Friday, September 03, 2004
Scenarios for Iraq
Bob Herbert reports in today’s paper the statement of John McCain that our troops are likely to remain in Iraq for 10 to 20 years. Yet, sadly, no one else is telling the people the truth. He backs up his case by pointing to a “Briefing Paper” just released by the Royal Institute of International Affairs. (Click here to look at the study). Let us briefly summarize the three scenarios the Paper suggests.
(1) The “fragmentation scenario” which it considers the “default scenario”. The assumption is that the Shi’a, Sunni, and Kurdish elements of the population will work against one another’s interests to such an extent that the nation will slowly dissolve before the present political process comes to fruition. In this scenario opposition to American forces continues and grows, but not in a way that unites the disparate factions. The Kurds are scared of losing independence; the Sunnis are afraid of being overrun, the Shi’as are afraid that there is a Sunni-Baathist plot that will not allow their promised control of the country to be realized.
(2) The “Holding Together” scenario. Enough people will choose to work together to make it possible to establish a government on the projected model. This will occur only if the interim government and the Americans work effectively to block the fragmentation scenario.
(3) The “Regional Remake” scenario. The way I understand it, this could occur during or after the playing out of either of the first two. The Paper then goes on to detail the ways in which Iraq might become a fulcrum for re-forming the Middle East. If the Kurds end up essentially autonomous, his will reverberate through Iran, Turkey, and Syria. This may incite the Turks to invade, ostensibly to help their Turkoman relations in the Kirkuk area, but actually to block the spread of Kurdish nationalism by suppressing any quasi-independent Kurdistan. (However, elsewhere the Paper suggests that Turkey might be willing to accept an independent Kurdistan within Iraq if the alternative seemed to be a revived Shi’a or Sunni world pressing on its borders, as described below.) In this scenario, Najaf becomes the focus of a suddenly expansionist Shi’a world, in which the Shi’as of eastern Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Lebanon and elsewhere change the directions of their loyalties. One interesting aspect of this scenario is that the Shi’a Ulema of Iran might fear a world in which Iranians could change the direction of their loyalties to the theologically higher ranked Najaf clergy. This might undermine the present Iranian regime, based as it is on a politically activist Shi’a doctrine that Sistani rejects. On the other hand, the Sunnis in the triangle in this scenario become the focus of an extremist salafist Islam that shakes the present boundaries of Sunnite states such as Saudi Arabia.
The Paper’s more general thesis is that Iraq threatens to fly apart. Even with the most careful military and diplomatic efforts, the best the Interim Government and the United States can hope for is a fragile state in which the parts are only held together with continuing difficulty. The Paper implies that there is a good chance the result will be much worse. However, Herbert’s belief that the Paper calls “full-fledged democracy” in Iraq “beyond belief” is not supported by the Briefing Paper. Of course, it will not be perfect Swiss or Icelandic democracy. Brazil and India, Taiwan and Argentina are also not that “full-fledged”. Countering pessimism about democracy is the strange fact that something like a European model of democracy might become the least common denominator for the groups that would participate in the “holding together” scenario. Personally, I think we should be happy enough if we could leave behind something like Putin’s Russia with a Kurdish Albania or Montenegro.
But let us return again to McCain and his ten to twenty years. Given these scenarios, with the least common denominator for the participants in all of them a desire to get the Americans out—except for the Kurds for whom we might end up a permanent protector (they wish!)—it seems to me McCain’s time schedule is a counsel of despair. If things do begin dragging out as he suggests, then some American President is going to simply take the troops out. Or if he does not, then he will be remaking America into a truly Imperialist state such as the American people are unlikely to understand or support. We might leave a small mission in there as a fire break for the Kurds, but beyond that I do not see a long mission.
(1) The “fragmentation scenario” which it considers the “default scenario”. The assumption is that the Shi’a, Sunni, and Kurdish elements of the population will work against one another’s interests to such an extent that the nation will slowly dissolve before the present political process comes to fruition. In this scenario opposition to American forces continues and grows, but not in a way that unites the disparate factions. The Kurds are scared of losing independence; the Sunnis are afraid of being overrun, the Shi’as are afraid that there is a Sunni-Baathist plot that will not allow their promised control of the country to be realized.
(2) The “Holding Together” scenario. Enough people will choose to work together to make it possible to establish a government on the projected model. This will occur only if the interim government and the Americans work effectively to block the fragmentation scenario.
