Friday, December 31, 2004
Kurdistan in Iraq
Today’s Times brings back the discussion of the Kurdish independence movement in Iraq. It describes the three largely Kurdish provinces of Iraq’s northeast, governed by the Kurdish Regional Government, as to all intents and purposes an independent country. They have been independent in one way or another since 1991 and today are more unified and stronger than ever. Their security forces are the most effective non-coalition forces in the country. They have managed to preserve near total exemption from the violence in the rest of the country. Investment is pouring in, especially from overseas Kurds, but also from Turkey. The reporter said that he saw very few flags of Iraq but Kurdish flags were everywhere. It is a largely secular society with a booming economy. A new luxury hotel is going up in the capital, Erbil.
Kurdish leaders speak of the desire of the Kurds to remain in Iraq in a loose federal system. But one gets the impression that this is just the diplomatic discourse of leaders who know that the United States is unlikely to accept greater demands. The attitude and behavior of the people suggests they will accept little less than effective independence. Meanwhile, these same leaders are demanding that Kirkuk, an important city because of its surrounding oil fields, be turned over to them. They speak of the need to have an accepted right to the oil resources of the region, a right that the defense minister for the regional government says would allow them to triple the size of their forces (to 240,000!). At least 100,000 Arabs have been driven out of the Kirkuk area by the Kurds since the defeat of Saddam. This was simply payback for a Saddam expulsion of Kurds in the recent past. Kurds are reoccupying their old houses and lands. But it has generated a resettlement problem.
The flash point could come very soon. In the U.S.-initiated constitution that Iraq lives by now, the Kurds are guaranteed a right to veto any provisions they do not like (such as reducing their autonomy). But the Shiites have suggested that these rules cannot last beyond the January election. They have indicated they want a country at long last that they will rule and the Kurds must stay in it. The United States and other powers, near and far, have indicated there should be Kurdish autonomy, but this seems in the words of Condoleezza Rice and others to be more like the autonomy of California than what the Kurds have in mind.
But what do the Kurds have in mind? There is no example that I know of in the world that really fits their idea of autonomy. We could look at Albania and Montenegro in Yugoslavia/Serbia, but these hardly seem to be viable examples. A better example, ironically, might be Taiwan, a country that the world has decided to treat as part of China, but is able to maintain itself as an independent state in spite of that. What the Kurds, sheltered behind a seasoned and successful armed force of their own, and with enough money to maintain it, seem unlikely to accept is a country “occupied” by a largely Arab army answerable to Baghdad.
Ambassador Galbraith, a person who has worked with the Kurds independently and for the American government for years, and served as Ambassador to Croatia after it separated from Yugoslavia advises us here to support an essentially autonomous Kurdistan, covering it with the fig leaf of federalism. He argues that geographically separate and distinct peoples cannot be forced to live together in a unified state, a fact he says he found out in Yugoslavia. Yes, we all found it out. But where does that leave federalism? He appears in his heart to want Kurdish independence, but he believes the unwillingness of Turkey, Iran, and Turkey, all with large Kurdish minorities striving for autonomy, to accept true Kurdish independence makes the achievement of anything more than a very limited autonomy impossible. The long and bitter Kurdish struggle in Turkey had its roots in a communist movement, and has resulted in extreme violence on both sides. The Turkish army is naturally apprehensive about an independent Kurdistan. In Iran, the short-lived Kurdish Mahabad Republic after World War II was briefly supported by the USSR. Their leadership was essentially nationalists and tribal; their leaders were from the same family that rules in half of Iraq's Kurdistan today. There does not seem to be a strong nationalist movement in Iranian Kurdistan now, but the population is Sunni and is apparently quite opposed to Shi'a rule from Tehran. An independent Kurdistan in Iraq could be a spark that could blow apart the current regime in Iran.
Some parting thoughts. The outside world overwhelmingly accepts the idea that the Kurds should not be allowed to secede from Iraq. One small chink in the armor is an Australian Senator who argues for complete independence. It must also encourage the Kurds to find that Turkish companies have been more than willing to engage in the reconstruction of the country. On this front, the Kurdish leadership has been most accommodating, resisting any idea that they would help the struggle of the Kurds in Turkey for independence. On the other hand, there is a large Kurdish population in Mosul, a city now partially occupied by Kurdish forces but outside the area they normally claim, and perhaps a million Kurds continue to live in Baghdad. In any messy breakup of the country Kurds outside Kurdistan could suffer, or at least there could be large population exchanges.
