Iraq and Afghanistan

American intelligence is developing what purports to be an improved picture of the enemy they are fighting. Intelligence officers believe they are facing 8000 to 12,000 insurgents backed up by another 20,000 active sympathizers (this figure seems low). They are divided into an estimated 50 cells. They believe that only a 1000 of the total are foreign fighters, although these are some of the most dedicated. The insurgents are supported by almost unlimited supplies of money brought in from Syria, but originating in many cases in Saudi Arabia (notice the absence of Iran in this account). The rest of the money is evidently parceled out by relatives of Saddam from a hoard that the family had managed to place under their control in Syria. It was noted that Iraqis are often fees decided on in advance for setting bombs or attacking Americans. The data reported in the article suggests that 80% of the attacks are criminal rather than insurgency in the accepted sense. This applies especially to kidnappings for ransom and hijackings. Four-fifths of the remaining 20% are carried out by domestic insurgents rather than outsiders. Major insurgent leaders in the Falluja area are more like gang leaders than guerrilla fighters. (The numbers may be wrong, but other accounts suggest that a large percentage of the incidents reported are not actually political. This includes large numbers of revenge killings within the Iraqi community.) The new intelligence suggests a lack of unified command. There are five leaders in the Falluja area alone. The new intelligence is based on an increase in intelligence due to increasing involvement of Iraqis in the anti-insurgent effort. Unfortunately, this gain is balanced in part by the fact that as more Iraqis become a part of the anti-insurgency, the insurgents are able to also improve their intelligence by placing some of their members in the new anti-insurgent units.

These figures should be considered in the context of theories of guerrilla war. The old “rule of thumb” going back at least to the war of the British to suppress the communist insurgency in Malaysia was that to defeat guerrillas the government (or analogous body) needs ten times as many soldiers as there are active guerrillas. This suggests that we are not in such a bad situation in Iraq. We have more than the 120,000 soldiers that this would imply are needed. Unfortunately, the 135,000 or so Americans are scattered over a large area while the guerrillas we are speaking of here are concentrated in a much smaller area. In this area, we do not have ten times their number. Bringing a few thousand British up from the South should help. But perhaps we could turn a much larger percentage of the country over to Iraqi security control, concentrating our forces only in the most difficult areas. We already have very few troops in the Kurdish area. We could also reduce our forces greatly in most of the South.

The Association of Muslim Scholars announced earlier this week that all Iraqis should boycott the elections unless attacks on Falluja or similar American offenses were stopped. The Association is said to represent 3000 Sunni mosques. This announcement came at the time that negotiations to avert the American attacks seemed to be on again, off again. The Association particularly attacked Allawi for insisting on “impossible conditions” for calling off the attack. They objected to the demand that the Fallujans turn over Zarqawi when (they claim) he is not in Falluja. I am sure that many Sunnis are upset by every bomb that falls on Falluja, but we are not really sure of the effect elsewhere.

This morning we had news that the United Nations (only 14 persons in country) has developed with the Iraqis what appears to be an excellent registration system, given the circumstances. They plan to use the country’s food distribution rolls as a basis for registration. The coverage of this system is nearly universal, and government food distribution continues even in Falluja. The electoral administration intends to use the occasion of people coming in for their November food ration for a creative form of registration. Each person with his or her food will be given a piece of paper giving the number of eligible voters in the family. That person is then to correct the list as necessary and hand it back. As I understand it, this will serve as a registration. The clever part of it is that it means that no one will be seen going into an office specifically to register, an action that could be dangerous in some areas. Relying on this method one can begin to understand how some Iraqis assert that they will be able to have a reasonable vote everywhere in the country in spite of the problems.

In all the discussion of the reform of the intelligence services, based in part on the 9/11 report, there is simply not enough realization that the agency has repeatedly failed the country. Today there is yet another report about how immediately before and in the early stages of the war in Iraq, the Central Intelligence Agency in its capacity as advisor to the government and as advisor to various commanders on the ground in Iraq, repeatedly “had it wrong”. They really did think that the people would welcome us with open arms. They really thought that insurgency after we had conquered the country would be a minor problem. They evidently had no idea of the state of Iraq’s infrastructure before the war. With this kind of advice coming in it is no wonder that the Bush Administration so badly judged the requirements of the commitment. The Agency has also been responsible in part for the egregious violations of the right of prisoners in a largely futile search for information.

This, we should remember not the first time that the Agency has failed us. I remember that when I was visiting Vietnam as an advisor to DOD, that the CIA had become something of a joke because in a recent election it had predicted the victory of a faction that in fact came in about eighth when the votes were counted.