(3) The “Regional Remake” scenario. The way I understand it, this could occur during or after the playing out of either of the first two. The Paper then goes on to detail the ways in which Iraq might become a fulcrum for re-forming the Middle East. If the Kurds end up essentially autonomous, his will reverberate through Iran, Turkey, and Syria. This may incite the Turks to invade, ostensibly to help their Turkoman relations in the Kirkuk area, but actually to block the spread of Kurdish nationalism by suppressing any quasi-independent Kurdistan. (However, elsewhere the Paper suggests that Turkey might be willing to accept an independent Kurdistan within Iraq if the alternative seemed to be a revived Shi’a or Sunni world pressing on its borders, as described below.) In this scenario, Najaf becomes the focus of a suddenly expansionist Shi’a world, in which the Shi’as of eastern Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Lebanon and elsewhere change the directions of their loyalties. One interesting aspect of this scenario is that the Shi’a Ulema of Iran might fear a world in which Iranians could change the direction of their loyalties to the theologically higher ranked Najaf clergy. This might undermine the present Iranian regime, based as it is on a politically activist Shi’a doctrine that Sistani rejects. On the other hand, the Sunnis in the triangle in this scenario become the focus of an extremist salafist Islam that shakes the present boundaries of Sunnite states such as Saudi Arabia.
The Paper’s more general thesis is that Iraq threatens to fly apart. Even with the most careful military and diplomatic efforts, the best the Interim Government and the United States can hope for is a fragile state in which the parts are only held together with continuing difficulty. The Paper implies that there is a good chance the result will be much worse. However, Herbert’s belief that the Paper calls “full-fledged democracy” in Iraq “beyond belief” is not supported by the Briefing Paper. Of course, it will not be perfect Swiss or Icelandic democracy. Brazil and India, Taiwan and Argentina are also not that “full-fledged”. Countering pessimism about democracy is the strange fact that something like a European model of democracy might become the least common denominator for the groups that would participate in the “holding together” scenario. Personally, I think we should be happy enough if we could leave behind something like Putin’s Russia with a Kurdish Albania or Montenegro.
But let us return again to McCain and his ten to twenty years. Given these scenarios, with the least common denominator for the participants in all of them a desire to get the Americans out—except for the Kurds for whom we might end up a permanent protector (they wish!)—it seems to me McCain’s time schedule is a counsel of despair. If things do begin dragging out as he suggests, then some American President is going to simply take the troops out. Or if he does not, then he will be remaking America into a truly Imperialist state such as the American people are unlikely to understand or support. We might leave a small mission in there as a fire break for the Kurds, but beyond that I do not see a long mission.
Thursday, September 02, 2004
Mujahedin-e-Khalq and Anti-Terrorist Policy
The Mujahedin-e-Khalq is a left-over Iranian leftist organization with a most chequered history. In the 1960s and 70s, the Mujahedin staged several small terrorist attacks within Iran. When the Shah was expelled from Iran, many observers imagined that the end of the Shah would mean a leftish Iran (we feared a communist). Certainly most of the middle class opposed to the Shah also thought so. However, soon, even the liberals were on the run and theocracy was established. The Mujahedin-e-Khalq were the last group to go under completely, after one last blood-letting in 1981 that left many of Khomeini’s men dead or injured. The remnants of the organization ended up, along with many real liberals, in the West, lobbying Americans, even Congress, for support against Tehran. Over the course of the next twenty years, two things happened. First, they evolved into a rather cultist organization that looked to its female leader as a kind of goddess (the leading “brother” and leading “sister” married in grand ceremony, but she seemed to come out on top). Second, their activity came to be centered on a military wing supplied and supported by Saddam in Iraq. Toward the end of the Iran-Iraq War they were armed by Saddam and sent into battle. They later helped Saddam put down the Shi’a and Kurdish revolts after the first Gulf War. This record probably destroyed most of the lingering support of Iranians outside their own ranks, but helped them with some Americans who wanted to be sure that Iran was held in check.
Nevertheless, when after the war the United States came to listing groups throughout the world as terrorist, the Mujahedin ended up on the list. They did, in fact, continue to sporadically engage in terrorist activities in Iran and around the world (especially against Iranian missions). Whether they should be listed as a terrorist organization has, however, remained a contentious issue, even within Congress. But they stayed on the list. So at the beginning of the latest Iraq war we bombed their camps and our intention was to arrest them. However, apparently because they appeared to have some possible value to us in the future, we made an agreement to simply disarm them, leaving them in their camps.
Now we would like the Iranian government to turn over a number of top al-Qaida people that they hold. Iran says “Fine, as long as you give us the Mujahedin leaders” (I do not know how many they want.) Here there is a standoff. There is a group within the United States government, the neocons, which Juan Cole says are closely connected to the Israeli lobby, that wants to maintain the Mujahedin as a threat to Iran, and as a possible source of support in some future invasion or sponsored revolution. (If this is the reason, it seems foolish, because I suspect they would discredit any revolution or invasion more than they would help.) So far, this group has successfully argued against handing them over. This also points to the obvious: ours is not a “war on terror” as much as a “war on whomever it seems in our interest right now to label a terrorist”.
Although it seems foolish to not take the opportunity to get our hands on the al-Qaida leaders just because we are reluctant to hand over Mujahedin who are ideologically as far from us as Tehran, there is a dilemma here for any government attempting to stick to principles (either out of moral scruples or a desire for a better reputation). Should we be seen as handing over a group with whom we have worked out a deal to live in Iraq to a government that might well execute them for crimes against the state? Whatever else they may be, the Mujahedin are certainly now in the class “political refugees”, the kind of people that we often admit into the United States because of the danger they would be killed if they went home. Whether we will be able to protect them when and if a new Iraqi government gets around to considering their case remains unclear.
