Iraq and Afghanistan

The most encouraging news today is the relative opening up of North Korea, at least to countries other than the United States. While the government has continued its oppressive ways, it has also been changing its philosophy. Since 2000, it has established diplomatic relations with 19 new countries, especially in Europe. Germany has been the leader in the attempt to open up the country, establishing a Goethe Information Center in Pyongyang. It offers scientific and popular media open to all (some North Koreans understand German because of the relationship with East Germany; however one wonders how many people actually are able to use this resource). Germany is now giving a course on libraries and librarians, as well as use of the Internet.

North Korea is also initiating limited capitalist reforms (not that capitalism in itself means freedom). Three hundred markets have been established, private trade with China is increasing, and private cars are beginning to appear on the streets. South Korea is helping to establish an industrial park, connected through a new highway and railroad to the South. Bilateral talks are occurring with its neighbors, even among military leaders. While the United States continues to demonize the country for its human rights record, the other countries are taking a much more relaxed attitude. On the one hand, the United States is quite right. The government is demonic and should be treated as such. On the other hand, maybe there is little to gain with this approach at this juncture. The USSR and its satellites were in part brought down by the Helsinki Accord focusing on human rights. By stressing the importance of adhering to its provisions, the United States helped to edge the USSR and the satellite world into a transformation. Yet perhaps this was possible only because it occurred at a certain point in the evolution of the USSR and Eastern Europe. If the treaty and our pressure had occurred earlier it might well have been counterproductive. Perhaps the Europeans and the South Koreans have it right this time. Or perhaps we can proceed forward using the good cop - bad cop approach.

In any event, whatever it portends, this opening lays a more useful basis for talks on nuclear, humanitarian, and other issues than we have had in the past.

Today the leading Times Op-Ed is a plea for making a greater effort to divide humanitarian assistance from the use of military force. This is a recurrent theme lately, often with references to the decision of Doctors without Borders to leave Afghanistan because several of its people were killed (and the organization felt that there had been too little attempt to punish the killers) and the destruction of the UN headquarters in Baghdad about a year ago.

Before we analyze these issues, we must make some distinctions. The work of the United Nations should not be conflated with that of USAID or other governmental aid organizations on the one hand, nor with that of independent nonprofits such as Doctors with Borders on the other. First, as to governmental assistance, we should not accept even provisionally the idea that American or West European assistance organizations, such as the Peace Corps or most economic, educational, or medical assistance programs, have nefarious objectives such as undermining local religion or society. We should understand that many think so, just as we understand that many believe that medical missionaries are actually there to infect rather than treat the people. Second, we must not forget that the United Nations serves the countries of the world, particularly those that supply its budget. As such, whatever it does cannot be "apolitical", even though the politics may be different than that of any particular member of the United Nations. It was not so much because the insurgents in Iraq thought that the United Nations was a tool of the United States that they blew up its headquarters. It was because they had become convinced by propaganda and otherwise that the country had suffered for years primarily because of United Nations sanctions. Only after understanding these distinctions should we approach the issues and suggestions that the Op-Ed raises.

First, it makes the suggestion, already forcibly made by others, that military forces should never become involved in humanitarian assistance because this blurs the distinction between the use of force and humanitarianism. This is a proposition that we cannot endorse. In many cases, assistance must be given in extremely violent environments into which it would be foolish to send unarmed civilians. Secondly, in many cases it is the military that is willing and able to act now while the civilian agencies are just gearing up. This is true of building schools, refurbishing hospitals etc. Moreover, an occupation army not under great pressure has a great deal of spare energy that can be used in assistance activities during lulls in the fighting. Moreover, many soldiers come back from overseas activities seeing their assistance activities as the best part of their experience. Taking part in assistance programs makes them come to view the local people as more than just enemies, just as it helps the locals to see them as more than just enemies. Later, in battle, this combined experience should have a positive influence on the way in which each side fights.

One can certainly second the Op-Ed's suggestion that more should be done to acquaint the local people with the special missions of humanitarian organizations. Often they do not know. Often their leaders do not want them to know. Such education should not be a primary task for the United States or other Western governments. It should in the first instance be a task for the nonprofits. Secondly, it would seem to be a useful function of the United Nations itself. For it has responsibilities both to these groups and to the governments behind it.

I take this occasion to go back a little and consider the Op-Ed of Daniel Pletka ("Arabs on the Verge of democracy", August 9). Pletka criticizes John Kerry for valuing "stability" above "democracy" in the Middle East and President Bush for not more aggressively pursuing his announced goal of democratizing the region. What Pletka does not seem to understand and what the Bush White House has come belatedly to understand is the cost to the United States and the region of pursuing an effective democratization policy. It would be possible to democratize the region in a generation. But it would require several times the expenditure in dollars and lives that we have so far incurred. It would require the imposition of a peace settlement on Israelis and Arabs. It would require the conquest of several major countries in the area with attendant casualties. It would require the training of a new political class in the standards and procedures of democracy. And it would require maintaining a massive and effective occupation force able to maintain order in the face of the inevitable opposition of the religious and political classes that now rule the area.

