Thursday, December 02, 2004
Iraq Elections: Positive Steps
Several more positive steps have recently been made in support of the elections. First, the Americans have decided to put 12,000 more troops in until after the election (at least). Second, Allawi is on another campaign to get support for the election. This time he is in Jordan. Jordan now says it backs the early elections. In Jordan he is meeting with many Sunni leaders, party and otherwise. These include some of the Sunni tribal leaders with whom he has had past relationships. They evidently find it more comfortable in Jordan these days.
There have been some interesting new ideas about how the elections might be carried out in stages, so-called "rolling elections". After the first elections in the safer areas, security forces would be brought in for short periods in one area after another until people had had a reasonable chance to vote everywhere. While people elected in the first round would meet before the completion of the process, it is thought that they might agree to dealing with non-binding measures that could easily be changed when they meet after the completion of the process.
Many academics continue to believe that we have lost already in Iraq, partly because of the record there and partly because of the general proposition that insurgencies like this do not fail. This is a respectable argument. However, my judgement is that this election will take place regardless. If it does get a reasonable turnout most places, or is repaired some way, then we will be faced with a new situation — a government now considered legitimate by more than 50% of Iraqis will be the enemy of the insurgents. Clearly, many cases in the past, such as Sri Lanka, suggest this is not the end of the story, but it should certainly change the parameters.
There have been some interesting new ideas about how the elections might be carried out in stages, so-called "rolling elections". After the first elections in the safer areas, security forces would be brought in for short periods in one area after another until people had had a reasonable chance to vote everywhere. While people elected in the first round would meet before the completion of the process, it is thought that they might agree to dealing with non-binding measures that could easily be changed when they meet after the completion of the process.
Many academics continue to believe that we have lost already in Iraq, partly because of the record there and partly because of the general proposition that insurgencies like this do not fail. This is a respectable argument. However, my judgement is that this election will take place regardless. If it does get a reasonable turnout most places, or is repaired some way, then we will be faced with a new situation — a government now considered legitimate by more than 50% of Iraqis will be the enemy of the insurgents. Clearly, many cases in the past, such as Sri Lanka, suggest this is not the end of the story, but it should certainly change the parameters.
Monday, November 29, 2004
Iraq: New Analysis of the Elections
For anyone interested in the elections and the election controversy in Iraq, the accompanying discussion offers a wealth of useful argument and detail.
Let us review what is to happen. The election will "choose a 275-member assembly that will serve for about a year. During that time, it will select a president and two deputies, who will in turn choose one of the assembly´s members to serve as prime minister. Its main task, however, will be to draft a constitution by the middle of August 2005. This will be submitted to a referendum by next October, and then used to conduct, by 15 December 2005, elections for a fully constitutional government that is to take power by the end of next year."
Good progress has been made toward the election. Of 545 projected registration centers, all but 90 are said to be functioning. In spite of the fact of some fairly stringent qualifications, including petitions with 500 names, 126 party or individual applications to run have already been approved, although only 15 seem to represent sunni groups. The United States is trying to have one super list developed that would include most of the people in the present governing council. This would favor us and returnees. However, the Ayatollah Sistani is putting together a super Shi'a list that will probably be more attractive. In this list, 30-50% will be for shi'a religious parties, including 10-12% for al-Sadr's group, the same for SCIRI (pro-Iranian) and 20% for various Dawa groups. On the other side, an Iraqi Founding Congress has brought together all the groups intending to boycott the election.
The writers doubt that the elections can go forward with the amount of violence that there is in the country. Their hope is that the Ayatollah Sistani will see that the best solution is to wait. However, why he would do this given the advantages of not doing it are unclear. It would be a magnanimous gesture and mean a lot for the country. But this sort of approach to the problems of the country has been rare in the past and I doubt if we can have a great deal of confidence in it now, even from one with the good credentials of the Ayatollah.