Nevertheless, when after the war the United States came to listing groups throughout the world as terrorist, the Mujahedin ended up on the list. They did, in fact, continue to sporadically engage in terrorist activities in Iran and around the world (especially against Iranian missions). Whether they should be listed as a terrorist organization has, however, remained a contentious issue, even within Congress. But they stayed on the list. So at the beginning of the latest Iraq war we bombed their camps and our intention was to arrest them. However, apparently because they appeared to have some possible value to us in the future, we made an agreement to simply disarm them, leaving them in their camps.
Now we would like the Iranian government to turn over a number of top al-Qaida people that they hold. Iran says “Fine, as long as you give us the Mujahedin leaders” (I do not know how many they want.) Here there is a standoff. There is a group within the United States government, the neocons, which Juan Cole says are closely connected to the Israeli lobby, that wants to maintain the Mujahedin as a threat to Iran, and as a possible source of support in some future invasion or sponsored revolution. (If this is the reason, it seems foolish, because I suspect they would discredit any revolution or invasion more than they would help.) So far, this group has successfully argued against handing them over. This also points to the obvious: ours is not a “war on terror” as much as a “war on whomever it seems in our interest right now to label a terrorist”.
Although it seems foolish to not take the opportunity to get our hands on the al-Qaida leaders just because we are reluctant to hand over Mujahedin who are ideologically as far from us as Tehran, there is a dilemma here for any government attempting to stick to principles (either out of moral scruples or a desire for a better reputation). Should we be seen as handing over a group with whom we have worked out a deal to live in Iraq to a government that might well execute them for crimes against the state? Whatever else they may be, the Mujahedin are certainly now in the class “political refugees”, the kind of people that we often admit into the United States because of the danger they would be killed if they went home. Whether we will be able to protect them when and if a new Iraqi government gets around to considering their case remains unclear.
Wednesday, September 01, 2004
The 9/11 Report: "Dissent"
One of the best discussions of what is possible and what is not in the fight against terrorism is found in a book review of the 9/11 report by Richard Posner in last Sunday's NYT. He thinks it is surprisingly well written, with "riveting" narratives. However, he finds the analysis less than impressive and the recommendations largely mistaken. Indeed, he thinks the fact that the report emphasizes its recommendations vitiates the whole enterprise, for the analysis in a report so focused on recommendations is inevitably going to be recast to support the recommendations. "Combining an investigation of the attacks with proposals for preventing future attacks is the same mistake as combining intelligence with policy. The way a problem is described is bound to influence the choice of how to solve it". (I think he got the last sentence backwards, but never mind it goes both ways.)
His main propositions are that (1) there is little reason to believe that we could have prevented 9/11 with a better intelligence system, and (2) There is certainly little reason to believe that combining all intelligence agencies into one would help anything. In fact, he thinks it will lead to herd thinking that makes dissenters even more likely to be ignored than is true today. He believes that the desire for unanimity of Republicans and Democrats drove the Commission to end up blaming everyone in both administrations. It was forced to blame both Clinton and Bush administrations equally (an especially good point).
He sees nothing in the Report supporting the conclusion that 9/11 could have been prevented if we had had a better system. No intelligence system would have been able to put the bits and pieces of information together in time to prevent the attack, although it is easy enough to see how this might be done in retrospect. He argues that no novel attack of this type can ever be prevented. We are always protecting ourselves against the last attack and it cannot be otherwise. "No terrorist had hijacked an American commercial aircraft anywhere in the world since 1986." He points out that both the Clinton and Bush administrations had considered and to some degree acted on a variety of ways to control bin Ladin. In fact by the time the Bush people came in, "bin Ladin fatigue" had set in. He does not blame the Bush people, because he finds it only natural that a new administration should not adopt the same priorities in any area as the previous.
Posner points to a short list of actions that we could take to improve our defenses against Jihadist groups. They include better evacuation plans for major buildings, the more careful inspection of the papers of Muslims entering the country, more careful screening of airline passengers and baggage, stronger cockpit doors, ground control overrides for controlling airliners in emergencies, elimination go legal barriers to sharing information between the FBI and CIA, more training in relevant languages, and reassignment of federal agents assigned to the war on drugs to some aspect of the war on terrorism.
He also argues by implication that the FBI should be taken off the case. It is institutionally simply unable to operate against this kind of threat. It is a police department working for arrests and prosecutions and this culture appears unlikely to change. Information sharing within the FBI is at least as bad as that between agencies. Its antiquated equipment and the independence of its offices work against what is needed for the counterterrorist enterprise. He concludes that we need either to appoint a tough new manager that would really be able to change the way the Bureau operates or create a new agency analogous to the British Secret Service (MI5). The British MI5 and MI6 seem to work well together, have the same culture, and neither is involved in arrests. In any event, we clearly need an effective domestic intelligence agency.