Where people have generations of experience with democracy and identify with liberal society, as in Eastern Europe, a minimal level of democratic assistance can transform an area. But where, as in Afghanistan, Iraq, Russia, or Pakistan, this background and identification is absent, we should not imagine that we can democratize on the cheap.

At the end of a tumultuous four days, the National Conference managed to appoint a 100 member Congress to oversee the operation of the interim government until elections next January. The process was hectic; many threatened to walk out. But in the end they all stayed and acquiesced in the result. It was a compromise list agreed on by the leading parties and factions in the country. The chief negotiators included the Shiite Dawa Party (actually there are several such parties, but at the time of the defeat of Saddam's forces, they were thought to represent most of the country's Shiites), and the Shiite Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, the Sunni Islamic Party, the two Kurdish parties, the former exiles of the Iraqi National Congress and Allawi's Iraqi National Accord. The smaller groups felt they were ignored. The final result did not have the promised 25% female membership because the tribal sheikhs would not appoint women in their slots. Yet, by and large, it appears to be a fairly representative group.

I assume now that it has done its job, the National Conference will go out of existence, or at least become inactive. Its one other action was to try to solve the Najaf problem. After an initial rejection, it appeared as though they had a deal, but then within hours this too fell apart. Shells are again bursting in Najaf and the Americans are bombing both Najaf and Falluja. The breakdown may have been partly due to the Interim Government's stiffening of its demands on al-Sadr. They demanded an immediate disbanding of the Mahdi Army throughout the country. Again, intransigence seems to mark the approach of Allawi and his friends — and the American forces are expected to back up this policy. Suggesting that a less extreme, more temporizing policy would work better is, of course, easy to do at a distance. In any event, we are obviously not out of the woods in many areas of the country, particularly those heavily influenced by the Mahdi Army.

Yet, the Conference was held. A Congress was "elected" by acclamation (actually an appointive process). These steps had to be accomplished. Whether they are enough remains at issue.

We return today to the dark subject of whether it is "Time to Quit" (Op-Ed, August 18). This has been addressed in several earlier posts (particularly April 7, 9, and 25). It is occasioned by an excellent Op-Ed under this heading by Edward Luttwak, a sometimes conservative expert on military affairs. After discussing the feeling of many commentators that we should just leave, he reviews the reasons most Americans still feel we should not, such as the resulting collapse of the government, invasion by neighbors, encouragement to Islamic extremists everywhere, and loss of America's global credibility.

Luttwak then proceeds to stand this argument on its head by arguing that it is precisely this list of dangers that makes it possible for United States to "disengage" at little cost. He feels that the Sadrists are able to get away with mayhem and our regional and international allies are able to carp on the sidelines, remain unhelpful, and pursue their own agendas precisely because they feel they can count on the United States "staying the course". If we were to cast doubt on this assumption, we would see a change in their willingness to help. He concludes from this analysis that we should begin making preparations for a departure now — and we have to mean it! If this doesn't change attitudes in the main players, then we should complete our withdrawal.

The basic argument is that other regional and international players have more to lose than we do in Iraq. We must use this advantage now while there is still time. If we do not, we may end up with worse choices, such as an evacuation under fire. Luttwak makes this rather extreme suggestion because he believes that if our reformation of the country continues to stumble, we will be throwing men and material goods away for nought. Sooner or later Americans will wake up to this fact and demand that we just leave, even if Saigon-style.

I would like to believe Luttwak. Unfortunately, like most strategists, he overestimates the role of logic and calculation in human affairs. As I have argued before, the Shiites should be supporting a process that is bound to lead to their domination of the country. Yet the violent young men in the street are moved more by nationalist hatred of the foreigner than such calculations, and it is increasingly unclear that their more moderate religious and political leaders can effectively stem this hatred. Too many Iraqis now see the Sadrists and other extremists as they would view combatants in a great drama between we and them. The more insurgents persist, the more they appear able to thumb their noses at the Americans, the more they become national heroes and the more are recruited to their cause. This may develop into an inexorable trend that Americans and the newly minted Iraqi government will find impossible to turn around.

The delayed National Conference did open in Baghdad, although under siege conditions with mortars bursting outside. Open 1100 delegates chosen in communities throughout Iraq showed up. The first session was thrown into disarray by angry protests against the fighting in Najaf. One hundred members stormed out; however they later returned. Today's report suggests that the Conference has drafted a request to Muqtada al-Sadr asking him to leave the shrine and join the political process. It was drafted by a distant relative of Muqtada and will be delivered today by a delegation of sixty traveling to Najaf. Whether this will be seen as anything different than another attempt by Allawi to stop the fighting is unclear. But the fact that the Conference took place and that it did get large number of delegates that were desired are encouraging signs, at least for the moment.

