Saturday, February 05, 2005
Gross Pentagon Incompetency
An Op-Ed in Friday’s Times discusses in detail the lack of medical services at the Abu Ghraib prison. This was not an occasional or early-on problem. It was a day in and day out problem over a period of months. It turns out that the medical people accepted the idea of putting a leash on some of the more psychotic prisoners because they had no psychologist to prescribe antipsychotic drugs and they lacked the usual restraining devices. More generally, the prison hospital lacked basic supplies. It often ran out of intravenous fluids and even had a dentist do a heart surgery. When they ran out of the standard blood sugar tests, they simply guessed the right dose of insulin from the appearance of the patients.
This is only the latest chapter in a long history of Pentagon incompetence attending the Iraq adventure. It started back when the SecDef told his people to ignore the State Department’s well thought out plan for what to do after the invasion. This led to confusion in planning at the start. After one poorly planned false start on the civilian side, Bremer was brought in to run the show. One of his first actions was to disband the Iraqi Army and dismiss all people from leading positions in the civil service that had Baath Party connections. Since in Saddam’s Iraq nearly everyone with any education worked for the government, this meant that the best and the brightest and well as hundreds of thousands of less well endowed were suddenly out of work. It also meant that a large part of the populace understood their pensions to be cancelled. This disenfranchised group became the heart of the insurgency and has remained so.
Lack of planning, of thinking through what might happen, led to a more general inability to imagine any problems after attaining a quick victory. The most critical mistake was to underestimate the force that was needed in the field (several generals had this right but no one was listening: Rumsfeld’s light and nimble modern army was the fashion of the day). This led to sending insufficient forces to Iraq. This meant in the first instance that the thin forces that had to hold Baghdad initially had neither the ability nor the orders to protect the country’s archaeological heritage from looting — even though looting on a smaller scale had accompanied the first Gulf War. Lack of adequate planning also included the failure to provide body armor for many soldiers in the field. This led to many people raising money in the States to purchase body armor for their soldiers. Poor planning and inadequate forces in the field led to a massive failure to secure ammunition storage sites throughout the country. It is true these were more numerous than anyone expected, but still when the military learned of the existence of unsecured major sites, many continued to be left unguarded. Even in recent months, we have been told again and again that the vehicles used to transport our military have not been armed adequately — this more than a year after we learned from experience the insurgency’s widespread use of roadside bombs. Even today, one notes in photographs from the front that vehicles often have jury-rigged armor plates bolted on to them.
These massive failures of planning and inability to respond to what was happening in the field should be investigated in full by the military forces, the Pentagon, and Congress. An honest evaluation and accounting may require waiting until a new Administration comes into office. It may not. There are several top Republicans very concerned about the record. As a result of the bungling, many Americans and Iraqis have unnecessarily lost their lives. The war has been unnecessarily drawn out. It has been unnecessarily costly. Before such incompetence is confronted and remedies are carried out, we should never again take off on such an adventure, no matter how appealing it might seem. Let’s put our dreams in quarantine until we are prepared to fully accept their costs and implications.
This is only the latest chapter in a long history of Pentagon incompetence attending the Iraq adventure. It started back when the SecDef told his people to ignore the State Department’s well thought out plan for what to do after the invasion. This led to confusion in planning at the start. After one poorly planned false start on the civilian side, Bremer was brought in to run the show. One of his first actions was to disband the Iraqi Army and dismiss all people from leading positions in the civil service that had Baath Party connections. Since in Saddam’s Iraq nearly everyone with any education worked for the government, this meant that the best and the brightest and well as hundreds of thousands of less well endowed were suddenly out of work. It also meant that a large part of the populace understood their pensions to be cancelled. This disenfranchised group became the heart of the insurgency and has remained so.
Lack of planning, of thinking through what might happen, led to a more general inability to imagine any problems after attaining a quick victory. The most critical mistake was to underestimate the force that was needed in the field (several generals had this right but no one was listening: Rumsfeld’s light and nimble modern army was the fashion of the day). This led to sending insufficient forces to Iraq. This meant in the first instance that the thin forces that had to hold Baghdad initially had neither the ability nor the orders to protect the country’s archaeological heritage from looting — even though looting on a smaller scale had accompanied the first Gulf War. Lack of adequate planning also included the failure to provide body armor for many soldiers in the field. This led to many people raising money in the States to purchase body armor for their soldiers. Poor planning and inadequate forces in the field led to a massive failure to secure ammunition storage sites throughout the country. It is true these were more numerous than anyone expected, but still when the military learned of the existence of unsecured major sites, many continued to be left unguarded. Even in recent months, we have been told again and again that the vehicles used to transport our military have not been armed adequately — this more than a year after we learned from experience the insurgency’s widespread use of roadside bombs. Even today, one notes in photographs from the front that vehicles often have jury-rigged armor plates bolted on to them.