Posner is particularly incensed by the argument that the reason the bits and pieces of intelligence were not put together in a timely fashion was that there was no one person in charge. There is simply too much information for any single or interconnected data base arrangement to handle it. There will always be some information that will not be shared for quite legitimate reasons. Because information is power, there will always be some hoarding of information within subunits no matter how centralized the system is in theory. In his view, efforts to centralize will lengthen the time that information takes to get to the President and will reduce the number of alternatives that he is presented with. He sees the "National Intelligence Director in continuous conflict with the Attorney General, the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the National Security Advisor."
Posner is an opponent of proposals for centralization throughout his critique. One more arrow is shot at the idea that the paramilitary operations of the CIA should be folded into the Department of Defense. He thinks that the CIA has a more flexible structure and can do things that the DoD cannot. We now have multiple forces in addition to the CIA's Special Activities Division. They are all useful, giving administrations more flexibility in confronting crises.
The author frequently returns to the proposition that even if all the right steps are taken, we will only reduce slightly the probability of another 9/11 type event. The Report does not demonstrate that the system did not respond well before 9/11. The problem was in the nature of the threat, not the system it confronted.
His main propositions are that (1) there is little reason to believe that we could have prevented 9/11 with a better intelligence system, and (2) There is certainly little reason to believe that combining all intelligence agencies into one would help anything. In fact, he thinks it will lead to herd thinking that makes dissenters even more likely to be ignored than is true today. He believes that the desire for unanimity of Republicans and Democrats drove the Commission to end up blaming everyone in both administrations. It was forced to blame both Clinton and Bush administrations equally (an especially good point).
He sees nothing in the Report supporting the conclusion that 9/11 could have been prevented if we had had a better system. No intelligence system would have been able to put the bits and pieces of information together in time to prevent the attack, although it is easy enough to see how this might be done in retrospect. He argues that no novel attack of this type can ever be prevented. We are always protecting ourselves against the last attack and it cannot be otherwise. "No terrorist had hijacked an American commercial aircraft anywhere in the world since 1986." He points out that both the Clinton and Bush administrations had considered and to some degree acted on a variety of ways to control bin Ladin. In fact by the time the Bush people came in, "bin Ladin fatigue" had set in. He does not blame the Bush people, because he finds it only natural that a new administration should not adopt the same priorities in any area as the previous.
Posner points to a short list of actions that we could take to improve our defenses against Jihadist groups. They include better evacuation plans for major buildings, the more careful inspection of the papers of Muslims entering the country, more careful screening of airline passengers and baggage, stronger cockpit doors, ground control overrides for controlling airliners in emergencies, elimination go legal barriers to sharing information between the FBI and CIA, more training in relevant languages, and reassignment of federal agents assigned to the war on drugs to some aspect of the war on terrorism.
He also argues by implication that the FBI should be taken off the case. It is institutionally simply unable to operate against this kind of threat. It is a police department working for arrests and prosecutions and this culture appears unlikely to change. Information sharing within the FBI is at least as bad as that between agencies. Its antiquated equipment and the independence of its offices work against what is needed for the counterterrorist enterprise. He concludes that we need either to appoint a tough new manager that would really be able to change the way the Bureau operates or create a new agency analogous to the British Secret Service (MI5). The British MI5 and MI6 seem to work well together, have the same culture, and neither is involved in arrests. In any event, we clearly need an effective domestic intelligence agency.
Posner is particularly incensed by the argument that the reason the bits and pieces of intelligence were not put together in a timely fashion was that there was no one person in charge. There is simply too much information for any single or interconnected data base arrangement to handle it. There will always be some information that will not be shared for quite legitimate reasons. Because information is power, there will always be some hoarding of information within subunits no matter how centralized the system is in theory. In his view, efforts to centralize will lengthen the time that information takes to get to the President and will reduce the number of alternatives that he is presented with. He sees the "National Intelligence Director in continuous conflict with the Attorney General, the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the National Security Advisor."
Posner is an opponent of proposals for centralization throughout his critique. One more arrow is shot at the idea that the paramilitary operations of the CIA should be folded into the Department of Defense. He thinks that the CIA has a more flexible structure and can do things that the DoD cannot. We now have multiple forces in addition to the CIA's Special Activities Division. They are all useful, giving administrations more flexibility in confronting crises.
The author frequently returns to the proposition that even if all the right steps are taken, we will only reduce slightly the probability of another 9/11 type event. The Report does not demonstrate that the system did not respond well before 9/11. The problem was in the nature of the threat, not the system it confronted.