Let us review what is to happen. The election will "choose a 275-member assembly that will serve for about a year. During that time, it will select a president and two deputies, who will in turn choose one of the assembly´s members to serve as prime minister. Its main task, however, will be to draft a constitution by the middle of August 2005. This will be submitted to a referendum by next October, and then used to conduct, by 15 December 2005, elections for a fully constitutional government that is to take power by the end of next year."
Good progress has been made toward the election. Of 545 projected registration centers, all but 90 are said to be functioning. In spite of the fact of some fairly stringent qualifications, including petitions with 500 names, 126 party or individual applications to run have already been approved, although only 15 seem to represent sunni groups. The United States is trying to have one super list developed that would include most of the people in the present governing council. This would favor us and returnees. However, the Ayatollah Sistani is putting together a super Shi'a list that will probably be more attractive. In this list, 30-50% will be for shi'a religious parties, including 10-12% for al-Sadr's group, the same for SCIRI (pro-Iranian) and 20% for various Dawa groups. On the other side, an Iraqi Founding Congress has brought together all the groups intending to boycott the election.
The writers doubt that the elections can go forward with the amount of violence that there is in the country. Their hope is that the Ayatollah Sistani will see that the best solution is to wait. However, why he would do this given the advantages of not doing it are unclear. It would be a magnanimous gesture and mean a lot for the country. But this sort of approach to the problems of the country has been rare in the past and I doubt if we can have a great deal of confidence in it now, even from one with the good credentials of the Ayatollah.
Iraq and Afghanistan Need to be States Before They are Democracies
In two interesting papers, Andreas Wimmer and colleagues argue that Afghanistan and Iraq are ineffective states, unable to control or service the people for whom they are responsible. He argues that in this condition of state collapse, the first task of the international community should be strengthening state institutions rather than the establishment of functioning democracies. It is an appealing argument, and one I have made in other forms many times in this blog. We need, for example, to be less concerned with establishing “civic society”, that basis for good democracy that has become so popular in the literature. What we need are administrations that can provide health, education, security, and legal services that are both effective and acceptable to the greater part of the population.
The problem then becomes: How does America get from the position it has painted itself into to the position that Wimmer would have us occupy? Fortunately, it would appear that his goal is, attainable in Afghanistan. Although we have talked a great deal about democracy there, we have committed relatively little money and relatively few troops to the enterprise. The same for the larger international community. This leaves us an opportunity to put further democratization on a back burner and concentrate on creating effective state services. Sometimes the two overlap; sometimes they do not. One of Wimmer’s suggestions would be to talk less about international human rights, particularly issues such as women’s rights, and concentrate on establishing an effective system that will make possible any rights at all. Similarly, if Karzai goes ahead with the planned parliamentary elections, we should not be too exercised about the fine points. If a legislature is established that is widely accepted, then the government can function, and functioning is the first step.
The situation in Iraq is more difficult. We have made so much of the democracy side that we will be disappointing large segments of the population if we do not carry on in this vein. This will be true of both the secular and religious groups, for they are both figuring out how to manage the system we have promised for their own ends. But there must be priorities. Violence has been the story of Iraq’s political life for too long. We should support almost anything that brings down the level. It is what we want and what the man in the street wants, if not necessarily his political leaders. Likewise, we have identified, falsely I would suggest, but nevertheless have, capitalism with democracy. Iraq today is almost entirely a state-run economy. People “out of work” means primarily that the state no longer has the positions that Saddam had open for the average person. The job the United States and the Iraqi government must resolutely tackle is to get the economy functioning, at any ideological cost. If this means reestablishing some of the state institutions that characterized the former state, we should at least temporarily do that. It is no time to throw “cold water” on the people in a misguided attempt to move them immediately into a capitalist economy. Get the society working, then reform it, should be our approach, regardless of how far this may diverge from the standards of the modern liberal society that we hold out as the future for all peoples.