The fact is the CIA is lost in a world of its own making. Its analysts believe what they want to believe, and hire secret agents that will feed their fantasies. It seems to me that we need a complete redo, not just a rearrangement at the top. We need an analytic agency that begins de novo, based on the best and most knowledgeable people our universities can provide. We will need to incorporate into the agency some of the truly secret investigative parts of the agency, while keeping the analysts in charge. The analytic agency will operate in the clear without secrecy. The investigative branch will operate in a classified manner. But we must develop a working relationship by which the analysts can both use the clandestine service as a source of information and direct this service in the kind of information that they try to obtain. In the end, the analysts with the broader picture should be the channel through which information from the Agency is provided to actors in government and the military.

In comments on the war, there is often little attention played to the number of Iraqis who are dying, particular as a result of insurgent action. The Times reports that in one recent week 208 Iraqis were killed compared to 23 American military. Perhaps half the 208 were killed by American military action (targeted insurgents and civilians combined). The other half are divided between casualties among the Iraqi security services targeted by the insurgents and civilians killed in the course of insurgent “cause havoc” actions (particularly suicide bombings). In addition there are the kidnappings, either for profit or ideology — sometimes both. The latest is that of the director of CARE in Iraq. What is important to the cause of peace and stability in Iraq is the reaction of the Iraqi people to all this. Some surely condemn many of our bombing attacks that inadvertently kill civilians. They also condemn both America and the Allawi government for our inability to stop the killing. But many civilians are also bound to condemn insurgent attacks that seem to have little purpose other than killing civilians. These may be targeted civilians or just persons in the wrong place at the wrong time. So it would seem to an outside observer that in many cases the insurgent attacks, particularly the suicide bombers are counterproductive. It is said that many Iraqis believe these are the work of outside Islamists, because they do not believe real Iraqis would kill so indiscriminately.

In a recent discussion with a person well acquainted with events in Iran, he suggested that the next successful democracy in the Middle East after Turkey will be Iran. His feeling is that the Iranian people are just waiting for this opportunity. He believes that the religious leaders have completely lost the support of the population. Since the opposition seems to have rejected the idea of mounting a violent revolution, the problem then becomes trying to understand the process by which the present system is replaced. His suggestion is that sooner or later a commander in the security forces (Revolutionary Guards in his scenario) realizes that he would be welcomed by the people if he simply set the religious leadership aside. The result in the first instance would be an authoritarian regime, but this would soon evolve into democracy.

Maybe so, but let us step back a little and examine the situation.

The government of Iran as it is now constituted consists of a Supreme Leader appointed for life by an Assembly of Experts (a small council of religious leaders), the Assembly of Experts (advises on many issues, particularly judicial), the President (popularly elected every four years), and a Consultative Assembly (elected every four years). The problems with the system from a democratic perspective include the nonelection of the Supreme leader who can override anything, the participation of the Supreme Leader in appointing the President’s cabinet, the ability of the Assembly or Experts or other religious bodies to veto the candidacy of anyone to an elected office, and the continual interference with the media by the religious bodies, the Revolutionary Guards, and other antisecular gangs that operate either with or without government support. As might be expected in a state viewing itself as Islamic, the judiciary is largely under the control of clerics (whose education is often primarily in Islamic law). The head of the judiciary is an Ayatollah. The regular court system is supplemented by a Revolutionary Court System that has been responsible for a good deal of the suppression of what modern societies consider personal rights.

In spite of all this, there is a large segment of the Iranian population, especially that centering around the universities, that is quite outspoken. While newspapers and other publications and artistic products (such as movies) are continually banned or closed, the flow of information and artistic expression continues. The movies that reach the West depict a remarkably westernized life in which women play effective and accepted leadership roles. The opposition scored important gains in electing and reelecting Khatami as President (a clergyman, but moderate). They also elected a competitive parliament willing to challenge the religious leaders in many respects. However, by the time of the most recent parliamentary election the inability or unwillingness of Khatami to stand up to the religious leaders and the failure of the parliament to get its measures past the religious hurdles set up by the system, combined with a stronger than previous effort by the clergy to veto the candidacies of many liberals, turned off the liberal leaders to such an extent that they told their followers to abstain from voting. The result was a predictable sweep by the conservatives — further isolating President Khatami.