There have been a number of items in the news recently that remind us of the importance of maintaining good relations with Iran. Dilip Hiro in an Op-Ed on Monday pointed to the variation of opinion that he found within Iran. Interestingly, he found that those most supportive of what we have done in Iraq are those living closest to the Iraq border (because of what happened to them in the Iran-Iraq war). Further away he found many young people who looked to the possibility of democracy in Iraq as a future model for Iran. (One should be cautious about this and the reports from other recent trips by Westerners to the country. Even with one's best efforts, one tends in a foreign country to spend more time with those like oneself in ideas, culture, and age than with those less interested in you and less able to contact you.) He also found, especially in the holy city of Qom, some virulent anti-Americans, a segment dating back to the Mossadeq era and the later satanization of Americans by Khomeini. This group often regards recent events in Iraq as a deliberate attack on Islam. It is interesting to reflect that the nationalist movement in Iran began about 1890 with a boycott of tobacco (being imported by the British) led by the religious leaders.

The United States should develop better relations with Iran for many reasons.

First, outside of Turkey, it is most democratic significant democratic state in the region. We make a lot of it being a "theocracy". But it has in fact held a series of elections over the past twenty years that have been more "free and fair" than most elections in the area. The position of women in Iran is far better than that in neighboring states (always with the exception of Turkey). Freedom in the arts and in the expression of opinion is significant if by no means complete. Iran has a relatively well-educated population as the result of the efforts of both the preceding monarchy and the present "theocracy".

Second, whatever we may think of it, Iran is situated between Iraq and Afghanistan. It is understandably interested in what goes on in both states. That it interferes in their affairs from time to time should not be condemned as much as modified or redirected. As the most powerful Shi'a state in the world (a role it also played from the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries), Iran is also directly involved in the affairs of the Shi'as of Iraq, as well as those of Afghanistan, Lebanon, Pakistan, and elsewhere. Khomeini fled to Iraq to escape the Shah. Under Saddam, high religious leaders fled from Iraq to Iran (Qom). Many of these are still revered in Iraq, and some have returned or intend to. The holy cities of Kerbala and Najaf are equally holy cities for Iranians.

Long before the religious leaders came to power in modern Iran, Iran has longed for a decisive role in the world. After all, they see themselves as the descendants of a people that once ruled from Cairo to Delhi. The support of Palestinian groups opposing the Israelis as well as their interest in nuclear energy, the development of new missiles and maintenance of the possibility of a bomb are not unrelated to their view of their "international responsibility". These objectives clash with our own objectives and must be countered. But they should be countered in the framework of an understanding of, and accommodation where possible with, the Iranian understanding of themselves.

The area we now refer to as Afghanistan has seldom in its history been ruled as a unitary country. The people are diverse, transportation is difficult, and expectations of unity are weak. This has been illustrated once again by fighting around the city of Herat in the west, probably the most civilized and developed urban area in the country outside Kabul. This Tajik city has been ruled for many years, off and on, by Ismail Khan, one of the less deplorable of the country's war lords. As readers may remember, last March his son (who had the title of Minister for Civil Aviation in the central government) was killed by supporters of a neighboring warlord, with Khan's resulting counterattack condemned vigorously by Kabul. Now the warlords of three neighboring provinces, including the aforementioned, have made a coordinated attack on Khan's positions with artillery and tanks south of Herat. The attack was heavy enough to kill two "defense ministry commanders" (who, given the way titles are given here, were evidently actually commanders for Ismail Khan). The government has responded vigorously with a statement that such attacks are "illegal and a threat to public security". It was noted at the end of the Times article that the defense ministry said that "a battalion of the newly trained Afghan National Army is based in Herat and was on alert but for now remained in their barracks".

Such fighting back and forth happens periodically in the north between General Dostum and other warlords, and they among themselves. This is in addition to fights in the areas of the country that were former centers of Taliban power and are in a state of low level rebellion against much of the time. The country is gearing up for an election, but we should not expect that magically anything more than a semblance of a country will emerge. In the jockeying for power before the vote (which probably means ability to determine the vote) Karzai and other commanders (incidentally, mostly members of Karzai's cabinet) have developed new and cross-cutting alliances that seem to imply that whoever wins, the elected president's mandate will be less than overwhelming.

