Iraq and Afghanistan

Noah Feldman, a noted authority on the current situation in Iraq, writes in Friday’s Op-Ed that elections in Iraq would be worse than useless if they take place without the Sunni Triangle’s full participation. His argument is several fold.

Feldman regards Sistani’s latest demand that the elections be held in January and that the government parties abandon the single list approach to be actually a bargaining ploy to strengthen the hand of his supporters in making election arrangements. Sistani believes that instead of the 55% Shi’a population that the list is being based on the real number is more like 70%. He wants the list to be based on 70%. Feldman points out that the January election is important because those elected will rewrite the constitution. Sistani intervenes because he wants the Shi’as to dominate that process. Turning to the Sunni, Feldman notes that they are used to running the country. They are also clearly able at this juncture to mount an effective insurgency. Were they to be left out of the election process, they would turn decisively against the democracy project and persist as an uncontrollable population in the heart of the country. Therefore, unifying the country will require both the suppression of the insurgency, proving the insurgents cannot win and “the carrot” of being offered an effective role in the political process. He believes this offer will be enough to get the Sunni clerics who have told their followers to sit out the election to change their minds. He realizes this will take some time, but believes it would be a disaster to not postpone the election until such time as the Sunnis are ready.

Whether Feldman is right or wrong depends in large part on what the country really looks like. If as Allawi and the American Administration claim, there are really only three provinces where elections could not be held today, that is one thing. But there is considerable dispute over where control is adequate and where it is not. Juan Cole’s position is that the elections now could only be held in only nine provinces: the three Kurdish provinces, Baghdad, and five provinces in the south (including Karbala and Basra). Cole’s position on Baghdad is unclear because he says that Allawi included Baghdad in the three no-goes where elections could still not be held, and Cole certainly is aware of lack of control in much of Baghdad. Perhaps Cole’s map where he shows Baghdad white is simply a mistake. One thing to remember is that out of a population of about 25 million, 6 million live in the Baghdad region. So if that is in the pacified area, great, but if it remains out in the cold as Allawi and others say now (and as I would guess from the news), then it is hard to see how a “national election” could be out.

Perhaps the greatest objection to the Feldman approach is that it is unclear why the Sunnis would ever “come in out of the cold”. They will lose control no matter how the constitution is written, if it is at all democratic. Moreover, for whatever reasons, they hate Americans and those who cooperate with them. This unfortunate hatred cannot be wished away. The longer the war goes on in the Sunni Triangle, the more Sunnis are killed, and the more individual Sunnis come to feel the need for revenge against the Americans and their allies. I do not see how “suppression” under these conditions will produce a country ready for a democratic vote.

Today’s paper reports that the Ayatollah Sistani is again expressing his concerns about the planned elections. He seems to have two fears. First, he objects to the fact that the major political parties, all groups that had an existence outside the country during Saddam’s day (but not only outside), are meeting together to decide on a common ticket that will be presented to the people without offering the chance for others, particularly local leaders, to run effectively for office. Their argument is that this will mean a more unified country after the elections. His argument is that it will mean a less legitimate process. Second, he is worried that all the talk about security being too poor for the elections to occur is just a pretext to put them off. He thinks they should go ahead where there is enough peace, and that means most of the country in his view. (This is a view I share.)

One never knows why the Ayatollah injects himself into the process in this way. But leaving aside the obviously important “real concerns”, he probably also feels a need to counter the thought that al-Sadr is the only Shi’a leader that stands up for the masses. He wants to show that he is there for them, that he will not allow the shenanigans of the foreigners and the Sunnis to deny the Shi’a masses their right to rule Iraq.

Regardless of his reasoning, one can draw a positive conclusion from his statements (as usual cloudily expressed through a representative). This is that he is taking the process seriously. He still wants, as he has said in the past, for a legitimate vote to take place. He still believes it can. He wants to have a Shi’a run Iraq and believes that if the present process is carried through on schedule, this will result. He is suspicious, or wants to show that he is suspicious, of the Allawi government and the Americans. But if he holds their feet to the fire, all will be well. (He must see more bright lights than many commentators do.)

Wouldn’t it be nice to have an old-fashioned war where we could judge success or lack of success by the movement of front lines? Iraq and Afghanistan, indeed the whole so-called “War on Terrorism”, confuses everyone, even those who do not have a pre-determined wish to see events turn out poorly or well.

