Saturday, October 02, 2004
John Kerry’s Plan for Iraq
It is very difficult for a challenger in a war situation to express simultaneously support for the troops and promote the idea that this was “the wrong war at the wrong time”. Bush is right about that. But Kerry must do both to win and he is right to do both.
It is in the area of developing a new strategy for Iraq that Kerry faces the most serious challenge. He is absolutely right that if one were going to fight this war, the war should have been better planned and the aftermath should have been better planned. This is both a matter of inadequate resources and inadequate planning for the use of those resources. But Kerry must be careful. He knows that he will not really know what to do until after his election (if it occurs) and he is able to sit down with the principals and see what is possible.
Kerry accuses Bush of having a policy of “more of the same” in Iraq. Yet if we look at the Kerry plans, outlined here, we find that they too are made up of items that could be labeled “more of the same”. He is going to:
* Internationalize, because others must share the burden;
* Train Iraqis, because they must be responsible for their own security;
* Move forward with reconstruction because that's an important way to stop the spread of terror; and
* Help Iraqis achieve a viable government, because it is up to them to run their own country.
All of these items are, of course, what Bush claims to be doing. But under these headings Kerry does spell out some new directions or at least emphases that would help. Probably the most useful (found under several headings) is the shifting of more of the development process at small and major levels, in gas fields and in election preparations, to a broader set of international actors as well as to the Iraqis themselves. There has been too much reliance on Americans, particularly in the major oil and construction projects. It is also interesting to note that while Kerry has had his doubts about making the democratic transformation of Iraq (or other states) a major aspect of American policy, in his Iraq program he suggests strengthening the democracy program by such actions as increased protection of the voting process, more training in civil society and the operation of political parties, and more support for judicial training.
It is in the area of developing a new strategy for Iraq that Kerry faces the most serious challenge. He is absolutely right that if one were going to fight this war, the war should have been better planned and the aftermath should have been better planned. This is both a matter of inadequate resources and inadequate planning for the use of those resources. But Kerry must be careful. He knows that he will not really know what to do until after his election (if it occurs) and he is able to sit down with the principals and see what is possible.
Kerry accuses Bush of having a policy of “more of the same” in Iraq. Yet if we look at the Kerry plans, outlined here, we find that they too are made up of items that could be labeled “more of the same”. He is going to:
* Internationalize, because others must share the burden;
* Train Iraqis, because they must be responsible for their own security;
* Move forward with reconstruction because that's an important way to stop the spread of terror; and
* Help Iraqis achieve a viable government, because it is up to them to run their own country.
All of these items are, of course, what Bush claims to be doing. But under these headings Kerry does spell out some new directions or at least emphases that would help. Probably the most useful (found under several headings) is the shifting of more of the development process at small and major levels, in gas fields and in election preparations, to a broader set of international actors as well as to the Iraqis themselves. There has been too much reliance on Americans, particularly in the major oil and construction projects. It is also interesting to note that while Kerry has had his doubts about making the democratic transformation of Iraq (or other states) a major aspect of American policy, in his Iraq program he suggests strengthening the democracy program by such actions as increased protection of the voting process, more training in civil society and the operation of political parties, and more support for judicial training.
Wednesday, September 29, 2004
Conclusions Based on Iraq Incident Map
On September 29 the NY Times published one of the most informative pieces on the Iraq war yet. The article was written around an incident map compiled by a private security company working in Iraq. They report that in the last 30 days there have been 2300 attacks, which is about average for this period of time. The point of the piece emphasized by the Times is that the insurgency is everywhere.
Yet studying the map rebuts this assumption and leads to very different conclusions. The number of incidents in the three southwestern provinces are 1, 2, and 7 respectively. For the provinces east of that, the figures are 1 and 6. Beyond that, on the Iranian border, they are 12 and 13. In the three Kurdish provinces in the northeast the figures are 1, 4, and 1. So out of the 18 provinces in the country 10 are essentially quiet. At the other extreme we have Baghdad with 997, Anbar (Falluja) with 332 and six others with 325, 283, 83, 123, 87, and 76 respectively. This certainly refutes Dr. Allawi’s recent claim in Washington that “14 to 15 of the provinces are completely safe”.
An overlay map of where the Sunni Arabs live shows that nearly all the incidents have been in Sunni Arab majority areas: Shi’a areas are remarkably free. The only Shi’a area with significant incidents is Basra with 87, and I believe there is a considerable Sunni Arab population there. It should be noted that in the Najaf and Karbala, areas where there has been heavy fighting recently, there were very few violent incidents in September. The kind of war that we had in Najaf is not a war against terrorists. It is essentially conventional and much easier to fight and win in a meaningful sense.