The problem then becomes: How does America get from the position it has painted itself into to the position that Wimmer would have us occupy? Fortunately, it would appear that his goal is, attainable in Afghanistan. Although we have talked a great deal about democracy there, we have committed relatively little money and relatively few troops to the enterprise. The same for the larger international community. This leaves us an opportunity to put further democratization on a back burner and concentrate on creating effective state services. Sometimes the two overlap; sometimes they do not. One of Wimmer’s suggestions would be to talk less about international human rights, particularly issues such as women’s rights, and concentrate on establishing an effective system that will make possible any rights at all. Similarly, if Karzai goes ahead with the planned parliamentary elections, we should not be too exercised about the fine points. If a legislature is established that is widely accepted, then the government can function, and functioning is the first step.
The situation in Iraq is more difficult. We have made so much of the democracy side that we will be disappointing large segments of the population if we do not carry on in this vein. This will be true of both the secular and religious groups, for they are both figuring out how to manage the system we have promised for their own ends. But there must be priorities. Violence has been the story of Iraq’s political life for too long. We should support almost anything that brings down the level. It is what we want and what the man in the street wants, if not necessarily his political leaders. Likewise, we have identified, falsely I would suggest, but nevertheless have, capitalism with democracy. Iraq today is almost entirely a state-run economy. People “out of work” means primarily that the state no longer has the positions that Saddam had open for the average person. The job the United States and the Iraqi government must resolutely tackle is to get the economy functioning, at any ideological cost. If this means reestablishing some of the state institutions that characterized the former state, we should at least temporarily do that. It is no time to throw “cold water” on the people in a misguided attempt to move them immediately into a capitalist economy. Get the society working, then reform it, should be our approach, regardless of how far this may diverge from the standards of the modern liberal society that we hold out as the future for all peoples.
Iraq and Afghanistan Need to be States Before They are Democracies
In two interesting papers, Andreas Wimmer and colleagues argue that Afghanistan and Iraq are ineffective states, unable to control or service the people for whom they are responsible. He argues that in this condition of state collapse, the first task of the international community should be strengthening state institutions rather than the establishment of functioning democracies. It is an appealing argument, and one I have made in other forms many times in this blog. We need, for example, to be less concerned with establishing “civic society”, that basis for good democracy that has become so popular in the literature. What we need are administrations that can provide health, education, security, and legal services that are both effective and acceptable to the greater part of the population.
The problem then becomes: How does America get from the position it has painted itself into to the position that Wimmer would have us occupy? Fortunately, it would appear that his goal is, attainable in Afghanistan. Although we have talked a great deal about democracy there, we have committed relatively little money and relatively few troops to the enterprise. The same for the larger international community. This leaves us an opportunity to put further democratization on a back burner and concentrate on creating effective state services. Sometimes the two overlap; sometimes they do not. One of Wimmer’s suggestions would be to talk less about international human rights, particularly issues such as women’s rights, and concentrate on establishing an effective system that will make possible any rights at all. Similarly, if Karzai goes ahead with the planned parliamentary elections, we should not be too exercised about the fine points. If a legislature is established that is widely accepted, then the government can function, and functioning is the first step.
The situation in Iraq is more difficult. We have made so much of the democracy side that we will be disappointing large segments of the population if we do not carry on in this vein. This will be true of both the secular and religious groups, for they are both figuring out how to manage the system we have promised for their own ends. But there must be priorities. Violence has been the story of Iraq’s political life for too long. We should support almost anything that brings down the level. It is what we want and what the man in the street wants, if not necessarily his political leaders. Likewise, we have identified, falsely I would suggest, but nevertheless have, capitalism with democracy. Iraq today is almost entirely a state-run economy. People “out of work” means primarily that the state no longer has the positions that Saddam had open for the average person. The job the United States and the Iraqi government must resolutely tackle is to get the economy functioning, at any ideological cost. If this means reestablishing some of the state institutions that characterized the former state, we should at least temporarily do that. It is no time to throw “cold water” on the people in a misguided attempt to move them immediately into a capitalist economy. Get the society working, then reform it, should be our approach, regardless of how far this may diverge from the standards of the modern liberal society that we hold out as the future for all peoples.