My feeling is that the United States should think long and hard about supporting an independent homeland for the Kurds. We have supported the independence of Israel under much more doubtful circumstances, and we have come to feel that Israel is our only true ally in the region. Kurdistan and the Kurds, if we stay by them and do not abandon them again, could become another long-term ally in the region. Of course, we have our eye on the larger prize of a stable, pro-American, democratic Iraq. Maybe so. But in the pursuit of this dream, we should not lose site of the current reality of a secular Kurdistan that wants to be in our corner.
Kurdish leaders speak of the desire of the Kurds to remain in Iraq in a loose federal system. But one gets the impression that this is just the diplomatic discourse of leaders who know that the United States is unlikely to accept greater demands. The attitude and behavior of the people suggests they will accept little less than effective independence. Meanwhile, these same leaders are demanding that Kirkuk, an important city because of its surrounding oil fields, be turned over to them. They speak of the need to have an accepted right to the oil resources of the region, a right that the defense minister for the regional government says would allow them to triple the size of their forces (to 240,000!). At least 100,000 Arabs have been driven out of the Kirkuk area by the Kurds since the defeat of Saddam. This was simply payback for a Saddam expulsion of Kurds in the recent past. Kurds are reoccupying their old houses and lands. But it has generated a resettlement problem.
The flash point could come very soon. In the U.S.-initiated constitution that Iraq lives by now, the Kurds are guaranteed a right to veto any provisions they do not like (such as reducing their autonomy). But the Shiites have suggested that these rules cannot last beyond the January election. They have indicated they want a country at long last that they will rule and the Kurds must stay in it. The United States and other powers, near and far, have indicated there should be Kurdish autonomy, but this seems in the words of Condoleezza Rice and others to be more like the autonomy of California than what the Kurds have in mind.
But what do the Kurds have in mind? There is no example that I know of in the world that really fits their idea of autonomy. We could look at Albania and Montenegro in Yugoslavia/Serbia, but these hardly seem to be viable examples. A better example, ironically, might be Taiwan, a country that the world has decided to treat as part of China, but is able to maintain itself as an independent state in spite of that. What the Kurds, sheltered behind a seasoned and successful armed force of their own, and with enough money to maintain it, seem unlikely to accept is a country “occupied” by a largely Arab army answerable to Baghdad.
Ambassador Galbraith, a person who has worked with the Kurds independently and for the American government for years, and served as Ambassador to Croatia after it separated from Yugoslavia advises us here to support an essentially autonomous Kurdistan, covering it with the fig leaf of federalism. He argues that geographically separate and distinct peoples cannot be forced to live together in a unified state, a fact he says he found out in Yugoslavia. Yes, we all found it out. But where does that leave federalism? He appears in his heart to want Kurdish independence, but he believes the unwillingness of Turkey, Iran, and Turkey, all with large Kurdish minorities striving for autonomy, to accept true Kurdish independence makes the achievement of anything more than a very limited autonomy impossible. The long and bitter Kurdish struggle in Turkey had its roots in a communist movement, and has resulted in extreme violence on both sides. The Turkish army is naturally apprehensive about an independent Kurdistan. In Iran, the short-lived Kurdish Mahabad Republic after World War II was briefly supported by the USSR. Their leadership was essentially nationalists and tribal; their leaders were from the same family that rules in half of Iraq's Kurdistan today. There does not seem to be a strong nationalist movement in Iranian Kurdistan now, but the population is Sunni and is apparently quite opposed to Shi'a rule from Tehran. An independent Kurdistan in Iraq could be a spark that could blow apart the current regime in Iran.
Some parting thoughts. The outside world overwhelmingly accepts the idea that the Kurds should not be allowed to secede from Iraq. One small chink in the armor is an Australian Senator who argues for complete independence. It must also encourage the Kurds to find that Turkish companies have been more than willing to engage in the reconstruction of the country. On this front, the Kurdish leadership has been most accommodating, resisting any idea that they would help the struggle of the Kurds in Turkey for independence. On the other hand, there is a large Kurdish population in Mosul, a city now partially occupied by Kurdish forces but outside the area they normally claim, and perhaps a million Kurds continue to live in Baghdad. In any messy breakup of the country Kurds outside Kurdistan could suffer, or at least there could be large population exchanges.
