Iraq and Afghanistan

The International Institute for Strategic Studies in one of its latest releases characterizes recent American steps, such as the invasion of Iraq, as well as its one-sided Middle Eastern policy more generally, as helping the al-Qaida recruitment (supporting the thesis of Scheuer recently discussed in this blog). Iraq may well be seen in retrospect to have been a valuable proving ground for Jihadists if they later fan out over the world in pursuit of globalist objectives. However, the report also points out that the ideology and focus of al-Qaida appears to be in flux. They have some positives, but also negatives. They are dispersed more than they were and seem to be less under the direction of the center. Many of the groups that work with al-Qaida, for example in Southeast Asia, have reason to work with it tactically, but they do not have the global goals of the parent organization. This has two implications. First, such groups can be dealt with on a bargaining basis. Second, they are unlikely to be interested in using weapons of mass destruction.

The report believes that efforts against al-Qaida have reduced its effectiveness in the short run. However, in the longer run it sees the need for a change in U.S. policies that will make it less possible for al-Qaida to picture the West as an eternal enemy of Islam (again Scheuer's thesis). This needed change is referred to as moving toward more emphasis on "soft power" rather than "hard" (this is not an argument Scheuer would make).

As I have referenced several times, Professor Juan Cole at Michigan offers perhaps the most informed and useful blog on the Iraq war from an academic viewpoint. He knows Iraq well, particularly the history of its Shi'a community.

It is encouraging to find that his most recent posts seem to have a different tone from those earlier in the year. He is more friendly and supportive of the American effort than he has been in the past. Reading on, this seems to reflect the decision by the overwhelming majority of the Iraqi Shiites to support the electoral process. He is scathing in his denunciation of the statement by Khomenei of Iran that the Americans and the Israelis were behind the attacks in Najaf and Kerbala. He points out once again that the Iraqi Shiites are uninterested in such statements. They are Iraqis and do not take kindly to outside Iranian interference. It is his thought that the insurgency has all along been primarily a Baathist effort, and that the attacks in the holy cities should also be ascribed to the Baathists. These attacks were, incidentally, also denounced by the leading Sunni clerics association.

Cole remains bothered that there is too much violence for the elections to be held in January. If large numbers of Sunni Arabs voters are kept away from the polls, this will make any constitution that came out of the process suspect in the eyes of many. However, unlike the New York Times which in its recent editorial called again for a postponement in view of our evident inability to control the violence, Cole believes this has to be balanced against the strong support of the Kurds and Shiites for having the elections as soon as possible. As he says, "the U.S. has to make the Shi'a community happy". The growing closeness of the U.S. and the Shi'a is suggested by the following note: "The U.S. has been fighting Sunni Arab guerrillas in Babil province to stop their attacks on Shiite locals and pilgrims, an action warmly supported by Iraqi vice president Ibrahim Jaafari and other Shiite leaders."

Cole repeats a discussion with the Iraqi education ministry. Apparently the situation has improved quite a bit. Many Baathists who were formerly excluded from teaching are now back teaching again while a number of non-Baathists who excluded from teaching by the Baathists under Saddam are also now teaching. Many schools have been repaired and new ones are being built. There are 6 million students and 370,000 teachers, giving an overall ratio of 19/1, although some schools are still in want of teachers.

In the international relations area, the Jordanian and Egyptian foreign ministers are warning Iraq against the possibility of a sectarian state, while Iran has closed its borders because it thinks Iraq is too dangerous for pilgrims!

Do not misunderstand. Cole is still very down on the war, how it has been initiated, and how it is being carried on (he even has a note on where one can contribute clothing for our soldiers in Iraq). He points out the dangers. The chief one being that the Shiite leaders will not be able to continue to restrain their followers from striking back at the Sunni Arabs, thus inviting a more thorough explosion. He also points out the danger that Saudi Arabia will be hit with more attacks by al-Qaida, particularly of its oil lines. This may become particularly serious when a generation of battle-hardened Jihadists return from Iraq if and when things quiet down there.

Sunday's Times gave a good summary of what might be described as the "order of battle" for the insurgents. The current estimate is that there are 11,000 to 20,000 insurgents. Of these 2200 to 3300 are hard core supporters of Saddam and the Baath Party. Many of the leaders are in Syria. They are assisted by 6100 to 10,000 part-time supporters. These are often paid on a per-job basis for their attacks. Their goal is a strong government recreating the authoritarian, Sunni-Arab, Baathists past. The Islamic extremists are mostly Salafists, persons with views similar to the Wahhabi, but not now identified with them. Perhaps 700 insurgents are aligned with al-Qaida and al-Zarqawi, mostly in the Mosul area. One of the main leaders here is Muhammad Sharkawa, formerly a member of Ansar. Perhaps 2000 other extremists or Jihadists operate separately from this structure. The Islamic extremists hope to ensure a weak government that will eventually be replaced by a Taliban type regime. American also estimate that there are 2900 in al-Sadr's Mahdi Army, mostly in Baghdad. It seems doubtful that these should be seen as part of the insurgency now.

Today's paper reported a terrible day yesterday, with more than 60 killed. The targets were ordinary Shi'a in Karbala and Najaf and election officials in Baghdad. It seems clear that the major focus has shifted to killing Shi'a, thereby kindling a sectarian war that they are sure they can win, and killing Iraqis connected with the election effort. An encouraging sign is the fact that the going price for getting a person to fire a grenade at Americans has gone up from $50 to $200. But in all these figures, what one does not get is where the suicide bombers are recruited. This seems now to be the main tool of the insurgents, a tool used mostly against Iraqis. The insurgent decisions to concentrate on Iraqis may have a short-term pay off, but in the longer term it would seem bound to reduce sympathy for their cause.

Th reader may also be interested in looking at the American forces order of battle. It is interesting to reflect that the Coalition forces taken together, and assisted by the newly trained and sometimes feckless Iraqi government forces add up to well over 200,000. Given the stardard 1:10 ratio said to be required when fighting a guerrilla war, this should be an adequate force if deployed intelligently.

One of the primary problems afflicting "our side" in Iraq is the difficulty we have in controlling the movement of insurgents. Unlike insurgents of the past, most of this movement is by car or light truck. One example of the seriousness of the problem is the report that the insurgents regularly pay Iraqis for making attacks with money that is brought in regularly from Syria (from which much of the war is directed). Another example is the report of two very destructive suicide vehicle attacks in Najaf and Karbala yesterday. The assumption seems to be that the vehicles involved came from the southern edge of the "Sunni Triangle". Without knowing what measures are in place or planned to control such movement, let me make a suggestion.

We control the air, and with few trees in Iraq and little cloud cover, we could regularly and effectively see from the air every vehicle in Iraq, stationary or in movement. The proposal is to require that every vehicle in Iraq be required to be (1) registered and (2) have on its roof in paint that can be seen at night the registration number. After a month period during which all vehicles would have to be registered and emblazoned with their registration numbers, air reconnaissance could start rapidly building a data base containing the location of every vehicle in the country. Once this database is established, planes patrolling over the country, and especially along the more important ways in from Syria and above the road systems of the "Sunni Triangle" could establish the location of every vehicle, updating this regularly whenever movement is noted. It should be possible to gin up a computer program to distinguish standard movements from suspicious, reporting the latter down to units on the ground that could then check suspected vehicles. The use of false identification could be reduced by continuous monitoring that was able to note any vehicles that had unrecorded numbers or duplicate numbers. Vehicles operating not in accord with the law would be subject to impoundment.

Critics will raise many objections. The suggestion is certainly in need of many refinements, especially those that experience would suggest. In any event, the system would obviously be perfected over time.