The problem then becomes: How does America get from the position it has painted itself into to the position that Wimmer would have us occupy? Fortunately, it would appear that his goal is, attainable in Afghanistan. Although we have talked a great deal about democracy there, we have committed relatively little money and relatively few troops to the enterprise. The same for the larger international community. This leaves us an opportunity to put further democratization on a back burner and concentrate on creating effective state services. Sometimes the two overlap; sometimes they do not. One of Wimmer’s suggestions would be to talk less about international human rights, particularly issues such as women’s rights, and concentrate on establishing an effective system that will make possible any rights at all. Similarly, if Karzai goes ahead with the planned parliamentary elections, we should not be too exercised about the fine points. If a legislature is established that is widely accepted, then the government can function, and functioning is the first step.
The situation in Iraq is more difficult. We have made so much of the democracy side that we will be disappointing large segments of the population if we do not carry on in this vein. This will be true of both the secular and religious groups, for they are both figuring out how to manage the system we have promised for their own ends. But there must be priorities. Violence has been the story of Iraq’s political life for too long. We should support almost anything that brings down the level. It is what we want and what the man in the street wants, if not necessarily his political leaders. Likewise, we have identified, falsely I would suggest, but nevertheless have, capitalism with democracy. Iraq today is almost entirely a state-run economy. People “out of work” means primarily that the state no longer has the positions that Saddam had open for the average person. The job the United States and the Iraqi government must resolutely tackle is to get the economy functioning, at any ideological cost. If this means reestablishing some of the state institutions that characterized the former state, we should at least temporarily do that. It is no time to throw “cold water” on the people in a misguided attempt to move them immediately into a capitalist economy. Get the society working, then reform it, should be our approach, regardless of how far this may diverge from the standards of the modern liberal society that we hold out as the future for all peoples.
Iraq: One State or Several?
“The Future of Iraq: Dictatorship, Democracy, or Division” by Liam Anderson and Gareth Stansfield argues that Iraq is an artificial state that can probably be held together only by the use of Saddam-like violence. In particular, they argue that it is in our interest to allow the Kurds to form a state of their own in the north. Their case is many pronged. First, they see it as a moral duty of the international community. They were promised such a state after World War II only to have it taken away from them because of Turkish objections. The rest of the world has subsequently used Kurdish insurrections for their own purposes on several occasions, only to abandon the Kurds to their fate when it was no longer in the interest of the larger power (often the United States). Second, and related to this, Iraq is an artificial state. The northern or Mosul Province (an Ottoman Province that included the Kurdish area, but also a good deal more) was added as an after thought to the Ottoman Provinces of central and southern Iraq. The Kurds have since then never stopped revolting. Third, the only example today of a peaceful and more or less democratic area in Iraq is Kurdistan. For over five years the Kurds have managed to live a reasonably modern and prosperous life in their enclave. Politically this amounts to no more than two one-party states that hardly meet our definition of democracy. Still, in the context of Iraq, this is an important accomplishment. It should not be lightly abandoned in a search for a more perfect Iraq. Finally, if we try to force all parts of Iraq to live together, we will end up with something like Bosnia where only the presence of foreign troops prevents the parts from once again being at one another’s throats.
The argument of Stansfield and Gareth is appealing. The Kurds do have a right. And we have no “duty” to reestablish Iraq within its prewar borders. However, were we to follow this route, there would be many short-term losses. We would not gain friends among the Sunni or Shi’a who might argue that we were destroying Iraq, and that we had this in mind all the time. We also would find few friends among the Turks who would view the new state as a threat. The Iranians also would find an independent Kurdistan threatening, and would in any event side with the Shiites. Much of the world would argue that we have betrayed our responsibility in Iraq. (This would be particularly true if we took the Anderson and Stansfield suggestion that we establish a permanent military base in Kurdistan to oversee the area.) However, in the longer term supporting an independent Kurdistan may prove to have been a good fallback position. We would feel better about ourselves. We would have made a firm friend in the area (which we need badly). And if the rest of Iraq goes to hell, we would have at least one positive accomplishment to look back on.
