such actions take too high a toll on insurgent forces.
The insurgency appears to be bankrolled, and in part directed, from Syria. Most of the Jihadists recruited in Europe, especially for suicide missions, appear to come through Syria. Now we have an opportunity, especially after the revulsion in much of the world at the Lebanese bombing, and the relatively good international press leading up an elected Iraqi government, to press the Syrians much harder. More pressure should be put on them to effectively close their borders, and arrest or expel from the country those persons helping support the insurgency. The funds of the insurgents now residing in Syrian banks could also be frozen.
This analysis dovetails with another report in the same paper that the insurgency has changed its focus. Concentration is now on destroying infrastructure, especially water and electricity, in Baghdad and its environs. They are striking simultaneously at so many points that it is hard for the government to keep up. All agree theirs is a markedly successful and well-planned effort, probably advised by Saddam's former officials in these sectors. Defense against this kind of attack is notably difficult and the government and American side seem somewhat confused as to how to respond. In addition to these strikes, the suicide bomb campaign now focuses mainly on Shiites, particularly those frequenting mosques. This is apparently the work of the Jihadists, intent on starting a religious war which they are sure they would win. The simultaneous reduction in attacks on Americans probably results in part from the fact that casualties taken in such actions take too high a toll on insurgent forces.
The insurgency appears to be bankrolled, and in part directed, from Syria. Most of the Jihadists recruited in Europe, especially for suicide missions, appear to come through Syria. Now we have an opportunity, especially after the revulsion in much of the world at the Lebanese bombing, and the relatively good international press leading up an elected Iraqi government, to press the Syrians much harder. More pressure should be put on them to effectively close their borders, and arrest or expel from the country those persons helping support the insurgency. The funds of the insurgents now residing in Syrian banks could also be frozen.
Iraq Election Aftermath: Jockeying for Prime Minister
The Iraq expert Juan Cole sums up the election results as follows:
United Iraqi Alliance 140 seats 51 percent
Kurdish Alliance 75 seats 27 percent
Iraqiya (Allawi) 40 seats 14.5 percent
Iraqiyyun (Ghazi al-Yawir) 5 seats 1.8 percent
Cadres and Chosen (Sadr) 3 seats 1 percent
Turkmen National Front 3 seats 1 percent
Islamic Action Council (Shiite) 2 seats 0.7 percent
Communists 2 seats 0.7 percent
Kurdish Islamic Bloc 2 seats 0.7 percent
National Democratic Alliance 1 seat 0.3 percent
Mesopotamian National (Christian) 1 seat 0.3 percent
Welfare and Liberation (Juburi) 1 seat 0.3 percent
A few comments on the list. The United Iraqi Alliance is the group put together by Ayatollah Sistani so that the Shiites could form a united front for the election. Its two main groups are the DAWA (itself divided) and SCIRI. The Iraqi National Congress of Chalabi was included and it may have won ten seats. The members of all these parties were forced largely into exile by Saddam. In the case of SCIRI, they went primarily to Iran and many of its supporters are thought to be, or accused of being, close to the Iranian government. Sistani appears to have wanted to be sure that expatriates did not dominate the result, so reduced the numbers placed near the top of election lists that were from these parties. The result is that even taken together they do not form a majority of the UIA's 140. Another note is that Muqtada al-Sadr played a very complicated role. One the one hand he opposed voting and some of his people still say the election was illegitimate; on another hand, he was given a major share in the UIA's winning list (15 or more); on the third hand, 3 seats went to "Cadres and Chosen", a Sadrist party that may or may not support Muqtada. Iraqiya is a secular party headed by the present PM, Allawi; Iraqiyyun is headed by the present President, Yawir. It is interesting to note that the secular vote was quite large. By and large we can include as secularists the Kurdish Alliance, Allawi's group, the Communists, the Christians, and Chalabi's faction within the UIA. There are surely others within the lists of the winners, particularly women. This means fifty percent or more of those elected (275) may well be secularists.