So the Coalition and the Interim Government are fighting the Sunni Arabs and not the Shi’a. As I have said many times, this fits the rational assumptions about why Iraqis might fight to fight “the invader”. The Sunni Arabs are the ones who will be left out in the cold in a democracy — or feel they will. The map also suggests that the Iranians are not playing a major role in anything that is going on. The map is remarkably free of incidents near the Iranian border, which, incidentally, is where the Shi’a and the Kurds live.
Yet studying the map rebuts this assumption and leads to very different conclusions. The number of incidents in the three southwestern provinces are 1, 2, and 7 respectively. For the provinces east of that, the figures are 1 and 6. Beyond that, on the Iranian border, they are 12 and 13. In the three Kurdish provinces in the northeast the figures are 1, 4, and 1. So out of the 18 provinces in the country 10 are essentially quiet. At the other extreme we have Baghdad with 997, Anbar (Falluja) with 332 and six others with 325, 283, 83, 123, 87, and 76 respectively. This certainly refutes Dr. Allawi’s recent claim in Washington that “14 to 15 of the provinces are completely safe”.
An overlay map of where the Sunni Arabs live shows that nearly all the incidents have been in Sunni Arab majority areas: Shi’a areas are remarkably free. The only Shi’a area with significant incidents is Basra with 87, and I believe there is a considerable Sunni Arab population there. It should be noted that in the Najaf and Karbala, areas where there has been heavy fighting recently, there were very few violent incidents in September. The kind of war that we had in Najaf is not a war against terrorists. It is essentially conventional and much easier to fight and win in a meaningful sense.
So the Coalition and the Interim Government are fighting the Sunni Arabs and not the Shi’a. As I have said many times, this fits the rational assumptions about why Iraqis might fight to fight “the invader”. The Sunni Arabs are the ones who will be left out in the cold in a democracy — or feel they will. The map also suggests that the Iranians are not playing a major role in anything that is going on. The map is remarkably free of incidents near the Iranian border, which, incidentally, is where the Shi’a and the Kurds live.
Are Elections the Road to Peace?
David Brooks gives a reasoned argument in Tuesday’s paper for the Administration’s thesis (supported in other days by many academics) that elections (as a road to democracy) are the best solution for terrorism. His example is the election of Napoleon Duarte in El Salvador in the 1980s. There is no doubt that this did play a part in moving social conflict in the state from the jungle to the election booth. Brook’s message is that as soon as we bring democracy, the “insurgency buster” to Iraq and Afghanistan, there will be an end to violence and insurgency.
There are several reasons to doubt the analogy. First, El Salvador, like all Latin American countries had been working on making democracy work since the 1820s. The people were used to elections, parties, and freedom of expression. The fact that these features of their systems were often set aside by recurrent times of trouble and dictatorships does not vitiate this experience. So when the elections were held in the 1980s, most Salvadorans were ready for them in a sense that Iraqis are not. Second, although they have had much less experience with democracy than Latin Americans, the peoples surrounding Iraq and Afghanistan have had brief episodes of democracy. The Syrians and Iranians have both had short bouts with democracy. Afghanistan had a democratic opening in the 1920s and more serious experience with democracy in the 1960s. Pakistan has been an off and on again democracy since its creation. Unfortunately, violence and repression followed these experiments. Third, we should also remember the experience in Yugoslavia. For forty years Tito ruled the many peoples of the land with an iron hand. When this was removed, the successor states all intended and tried to be democracies. But except for relatively homogeneous Slovenia, the result was a bloodletting that has still not worked itself completely out. Several successor states remain relatively peaceful only with the help of the international community.
In Post-USSR and post-colonial lands, the institutions of democracy were established and elections held immediately after the attainment of independence. Yet the end result for most of the “successor states” was dictatorship in a new form, this time covered with the fig leaf of democratic forms. India, and Caribbean Islands largely escaped this experience, and today in some of these states democracy is having a rebirth. But the record hardly suggests that elections are a sovereign solution for violence in emerging societies.
Yes, elections might help to calm things down, especially in Afghanistan. But they could also be no more than a starting point for a new cycle of violence, an experience only too common in the modern world.
There are several reasons to doubt the analogy. First, El Salvador, like all Latin American countries had been working on making democracy work since the 1820s. The people were used to elections, parties, and freedom of expression. The fact that these features of their systems were often set aside by recurrent times of trouble and dictatorships does not vitiate this experience. So when the elections were held in the 1980s, most Salvadorans were ready for them in a sense that Iraqis are not. Second, although they have had much less experience with democracy than Latin Americans, the peoples surrounding Iraq and Afghanistan have had brief episodes of democracy. The Syrians and Iranians have both had short bouts with democracy. Afghanistan had a democratic opening in the 1920s and more serious experience with democracy in the 1960s. Pakistan has been an off and on again democracy since its creation. Unfortunately, violence and repression followed these experiments. Third, we should also remember the experience in Yugoslavia. For forty years Tito ruled the many peoples of the land with an iron hand. When this was removed, the successor states all intended and tried to be democracies. But except for relatively homogeneous Slovenia, the result was a bloodletting that has still not worked itself completely out. Several successor states remain relatively peaceful only with the help of the international community.
