Tuesday, August 24, 2004
Global Domination or Global Leadership
I have just finished an excellent book by Brezezinski entitled The Choice: Global Domination or Global Leadership. His primary thesis is that to maintain its position and to smooth the transition to an inevitable future in which the United States will no longer be an unchallenged superpower, the country needs to begin now to establish stronger working relationships with like-minded states. In particular, and in the short term, it needs to work in partnership with an expanded European community. The way he puts it is that while the power of Europe is insufficiently organized for it to be a superpower on its own and an isolated American superpower will not be able to meet the challenges of the world (which are more than military), in combination they will form a truly unchallengeable and effective superpower. He goes on to envisage a future in which this community is gradually expanded to eventually include Russia, India, China, and Japan.
The book should be read, of course, as an extended critique of the unilateralism of the Bush administration based on the proposition that the United States is so strong it can do anything with or without allies. Brezezinski offers a number of reasons why this just is not so. In particular, he sees our Middle Eastern policy as unavoidably limited by the pro-Israel lobby. Only in tandem with Europe, and thus with both believable pro-Palestinian and pro-Israeli policies side by side can we work effectively with the Islamic world. If we accept the proposition that our policy should be Euro-American, it will be much less beholden to the pro-Israeli lobby. For unless the reality and the perception of our identification with Israel is changed, we can never have a satisfactory relation with the Islamic world. We cannot obtain our energy or anti-terrorist objectives in the long run unless our identification with the Israelis is moderated.
In passing, Brezezinski makes many other useful points. He distinguishes, for example, between preemption and prevention. The first is an action that must be taken now, because the crisis is upon us. The second is an action that has a considerably longer lead time, because the crisis is judged to be building but not yet upon us. Thus, we had no evidence that justified a preemptive strike against Iraq. We did have evidence that Iraq was a dangerous power that might try to develop WMD in the future. But a preventive war against Iraq could have been undertaken later after a great deal more diplomatic preparation of the ground. Another point is that globalization has naturally developed opposing forces against it. The only way to successfully confront these opponents is to develop more fully the moral dimension of globalization. We must give all of those involved more of a say in the process. We must "[tone] down [our] doctrinaire impulses, practicing what [we] preach, and [focus] more on the global good." Finally, he agrees with the policy of promoting democracy for all. But he cautions that "any just cause, in the hands of fanatics, will degenerate into its antithesis." If we try, for example, to fanatically force democracy down the throats of Islamic countries without regard to their history and culture we will produce the negation of democracy.
The book should be read, of course, as an extended critique of the unilateralism of the Bush administration based on the proposition that the United States is so strong it can do anything with or without allies. Brezezinski offers a number of reasons why this just is not so. In particular, he sees our Middle Eastern policy as unavoidably limited by the pro-Israel lobby. Only in tandem with Europe, and thus with both believable pro-Palestinian and pro-Israeli policies side by side can we work effectively with the Islamic world. If we accept the proposition that our policy should be Euro-American, it will be much less beholden to the pro-Israeli lobby. For unless the reality and the perception of our identification with Israel is changed, we can never have a satisfactory relation with the Islamic world. We cannot obtain our energy or anti-terrorist objectives in the long run unless our identification with the Israelis is moderated.
In passing, Brezezinski makes many other useful points. He distinguishes, for example, between preemption and prevention. The first is an action that must be taken now, because the crisis is upon us. The second is an action that has a considerably longer lead time, because the crisis is judged to be building but not yet upon us. Thus, we had no evidence that justified a preemptive strike against Iraq. We did have evidence that Iraq was a dangerous power that might try to develop WMD in the future. But a preventive war against Iraq could have been undertaken later after a great deal more diplomatic preparation of the ground. Another point is that globalization has naturally developed opposing forces against it. The only way to successfully confront these opponents is to develop more fully the moral dimension of globalization. We must give all of those involved more of a say in the process. We must "[tone] down [our] doctrinaire impulses, practicing what [we] preach, and [focus] more on the global good." Finally, he agrees with the policy of promoting democracy for all. But he cautions that "any just cause, in the hands of fanatics, will degenerate into its antithesis." If we try, for example, to fanatically force democracy down the throats of Islamic countries without regard to their history and culture we will produce the negation of democracy.
A New Unified Command for Terrorism
Since intelligence services are meant to "serve" other parts of the government, and in particular its defense commands, the first step in reorganizing our response to terrorist threats such as what we loosely refer to as al-Qaida is to establish a organizing point within the command structure that will be able to more effectively use and discipline the intelligence services to assist the carrying out of their (new) responsibilities. Let us first note the command structure that exists at present.
