Iraq and Afghanistan

Today’s paper suggests that the situation in Iraq may be better than many have thought. First, as we have already commented, the international community meeting in Egypt has been willing to accept the idea of an election as the solution. Perhaps more significantly, the meetings did not turn into a propaganda bashing over events in Falluja. It appears that many people, in and outside Iraq, have become increasingly tired of the indiscriminate killing by the insurgents. Second, a insurgent web site broadcast a tape of Zarqawi condemning Sunni Arab clerics for having “let them down” in their greatest hour of need. It goes on to say that clerics have apparently “stopped supporting the Mujahedeen”. If this tape is authentic, it has several implications. First, Falluja was an American victory. It has been noticed that after a flurry of attacks, insurgent incidents have declined a bit. The continuing struggle in Mosul and elsewhere might be a desperate last gasp (hope, hope). The new offensive by government and Coalition forces south of Baghdad seems to be going well. It is also significant that a main goal of this offensive is the suppression of criminal gangs rather than the usual targets. Also, if the Sunni clerics have by and large backed off a bit, it may indicate that there is a growing rift between the extremist doctrines of Zarqawi and other ‘Salafists” and the more mainstream Sunnis. This has always been a potential line of cleavage but so far we had not seen much of it. This would rather isolate most of the “foreigners”. Finally, there appears to be increasing political activity leading up to the elections. More than 200 Iraqi political parties have registered for the elections. The Shi’a are working hard on trying to get a single list put together so that they can end up dominating the scene.

The primary conclusion of Noah Feldman’s “What We Owe Iraq: War and the Ethics of Nation Building” is that by invading Iraq with an announced intention to build a renewed nation we have taken on a responsibility of trusteeship that cannot be lightly laid down. While he agrees that we must press on toward elections, he insist that even the completion of elections will not end the matter. Until the Iraqis are able to establish security, that is, actually rule their country in a satisfactory manner, we will be ethically bound to provide security for the new institutions. When they can run the place themselves, and this may be several years from now, then we can say that the nation-building phase is over and leave. By being able to rule, Feldman specifically does not mean that the new government needs to be able to defend the country from others. As he points out, South Korea is sovereign, but we still aid in its defense.

For several reasons, I do not agree. Our implicit promise to the Iraqis was to give them the opportunity to form a new and better political society than Saddam offered them. As long as he lived, they were evidently unable to get out from under his tyranny. We came, we shoved him aside, we invested many lives in trying to give them this opportunity. Many Iraqis have responded in ways that have impeded our objectives. First, a portion of the population mounted an insurgent campaign that continues. Second, the rest of the society has been unable to come forward in sufficient numbers and with sufficient determination to take over the security responsibility in spite of a great deal of effort by the Coalition forces. It would seem to me that if we support the process until an election whose results are welcomed and accepted by a significant part of the population, we should then work out with the new government the terms of our departure. The resources and attention of the United States are not infinite. There are many other crises and potential crises in the world that demand our resources and leadership. This is a larger ethical issue. As long as we are stuck with an effort of the size we have in Iraq we can simply look on as events elsewhere deteriorate. We cannot be effective. And the rest of the world knows it.

Let us compare our effort in Iraq with that in Afghanistan. In the latter we brought in a much smaller force, even if we include those from NATO and elsewhere. The populations and size of country are roughly similar. We continue to have violent incidents in Afghanistan. Yet since we have had an election, the future of the country seems firmly in the hands of the new government in spite of its relatively incompetent security forces. We will keep troops there indefinitely. But these are small units and the purpose is not primarily to shore up the government. I suggest that we will leave the Afghans to work out their own future, even if it is not a perfect democracy. Much of the country is in the hands of warlords. That may remain the case. So be it.

Turning back to Iraq, we see that there are many segments of the population. Thinking of experience in the Balkans and elsewhere Feldman evidently sees our responsibility the creation of a unitary state. If we stay, this is what we will insist on, may even be forced to fight for. But it seems to me that this is an aspect of the Iraqi future that we should not weigh in on. If the state breaks up, we do not want to be a party to it. On the other hand, it could be best for the Iraqis. At least the Kurds have fought too long for autonomy to have it denied to them now. We should leave a leveler playing field on which some of these decisions can be worked out. Then leave it to the Iraqis.

As mentioned in my last post, the international community apparently agrees with the Ayatollah Sistani that elections are the key to legitimizing and ultimately resolving the problem of Iraq. However, unlike the Americans (officially) and the interim government so far, many foreign representatives believe the date of January 30 that has been set may be unreasonably soon. It is clear that the insurgency continues apace in the Sunni Arab areas. Although there has been some decline in the frequency of incidents recently, it is still higher than before Falluja II. 90 of the country’s 540 registration centers have been closed in recent weeks because of the threat of violence. Registration has been proceeding well outside these areas. In Baghdad, there is a surprising expectation that eighty percent or more of the population will vote on January 30. In the worst areas, where registration may remain impossible, one idea is to allow registration on the day of voting to prevent effective insurgent interference.

All parties have been much exercised by the problem of how the voters might be protected. The United States now plans on increasing the size of its force in Iraq by 4000 or so to help guard the process. This is still woefully inadequate. The plan, in any event, is to keep American forces away from polling places to reduce the appearance of a coerced vote. Yet the Iraqis have less than half the number of security personnel that had been thought necessary for the protection of the booths. In addition, faith has been lost in police forces as evidence mounts that many units have been penetrated. The police chief of Mosul has been arrested after apparently accepting a $600,000 bribe from the insurgents. In Mosul, Kurdish militias were brought in to fill the gap. Some Iraqi leaders are suggesting that some of the Shiite militias be asked to help guard the polling process. But given ethnic fears and party distrusts, such solutions might cause as many problems as they solve.

Some of the best news about Iraq in quite a while comes from reports of the increasing willingness of the world as a whole to accept some of the American “burden”. First, the Americans have managed to convince major world powers as well as neighboring Arab states to agree to a reduction in the Iraq debt by as much as 80%. this includes Russia, France, and Germany. Next, a major conference at the foreign minister level is being held at an Egyptian resort to discuss alternatives for Iraq. This includes many of the Arab states, Iran, the principal Europeans, Powell from the United States, and Annan from the United Nations. The interim Iraqi government is also involved. Whatever the outcome, and the objectives appear to be modest, the exercise gives a much needed expression of support for the legitimacy of both the actions of the United States, the interim Iraqi regime, and the upcoming elections. So far the only difference that has developed is one on whether the elections should be followed by a withdrawal of American forces that is announced before the elections. The Iraqi government, the Egyptians and the U.S. argued that we must wait until after security is established, but most of the other participants were for the idea.