For the United States, the instability and weakness of Kabul is not nearly as serious as our troubles in Iraq. The difference is that without saying so our expectations in Afghanistan have always been at a lower level, as have those of Karzai. The forces that we have operating in the country have never been so large that leaving Afghanistan without the accomplishments that we had hoped will be seen as a disaster. If we can leave behind a responsible, fairly modern government in Kabul with some development and at least intermittent control over most of the rest of the country, we will have to be content. Unfortunately, accepting this reduced goal will not help control al-Qaida.

It has been a while since I issued my most pessimistic blogs in April; unfortunately, it appears to be time to put on my pessimist hat again.

For a long while, it has been assumed that our basic problem is the Sunni Triangle, the Jihadists and the Baathists. But concern about the threat they represent needs now to be set on a back burner. Muqtada al-Sadr can no longer be dismissed as a hot-headed leader of a bunch of unorganized thugs from the Shi'a underclass. No longer should we imagine that the more conservative Shi'a hierarchy will rein him in. They would like to, but appear unable to even if they continued to want to. Muqtada has managed to oppose the Americans and the new government cleverly and effectively, apparently building as he does so a reservoir of support throughout the country. It would appear now that he does have a less than laughable objective, which is to run the country.

These comments reflect the last few days' fighting in Najaf, Cole's latest comments, and a NYT report on the role of the Mahdi Army in Baghdad. The Americans and Iraqis are at a loss as to what to do in Najaf. They do not want to destroy the holiest of Shi'a shrines and yet the Mahdi Army continues to use it as their main base in the city. If they do go in with all guns blazing as they have threatened, they will be alienating both the Shi'as of Iraq and those far beyond. If they do not, then the reputation of Muqtada is enhanced. A major Ayatollah of Iraq (encamped in Qom until the Americans leave) has issued a fatwa saying that no Iraqi Muslim may fight on behalf of the government or the Americans. Shi'as are said to be streaming to Najaf from every direction to join up with the Army. Another report has most of the country below Najaf out of control of the government (this seems unlikely but could soon be so). The Shi'a continue to attack in a dozen other cities, the Americans responding with bombing that wins the day but does not help in the longer term. The latest reports suggest that the Americans and the Interim Government have effectively ceded the Sadr City area of Baghdad to the Mahdi Army whose administration is becoming more and more entrenched. More ominously, the Army is increasingly be able to exert its power throughout the city. Their forces appear able to raid almost at will even in the center. In a recent symbolic victory, an Iraqi-American attempt to set up a curfew in Sadr City was answered by a Sadrist announcement of a curfew for the entire city, one that was respected almost everywhere.

What are we left with? Within the well-protected area reserved for American and Iraqi administrations in Baghdad and in military camps throughout the country, as well as in Kurdish areas, there is the reality of a state progressing toward democracy under our auspices. But the bulk of the country appears to be sliding away from us and Allawi's administration. I can only hope that this pessimistic assessment is wrong.

It has been a while since I issued my most pessimistic blogs in April; unfortunately, it appears to be time to put on my pessimist hat again.

For a long while, it has been assumed that our basic problem is the Sunni Triangle, the Jihadists and the Baathists. But concern about the threat they represent needs now to be set on a back burner. Muqtada al-Sadr can no longer be dismissed as a hot-headed leader of a bunch of unorganized thugs from the Shi'a underclass. No longer should we imagine that the more conservative Shi'a hierarchy will rein him in. They would like to, but appear unable to even if they continued to want to. Muqtada has managed to oppose the Americans and the new government cleverly and effectively, apparently building as he does so a reservoir of support throughout the country. It would appear now that he does have a less than laughable objective, which is to run the country.

These comments reflect the last few days' fighting in Najaf, Cole's latest comments, and a NYT report on the role of the Mahdi Army in Baghdad. The Americans and Iraqis are at a loss as to what to do in Najaf. They do not want to destroy the holiest of Shi'a shrines and yet the Mahdi Army continues to use it as their main base in the city. If they do go in with all guns blazing as they have threatened, they will be alienating both the Shi'as of Iraq and those far beyond. If they do not, then the reputation of Muqtada is enhanced. A major Ayatollah of Iraq (encamped in Qom until the Americans leave) has issued a fatwa saying that no Iraqi Muslim may fight on behalf of the government or the Americans. Shi'as are said to be streaming to Najaf from every direction to join up with the Army. Another report has most of the country below Najaf out of control of the government (this seems unlikely but could soon be so). The Shi'a continue to attack in a dozen other cities, the Americans responding with bombing that wins the day but does not help in the longer term. The latest reports suggest that the Americans and the Interim Government have effectively ceded the Sadr City area of Baghdad to the Mahdi Army whose administration is becoming more and more entrenched. More ominously, the Army is increasingly be able to exert its power throughout the city. Their forces appear able to raid almost at will even in the center. In a recent symbolic victory, an Iraqi-American attempt to set up a curfew in Sadr City was answered by a Sadrist announcement of a curfew for the entire city, one that was respected almost everywhere.