My feeling is that the United States should think long and hard about supporting an independent homeland for the Kurds. We have supported the independence of Israel under much more doubtful circumstances, and we have come to feel that Israel is our only true ally in the region. Kurdistan and the Kurds, if we stay by them and do not abandon them again, could become another long-term ally in the region. Of course, we have our eye on the larger prize of a stable, pro-American, democratic Iraq. Maybe so. But in the pursuit of this dream, we should not lose site of the current reality of a secular Kurdistan that wants to be in our corner.
Wednesday, December 29, 2004
Taking Our Responsibilities Seriously
The juxtaposition of initiating an open-ended war without adequate international support in Iraq and the cutting of taxes while the deficit and trade balance were carrying the country toward a fiscal cliff led me about a year ago to recommend that we place a surcharge on the U.S. income tax. This would have the double effect of reducing our fiscal haemorrhaging while making all Americans feel a part of what was going on in the Middle East. To me there was an eerie sense that we were hiring the young to go off and risk their lives while most Americans went on "living it up". The Indian Ocean Tsunami seems to me to have some of the same urgency about it. If we as a country are serious about helping the millions of people affected around the Indian Ocean, then we should be willing to act as a community, a community in which all contribute, to help those who need assistance in the short or long term. It would do the Americans good to have it announced that a surcharge would be placed on this year’s income tax for all Americans. All the money raised by this surcharge would be used to replace the money needed now to help the affected people. We need to have symbolic gestures like this to make us all realize we are one people united in serving not just our own pleasures but the greater world around us. The gesture might also improve our reputation as a people, especially if placing such special occasion surcharges on the income tax were to become a standard part of American tax policy.
Democracy Emerging from a Bath of Blood?
Last night Zbigniew Brezezinski, one of my personal heroes, was interviewed on the Lehrer show as to what he thought was going to happen in Iraq. Unfortunately, he seemed to have it all wrong. First, he thought that there was little chance that a successful election could be held under the circumstances. Second, he thought that the system that emerged if the process went forward would be a theocracy that would be a long way from being a democracy. Walter Russell Mead, another foreign policy expert that sat with him demurred. He said, rightly, that the situation was more hopeful and that it was unlikely that the Shiites would set up anything like what they had in Iran. The fact is that the doubters, the good guys that opposed the war, have allowed their opposition to get in the way of their judgment. The bloody mess is just that. But it does not mean that it is hopeless. It may well be that Iraqis have become so inured to killing over the last generation that their response to the daily toll in their country is not as overwhekming as it would be for more fortunate or pampered Americans. It certainly does not mean that we are fighting Islam in Iraq, in a version of Sam Huntington’s war of civilizations (a common belief of many pundits), nor that the bad guys will necessarily win. What it does mean is that a lot of blood is yet to be spilled.
Today’s paper has a fascinating piece on the reactions of minorities in northeast Syria to the chance for democracy in Iraq. Minorities in this case mean Armenians, Assyrian Christians, and Kurds. It even included repressed political minorities such as the communists (what an irony that they should be looking to us to bail them out). The reporter was amazed at the optimism of their leaders. What they saw was a chance for democracy not only in Iraq, but in Syria as well. They believed that events in Iraq had already started to weaken the controls they have been living under. (Remember that the other branch of the Baath party has been in control of Syria for more than a generation now.) The goals of these leaders are quite different. The Kurds are rejoicing in what they see as a chance for an autonomous Kurdistan. There has already been dancing in the streets for this goal (suppressed of course by the police). The Christian groups, on the other hand, see the possibility for a more democratic Syria in which they would have something more like equality than what they have had.
At this point, it is only a dream, a spark likely to be extinguished. But it does show that the ideological team behind Bush, with its dream of a democratic Middle East emerging from Iraq, is not as foolish as most regional and foreign policy experts here and abroad have believed. Of course, there is still a long way to go.
Monday, December 27, 2004
Iraq: When to Get Out
On a sober-sided talk show the other day, a retired military officer was interviewed on the subject of how long we would be in Iraq. His answer was that it would be ten or fifteen years before our soldiers could leave. The argument was that the violence was simply not going down and the Iraqis we were training showed no signs of being able to pick up the slack. This argument has three possible bases.