In Post-USSR and post-colonial lands, the institutions of democracy were established and elections held immediately after the attainment of independence. Yet the end result for most of the “successor states” was dictatorship in a new form, this time covered with the fig leaf of democratic forms. India, and Caribbean Islands largely escaped this experience, and today in some of these states democracy is having a rebirth. But the record hardly suggests that elections are a sovereign solution for violence in emerging societies.
Yes, elections might help to calm things down, especially in Afghanistan. But they could also be no more than a starting point for a new cycle of violence, an experience only too common in the modern world.
Tuesday, September 28, 2004
What is the Level of Violence in Iraq?
There is a growing feeling that we are trapped in a cycle of violence in Iraq. Today, let us see some arguments on both sides of this judgment. On the one side are experts such as Juan Cole who continues to report in greater detail than the media the litany of deaths and destruction. By his estimate the level of violence has been steadily rising since June. He apologizes today for having reported too large a safe area previously (see our earlier posting). He now thinks only the three Kurdish provinces are relatively safe. On Sunday, Maureen Dowd led yet another Times Op-Ed charge against the mendacity or delusion of an administration that cannot admit such an obvious fact.
On the other side, I read a fabulous Times account in Monday’s paper by a reporter who accompanied a truck convoy from Kuwait to Baghdad. He reports that at any one time there are about 700 large trucks hauling goods in Iraq. The drivers include many Americans as well as Pakistanis, Bangladeshis, Somalis and others. They realize it is dangerous, but continue for the money and apparently the thrill and camaraderie “of the road”. The trucks largely move in large convoys, with accompanying humvees. Yet the impression is that they are very lightly protected. The long line of closely packed fuel trucks pictured in the article must present an enticing target for terrorists with rockets (Cole reports a recent attack on just such a line). Nearly all the drivers have had their trucks attacked at one time or another. But the trucks are getting through both for the military and the civilian economy. As far as the extent to which the violence is concentrated, the general consensus of the drivers was that danger increased with every mile from Kuwait to Baghdad. The reporter’s convoy stopped for a while before making a night run into the city.
This made me stop and think a little. The willingness of these drivers to take these risks suggests that there is more of a chance than we might think. If we imagine that a truck is stopped or highjacked every week, that is only 52 a year out of 700 plus large carriers. When we think of the civilian deaths at the hand of terrorists, we must remember this is a country of 26 million. I suspect that if we did the calculation, the danger for Israeli and Palestinian civilians over the last several years has probably been a good deal greater than for Iraqi civilians once the early stages of the war were behind them. I saw a report the other day on homicides dealt with in Baghdad hospitals. The doctors said that they were mostly domestic homicides, often revenge killings or other killings for honor.
I am not willing to go the Administration route and put on rose-colored glasses. But it is well to remember once again that the media do report what happens, not what does not happen. This can give a warped view. (For example, killings in American schools have been going down for many years; this would never be understood through watching or reading the media.)
On the other side, I read a fabulous Times account in Monday’s paper by a reporter who accompanied a truck convoy from Kuwait to Baghdad. He reports that at any one time there are about 700 large trucks hauling goods in Iraq. The drivers include many Americans as well as Pakistanis, Bangladeshis, Somalis and others. They realize it is dangerous, but continue for the money and apparently the thrill and camaraderie “of the road”. The trucks largely move in large convoys, with accompanying humvees. Yet the impression is that they are very lightly protected. The long line of closely packed fuel trucks pictured in the article must present an enticing target for terrorists with rockets (Cole reports a recent attack on just such a line). Nearly all the drivers have had their trucks attacked at one time or another. But the trucks are getting through both for the military and the civilian economy. As far as the extent to which the violence is concentrated, the general consensus of the drivers was that danger increased with every mile from Kuwait to Baghdad. The reporter’s convoy stopped for a while before making a night run into the city.
This made me stop and think a little. The willingness of these drivers to take these risks suggests that there is more of a chance than we might think. If we imagine that a truck is stopped or highjacked every week, that is only 52 a year out of 700 plus large carriers. When we think of the civilian deaths at the hand of terrorists, we must remember this is a country of 26 million. I suspect that if we did the calculation, the danger for Israeli and Palestinian civilians over the last several years has probably been a good deal greater than for Iraqi civilians once the early stages of the war were behind them. I saw a report the other day on homicides dealt with in Baghdad hospitals. The doctors said that they were mostly domestic homicides, often revenge killings or other killings for honor.
I am not willing to go the Administration route and put on rose-colored glasses. But it is well to remember once again that the media do report what happens, not what does not happen. This can give a warped view. (For example, killings in American schools have been going down for many years; this would never be understood through watching or reading the media.)