What are we left with? Within the well-protected area reserved for American and Iraqi administrations in Baghdad and in military camps throughout the country, as well as in Kurdish areas, there is the reality of a state progressing toward democracy under our auspices. But the bulk of the country appears to be sliding away from us and Allawi's administration. I can only hope that this pessimistic assessment is wrong.

It has been a while since I issued my most pessimistic blogs in April; unfortunately, it appears to be time to put on my pessimist hat again.

For a long while, it has been assumed that our basic problem is the Sunni Triangle, the Jihadists and the Baathists. But concern about the threat they represent needs now to be set on a back burner. Muqtada al-Sadr can no longer be dismissed as a hot-headed leader of a bunch of unorganized thugs from the Shi'a underclass. No longer should we imagine that the more conservative Shi'a hierarchy will rein him in. They would like to, but appear unable to even if they continued to want to. Muqtada has managed to oppose the Americans and the new government cleverly and effectively, apparently building as he does so a reservoir of support throughout the country. It would appear now that he does have a less than laughable objective, which is to run the country.

These comments reflect the last few days' fighting in Najaf, Cole's latest comments, and a NYT report on the role of the Mahdi Army in Baghdad. The Americans and Iraqis are at a loss as to what to do in Najaf. They do not want to destroy the holiest of Shi'a shrines and yet the Mahdi Army continues to use it as their main base in the city. If they do go in with all guns blazing as they have threatened, they will be alienating both the Shi'as of Iraq and those far beyond. If they do not, then the reputation of Muqtada is enhanced. A major Ayatollah of Iraq (encamped in Qom until the Americans leave) has issued a fatwa saying that no Iraqi Muslim may fight on behalf of the government or the Americans. Shi'as are said to be streaming to Najaf from every direction to join up with the Army. Another report has most of the country below Najaf out of control of the government (this seems unlikely but could soon be so). The Shi'a continue to attack in a dozen other cities, the Americans responding with bombing that wins the day but does not help in the longer term. The latest reports suggest that the Americans and the Interim Government have effectively ceded the Sadr City area of Baghdad to the Mahdi Army whose administration is becoming more and more entrenched. More ominously, the Army is increasingly be able to exert its power throughout the city. Their forces appear able to raid almost at will even in the center. In a recent symbolic victory, an Iraqi-American attempt to set up a curfew in Sadr City was answered by a Sadrist announcement of a curfew for the entire city, one that was respected almost everywhere.

What are we left with? Within the well-protected area reserved for American and Iraqi administrations in Baghdad and in military camps throughout the country, as well as in Kurdish areas, there is the reality of a state progressing toward democracy under our auspices. But the bulk of the country appears to be sliding away from us and Allawi's administration. I can only hope that this pessimistic assessment is wrong.

It has been a while since I issued my most pessimistic blogs in April; unfortunately, it appears to be time to put on my pessimist hat again.

For a long while, it has been assumed that our basic problem is the Sunni Triangle, the Jihadists and the Baathists. But concern about the threat they represent needs now to be set on a back burner. Muqtada al-Sadr can no longer be dismissed as a hot-headed leader of a bunch of unorganized thugs from the Shi'a underclass. No longer should we imagine that the more conservative Shi'a hierarchy will rein him in. They would like to, but appear unable to even if they continued to want to. Muqtada has managed to oppose the Americans and the new government cleverly and effectively, apparently building as he does so a reservoir of support throughout the country. It would appear now that he does have a less than laughable objective, which is to run the country.

These comments reflect the last few days' fighting in Najaf, Cole's latest comments, and a NYT report on the role of the Mahdi Army in Baghdad. The Americans and Iraqis are at a loss as to what to do in Najaf. They do not want to destroy the holiest of Shi'a shrines and yet the Mahdi Army continues to use it as their main base in the city. If they do go in with all guns blazing as they have threatened, they will be alienating both the Shi'as of Iraq and those far beyond. If they do not, then the reputation of Muqtada is enhanced. A major Ayatollah of Iraq (encamped in Qom until the Americans leave) has issued a fatwa saying that no Iraqi Muslim may fight on behalf of the government or the Americans. Shi'as are said to be streaming to Najaf from every direction to join up with the Army. Another report has most of the country below Najaf out of control of the government (this seems unlikely but could soon be so). The Shi'a continue to attack in a dozen other cities, the Americans responding with bombing that wins the day but does not help in the longer term. The latest reports suggest that the Americans and the Interim Government have effectively ceded the Sadr City area of Baghdad to the Mahdi Army whose administration is becoming more and more entrenched. More ominously, the Army is increasingly be able to exert its power throughout the city. Their forces appear able to raid almost at will even in the center. In a recent symbolic victory, an Iraqi-American attempt to set up a curfew in Sadr City was answered by a Sadrist announcement of a curfew for the entire city, one that was respected almost everywhere.