The United States has nine "Unified Combatant Commands". The commanders in chief of these commands are expected to be the leaders in military actions that occur in their areas of responsibility. The commands (with their area of responsibility briefly noted in parenthesis) are: European (West Africa, Europe, Russia), Pacific (Pacific Ocean, Japan, East and South Asia, Indonesia), Southern (Caribbean and South America), Northern (North America), Central (East Africa, Middle East, Central Asia, Pakistan), Strategic (Strategic Nuclear War, Space), Joint Forces (training, force structuring, and force provision ), Transportation (transportation ), and Special Operations (training and deployment of special operations forces). The first five are "action commands". The next four are "support commands". Special Operations might also be considered an action command, yet its responsibilities are primarily the training and provision of forces for missions as determined and overseen by one or another of the action commands.
This leads us to wondering who in the military structure is responsible for countering the al-Qaida or Jihadist threat? In so far as al-Qaida exists only in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the responsibility is that of the Central Command, assisted by Special Forces in particular areas. Elsewhere, the military commands are on the sidelines, with the lead taken presumably by the intelligence services. The fight is also the responsibility of the FBI (a quasi-police service operating mainly but not exclusively in the United States) and the CIA (an intelligence service with an "enforcement" branch operating mainly but not exclusively outside the United States). One might think this is also the responsibility of Homeland Security. But this is a civilian agency concerned primarily with organization and training. Homeland Security is certainly not prepared to be the leader in the fight against al-Qaida or similar groups. The conclusion might be drawn that the lack of a responsible military command to meet this new threat is a major reason for the irresponsibility and confusion in the availability, analysis, and usefulness of intelligence in this struggle.
If we are to take the terrorist threat as seriously as we took the threat of major nuclear attack in the past, it is time that we created a command analogous to the Strategic Command that takes on itself the unique responsibility of defending the country against the new threat. Let us note the responsibilities of the Strategic Command as described on their web site:
Thus, this command coordinates and assesses intelligence, prepares the plans, and executes the plans where necessary to meet the threat. If we are to take the Jihadist or al-Qaida threat with equal seriousness, we must develop a command structure that reflects this seriousness. This new command would then be in a position to demand from all intelligence services coordinated and actionable intelligence that would make possible the accomplishment of its mission to assess and respond to danger of terrorist attack in a timely fashion. This command should be in direct communication with the President at all times. And when intelligence is not up to its responsibility to serve this command, the command will be in a position to change that equation.
The United States has nine "Unified Combatant Commands". The commanders in chief of these commands are expected to be the leaders in military actions that occur in their areas of responsibility. The commands (with their area of responsibility briefly noted in parenthesis) are: European (West Africa, Europe, Russia), Pacific (Pacific Ocean, Japan, East and South Asia, Indonesia), Southern (Caribbean and South America), Northern (North America), Central (East Africa, Middle East, Central Asia, Pakistan), Strategic (Strategic Nuclear War, Space), Joint Forces (training, force structuring, and force provision ), Transportation (transportation ), and Special Operations (training and deployment of special operations forces). The first five are "action commands". The next four are "support commands". Special Operations might also be considered an action command, yet its responsibilities are primarily the training and provision of forces for missions as determined and overseen by one or another of the action commands.
This leads us to wondering who in the military structure is responsible for countering the al-Qaida or Jihadist threat? In so far as al-Qaida exists only in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the responsibility is that of the Central Command, assisted by Special Forces in particular areas. Elsewhere, the military commands are on the sidelines, with the lead taken presumably by the intelligence services. The fight is also the responsibility of the FBI (a quasi-police service operating mainly but not exclusively in the United States) and the CIA (an intelligence service with an "enforcement" branch operating mainly but not exclusively outside the United States). One might think this is also the responsibility of Homeland Security. But this is a civilian agency concerned primarily with organization and training. Homeland Security is certainly not prepared to be the leader in the fight against al-Qaida or similar groups. The conclusion might be drawn that the lack of a responsible military command to meet this new threat is a major reason for the irresponsibility and confusion in the availability, analysis, and usefulness of intelligence in this struggle.
If we are to take the terrorist threat as seriously as we took the threat of major nuclear attack in the past, it is time that we created a command analogous to the Strategic Command that takes on itself the unique responsibility of defending the country against the new threat. Let us note the responsibilities of the Strategic Command as described on their web site:
"USSTRATCOM is the command and control center for U.S. strategic forces and controls military space operations, computer network operations, information operations, strategic warning and intelligence assessments as well as global strategic planning.
The command is responsible for both early warning of and defense against missile attack and long-range conventional attacks. The command is charged with deterring and defending against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction."