What Cole in his latest posting finds hard to understand is why Jaafari from the Dawa has not been acclaimed yet by the UIA as its consensus candidate for PM. Chalabi's candidacy still seems to have a chance and Cole finds this surprising. In fact, earlier on, Cole said that Chalabi had no chance. (Cole always downplays Chalabi and apparently hates him.) One reason he adduces for Jaafari's failure to win by acclamation is that by law 46 of the UIA seats had to be given to women and women are very suspicious of anything that sounds like what went on in Iran. Chalabi may be able to pick up as supporters many of the women, the Kurdish Islamic Bloc (Shiite) and, strangely, the seats won by Muqtada (strangely, because he is the most fundamentalist of the Shi'as).
With the Sunni Arabs and the Kurds lying in wait in the wings as the Shiites try to work out their candidate for Prime Minister, the end result, and even more what the end result portends, is far from clear.
United Iraqi Alliance 140 seats 51 percent
Kurdish Alliance 75 seats 27 percent
Iraqiya (Allawi) 40 seats 14.5 percent
Iraqiyyun (Ghazi al-Yawir) 5 seats 1.8 percent
Cadres and Chosen (Sadr) 3 seats 1 percent
Turkmen National Front 3 seats 1 percent
Islamic Action Council (Shiite) 2 seats 0.7 percent
Communists 2 seats 0.7 percent
Kurdish Islamic Bloc 2 seats 0.7 percent
National Democratic Alliance 1 seat 0.3 percent
Mesopotamian National (Christian) 1 seat 0.3 percent
Welfare and Liberation (Juburi) 1 seat 0.3 percent
A few comments on the list. The United Iraqi Alliance is the group put together by Ayatollah Sistani so that the Shiites could form a united front for the election. Its two main groups are the DAWA (itself divided) and SCIRI. The Iraqi National Congress of Chalabi was included and it may have won ten seats. The members of all these parties were forced largely into exile by Saddam. In the case of SCIRI, they went primarily to Iran and many of its supporters are thought to be, or accused of being, close to the Iranian government. Sistani appears to have wanted to be sure that expatriates did not dominate the result, so reduced the numbers placed near the top of election lists that were from these parties. The result is that even taken together they do not form a majority of the UIA's 140. Another note is that Muqtada al-Sadr played a very complicated role. One the one hand he opposed voting and some of his people still say the election was illegitimate; on another hand, he was given a major share in the UIA's winning list (15 or more); on the third hand, 3 seats went to "Cadres and Chosen", a Sadrist party that may or may not support Muqtada. Iraqiya is a secular party headed by the present PM, Allawi; Iraqiyyun is headed by the present President, Yawir. It is interesting to note that the secular vote was quite large. By and large we can include as secularists the Kurdish Alliance, Allawi's group, the Communists, the Christians, and Chalabi's faction within the UIA. There are surely others within the lists of the winners, particularly women. This means fifty percent or more of those elected (275) may well be secularists.
What Cole in his latest posting finds hard to understand is why Jaafari from the Dawa has not been acclaimed yet by the UIA as its consensus candidate for PM. Chalabi's candidacy still seems to have a chance and Cole finds this surprising. In fact, earlier on, Cole said that Chalabi had no chance. (Cole always downplays Chalabi and apparently hates him.) One reason he adduces for Jaafari's failure to win by acclamation is that by law 46 of the UIA seats had to be given to women and women are very suspicious of anything that sounds like what went on in Iran. Chalabi may be able to pick up as supporters many of the women, the Kurdish Islamic Bloc (Shiite) and, strangely, the seats won by Muqtada (strangely, because he is the most fundamentalist of the Shi'as).
With the Sunni Arabs and the Kurds lying in wait in the wings as the Shiites try to work out their candidate for Prime Minister, the end result, and even more what the end result portends, is far from clear.