President Bush tells the United Nations that we are building democracy in Iraq, never mind a few stumbles along the way. Prime Minister Allawi assures us that what we are seeing in Iraq is the last gasp of the insurgents, made desperate by their inability to derail progress toward democracy. Meantime the killing goes on in Iraq. I am particularly discouraged by the thought that for many Iraqis the issue is not so much deciding on which side would be best for the country but rather the inescapable rules of revenge. With every person killed in Iraq, no matter whether we were the direct killers or not, there is likely to be group of persons united by family or other ties that feel that they are duty bound to exact revenge on the Americans (or other foreigners, they are not always that discriminating). I am not sure we can get over this hurdle. Yet Allawi’s words also remind me of the Tet Offensive in Vietnam. Many observers saw that as a defeat for the communists (their losses were tremendous, they failed to hold any cities — they never had any Fallujas). Yet it was at this point that many Americans decided they had had enough. There may or may not be any moral in this.

Afghanistan looks a little better. Today’s NYT Op-Ed page had two pieces. One said that bad planning and unwillingness to put adequate forces and resources into the country has resulted in a smoldering disaster. The presidential election in going ahead in spite of a lack of control over much of the country. The economy has come to depend largely on the opium crop. Yet even this critic sees some positive gains, particularly in the education of girls and the number registering to vote. The other piece paints a much more optimistic view of what is happening, what we have come to know as a Bush-eye view. I believe that one of the best parts of the Afghan situation, one that ironically may be due to the fact we have not invested very much in the effort, is that Hamid Karzai and the Kabul government is taken much more seriously than Allawi’s government in Iraq. Hatred of the foreigner does not seem to be the most salient fact in the violence in much of the country. This is due, in another part, to the fact that the structure of the country was not torn apart by an invasion as it was in Iraq. The old ethnic and tribal groups, often led by what we call “warlords” were never driven out. They either never left or easily returned (as did Karzai). In fact, some of their units played a major role in bringing down the Taliban. The Karzai government also benefits from its authentication by the Grand Assembly or loya jirga that was carefully planned out of the country and then convened with comprehensive participation within the country. Along with the involvement of the former King, this gave Karzai a credibility that similar efforts carried through in the more hostile redoubts of Baghdad simply did not obtain. Would that it would have been possible to approach Iraq in the same fashion.

If we are to escape from the trap recent policies have led us into, we must take urgent and dramatic steps to reestablish our credibility and thereby reestablish our leadership. Only then can we pursue the essential goals of any American administration: the protection of American interests at home and abroad and progress toward the achievement of a better life for all people.

At a minimum, the following steps are necessary:

1. Make careful and judicious use of our resources. This means avoiding spending beyond our means except in clearly exceptional times. In military terms, it means undertaking actions only when we have clear objectives and when we can apply overwhelming force. It means ending actions only after our objectives have been attained. Following this path, we will reduce casualties on all sides and preserve the ability of the country to respond in a timely fashion to other crises as they arise.

2. Establish and maintain friendly working relationships with all responsible governments, even those with which we have important policy differences. In the case of Iraq specifically, this means working with the governments of all adjoining states to help contain the movement of supplies to the insurgents and to assist in the development of the country. In the case of Russia, it means avoiding unnecessary criticisms of their internal policies and offering assistance in their struggle against terrorism and ethnic unrest. It also means taking a more even-handed approach to Russia’s relations with its former socialist republics.

3. Play a more supportive and cooperative part in international organizations or conferences, whether the subject be environmental policy, trade policy, nuclear proliferation, or international courts. We must be seen as playing a positive rather than disruptive role in creating a new international order, as well as in the creation of new regional organizations or systems.

4. Work for the extension of freedom (democracy and human rights) in the world through peaceful means. We can do this through offering democratic assistance to countries that ask for it. Many countries desire our assistance in improving their security, judicial, or electoral systems - or in the building of a civil society. We should remain a haven for exiles working for freedom in countries still without freedom. We should publicize our impression of the degree to which the performance of some states falls below international standards. Official condemnations of the behavior of other governments should, however, only be made in exceptional circumstances. Finally, we should support freedom through our example, through inviting people throughout the world to become acquainted with the better aspects of our way of life. We should, of course, be sure to continue working on improving the level of freedom and democracy in the United States.

5. Assist in the creation and maintenance of chains of nonaggression agreements throughout the world. We might, for example, help to create and ensure a nonaggression agreement running from Lebanon and Turkey to India and Bangladesh. This would include specific guarantees to the countries involved that we will not threaten them and will come to their assistance if threatened, thereby strengthening their ability to develop nonthreatening relations with the countries around them.