What are we left with? Within the well-protected area reserved for American and Iraqi administrations in Baghdad and in military camps throughout the country, as well as in Kurdish areas, there is the reality of a state progressing toward democracy under our auspices. But the bulk of the country appears to be sliding away from us and Allawi's administration. I can only hope that this pessimistic assessment is wrong.

It has been a while since I issued my most pessimistic blogs in April; unfortunately, it appears to be time to put on my pessimist hat again.

For a long while, it has been assumed that our basic problem is the Sunni Triangle, the Jihadists and the Baathists. But concern about the threat they represent needs now to be set on a back burner. Muqtada al-Sadr can no longer be dismissed as a hot-headed leader of a bunch of unorganized thugs from the Shi'a underclass. No longer should we imagine that the more conservative Shi'a hierarchy will rein him in. They would like to, but appear unable to even if they continued to want to. Muqtada has managed to oppose the Americans and the new government cleverly and effectively, apparently building as he does so a reservoir of support throughout the country. It would appear now that he does have a less than laughable objective, which is to run the country.

These comments reflect the last few days' fighting in Najaf, Cole's latest comments, and a NYT report on the role of the Mahdi Army in Baghdad. The Americans and Iraqis are at a loss as to what to do in Najaf. They do not want to destroy the holiest of Shi'a shrines and yet the Mahdi Army continues to use it as their main base in the city. If they do go in with all guns blazing as they have threatened, they will be alienating both the Shi'as of Iraq and those far beyond. If they do not, then the reputation of Muqtada is enhanced. A major Ayatollah of Iraq (encamped in Qom until the Americans leave) has issued a fatwa saying that no Iraqi Muslim may fight on behalf of the government or the Americans. Shi'as are said to be streaming to Najaf from every direction to join up with the Army. Another report has most of the country below Najaf out of control of the government (this seems unlikely but could soon be so). The Shi'a continue to attack in a dozen other cities, the Americans responding with bombing that wins the day but does not help in the longer term. The latest reports suggest that the Americans and the Interim Government have effectively ceded the Sadr City area of Baghdad to the Mahdi Army whose administration is becoming more and more entrenched. More ominously, the Army is increasingly be able to exert its power throughout the city. Their forces appear able to raid almost at will even in the center. In a recent symbolic victory, an Iraqi-American attempt to set up a curfew in Sadr City was answered by a Sadrist announcement of a curfew for the entire city, one that was respected almost everywhere.

What are we left with? Within the well-protected area reserved for American and Iraqi administrations in Baghdad and in military camps throughout the country, as well as in Kurdish areas, there is the reality of a state progressing toward democracy under our auspices. But the bulk of the country appears to be sliding away from us and Allawi's administration. I can only hope that this pessimistic assessment is wrong.

It has been a while since I issued my most pessimistic blogs in April; unfortunately, it appears to be time to put on my pessimist hat again.

For a long while, it has been assumed that our basic problem is the Sunni Triangle, the Jihadists and the Baathists. But concern about the threat they represent needs now to be set on a back burner. Muqtada al-Sadr can no longer be dismissed as a hot-headed leader of a bunch of unorganized thugs from the Shi'a underclass. No longer should we imagine that the more conservative Shi'a hierarchy will rein him in. They would like to, but appear unable to even if they continued to want to. Muqtada has managed to oppose the Americans and the new government cleverly and effectively, apparently building as he does so a reservoir of support throughout the country. It would appear now that he does have a less than laughable objective, which is to run the country.

These comments reflect the last few days' fighting in Najaf, Cole's latest comments, and a NYT report on the role of the Mahdi Army in Baghdad. The Americans and Iraqis are at a loss as to what to do in Najaf. They do not want to destroy the holiest of Shi'a shrines and yet the Mahdi Army continues to use it as their main base in the city. If they do go in with all guns blazing as they have threatened, they will be alienating both the Shi'as of Iraq and those far beyond. If they do not, then the reputation of Muqtada is enhanced. A major Ayatollah of Iraq (encamped in Qom until the Americans leave) has issued a fatwa saying that no Iraqi Muslim may fight on behalf of the government or the Americans. Shi'as are said to be streaming to Najaf from every direction to join up with the Army. Another report has most of the country below Najaf out of control of the government (this seems unlikely but could soon be so). The Shi'a continue to attack in a dozen other cities, the Americans responding with bombing that wins the day but does not help in the longer term. The latest reports suggest that the Americans and the Interim Government have effectively ceded the Sadr City area of Baghdad to the Mahdi Army whose administration is becoming more and more entrenched. More ominously, the Army is increasingly be able to exert its power throughout the city. Their forces appear able to raid almost at will even in the center. In a recent symbolic victory, an Iraqi-American attempt to set up a curfew in Sadr City was answered by a Sadrist announcement of a curfew for the entire city, one that was respected almost everywhere.