Tuesday, August 31, 2004
Political Parties, Ideology, and Choices in Iraq
As the campaign season grinds along we are treated to the spectacle of the leadership of two warring political parties fixated on slogans and postures rather than positions and choices. It was alarming enough that John Kerry and his handlers chose to make their convention message one of military experience and leadership (based on Vietnam!) and that the Republicans responded with an all-too-successful campaign to smear his Vietnam record. Most recently, it was alarming that after George W was caught making an all-too-true admission that a war against terrorism cannot really be won, Edwards could not resist mounting a platform to say that unlike Bush, he and Kerry planned to "win the war on terrorism". Bush's handlers quickly tried to repair the "damage" by saying that he had been misunderstood. I can only thank the stars that for one golden moment Bush told the truth. (Of course, a better truth would be to abandon the "war on terrorism" phrase.)
David Brooks, my favorite Conservative (his smile and unpredictability I guess) writes in a long piece in the NYT magazine that the Republicans must get back to their conservative roots and give up pandering to the crowd. Among other points, he suggests that in the third world the first goal of assistance should not be the institution of a new capitalist order or (by implication) a new democratic order. Our first goal should rather be the establishment and securing of law and order, because without these nothing else works. This does return us to a legitimate and truly conservative doctrine. In a more doctrinaire mode, Pat Buchanan has a full page add in Section A of the NYT pushing his new book "Where the Right Went Wrong". He decries the invasion of Iraq, a country not threatening us. He sees the invasion as igniting a war of civilizations that we certainly did not need. Of course he also accuses Bush of a reckless fiscal record and the gutting of our economy through a false doctrine of free trade. It is certainly true that the attempt to reform the world (by force or otherwise) and to spend money we do not have has historically been associated with liberals rather than conservatives. But, of course, these are voices in the wilderness.
Kerry and his handlers have failed to offer anything more than "not Bush". I like "not Bush", but it is evidently not enough for the swing voter. In particular, Kerry has offered us very little to go on in regard to the wars in Iraq or Afghanistan or the so-called war against terror. It is mostly "me too" and "I'll do more than George W." It seems he will get our allies more involved, that he will spend more on training Iraqi forces. These are all moves the administration is already taking. He wants to bring our troops home as soon as we can. (I would imagine that Bush could go along with that.) Looking back he has made the error of saying he would have endorsed the invasion even if he knew that there were no WMD. So his position comes down to little more than: "I would have implemented the Bush policy more effectively than Bush did." That does not have much of a ring to it.
What the American public should hear is something like the following:
(1) The United States made an error in attacking Iraq when it did and for the reasons stated at the time. While the United States should reserve the right to make a preemptive attack, this option should be reserved exclusively for situations in which an attack on the United States is judged to be imminent on the basis of a variety of trustworthy intelligence sources. Only in such situations would we have the right to short-circuit the process of building international consensus necessary for any international policy's long-term success.
(2) Except in the direst of emergencies, the United States should never commit its forces to the field of battle without careful planning for the campaign and for its aftermath. In any major endeavor the country's leaders should make it clear that the undertaking will be costly and that military forces and foreign assistance will need to be increased for the duration. To that end, a full and reasonable budget should be established and taxes increased to meet the increased national obligations. Such a "war tax" should be acknowledged as the unavoidable duty of all Americans; paying it is the least that civilians can do to help the effort.
(3) In the present situation, after taking office in the beginning of next year, I, John Kerry, will strive to reduce significantly the tax cuts that have been foolishly instituted and maintained during this war. I will increase the defense budget pursuant to an increase in the size of our military budget and will increase foreign assistance to the governments of the countries directly involved in the struggle against Islamic extremism, particularly Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. I will, in consultation with the government of Iraq, develop a plan for the reduction of American troops in Iraq, looking toward the earliest possible ending of the occupation. We will also strive to increase the participation of NATO and other foreign troops and police in longer-term peacekeeping in Iraq. In Afghanistan we will stand ready to take similar measures. However, should the Government of Afghanistan desire it, we should be prepared to increase significantly the number of troops we have in the country, particularly for the purpose of sharply reducing the activities of the Taliban and eliminating the remnants of al-Qaida. Our material assistance to Pakistan should be economic, educational, and military, with a particular goal increasing Pakistan's contribution to the elimination of al-Qaida. (Portions of this paragraph are based on general statements John Kerry has already made.)
David Brooks, my favorite Conservative (his smile and unpredictability I guess) writes in a long piece in the NYT magazine that the Republicans must get back to their conservative roots and give up pandering to the crowd. Among other points, he suggests that in the third world the first goal of assistance should not be the institution of a new capitalist order or (by implication) a new democratic order. Our first goal should rather be the establishment and securing of law and order, because without these nothing else works. This does return us to a legitimate and truly conservative doctrine. In a more doctrinaire mode, Pat Buchanan has a full page add in Section A of the NYT pushing his new book "Where the Right Went Wrong". He decries the invasion of Iraq, a country not threatening us. He sees the invasion as igniting a war of civilizations that we certainly did not need. Of course he also accuses Bush of a reckless fiscal record and the gutting of our economy through a false doctrine of free trade. It is certainly true that the attempt to reform the world (by force or otherwise) and to spend money we do not have has historically been associated with liberals rather than conservatives. But, of course, these are voices in the wilderness.