6. Strive to develop along with other existing nuclear weapon powers a more responsible and equitable nuclear nonproliferation program. As it is, rising states with nuclear ambitions have no reason not to use the same logic that we do in imagining that nuclear weapons makes a country invulnerable through deterrence. We can say little that is convincing to the Iranians as long as we have allowed Israel, Pakistan, and India to possess these weapons and as long as we show little sign of actually dismantling the overwhelming nuclear deterrent capacity that we maintain. In the end, an effective nonproliferation program will be one in which all nuclear weapon countries move together toward a radical reduction in their stockpiles and radical change in their nuclear weapon doctrines. It is past time that the United States take a lead in an effort to develop such a program.

With an approach along these lines, we will begin to look more like a leader than a bully, and we may find it easier to induce other states and peoples to help us extricate ourselves from those projects in which we have floundered.

Yesterday’s paper bought us the news that “the cause of regime change in Iran is expected to be revived if President Bush is reelected.” It reports that Rick Santorum of Pennsylvania has submitted a bill that would give congressional support to “regime change” in Iran. The report suggests that the first step administration conservatives contemplate would be to try to start a revolution. But I imagine that when that doesn't work, perhaps the “imminent threat” of Iran developing a nuclear weapon (such as Pakistan, India, and Israel already have) will be enough to launch another invasion.

The idea of invading Iran is foolish on many counts. First, Iran is a much larger country than Iraq and its people are much more united. Second, while it is to some degree a theocracy, Iran is also to some extent a democracy. Iran’s media are controlled to an extent, but also remarkably vibrant. Iran’s women are in chadors, but light years ahead of much of the Middle East in the extent to which they participate in public life. Both through the efforts of the shah and the clergy, the country is now quite well educated, with millions of Iranians ready and willing to participate in the modern world.

Yes, we should support greater freedom in Iran and work with the world to contain its nuclear ambitions (which are supported by many Iranian liberals as well as conservatives), but no one should contemplate the United States plunging Iran into the kind of turmoil we see in Iraq because Washington has policy disputes with Tehran.

Let us understand the Iraq War at its most idealistic. Most liberals who supported the war never believed that America was in imminent danger if we did not "take out Saddam" in March of 2003. It is true that they believed there were more WMDs in Iraq than we actually found. They feared, and especially the military feared, that chemical and biological weapons would be used against American forces. However, they still felt we should invade Iraq to get rid of one of the world's most oppressive and bloody tyrants. They also believed that if we did invade we would be able to reconstruct Iraq as a democratic country. After all, in Iraq we were not dealing with a country sunk under the weight of illiteracy and poverty, but rather with one of the more developed and modern states in the developing world.

Fern Holland, grew up in poverty in a small Oklahoma town , but from an early age was able to achieve high grades in school at the same time as she helped those less fortunate than she. Wherever she went and whatever she did, she did it in an American "can do" spirit. She obtained a law degree, but even before it was obtained, she had embarked on a worldwide effort to make the world a better place. She helped dying children in Russia and assisted in a squatter camp in South Africa; she joined the Peace Corps and was off to Namibia. She moved to Washington and quickly became involved in the legal problems of African women and children. She tried to set up an African Institute for Democracy. When Iraq came along, she decided that she wanted to be a part of the democratization effort. In Iraq, Shi'a women told her of the struggle against Saddam and the thousands who had died after the Gulf War because of the betrayal of the Americans. She became convinced that whatever the flaws in the reasons for the war, these graves were a sufficient reason. She went to work for the American representative of the Provisional Authority in a province south of Baghdad. They worked together on setting up Human Rights Centers and soon she was focusing on democracy education and liberating Iraqi women. The Provisional Authority didn't seem to have very clear ideas of what to do, so she just went ahead, setting up provincial women's centers.

She developed many friends, men and women, who gladly worked with her. Sometimes she worked with an idealistic former marine who had come back after his tour of duty to help the Iraqis. But along the way in the local bazaars, she also came to be seen as a threat to men of authority and local customs. Rumors spread that she was handing out pornography, was conducting abortions, or was a Jewish spy. On one occasion, she took women to Washington so they might better understand the United States. Bremer and colleagues were impressed. They flew in occasionally to see her projects and heaped praise on her work. But on March 9, on the way back from one of her projects, a jeep pulled alongside her car and killed Fern and the Marine at close range with AK-47s. They were the first civilian employees of the Provisional Authority to be killed in Iraq.

Since then, security in much of the country has crumbled; there are now fewer Ferns in the field; the women who worked with her have mostly given up on the movement; her women's centers are largely abandoned.