(1) A lack of understanding of the war. The authority has not yet realized the extent to which the insurgency in Iraq is a response to the presence of foreign troops as much as to any other factor. He also has no concept of the extent to which the American population is tired of the war and is bound to grow increasingly tired if the promised elections lead to no change in our commitment.
(2) A confusion of the war in Iraq with the war against al-Qaida. The authority believes firmly that what we are fighting is primarily a Islamic Jihadist movement aimed at the United States. This being the case Iraq is just as good a place to engage the enemy as any other.
(3) Imperialist dreams. The authority is really entranced by the idea that we need to establish at least a semi-permanent base in the Middle East from which we can coerce the entire area while we convert the area through force and persuasion the area to democracy.
The fact is we are fighting a well financed Iraqi nationalist and Sunni Arab insurgency. This being the case, one of the primarily preconditions for ending the insurgency is the withdrawal of American forces. This may not end the insurgency, but without it, there is no way to end it. Accepting this analysis, once the Americans leave, the Kurds and Shi’as will have to work out a modus vivendi with these Baath forces or continue an endless fight against them. The eventual answer may be a de facto or de jure splitting up of the country, Yugoslavia style. In either case, we should not see preventing this or solving these relationships as our problem. (Many in the world may say “You broke it, you fix it”. But I do not think most Iraqis will feel this way. They want once again to be the decisive force in their country.) These are Iraqi problems and we should encourage them, possibly with international assistance, to solve them.
The United States will never recapture its role as the last resort for the preservation of world peace as long as it is identified with Iraq and our forces are tied down there. The American people are only prepared to do so much. And with a commitment anything like that we have today in Iraq, we are neither able to defend adequately our interests nor world interests in the many hot spots that fizz and bubble around the world.
If we have not already begun the process, we should begin talks with the political leaders of Iraq (and this includes the Ayatollah Sistani in spite of his disclaimers) about a time table for our orderly withdrawal. We should complete the training of Iraqi forces now in the pipeline and improve the performance of forces already “trained”, but then let them take over as we withdraw. The new parliament will write a constitution. By the time that is completed toward the end of 2005, we should announce victory and retire.
(1) A lack of understanding of the war. The authority has not yet realized the extent to which the insurgency in Iraq is a response to the presence of foreign troops as much as to any other factor. He also has no concept of the extent to which the American population is tired of the war and is bound to grow increasingly tired if the promised elections lead to no change in our commitment.
(2) A confusion of the war in Iraq with the war against al-Qaida. The authority believes firmly that what we are fighting is primarily a Islamic Jihadist movement aimed at the United States. This being the case Iraq is just as good a place to engage the enemy as any other.
(3) Imperialist dreams. The authority is really entranced by the idea that we need to establish at least a semi-permanent base in the Middle East from which we can coerce the entire area while we convert the area through force and persuasion the area to democracy.
The fact is we are fighting a well financed Iraqi nationalist and Sunni Arab insurgency. This being the case, one of the primarily preconditions for ending the insurgency is the withdrawal of American forces. This may not end the insurgency, but without it, there is no way to end it. Accepting this analysis, once the Americans leave, the Kurds and Shi’as will have to work out a modus vivendi with these Baath forces or continue an endless fight against them. The eventual answer may be a de facto or de jure splitting up of the country, Yugoslavia style. In either case, we should not see preventing this or solving these relationships as our problem. (Many in the world may say “You broke it, you fix it”. But I do not think most Iraqis will feel this way. They want once again to be the decisive force in their country.) These are Iraqi problems and we should encourage them, possibly with international assistance, to solve them.
The United States will never recapture its role as the last resort for the preservation of world peace as long as it is identified with Iraq and our forces are tied down there. The American people are only prepared to do so much. And with a commitment anything like that we have today in Iraq, we are neither able to defend adequately our interests nor world interests in the many hot spots that fizz and bubble around the world.
If we have not already begun the process, we should begin talks with the political leaders of Iraq (and this includes the Ayatollah Sistani in spite of his disclaimers) about a time table for our orderly withdrawal. We should complete the training of Iraqi forces now in the pipeline and improve the performance of forces already “trained”, but then let them take over as we withdraw. The new parliament will write a constitution. By the time that is completed toward the end of 2005, we should announce victory and retire.