These massive failures of planning and inability to respond to what was happening in the field should be investigated in full by the military forces, the Pentagon, and Congress. An honest evaluation and accounting may require waiting until a new Administration comes into office. It may not. There are several top Republicans very concerned about the record. As a result of the bungling, many Americans and Iraqis have unnecessarily lost their lives. The war has been unnecessarily drawn out. It has been unnecessarily costly. Before such incompetence is confronted and remedies are carried out, we should never again take off on such an adventure, no matter how appealing it might seem. Let’s put our dreams in quarantine until we are prepared to fully accept their costs and implications.
The Brutality and Viciousness of the American Military and Police
The recently reported speech of an American General in San Diego that sometimes it was just fun to shoot people has received the usual warning from generals higher up in the command structure, as well as a great deal of negative public commentary. However, what anyone who values humanity and morality must realize is that many people in our military service, the police at all levels in this country, and those employed in local, state, and federal prisons have a vicious streak that is only with difficulty kept under control. This is widely understood, and even sometimes applauded by the general public. While the media were tut tuting about the treatment of prisoners in Abu Ghraib, as well as similar behavior in other restraining areas set up to assist our “war against terrorism”, I have heard ordinary people with no military connection say, in effect, “they had it coming to them”, “this happens in war” etc.
As a civilized society we must try to reduce such events on three fronts. First, we must of course enter into any war with great reluctance, be prepared to finish it quickly, and to return any prisoners we may have to their societies. Sheer time in the field and length of contact is one of the greatest culprits. Secondly, we must make clear by example that the American government respects international agreements meant to reduce unnecessary killing and brutality in war. This commitment must be communicated down the chain of command, and to all those services such as the CIA that also employ violence. This has not been adequately done. Officers higher up the command structure, civilian or military, must be held responsible for lapses and punished adequately.
Finally, we must make it clear to the American people that the abusing of people in custody, whether in a military or civilian setting is a serious crime. Allowing the International Court to have jurisdiction over Americans would help bring home the lesson. But baring this, we must improve the means by which we employ and keep employed persons in police or prison work within the United States. I realize that these are not jobs most people want. But I also realize that in many communities these are positions that run in families and characterize certain subcommunities. It is in these that the most unfortunate attitudes toward the “other” are passed on from older to younger until a culture develops in which almost anything goes. This was, in fact, one of the aspects of what happened at Abu Ghraib. More must be done to break this cycle, to reform such subcultures, perhaps even to exclude people with certain backgrounds from such work.
As a civilized society we must try to reduce such events on three fronts. First, we must of course enter into any war with great reluctance, be prepared to finish it quickly, and to return any prisoners we may have to their societies. Sheer time in the field and length of contact is one of the greatest culprits. Secondly, we must make clear by example that the American government respects international agreements meant to reduce unnecessary killing and brutality in war. This commitment must be communicated down the chain of command, and to all those services such as the CIA that also employ violence. This has not been adequately done. Officers higher up the command structure, civilian or military, must be held responsible for lapses and punished adequately.
Finally, we must make it clear to the American people that the abusing of people in custody, whether in a military or civilian setting is a serious crime. Allowing the International Court to have jurisdiction over Americans would help bring home the lesson. But baring this, we must improve the means by which we employ and keep employed persons in police or prison work within the United States. I realize that these are not jobs most people want. But I also realize that in many communities these are positions that run in families and characterize certain subcommunities. It is in these that the most unfortunate attitudes toward the “other” are passed on from older to younger until a culture develops in which almost anything goes. This was, in fact, one of the aspects of what happened at Abu Ghraib. More must be done to break this cycle, to reform such subcultures, perhaps even to exclude people with certain backgrounds from such work.
Wednesday, February 02, 2005
Kurdistan Again
Yesterday Peter Galbraith wrote an impassioned plea for an essentially autonomous Kurdistan. Today Leslie Gelb follows it up with a less clear but nevertheless supporting case for a constitution that writes in a large role for the Kurds. This has been something that Galbraith (sometimes with Gelb) has been promoting for a long time. It seems to go back to his experience in Yugoslavia where the country was blown apart because it could not accommodate such ethno-nationalist longings.