Thus, this command coordinates and assesses intelligence, prepares the plans, and executes the plans where necessary to meet the threat. If we are to take the Jihadist or al-Qaida threat with equal seriousness, we must develop a command structure that reflects this seriousness. This new command would then be in a position to demand from all intelligence services coordinated and actionable intelligence that would make possible the accomplishment of its mission to assess and respond to danger of terrorist attack in a timely fashion. This command should be in direct communication with the President at all times. And when intelligence is not up to its responsibility to serve this command, the command will be in a position to change that equation.
Monday, August 23, 2004
We all See What we Want(?) to See
Reports out of Iraq continue to appear to be emanating from two different worlds occupying the same space. One reads and hears accounts from outstanding and well-thought of American and British reporters whose message is essentially that we have already lost the war. The people are all against us. They regard the new Iraqi government and its forces as completely illegitimate tools of the Americans. The ranks of the insurgents are growing every day while the areas under American or governmental control are steadily shrinking. Some former supporters of the war, even those directly involved in the American effort at an earlier point now accept this picture. This Sunday the paper included a discussion among neocons that pointed to a minority that have now moved into this camp.
One also reads and hears accounts from a different cast of persons, representing generally a more conservative viewpoint, and in many cases a military viewpoint, that says that what the papers are reporting is nonsense. Reporters are concentrating on problem areas while ignoring the much larger area of the country where American control is unchallenged and the new government is taking over. These analysts believe in polls that show that while Americans are not liked and are wanted out, most people continue to want the new government to succeed. The fact that a few days ago the government could bring together 1100 leaders (and many were local leaders) to a conference in Baghdad to choose the new assembly certainly supports this second picture. Why would so many Iraqis of standing be willing to identify themselves with this process if the country were already "going down the tube". They should be home taking care of their families and plotting ways to get out of the country.
Why would reporters like John Burns of the Times believe the first position that nothing is working if it is? One can understand why people who are emotionally invested in our success in Iraq would hold the second position. But if the first position is untrue, what mind-set would cause otherwise reliable observers to report so negatively? Do they hate the Bush administration so much, because of its half-truths that led us into war, that they want to see us lose, in spite of all that means to America's world position — yes, and even to the future of Iraq? I can think that of Moore, but I find it harder to think that of mainstream reporters.
The fact is that if we decide to leave without victory, we may as a nation never know what the truth was. We will want the first picture to be correct, for this will justify our actions to ourselves. We left Vietnam essentially because we were tired of the losses and fact that there was no light at the end of the tunnel. This led many reporters at the time to write as though the people of South Vietnam had rejected us as well as the South Vietnamese government in favor of the communists of the North. My belief as a sometime student of that war is that most of the people in the south remained anti-communist throughout the war. The famous Tet Offensive in 1968(?) was a propaganda victory for the communists but also a serious military defeat for them. Nearly the entire Viet Cong force in the South was wiped out. From this point on, the war was essentially a conventional war between a well organized and equipped conventional North Vietnamese Army and, as the American forces were phased out, the South Vietnamese Army. Remember that it was at least a year after the Americans had essentially left the country that the North Vietnamese staged a major tank attack down through the center of the country that broke through the government's lines, leading to an ultimate route.
Yet also in the end, what the situation actually was made little difference. The American public was tired. Why should we go on losing lives as long as we had no plans to invade the North and thus end the conflict. We had to leave.
Fortunately, the Iraqi insurgents have no outside power to rely on. Yet, the United States is much more worried about casualties today, and rightly so, than we were in Vietnam. It will take much less this time to make us tired. If we cannot bring down the scale of the insurgency within six months, and the government fails to extend its writ over all the country, perhaps we will again feel we have to leave, regardless of how many children wave at our soldiers or how many new schools have been opened.
One also reads and hears accounts from a different cast of persons, representing generally a more conservative viewpoint, and in many cases a military viewpoint, that says that what the papers are reporting is nonsense. Reporters are concentrating on problem areas while ignoring the much larger area of the country where American control is unchallenged and the new government is taking over. These analysts believe in polls that show that while Americans are not liked and are wanted out, most people continue to want the new government to succeed. The fact that a few days ago the government could bring together 1100 leaders (and many were local leaders) to a conference in Baghdad to choose the new assembly certainly supports this second picture. Why would so many Iraqis of standing be willing to identify themselves with this process if the country were already "going down the tube". They should be home taking care of their families and plotting ways to get out of the country.
Why would reporters like John Burns of the Times believe the first position that nothing is working if it is? One can understand why people who are emotionally invested in our success in Iraq would hold the second position. But if the first position is untrue, what mind-set would cause otherwise reliable observers to report so negatively? Do they hate the Bush administration so much, because of its half-truths that led us into war, that they want to see us lose, in spite of all that means to America's world position — yes, and even to the future of Iraq? I can think that of Moore, but I find it harder to think that of mainstream reporters.