We do not know what the Iranian people actually think. In the recent past, polls have shown majorities supporting liberal propositions, such closer relations with the United States. But one wonders why a liberal majority hasn’t been able to challenge the system more than it has. One suspects that in Tehran there would be a majority against the system. But, as in many countries, the modernized capital is not the country. It should be noted, however, that statistics suggest that Iran as a whole is a surprisingly modernized country for the region. Its total fertility rate is down below 2.0 births per woman, which means that the population is moving rapidly toward stabilization. By comparison, the rate in Iraq remains above 4.0. This achievement means that the people of Iran have been able with government encouragement under both previous and present political systems to control their fertility in a modern manner. The literacy rate is at 79%, with female literacy 74%. Comparative figures for Iraq are 40%, with female literacy at 24%. If these figures are anywhere near accurate, this means that Iran has without much of the world noticing been developing a modern society that is poised to demand a modern political system. What remains to determine is the path.

The implications of the discussion for American foreign policy are not clear. But it does suggest that instead of thinking of Iran as the next boulder in the path of universal democratization, we should think of it as a country well on its way toward joining our world through the efforts of its own citizens. It would be crazy to think of invading such a country, a step that would both discredit its growing liberal population and discredit liberal leaders. Instead, we must with the help of Iranians both within and without the country devise a strategy that will assist the democratic evolution of the country. In doing so, we must remember that Iranians, liberal and conservative, must be allowed to define their national interests in their own way. In particular, we should not assume that nuclear abstinence is a necessary part of the democratization process. Dictating the position of Iran on this or any other issue cannot be a part of a true democracy program.

The opponents of the Iraq War have many good arguments. It was “the wrong war at the wrong time in the wrong place”. Yet we are there, and all Americans and friends of what used to be called the “Free World” must realize that for both our country’s reputation and the good of the Iraqis we have to accomplish as much as we can while we are there and leave as early and as “successfully” as we can.

In today’s Times, Bob Herbert’s Op-Ed represents another example of the dark side of the liberal critique of the Bush Administration. Herbert tells us that “we find we can’t win this war we started”. Further down the page Herbert writes “As for the rebuilding of Iraq, forget about it.” These may appear to be brave words to Herbert’s admirers. They were words I might have written last April when it appeared our forces were entering the retreat phase of Napoleon’s invasion of Russia.

But today they no longer make sense. If we concentrate on the horror, on the repeated suicide bombings and mortar attacks, and mines along the roads, the picture can look black. But if we notice how these incidents have become more and more concentrated in the Sunni Arab areas, if we read reports detailing small gains here and there, of water systems reestablished, of electricity production which is now considerably above the level when we attacked, of schools that have been renovated, we will draw a different picture. If we note that the program of turning in weapons by the Mahdi Army is now being extended from Sadr City to other Shi’a areas in Iraq, we will see hope once more building. If we note the Shi’a majority in the South and the Kurdish enclaves in the North are expected to vote heavily in January, this will give another picture.

There is no doubt that the situation is still perilous, that the Sunni Arabs might be able to keep the insurgency up for months, or that relations with al-Sadr might break down once more. There is no doubt that the Administration’s plans for the aftermath of “victory” were poorly developed, that there were too few troops to carry out this phase, that the economic development effort, the arms available to American troops, the training of Iraqi security forces, and the incarceration and treatment of Iraqis captured in war or on the streets were so incompetently administered as to verge on criminality. Yet this does not mean that the probability of a reasonably successful outcome is below 50%. I suspect it is well above that. The hatred many of us have for the Administration should not be allowed to obscure the responsibility of observers to take careful and frequent readings of the course of events, and to adjust their judgments as new information comes in.

Today’s New York Times report on Guantanamo concludes that the mistreatment of prisoners there was (at least until this April) quite general and persistent. It assumes that much of the subsequent mistreatment in Afghanistan and Iraq was due, at least in part, to the habits developed and accepted at Guantanamo. An example of special treatment that their reporter repeatedly heard was the shackling of a prisoner to the floor while filling the room with extremely loud music and very bright strobe lights. This was combined with extremely high air conditioning for up to 14 hours.

Many confuse such treatment with the treatment of enemies on the battlefield where tensions are extreme and raw. But this is in a prison in which the power is completely in the hands of the guards and interrogators. There is little or no excuse for it. Experts do not believe that it leads to good intelligence not otherwise obtainable, particularly if, as was generally the case at Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib, the prisoners have little information to give.

Whatever administration is in power in the United States should take seriously the challenge such barbarity poses to the country, in the opinion of its citizens and the world community. The problem is one that transcends the military services and goes to the behavior of the whole corrections and intelligence community, whether in civilian life or in a so-called “time of war”. We cannot claim to be a defender of freedom and a purveyor of democracy while we are allowing people to act in this way at home and abroad.