Galbraith was one of the first to blow the whistle on the use of chemical weapons against the Kurds. He has worked on the problems of East Timor as well as Iraq and Yugoslavia and is now associated with an institution committed to the struggle against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. He has lately been mounting quite a campaign. One of his arguments for Iraq is that our other more pressing security concerns, such as that relating to nuclear proliferation, compels us to rapidly develop a viable exit policy (See article in the New York Review of Books here in which he writes: “From my experience in the Balkans, I feel strongly that it is impossible to preserve the unity of a democratic state where people in a geographically defined region almost unanimously do not want to be part of that state.”
His thesis now is that the American government has been keeping their head in the sand on this one. They do not want there to be a Kurd problem, so are willing to accept the sweet nothings that Kurdish leaders feed them. Yet the old head of the Kurdish mountaineers, Massoud Barzani, said in an election day interview that “I am certain that there will be an independent Kurdistan and I hope to see it in my lifetime.” It is most reporters on the ground that the Kurdish people as a whole have no use for Iraq. Much of their area does not even fly the Iraq flag. It only adds fuel to the fire that the worst mistake in Sunday’s election appears to have been the failure to deliver about 200,000 ballots to prospective Kurdish voters in the north.
Galbraith curiously seems unwilling to draw the final conclusion from his analysis. He wants the United States to insist on a constitution that gives the Kurds great autonomy within an Iraqi state. This is just what he knows has not worked in these situations. Now the world faces even the splitting off of Montenegro from Serbia, one of the two last acts in the miniaturization of Serbia.
It seems to me that while we struggle with different federal solutions, we should be making a parallel effort to convince all the states in the region that an independent, democratic Kurdistan is better than a festering sore like Northern Ireland, the Tamil resistance in Sri Lanka, or the Basque provinces of Spain. It should also be pointed out that it will reduce the relative size of Iraq by 20% and reduce the size of their economy (presuming the Kurds get all or part of the Kirkuk fields). It will also mean that secularism will dominate politics in an area adjacent to Turkey, which will serve one of the main needs of the Turkish military that fears more than the Kurds the growing militancy of Islam in the region.
At a minimum, we should be sure that we never end up training or even leading troops that are dispatched by Baghdad to put down a Kurdish resistance. We should also abandon the idea of establishing a permanent Middle Eastern military base in Kurdistan, a dream floated back at the beginning of this adventure. In extremis, we could and should provide an aerial cover for Kurdistan, much as we did in the Saddam days, if at some future point this becomes necessary.
Galbraith was one of the first to blow the whistle on the use of chemical weapons against the Kurds. He has worked on the problems of East Timor as well as Iraq and Yugoslavia and is now associated with an institution committed to the struggle against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. He has lately been mounting quite a campaign. One of his arguments for Iraq is that our other more pressing security concerns, such as that relating to nuclear proliferation, compels us to rapidly develop a viable exit policy (See article in the New York Review of Books here in which he writes: “From my experience in the Balkans, I feel strongly that it is impossible to preserve the unity of a democratic state where people in a geographically defined region almost unanimously do not want to be part of that state.”
His thesis now is that the American government has been keeping their head in the sand on this one. They do not want there to be a Kurd problem, so are willing to accept the sweet nothings that Kurdish leaders feed them. Yet the old head of the Kurdish mountaineers, Massoud Barzani, said in an election day interview that “I am certain that there will be an independent Kurdistan and I hope to see it in my lifetime.” It is most reporters on the ground that the Kurdish people as a whole have no use for Iraq. Much of their area does not even fly the Iraq flag. It only adds fuel to the fire that the worst mistake in Sunday’s election appears to have been the failure to deliver about 200,000 ballots to prospective Kurdish voters in the north.
Galbraith curiously seems unwilling to draw the final conclusion from his analysis. He wants the United States to insist on a constitution that gives the Kurds great autonomy within an Iraqi state. This is just what he knows has not worked in these situations. Now the world faces even the splitting off of Montenegro from Serbia, one of the two last acts in the miniaturization of Serbia.
It seems to me that while we struggle with different federal solutions, we should be making a parallel effort to convince all the states in the region that an independent, democratic Kurdistan is better than a festering sore like Northern Ireland, the Tamil resistance in Sri Lanka, or the Basque provinces of Spain. It should also be pointed out that it will reduce the relative size of Iraq by 20% and reduce the size of their economy (presuming the Kurds get all or part of the Kirkuk fields). It will also mean that secularism will dominate politics in an area adjacent to Turkey, which will serve one of the main needs of the Turkish military that fears more than the Kurds the growing militancy of Islam in the region.