The fact is that if we decide to leave without victory, we may as a nation never know what the truth was. We will want the first picture to be correct, for this will justify our actions to ourselves. We left Vietnam essentially because we were tired of the losses and fact that there was no light at the end of the tunnel. This led many reporters at the time to write as though the people of South Vietnam had rejected us as well as the South Vietnamese government in favor of the communists of the North. My belief as a sometime student of that war is that most of the people in the south remained anti-communist throughout the war. The famous Tet Offensive in 1968(?) was a propaganda victory for the communists but also a serious military defeat for them. Nearly the entire Viet Cong force in the South was wiped out. From this point on, the war was essentially a conventional war between a well organized and equipped conventional North Vietnamese Army and, as the American forces were phased out, the South Vietnamese Army. Remember that it was at least a year after the Americans had essentially left the country that the North Vietnamese staged a major tank attack down through the center of the country that broke through the government's lines, leading to an ultimate route.
Yet also in the end, what the situation actually was made little difference. The American public was tired. Why should we go on losing lives as long as we had no plans to invade the North and thus end the conflict. We had to leave.
Fortunately, the Iraqi insurgents have no outside power to rely on. Yet, the United States is much more worried about casualties today, and rightly so, than we were in Vietnam. It will take much less this time to make us tired. If we cannot bring down the scale of the insurgency within six months, and the government fails to extend its writ over all the country, perhaps we will again feel we have to leave, regardless of how many children wave at our soldiers or how many new schools have been opened.
Sunday, August 22, 2004
Muqtada al Sadr and Belief in the Coming of the Mahdi
Today's Times has an interview with Amatzia Baram, an expert on Shiism at the Institute of Peace. He pointed out facts about Muqtada's appeal and situation that I was only vaguely aware of. I was aware that he was the son of a leading Iraqi Ayatollah who was executed by Saddam. He has not, however, taken religious training seriously, and until recently was not regarded as having religious credentials. However, after leading the recent uprising his followers have begun calling him a "hojatolislam", the next rung below ayatollah.
More ominously, he has announced that the Shiite Messiah, the Mahdi, is about to return from occlusion. His claim has been that the Americans knew this and invaded in order to grab him and kill him. He has labeled his army the "Mahdi Army", thus putting it at the service of the returning Mahdi. Therefore he says that he could not disband it even if he wanted to. He is also coming to be referred to by his followers in a manner that suggests they may think he is actually the returned Mahdi. (I noted that when Khomeini returned to Iran, supporters started calling him the "Imam" in a similarly ambiguous manner. For Shi'as "Imam" has a double meaning. It means the leader of the congregation, for example the leader of the Friday Prayers. But it also means the leader of all Muslims. The twelver Shi'as (which is the group we are concerned with here) consider there have been only 12 leaders of Islam. If he returned, the last imam who disappeared would be the Mahdi.
All four grand ayatollahs in Iraq today are quietists who see Muqtada as an upstart. But they are also very attuned to public opinion. It is true that for Muqtada to rise higher religiously he would need a mentor, which would be Ayatollah Haeri, now in Qom. Haeri is an activist and bitter anti-American. If he returns and endorses Muqtada, the other Iraqi Ayatollahs may become politically irrelevant in spite of their theoretical standing.
More ominously, he has announced that the Shiite Messiah, the Mahdi, is about to return from occlusion. His claim has been that the Americans knew this and invaded in order to grab him and kill him. He has labeled his army the "Mahdi Army", thus putting it at the service of the returning Mahdi. Therefore he says that he could not disband it even if he wanted to. He is also coming to be referred to by his followers in a manner that suggests they may think he is actually the returned Mahdi. (I noted that when Khomeini returned to Iran, supporters started calling him the "Imam" in a similarly ambiguous manner. For Shi'as "Imam" has a double meaning. It means the leader of the congregation, for example the leader of the Friday Prayers. But it also means the leader of all Muslims. The twelver Shi'as (which is the group we are concerned with here) consider there have been only 12 leaders of Islam. If he returned, the last imam who disappeared would be the Mahdi.
All four grand ayatollahs in Iraq today are quietists who see Muqtada as an upstart. But they are also very attuned to public opinion. It is true that for Muqtada to rise higher religiously he would need a mentor, which would be Ayatollah Haeri, now in Qom. Haeri is an activist and bitter anti-American. If he returns and endorses Muqtada, the other Iraqi Ayatollahs may become politically irrelevant in spite of their theoretical standing.