A middle ground might be found if we could persuade (and continue to persuade) the Kurds to accept a semiautonomous state within Iraq and the Sunnis and Shi’as to accept such a solution. Given past history, it would be hard for either side to believe the promises of the other. However, if this the agreement fell apart later, this might mean Kurdistan becomes independent in 2010 rather than 2005 — not a bad outcome. For in this scenario many of the criticisms of the United States would be greatly muted, and yet we would have achieved a free Kurdistan. If the autonomy arrangement hold, even better. Of course, getting to the final solution is likely to entail some fighting. But with very little help the Kurds should be able to hold up their end. And eliminating violence from the scene in Iraq in either 2005 or 2010 is, in any event, most improbable.
The argument of Stansfield and Gareth is appealing. The Kurds do have a right. And we have no “duty” to reestablish Iraq within its prewar borders. However, were we to follow this route, there would be many short-term losses. We would not gain friends among the Sunni or Shi’a who might argue that we were destroying Iraq, and that we had this in mind all the time. We also would find few friends among the Turks who would view the new state as a threat. The Iranians also would find an independent Kurdistan threatening, and would in any event side with the Shiites. Much of the world would argue that we have betrayed our responsibility in Iraq. (This would be particularly true if we took the Anderson and Stansfield suggestion that we establish a permanent military base in Kurdistan to oversee the area.) However, in the longer term supporting an independent Kurdistan may prove to have been a good fallback position. We would feel better about ourselves. We would have made a firm friend in the area (which we need badly). And if the rest of Iraq goes to hell, we would have at least one positive accomplishment to look back on.
A middle ground might be found if we could persuade (and continue to persuade) the Kurds to accept a semiautonomous state within Iraq and the Sunnis and Shi’as to accept such a solution. Given past history, it would be hard for either side to believe the promises of the other. However, if this the agreement fell apart later, this might mean Kurdistan becomes independent in 2010 rather than 2005 — not a bad outcome. For in this scenario many of the criticisms of the United States would be greatly muted, and yet we would have achieved a free Kurdistan. If the autonomy arrangement hold, even better. Of course, getting to the final solution is likely to entail some fighting. But with very little help the Kurds should be able to hold up their end. And eliminating violence from the scene in Iraq in either 2005 or 2010 is, in any event, most improbable.
Iraq: One State or Several?
“The Future of Iraq: Dictatorship, Democracy, or Division” by Liam Anderson and Gareth Stansfield argues that Iraq is an artificial state that can probably be held together only by the use of Saddam-like violence. In particular, they argue that it is in our interest to allow the Kurds to form a state of their own in the north. Their case is many pronged. First, they see it as a moral duty of the international community. They were promised such a state after World War II only to have it taken away from them because of Turkish objections. The rest of the world has subsequently used Kurdish insurrections for their own purposes on several occasions, only to abandon the Kurds to their fate when it was no longer in the interest of the larger power (often the United States). Second, and related to this, Iraq is an artificial state. The northern or Mosul Province (an Ottoman Province that included the Kurdish area, but also a good deal more) was added as an after thought to the Ottoman Provinces of central and southern Iraq. The Kurds have since then never stopped revolting. Third, the only example today of a peaceful and more or less democratic area in Iraq is Kurdistan. For over five years the Kurds have managed to live a reasonably modern and prosperous life in their enclave. Politically this amounts to no more than two one-party states that hardly meet our definition of democracy. Still, in the context of Iraq, this is an important accomplishment. It should not be lightly abandoned in a search for a more perfect Iraq. Finally, if we try to force all parts of Iraq to live together, we will end up with something like Bosnia where only the presence of foreign troops prevents the parts from once again being at one another’s throats.