At a minimum, we should be sure that we never end up training or even leading troops that are dispatched by Baghdad to put down a Kurdish resistance. We should also abandon the idea of establishing a permanent Middle Eastern military base in Kurdistan, a dream floated back at the beginning of this adventure. In extremis, we could and should provide an aerial cover for Kurdistan, much as we did in the Saddam days, if at some future point this becomes necessary.
Monday, January 31, 2005
Iraq Elections
In spite of a great deal of sniping by some commentators (such as Herbert in the NY Times and Juan Cole in his excellent blog), the election in Iraq was a great occasion for Bush, for the Middle East, and for the Iraqi people. The defenses held. People went into the streets, and they voted. The heroism of people in much of the country was truly astounding — voting as the mortars went off in the background.
The most amazing renunciation, the one that got us to this point, was the order of the Ayatollah Sistani to his followers to not fight back when they were attacked. The result was that several insurgent attempts to ignite sectarian war got no where at all. The other was his order to all Shi’a to vote, an order that in Baghdad seemed to override the last minute attempt of some in the Mahdi Army to discourage voting.
Of course, we do not yet know the particulars. In some areas many Sunni Arabs voted; in others very few did. The statement of that overall 60% voted is subject to modification. It may well be much less. But it will certainly turn out to be more than 40%, which was the “success” figure some had indicated. It was true that many people had a confused ideas of what they were voting for. But the fact they did not know individuals seems beside the point. They knew of the lists, and seemed remarkably able to distinguish among hundreds of lists. Many of the voters did not want to be seen as Shi’a or Sunni: they were Iraqis and voted as Iraqis. Of course, these distinctions are important, but I think that foreigners in an attempt to make sense of what they are seeing sometimes do overemphasize such differences. Many Iraqis, especially in the major cities, are secular. They want a secular society and care less for these divisions. Perhaps the most important fact was that Arab television in the days before the election and on election day turned its attention to the election, reporting it in full and sometimes with positive commentary.
By the middle of February the results should be sorted out. Then the new Assembly will be established. Lots of bridges must be crossed. But I suspect that before the Assembly is established, the heart will have gone out of the insurgency. It will go on, but decline in intensity. The new government will feel more confident than the one it replaces. The people will feel more confident, and with that the Iraqi governmental forces. I suspect that in the new euphoria there may well be calls for the United States to work out a withdrawal time table.
The tough times for Iraq’s democracy will come when the United States is largely out and the groups begin fighting among themselves (which may include Shi’a versus Shi’a). Many peoples are not good at compromise and compromise is the most essential attribute of democracy.
The most amazing renunciation, the one that got us to this point, was the order of the Ayatollah Sistani to his followers to not fight back when they were attacked. The result was that several insurgent attempts to ignite sectarian war got no where at all. The other was his order to all Shi’a to vote, an order that in Baghdad seemed to override the last minute attempt of some in the Mahdi Army to discourage voting.
Of course, we do not yet know the particulars. In some areas many Sunni Arabs voted; in others very few did. The statement of that overall 60% voted is subject to modification. It may well be much less. But it will certainly turn out to be more than 40%, which was the “success” figure some had indicated. It was true that many people had a confused ideas of what they were voting for. But the fact they did not know individuals seems beside the point. They knew of the lists, and seemed remarkably able to distinguish among hundreds of lists. Many of the voters did not want to be seen as Shi’a or Sunni: they were Iraqis and voted as Iraqis. Of course, these distinctions are important, but I think that foreigners in an attempt to make sense of what they are seeing sometimes do overemphasize such differences. Many Iraqis, especially in the major cities, are secular. They want a secular society and care less for these divisions. Perhaps the most important fact was that Arab television in the days before the election and on election day turned its attention to the election, reporting it in full and sometimes with positive commentary.
By the middle of February the results should be sorted out. Then the new Assembly will be established. Lots of bridges must be crossed. But I suspect that before the Assembly is established, the heart will have gone out of the insurgency. It will go on, but decline in intensity. The new government will feel more confident than the one it replaces. The people will feel more confident, and with that the Iraqi governmental forces. I suspect that in the new euphoria there may well be calls for the United States to work out a withdrawal time table.
The tough times for Iraq’s democracy will come when the United States is largely out and the groups begin fighting among themselves (which may include Shi’a versus Shi’a). Many peoples are not good at compromise and compromise is the most essential attribute of democracy.