I would propose a series of conferences on law enforcement and corrections that included the military services, intelligence agencies, and those responsible for these functions at state levels. We should review existing standards of behavior in these agencies, compare these with international standards, and consider the ways in which these are taught to people “on the front lines” in these agencies. If there are special conditions that require measures that go beyond this base line, these should be narrowly defined and the persons identified who can legally give orders to go beyond this line. Such exceptional treatment should be allowed only for named persons and only for specified periods. The conferences should develop high and relevant psychological standards for persons allowed onto the front lines of corrections and interrogation. The conference should consider methods of improving the existing professional cultures among those charged with interrogation and corrections responsibilities.

In addition to this, the United States needs to rethink its identification of persons it picks up in what it refers to as a “war on terrorism”. Most of the people we picked up in Afghanistan were actually members of the Taliban militia. As such, they deserved to be treated as prisoners of war, with a classification identical to that of persons picked up in the course of military operations in Iraq. There has been a much too quick and vague identification of persons as members of al-Qaida or as terrorist enemies of the United States. I agree that there is such a category. But it should be much smaller than we have made it in this instance. For those so categorized, the answer is to bring them back to the United States and try them for their crimes against the United States on a basis that accords with international rather than national standards. We must remember at all times that by our actions we are being judged by peoples everywhere, those well intentioned toward the United States and those not well intentioned. But we are never going to win the long-term struggle to maintain the reputation of states dedicated to freedom and democracy unless we accept the right of our audiences to judge our actions by their standards as well as ours.

It is worth reading today’s discussion in the Week in Review of the difficulty of identifying the enemy in Iraq and the problem this poses for the American command. An American general is quoted as calling this a “negative insurgency” because the groups involved are not offering the Iraqi people any tangible benefits. Unlike other insurgencies, the insurgents have not established a political wing with a communicable political program. Some observers reason that a major reason for their negativity is that the insurgents are loosely organized into many separate groups, often with quite different and even clashing objectives. In this situation, the leaders of these groups may believe that it is better for now to abjure definite positions beyond anti-Americanism. It is, after all, a simple message, and simple messages are those most likely to mobilize large numbers of people. One can only assume that if insurgent success were imminent, the many groups of which they are composed might then shift their attention to their so far suppressed political agendas.

This suggests that if anti-Americanism is the major glue that holds most of these groups together, if we left violence would simply shift its focus. To some degree, it would. However, for the Coalition troops to leave might not be enough to change the focus in the short term. For there would still be in place the Iraqi political and security structure headed by Allawi. Would this continue to be viewed as no more than an American puppet, with a consequent intensification of efforts to drive it from power? If so, we should realize that defeating such a puppet could take longer than many suppose. We must remember that the South Vietnamese government held the country together for a year against one of the largest armies in the world after the Americans left.

We also must remember that the Shi’a hierarchy, the major Shi’a parties, and the major Kurdish parties stand to gain from the success of the political process headed by Allawi. Right now the Shi’as and Allawi are having difficulties because some Shi’a see Allawi as attempting to reestablish a Baathist and secular government. Yet if the Americans left, Allawi and the Shi’a would be forced to come to an understanding to resist the Sunni Arab insurgency. They might even be able to get al-Sadr on their side in this event. After initial losses in the aftermath of an American withdrawal, this new “coalition” might be able to consolidate control over most of the country. One can assume that eventually the Kurds and the rest of the country will have a falling out. But I place this after the democratic process has moved to at least the constitution writing stage. How a subsequent Kurdish challenge plays out will depend on the degree to which the Kurds will want to continue to play a role economically and politically in Baghdad.

Today’s paper discusses a British approach to fighting the insurgency that the American forces might profit from adopting. I say “might” because the British approach has not been 100% successful and the British in the South are in a largely Shi’a area in which the foreign intervention has been welcomed more than in the areas of or worst problems.

First, although they are working on setting up local councils, they are less intent on establishing democracy because they simply do not believe it will have much staying power. Second when the al-Sadr revolt reached them, their response was to hold their bases and outlast the mortar rounds. They killed many of the Mahdi Army in the process, but they launched no counterattacks and so spared the civilians. They make a deliberate effort to see the point of view of the local people, including the Mahdi Army. they try to avoid armor and even helmets as much as possible. They have developed a program to aid local businesses with small loans. The effort to involve the leaders even of hostile groups in these programs seems to have paid off — at least for now.