The argument of Stansfield and Gareth is appealing. The Kurds do have a right. And we have no “duty” to reestablish Iraq within its prewar borders. However, were we to follow this route, there would be many short-term losses. We would not gain friends among the Sunni or Shi’a who might argue that we were destroying Iraq, and that we had this in mind all the time. We also would find few friends among the Turks who would view the new state as a threat. The Iranians also would find an independent Kurdistan threatening, and would in any event side with the Shiites. Much of the world would argue that we have betrayed our responsibility in Iraq. (This would be particularly true if we took the Anderson and Stansfield suggestion that we establish a permanent military base in Kurdistan to oversee the area.) However, in the longer term supporting an independent Kurdistan may prove to have been a good fallback position. We would feel better about ourselves. We would have made a firm friend in the area (which we need badly). And if the rest of Iraq goes to hell, we would have at least one positive accomplishment to look back on.
A middle ground might be found if we could persuade (and continue to persuade) the Kurds to accept a semiautonomous state within Iraq and the Sunnis and Shi’as to accept such a solution. Given past history, it would be hard for either side to believe the promises of the other. However, if this the agreement fell apart later, this might mean Kurdistan becomes independent in 2010 rather than 2005 — not a bad outcome. For in this scenario many of the criticisms of the United States would be greatly muted, and yet we would have achieved a free Kurdistan. If the autonomy arrangement hold, even better. Of course, getting to the final solution is likely to entail some fighting. But with very little help the Kurds should be able to hold up their end. And eliminating violence from the scene in Iraq in either 2005 or 2010 is, in any event, most improbable.
The argument of Stansfield and Gareth is appealing. The Kurds do have a right. And we have no “duty” to reestablish Iraq within its prewar borders. However, were we to follow this route, there would be many short-term losses. We would not gain friends among the Sunni or Shi’a who might argue that we were destroying Iraq, and that we had this in mind all the time. We also would find few friends among the Turks who would view the new state as a threat. The Iranians also would find an independent Kurdistan threatening, and would in any event side with the Shiites. Much of the world would argue that we have betrayed our responsibility in Iraq. (This would be particularly true if we took the Anderson and Stansfield suggestion that we establish a permanent military base in Kurdistan to oversee the area.) However, in the longer term supporting an independent Kurdistan may prove to have been a good fallback position. We would feel better about ourselves. We would have made a firm friend in the area (which we need badly). And if the rest of Iraq goes to hell, we would have at least one positive accomplishment to look back on.
A middle ground might be found if we could persuade (and continue to persuade) the Kurds to accept a semiautonomous state within Iraq and the Sunnis and Shi’as to accept such a solution. Given past history, it would be hard for either side to believe the promises of the other. However, if this the agreement fell apart later, this might mean Kurdistan becomes independent in 2010 rather than 2005 — not a bad outcome. For in this scenario many of the criticisms of the United States would be greatly muted, and yet we would have achieved a free Kurdistan. If the autonomy arrangement hold, even better. Of course, getting to the final solution is likely to entail some fighting. But with very little help the Kurds should be able to hold up their end. And eliminating violence from the scene in Iraq in either 2005 or 2010 is, in any event, most improbable.
Iraq: One State or Several?
“The Future of Iraq: Dictatorship, Democracy, or Division” by Liam Anderson and Gareth Stansfield argues that Iraq is an artificial state that can probably be held together only by the use of Saddam-like violence. In particular, they argue that it is in our interest to allow the Kurds to form a state of their own in the north. Their case is many pronged. First, they see it as a moral duty of the international community. They were promised such a state after World War II only to have it taken away from them because of Turkish objections. The rest of the world has subsequently used Kurdish insurrections for their own purposes on several occasions, only to abandon the Kurds to their fate when it was no longer in the interest of the larger power (often the United States). Second, and related to this, Iraq is an artificial state. The northern or Mosul Province (an Ottoman Province that included the Kurdish area, but also a good deal more) was added as an after thought to the Ottoman Provinces of central and southern Iraq. The Kurds have since then never stopped revolting. Third, the only example today of a peaceful and more or less democratic area in Iraq is Kurdistan. For over five years the Kurds have managed to live a reasonably modern and prosperous life in their enclave. Politically this amounts to no more than two one-party states that hardly meet our definition of democracy. Still, in the context of Iraq, this is an important accomplishment. It should not be lightly abandoned in a search for a more perfect Iraq. Finally, if we try to force all parts of Iraq to live together, we will end up with something like Bosnia where only the presence of foreign troops prevents the parts from once again being at one another’s throats.