There are many reasons that Iraqis have for hating Americans: some are crazy, some are reasonable. But two reasons are most important. First, like many peoples in the world Iraqis simply do not understand the impetus to help others that moved Fern. Many loved or respected her. But too many could not help feeling that she must have ulterior motives, that she wanted to destroy their culture, to make them all Christians, to lay the basis for a permanent occupation, or to gain personally in some as yet unfathomable manner. For them, she was "too good to be true". Second, "nobody asked you". That is, they did not feel that anyone had a right to come into their country and try to impose their beliefs and practices on it, no matter how ideal these might seem in theory.

What can we learn? We should learn that the more intense our effort to transform a society, the more resistance will be encountered. This should teach us that if we are going to go out to a people with organizers and educators whose mission is to fundamentally change their way of life. then we must also have a large number of people in the field willing and able to protect those agents of change that we employ to carry out such a policy. It was foolish to have people like Fern out in the field day after day without protection. (I think we know that now, but I believe we have very few Ferns still in the field.)

We should also learn to moderate our aspirations and goals as we attempt to instill democracy. We need to remember that the relatively open and egalitarian society we have today evolved over centuries from a society with beliefs and attitudes not too different from those in modern Iraq. We must remember that even after a civil war, Americans in the South continued to treat African Americans as inferiors for a hundred years in spite of the efforts of northern educators, some of whom lived and worked in the South. Often they fought back violently against the idea of equality. Only after several generations of racists had come and gone and after communications North and South had greatly increased, was there a widespread acceptance of equality in the South. Why then should we expect the men of Iraq to suddenly accept the idea that women have the same rights as they do? People in countries such as Iraq are often ready to adopt the forms of Western democracies along with some of the reality. But we are not likely to be able to force down their throats the latest ideas of a liberalized West.

Sunday’s NYT Week in Review offers through two maps and accompanying discussions why Russia faces extreme difficulty in holding the country together at the same time as it is expected to adhere to those international human rights standards, particularly self-determination, that the advanced world has adopted. This material can be see by going here (at least this week. Later I suppose they can be found by going to nytimes.com and looking for archived pages under the titles Map: Russia’s Ethnic Jigsaw Puzzle, and Map: Piecing Together the Caucasus). The discussion accompanying the maps points out that more than half of Russia consists of ethnic republics and autonomous regions (this is, of course, after all the old SSRs were subtracted from the state). Many of these political units now have majority Russian populations. Yet many do not, and the complexity of holding them all together is daunting. The map of the Caucasus shows an overlapping of peoples and borders, international and otherwise, that make the complexities of the Balkans look relatively trivial. Today’s NYT points out that many of these groups hate and despise one another, often more so than they do their Russian overlords. It is expected, for example, that 40 days after the Beslan tragedy there will be another tragedy when Ossetians take revenge on nearby Ingush (even though the Chechens were probably the real sponsors).

All this should be remembered when we too easily criticize the Russian for trying to hold on to Chechnya, in part because their independence would enflame their neighbors. We should also more easily sympathize with Putin and his people when they propose or accept changes in the system that would give greater power to the center and reduce the power of local political leaders. We may not like it, but Russians do crave stability above other goods in the political arena — and perhaps with good reason.

In Sunday’s paper we read that the Administration plans to make a major military effort to take control of Falluja, Ramadi, Baquba, and Samarra toward the end of the year. The reason cited for delay is that they want Iraqi forces to spearhead the drive and these forces will not be adequately trained or equipped before then. In today’s paper we read that the effort to train the Iraqis has been lagging. The reason given is that, among other things, “only 230 of the nearly 600 military personnel required by the headquarters have been assigned. . .” Authorities say that “It takes time to build these new organizations. . .” One commentator notes that there doesn't seem to have been much urgency about the effort.

Let us think for a moment. We invaded the country on March 19, 2003. The war was “over” in about a month. Soon after that we announced the dissolution of the Iraqi army. Being told by many military experts before the war that the forces we were planning to use for the invasion were not adequate to police the country, are we to believe that it did not occur to the Administration that we would need a substantial new Iraqi army to take over security tasks after we left? Yet here we are in September, 2004 and we are told that the headquarters for the effort is not yet half manned! Not quite right. There was an earlier Iraqi security force put together by some other part of our occupation structure. When it collapsed in battle, we were told that these forces had not been sufficiently trained and that they had not been provided with enough weapons or body protection. Apparently, the “lagging program” that we are talking about now is a new training program that replaces rather than develops the failed earlier program.

Was our Administration this incompetent, or are we simply seeing the development of excuses for not taking back out of control areas until later. Could it be that the real reason for the United States delaying its offensive is not lack of a poorly staffed training headquarters but a desire to avoid American casualties in Iraq in the weeks before the election?

We can conclude that the Administration is either impossibly incompetent or crassly playing politics with its war. Meanwhile, Americans and Iraqis die every day.