Kerry and his handlers have failed to offer anything more than "not Bush". I like "not Bush", but it is evidently not enough for the swing voter. In particular, Kerry has offered us very little to go on in regard to the wars in Iraq or Afghanistan or the so-called war against terror. It is mostly "me too" and "I'll do more than George W." It seems he will get our allies more involved, that he will spend more on training Iraqi forces. These are all moves the administration is already taking. He wants to bring our troops home as soon as we can. (I would imagine that Bush could go along with that.) Looking back he has made the error of saying he would have endorsed the invasion even if he knew that there were no WMD. So his position comes down to little more than: "I would have implemented the Bush policy more effectively than Bush did." That does not have much of a ring to it.
What the American public should hear is something like the following:
(1) The United States made an error in attacking Iraq when it did and for the reasons stated at the time. While the United States should reserve the right to make a preemptive attack, this option should be reserved exclusively for situations in which an attack on the United States is judged to be imminent on the basis of a variety of trustworthy intelligence sources. Only in such situations would we have the right to short-circuit the process of building international consensus necessary for any international policy's long-term success.
(2) Except in the direst of emergencies, the United States should never commit its forces to the field of battle without careful planning for the campaign and for its aftermath. In any major endeavor the country's leaders should make it clear that the undertaking will be costly and that military forces and foreign assistance will need to be increased for the duration. To that end, a full and reasonable budget should be established and taxes increased to meet the increased national obligations. Such a "war tax" should be acknowledged as the unavoidable duty of all Americans; paying it is the least that civilians can do to help the effort.
(3) In the present situation, after taking office in the beginning of next year, I, John Kerry, will strive to reduce significantly the tax cuts that have been foolishly instituted and maintained during this war. I will increase the defense budget pursuant to an increase in the size of our military budget and will increase foreign assistance to the governments of the countries directly involved in the struggle against Islamic extremism, particularly Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. I will, in consultation with the government of Iraq, develop a plan for the reduction of American troops in Iraq, looking toward the earliest possible ending of the occupation. We will also strive to increase the participation of NATO and other foreign troops and police in longer-term peacekeeping in Iraq. In Afghanistan we will stand ready to take similar measures. However, should the Government of Afghanistan desire it, we should be prepared to increase significantly the number of troops we have in the country, particularly for the purpose of sharply reducing the activities of the Taliban and eliminating the remnants of al-Qaida. Our material assistance to Pakistan should be economic, educational, and military, with a particular goal increasing Pakistan's contribution to the elimination of al-Qaida. (Portions of this paragraph are based on general statements John Kerry has already made.)
Afghanistan: Insufficiency Breeds Chaos
In my recent discussion of the situation of Ismail Khan in Herat, I spoke too soon. It seems that the recent attacks on Ismail Khan's in Herat have come from Amanullah Khan a Pashtun leader who controls an area nearby. Although Kabul sent in national and American forces to assist Ismail Khan, Amanullah's attacks may have actually been encouraged by a government minister as the beginning of a campaign to get rid of Ismail. Kabul is said to be fearing a general breakdown of order in the area because Ismail Khan's control is slipping. Apparently his problem is also that he is too anti-American. Both Khans may end up as permanent guests in Kabul and be rewarded with positions in the new government when it is formed (an old Afghan way of dealing with troublesome Khans). I do not see why the Kabul government would prefer a Pashtun tribal leader over a Tajik leader like Ismail. After all, the base of the Taliban has always been the Pashtuns.
Meanwhile, back in Kabul as the elections near, explosions and assassinations have become more common. The Taliban vows to block the elections, and suggests that they have slipped many supporters into Kabul to increase the violence. It would seem to me that the national army has enough to do in Kabul and in engaging the Taliban without worrying about order in the West. All this danger is, of course, another cost of going into Iraq before we had really brought the country under the control of Kabul (or at least established a peaceful order of some kind) and effectively reduced the sway of the Taliban (and al-Qaida) everywhere. Remember that after the first defeat of the Taliban, Karzai pleaded with the Americans and the West to bring in more troops to stabilize the situation. We should have accepted this request with alacrity. But we did not. Now we do not have the forces to make a difference.
Meanwhile, back in Kabul as the elections near, explosions and assassinations have become more common. The Taliban vows to block the elections, and suggests that they have slipped many supporters into Kabul to increase the violence. It would seem to me that the national army has enough to do in Kabul and in engaging the Taliban without worrying about order in the West. All this danger is, of course, another cost of going into Iraq before we had really brought the country under the control of Kabul (or at least established a peaceful order of some kind) and effectively reduced the sway of the Taliban (and al-Qaida) everywhere. Remember that after the first defeat of the Taliban, Karzai pleaded with the Americans and the West to bring in more troops to stabilize the situation. We should have accepted this request with alacrity. But we did not. Now we do not have the forces to make a difference.