The argument of Stansfield and Gareth is appealing. The Kurds do have a right. And we have no “duty” to reestablish Iraq within its prewar borders. However, were we to follow this route, there would be many short-term losses. We would not gain friends among the Sunni or Shi’a who might argue that we were destroying Iraq, and that we had this in mind all the time. We also would find few friends among the Turks who would view the new state as a threat. The Iranians also would find an independent Kurdistan threatening, and would in any event side with the Shiites. Much of the world would argue that we have betrayed our responsibility in Iraq. (This would be particularly true if we took the Anderson and Stansfield suggestion that we establish a permanent military base in Kurdistan to oversee the area.) However, in the longer term supporting an independent Kurdistan may prove to have been a good fallback position. We would feel better about ourselves. We would have made a firm friend in the area (which we need badly). And if the rest of Iraq goes to hell, we would have at least one positive accomplishment to look back on.
A middle ground might be found if we could persuade (and continue to persuade) the Kurds to accept a semiautonomous state within Iraq and the Sunnis and Shi’as to accept such a solution. Given past history, it would be hard for either side to believe the promises of the other. However, if this the agreement fell apart later, this might mean Kurdistan becomes independent in 2010 rather than 2005 — not a bad outcome. For in this scenario many of the criticisms of the United States would be greatly muted, and yet we would have achieved a free Kurdistan. If the autonomy arrangement hold, even better. Of course, getting to the final solution is likely to entail some fighting. But with very little help the Kurds should be able to hold up their end. And eliminating violence from the scene in Iraq in either 2005 or 2010 is, in any event, most improbable.
The argument of Stansfield and Gareth is appealing. The Kurds do have a right. And we have no “duty” to reestablish Iraq within its prewar borders. However, were we to follow this route, there would be many short-term losses. We would not gain friends among the Sunni or Shi’a who might argue that we were destroying Iraq, and that we had this in mind all the time. We also would find few friends among the Turks who would view the new state as a threat. The Iranians also would find an independent Kurdistan threatening, and would in any event side with the Shiites. Much of the world would argue that we have betrayed our responsibility in Iraq. (This would be particularly true if we took the Anderson and Stansfield suggestion that we establish a permanent military base in Kurdistan to oversee the area.) However, in the longer term supporting an independent Kurdistan may prove to have been a good fallback position. We would feel better about ourselves. We would have made a firm friend in the area (which we need badly). And if the rest of Iraq goes to hell, we would have at least one positive accomplishment to look back on.
A middle ground might be found if we could persuade (and continue to persuade) the Kurds to accept a semiautonomous state within Iraq and the Sunnis and Shi’as to accept such a solution. Given past history, it would be hard for either side to believe the promises of the other. However, if this the agreement fell apart later, this might mean Kurdistan becomes independent in 2010 rather than 2005 — not a bad outcome. For in this scenario many of the criticisms of the United States would be greatly muted, and yet we would have achieved a free Kurdistan. If the autonomy arrangement hold, even better. Of course, getting to the final solution is likely to entail some fighting. But with very little help the Kurds should be able to hold up their end. And eliminating violence from the scene in Iraq in either 2005 or 2010 is, in any event, most improbable.
Sunday, November 28, 2004
Iraq: New Election Conundrum
A large group of political parties in Iraq, including most of the Sunni parties and the two major Kurdish parties, met a couple of days ago. The result was a proclamation asking for the elections to be postponed six months so that the whole population would be able to vote with security. One of these parties was that of the Prime Minister Allawi, although he has himself not taken a position on the issue. The response of the American Ambassador and President Bush was to insist that the election had to take place on January 30. The Elections Commission also agreed, saying that they had no authority to postpone the elections beyond January. Yesterday, the representative of the Ayatollah Sistani weighed in with a statement that the elections could not be delayed. At about the same time forty political groups, mostly Shiite, issued a “fiery statement” that the elections must not be delayed.