What are we left with? Within the well-protected area reserved for American and Iraqi administrations in Baghdad and in military camps throughout the country, as well as in Kurdish areas, there is the reality of a state progressing toward democracy under our auspices. But the bulk of the country appears to be sliding away from us and Allawi's administration. I can only hope that this pessimistic assessment is wrong.

It has been a while since I issued my most pessimistic blogs in April; unfortunately, it appears to be time to put on my pessimist hat again.

For a long while, it has been assumed that our basic problem is the Sunni Triangle, the Jihadists and the Baathists. But concern about the threat they represent needs now to be set on a back burner. Muqtada al-Sadr can no longer be dismissed as a hot-headed leader of a bunch of unorganized thugs from the Shi'a underclass. No longer should we imagine that the more conservative Shi'a hierarchy will rein him in. They would like to, but appear unable to even if they continued to want to. Muqtada has managed to oppose the Americans and the new government cleverly and effectively, apparently building as he does so a reservoir of support throughout the country. It would appear now that he does have a less than laughable objective, which is to run the country.

These comments reflect the last few days' fighting in Najaf, Cole's latest comments, and a NYT report on the role of the Mahdi Army in Baghdad. The Americans and Iraqis are at a loss as to what to do in Najaf. They do not want to destroy the holiest of Shi'a shrines and yet the Mahdi Army continues to use it as their main base in the city. If they do go in with all guns blazing as they have threatened, they will be alienating both the Shi'as of Iraq and those far beyond. If they do not, then the reputation of Muqtada is enhanced. A major Ayatollah of Iraq (encamped in Qom until the Americans leave) has issued a fatwa saying that no Iraqi Muslim may fight on behalf of the government or the Americans. Shi'as are said to be streaming to Najaf from every direction to join up with the Army. Another report has most of the country below Najaf out of control of the government (this seems unlikely but could soon be so). The Shi'a continue to attack in a dozen other cities, the Americans responding with bombing that wins the day but does not help in the longer term. The latest reports suggest that the Americans and the Interim Government have effectively ceded the Sadr City area of Baghdad to the Mahdi Army whose administration is becoming more and more entrenched. More ominously, the Army is increasingly be able to exert its power throughout the city. Their forces appear able to raid almost at will even in the center. In a recent symbolic victory, an Iraqi-American attempt to set up a curfew in Sadr City was answered by a Sadrist announcement of a curfew for the entire city, one that was respected almost everywhere.

What are we left with? Within the well-protected area reserved for American and Iraqi administrations in Baghdad and in military camps throughout the country, as well as in Kurdish areas, there is the reality of a state progressing toward democracy under our auspices. But the bulk of the country appears to be sliding away from us and Allawi's administration. I can only hope that this pessimistic assessment is wrong.

It has been a while since I issued my most pessimistic blogs in April; unfortunately, it appears to be time to put on my pessimist hat again.

For a long while, it has been assumed that our basic problem is the Sunni Triangle, the Jihadists and the Baathists. But concern about the threat they represent needs now to be set on a back burner. Muqtada al-Sadr can no longer be dismissed as a hot-headed leader of a bunch of unorganized thugs from the Shi'a underclass. No longer should we imagine that the more conservative Shi'a hierarchy will rein him in. They would like to, but appear unable to even if they continued to want to. Muqtada has managed to oppose the Americans and the new government cleverly and effectively, apparently building as he does so a reservoir of support throughout the country. It would appear now that he does have a less than laughable objective, which is to run the country.

These comments reflect the last few days' fighting in Najaf, Cole's latest comments, and a NYT report on the role of the Mahdi Army in Baghdad. The Americans and Iraqis are at a loss as to what to do in Najaf. They do not want to destroy the holiest of Shi'a shrines and yet the Mahdi Army continues to use it as their main base in the city. If they do go in with all guns blazing as they have threatened, they will be alienating both the Shi'as of Iraq and those far beyond. If they do not, then the reputation of Muqtada is enhanced. A major Ayatollah of Iraq (encamped in Qom until the Americans leave) has issued a fatwa saying that no Iraqi Muslim may fight on behalf of the government or the Americans. Shi'as are said to be streaming to Najaf from every direction to join up with the Army. Another report has most of the country below Najaf out of control of the government (this seems unlikely but could soon be so). The Shi'a continue to attack in a dozen other cities, the Americans responding with bombing that wins the day but does not help in the longer term. The latest reports suggest that the Americans and the Interim Government have effectively ceded the Sadr City area of Baghdad to the Mahdi Army whose administration is becoming more and more entrenched. More ominously, the Army is increasingly be able to exert its power throughout the city. Their forces appear able to raid almost at will even in the center. In a recent symbolic victory, an Iraqi-American attempt to set up a curfew in Sadr City was answered by a Sadrist announcement of a curfew for the entire city, one that was respected almost everywhere.