Sunday, August 29, 2004
Two Iraqs
Today's paper suggests once again that there are really two quite dissimilar Iraqs. What the Americans do to assist the government in the one may do little to solve the problems of the other.
The first is the larger part of the country in which the "Coalition forces" and the government seem to be able to govern and operate with some effectiveness most of the time. This includes most of the Shi'a areas, the Kurdish area, and most of Baghdad (at least outside Sadr City). This is the area that made possible the recent "elections". I note in the NYT letter column recently that a Kurdish representative highly praised this process, so presumably they are on board (at least for now). The peace agreement, however doubtful, in Najaf has for the moment removed a great burden from the shoulders of the government and the Americans. No longer do the Americans risk being involved in the destruction of the most holy of Shiite shrines. If Sadr removes his troops from Najaf (which he seems to have done) and Kufa (part of the agreement, but we are not sure), it will be a victory for the government. If he still maintains his forces in Sadr City and elsewhere, it will be unfortunate. Yet the events of the past few days show that he can be talked to. He certainly does not have the Shiites uniformly behind him. Again we must remember that for the recent Conference 1100 (the Kurds says 1300) delegates from all over the country were able to convene in Baghdad for a few days (and therefore get in and out of the city and the meeting hall). It was a heavily protected area, but still it happened.
Unfortunately in a large part of the Sunni triangle, in Falluja, Ramadi and elsewhere (mostly in what is called Anbar Province) the Jihadists seem to have won out, driving out both former Baathist leaders or killing them, and doing the same to government appointees (in so far as these were not the same). Executions have become a regular event, often videotaped. The Governor's sons were kidnapped in Ramadi and the Governor was made to confess on video that he had been a traitor to Islam. The so-called Falluja Brigade that was supposed to secure order in Falluja has disintegrated. The situation is so bad that a new governor of Anbar has not been appointed. The leader in Falluja is supposedly a Sunni divine named Janabi, but the hand of Zarqawi seems to be behind much of it. From the government perspective, the only potentially bright side is that these fanatics are also devoted anti-Shiites.
Allawi and the Americans continue to temporize, protecting in this area little more than their stationed forces. Right now they are relying on Janabi's promise to the area's sheikhs not to make more attacks on the Americans. In addition, the Americans are concentrating on reducing the movement of people into and out of the area, particularly to Baghdad. I do not, incidentally, see how supplies could still be coming in from Jordan unless these fanatics are open to a good deal of bribery themselves. (One must never be sure that the reporters of this situation have not overshot the mark a little in trying to make Americans understand the situation is not as Rumsfeld paints it.)
What to do? Because of the lack of sufficient men and materiel, the Coalition and the government simply cannot control the whole country at this point. So they must try quarantines. They should try to define and defend with local and national help perhaps three-quarters of the country, including most of Baghdad. In heavily disputed areas, they should continue aggressive patrolling to establish or maintain a presence (thereby not abandoning people in these areas still on the government's side). If they can establish a semi-reliable peace in this "Iraq", and this peace must include satisfying the Kurds for now (we could use their Sunni Pesh-Murga in the rest of Iraq if they were satisfied there was little threat at home), then Iraq can pursue its political calendar, possibly leaving at voting time a few empty seats for areas out of control and therefore not able to vote. After some success in this "Iraq", the government could proceed to bargain/force the areas outside of control into the system, taking them on one by one. Of course, some of their leaders would be considered incorrigibles and would need eventually to be arrested. We could also expect some continued violence long after "victory" in this new campaign is declared, just as the Taliban (which they model themselves after) has continued its attacks in Afghanistan.
The first is the larger part of the country in which the "Coalition forces" and the government seem to be able to govern and operate with some effectiveness most of the time. This includes most of the Shi'a areas, the Kurdish area, and most of Baghdad (at least outside Sadr City). This is the area that made possible the recent "elections". I note in the NYT letter column recently that a Kurdish representative highly praised this process, so presumably they are on board (at least for now). The peace agreement, however doubtful, in Najaf has for the moment removed a great burden from the shoulders of the government and the Americans. No longer do the Americans risk being involved in the destruction of the most holy of Shiite shrines. If Sadr removes his troops from Najaf (which he seems to have done) and Kufa (part of the agreement, but we are not sure), it will be a victory for the government. If he still maintains his forces in Sadr City and elsewhere, it will be unfortunate. Yet the events of the past few days show that he can be talked to. He certainly does not have the Shiites uniformly behind him. Again we must remember that for the recent Conference 1100 (the Kurds says 1300) delegates from all over the country were able to convene in Baghdad for a few days (and therefore get in and out of the city and the meeting hall). It was a heavily protected area, but still it happened.