What is happening is this. The Kurds have apparently come to realize that if they are to have any chance of stopping a Shiite juggernaut able to write a constitution forever taking away their hard-won autonomy, they need to work with the Sunni Arabs — a group they hate on other grounds, including the identification of many Sunni Arabs with Saddam’s persecutions. If the elections are held early, then the Sunnis will not have time enough to organize effectively in their highly volatile provinces and sections of Baghdad, and they will not have time to get the recalcitrant Sunni groups such as the Muslim Scholars to give up their opposition to the elections. The result will be that the Shiites will turn out a relatively larger vote than they would have if the country were all peaceful and the Sunnis will turn out a relatively small vote. The Kurds apparently have the additional problem in that their efforts to repopulate Kirkuk and the surrounding area with Kurds will not be far enough advanced on January 30. On the other hand, the Shi’a know that the security situation will make their majority even clearer than it would be otherwise. They would welcome the opportunity to impose whatever constitution they would like.
In the short term, this presents a challenge to the Americans. The need the continued support of the Shi’a or the enterprise is lost. They hope that the Kurds will stay on board in the last analysis because of their old support for the process. The Americans can hardly hope, however, that keeping to the January time table, which much of the Arab and Western world already opposes, is going to increase the legitimacy of the exercise. For a country that loves to criticize others for not having “free and fair” elections, carrying out present plans under what many consider impossible conditions, is not an easy choice. The United States is also concerned that giving the Shi’a a free hand in drawing up the constitution might result in a theocracy much like Iran. I believe that this possibility is much overdrawn, but it certainly enters the minds of some American leaders.
In the longer term, if Iraq’s leaders remain split over the timing of the election, then this may be the first step toward a breaking up of the country into three or more pieces. While the Shi’a have the votes, the other two groups have shown themselves more effective in the violence department. It is not at all clear that the Shi’a could force the other groups into a united Iraq with them in undisputed control. It could be done with American help. But I do not think that we want to take on the task of forcefully uniting Iraq after elections. It will soon be time for us to go.
What is happening is this. The Kurds have apparently come to realize that if they are to have any chance of stopping a Shiite juggernaut able to write a constitution forever taking away their hard-won autonomy, they need to work with the Sunni Arabs — a group they hate on other grounds, including the identification of many Sunni Arabs with Saddam’s persecutions. If the elections are held early, then the Sunnis will not have time enough to organize effectively in their highly volatile provinces and sections of Baghdad, and they will not have time to get the recalcitrant Sunni groups such as the Muslim Scholars to give up their opposition to the elections. The result will be that the Shiites will turn out a relatively larger vote than they would have if the country were all peaceful and the Sunnis will turn out a relatively small vote. The Kurds apparently have the additional problem in that their efforts to repopulate Kirkuk and the surrounding area with Kurds will not be far enough advanced on January 30. On the other hand, the Shi’a know that the security situation will make their majority even clearer than it would be otherwise. They would welcome the opportunity to impose whatever constitution they would like.
In the short term, this presents a challenge to the Americans. The need the continued support of the Shi’a or the enterprise is lost. They hope that the Kurds will stay on board in the last analysis because of their old support for the process. The Americans can hardly hope, however, that keeping to the January time table, which much of the Arab and Western world already opposes, is going to increase the legitimacy of the exercise. For a country that loves to criticize others for not having “free and fair” elections, carrying out present plans under what many consider impossible conditions, is not an easy choice. The United States is also concerned that giving the Shi’a a free hand in drawing up the constitution might result in a theocracy much like Iran. I believe that this possibility is much overdrawn, but it certainly enters the minds of some American leaders.
In the longer term, if Iraq’s leaders remain split over the timing of the election, then this may be the first step toward a breaking up of the country into three or more pieces. While the Shi’a have the votes, the other two groups have shown themselves more effective in the violence department. It is not at all clear that the Shi’a could force the other groups into a united Iraq with them in undisputed control. It could be done with American help. But I do not think that we want to take on the task of forcefully uniting Iraq after elections. It will soon be time for us to go.