Unfortunately in a large part of the Sunni triangle, in Falluja, Ramadi and elsewhere (mostly in what is called Anbar Province) the Jihadists seem to have won out, driving out both former Baathist leaders or killing them, and doing the same to government appointees (in so far as these were not the same). Executions have become a regular event, often videotaped. The Governor's sons were kidnapped in Ramadi and the Governor was made to confess on video that he had been a traitor to Islam. The so-called Falluja Brigade that was supposed to secure order in Falluja has disintegrated. The situation is so bad that a new governor of Anbar has not been appointed. The leader in Falluja is supposedly a Sunni divine named Janabi, but the hand of Zarqawi seems to be behind much of it. From the government perspective, the only potentially bright side is that these fanatics are also devoted anti-Shiites.
Allawi and the Americans continue to temporize, protecting in this area little more than their stationed forces. Right now they are relying on Janabi's promise to the area's sheikhs not to make more attacks on the Americans. In addition, the Americans are concentrating on reducing the movement of people into and out of the area, particularly to Baghdad. I do not, incidentally, see how supplies could still be coming in from Jordan unless these fanatics are open to a good deal of bribery themselves. (One must never be sure that the reporters of this situation have not overshot the mark a little in trying to make Americans understand the situation is not as Rumsfeld paints it.)
What to do? Because of the lack of sufficient men and materiel, the Coalition and the government simply cannot control the whole country at this point. So they must try quarantines. They should try to define and defend with local and national help perhaps three-quarters of the country, including most of Baghdad. In heavily disputed areas, they should continue aggressive patrolling to establish or maintain a presence (thereby not abandoning people in these areas still on the government's side). If they can establish a semi-reliable peace in this "Iraq", and this peace must include satisfying the Kurds for now (we could use their Sunni Pesh-Murga in the rest of Iraq if they were satisfied there was little threat at home), then Iraq can pursue its political calendar, possibly leaving at voting time a few empty seats for areas out of control and therefore not able to vote. After some success in this "Iraq", the government could proceed to bargain/force the areas outside of control into the system, taking them on one by one. Of course, some of their leaders would be considered incorrigibles and would need eventually to be arrested. We could also expect some continued violence long after "victory" in this new campaign is declared, just as the Taliban (which they model themselves after) has continued its attacks in Afghanistan.
Tanks and Modern Warfare
Today's NYT has an analysis of the use of tanks in Najaf. It seems that contrary to the assumption of the planners, and specifically Rumsfeld, army tanks turned out to be the key element in the "victory" of American forces in the city. The Mahdi Army could compete with the Marines to some extent, but they found the tanks unstoppable. The article suggests there is going to be some rethinking in a Washington that had envisioned a future dominated by light units backed up by highly accurate airpower.
This revives an old argument going back at least to the years after World War II. It was clear that in the two world wars, tanks were indispensable for major battles on open battlefields. One thing was clear: the only effective way to oppose tanks was with an effective tank force. Doubts have long been expressed about how effective tanks are in confined spaces, such as dense urban areas. Later tanks were seen as obsolete when facing powerful, small, often shoulder-fired weapons able to penetrate armor. The value of the tank seemed further diminished by the use of increasingly accurate air power. Yet, when the North Vietnamese overwhelmed South Vietnam, it was with a tank attack.
The issue is partly psychological. I am told by those who have experienced it, that soldiers in battle who see a tank coming at them tend to run for cover. However, some soldiers or guerillas have gotten sufficiently used to tanks that they are able to dart out with bombs etc. at the last minute in a confined environment (city or dense forest) and disable a tank. This does not see to have been the case for the Mahdi Army.
In judging this issue, three points should be remembered. First, new theories of ways to fight battles with fewer troops and weapons should always be looked carefully. Second, if a projected opponent does not have tanks, one of the critical reasons for needing a large force evaporates. Third, tanks that do not have to operate in an area where there is danger of aerial attack have an advantage which they would not have if they faced a force as modernized as themselves. This has certainly been true of our tanks in Iraq.
This revives an old argument going back at least to the years after World War II. It was clear that in the two world wars, tanks were indispensable for major battles on open battlefields. One thing was clear: the only effective way to oppose tanks was with an effective tank force. Doubts have long been expressed about how effective tanks are in confined spaces, such as dense urban areas. Later tanks were seen as obsolete when facing powerful, small, often shoulder-fired weapons able to penetrate armor. The value of the tank seemed further diminished by the use of increasingly accurate air power. Yet, when the North Vietnamese overwhelmed South Vietnam, it was with a tank attack.
The issue is partly psychological. I am told by those who have experienced it, that soldiers in battle who see a tank coming at them tend to run for cover. However, some soldiers or guerillas have gotten sufficiently used to tanks that they are able to dart out with bombs etc. at the last minute in a confined environment (city or dense forest) and disable a tank. This does not see to have been the case for the Mahdi Army.
In judging this issue, three points should be remembered. First, new theories of ways to fight battles with fewer troops and weapons should always be looked carefully. Second, if a projected opponent does not have tanks, one of the critical reasons for needing a large force evaporates. Third, tanks that do not have to operate in an area where there is danger of aerial attack have an advantage which they would not have if they faced a force as modernized as themselves. This has certainly been true of our tanks in Iraq.