What are we left with? Within the well-protected area reserved for American and Iraqi administrations in Baghdad and in military camps throughout the country, as well as in Kurdish areas, there is the reality of a state progressing toward democracy under our auspices. But the bulk of the country appears to be sliding away from us and Allawi's administration. I can only hope that this pessimistic assessment is wrong.

It has been a while since I issued my most pessimistic blogs in April; unfortunately, it appears to be time to put on my pessimist hat again.

For a long while, it has been assumed that our basic problem is the Sunni Triangle, the Jihadists and the Baathists. But concern about the threat they represent needs now to be set on a back burner. Muqtada al-Sadr can no longer be dismissed as a hot-headed leader of a bunch of unorganized thugs from the Shi'a underclass. No longer should we imagine that the more conservative Shi'a hierarchy will rein him in. They would like to, but appear unable to even if they continued to want to. Muqtada has managed to oppose the Americans and the new government cleverly and effectively, apparently building as he does so a reservoir of support throughout the country. It would appear now that he does have a less than laughable objective, which is to run the country.

These comments reflect the last few days' fighting in Najaf, Cole's latest comments, and a NYT report on the role of the Mahdi Army in Baghdad. The Americans and Iraqis are at a loss as to what to do in Najaf. They do not want to destroy the holiest of Shi'a shrines and yet the Mahdi Army continues to use it as their main base in the city. If they do go in with all guns blazing as they have threatened, they will be alienating both the Shi'as of Iraq and those far beyond. If they do not, then the reputation of Muqtada is enhanced. A major Ayatollah of Iraq (encamped in Qom until the Americans leave) has issued a fatwa saying that no Iraqi Muslim may fight on behalf of the government or the Americans. Shi'as are said to be streaming to Najaf from every direction to join up with the Army. Another report has most of the country below Najaf out of control of the government (this seems unlikely but could soon be so). The Shi'a continue to attack in a dozen other cities, the Americans responding with bombing that wins the day but does not help in the longer term. The latest reports suggest that the Americans and the Interim Government have effectively ceded the Sadr City area of Baghdad to the Mahdi Army whose administration is becoming more and more entrenched. More ominously, the Army is increasingly be able to exert its power throughout the city. Their forces appear able to raid almost at will even in the center. In a recent symbolic victory, an Iraqi-American attempt to set up a curfew in Sadr City was answered by a Sadrist announcement of a curfew for the entire city, one that was respected almost everywhere.

What are we left with? Within the well-protected area reserved for American and Iraqi administrations in Baghdad and in military camps throughout the country, as well as in Kurdish areas, there is the reality of a state progressing toward democracy under our auspices. But the bulk of the country appears to be sliding away from us and Allawi's administration. I can only hope that this pessimistic assessment is wrong.

It has been a while since I issued my most pessimistic blogs in April; unfortunately, it appears to be time to put on my pessimist hat again.

For a long while, it has been assumed that our basic problem is the Sunni Triangle, the Jihadists and the Baathists. But concern about the threat they represent needs now to be set on a back burner. Muqtada al-Sadr can no longer be dismissed as a hot-headed leader of a bunch of unorganized thugs from the Shi'a underclass. No longer should we imagine that the more conservative Shi'a hierarchy will rein him in. They would like to, but appear unable to even if they continued to want to. Muqtada has managed to oppose the Americans and the new government cleverly and effectively, apparently building as he does so a reservoir of support throughout the country. It would appear now that he does have a less than laughable objective, which is to run the country.

These comments reflect the last few days' fighting in Najaf, Cole's latest comments, and a NYT report on the role of the Mahdi Army in Baghdad. The Americans and Iraqis are at a loss as to what to do in Najaf. They do not want to destroy the holiest of Shi'a shrines and yet the Mahdi Army continues to use it as their main base in the city. If they do go in with all guns blazing as they have threatened, they will be alienating both the Shi'as of Iraq and those far beyond. If they do not, then the reputation of Muqtada is enhanced. A major Ayatollah of Iraq (encamped in Qom until the Americans leave) has issued a fatwa saying that no Iraqi Muslim may fight on behalf of the government or the Americans. Shi'as are said to be streaming to Najaf from every direction to join up with the Army. Another report has most of the country below Najaf out of control of the government (this seems unlikely but could soon be so). The Shi'a continue to attack in a dozen other cities, the Americans responding with bombing that wins the day but does not help in the longer term. The latest reports suggest that the Americans and the Interim Government have effectively ceded the Sadr City area of Baghdad to the Mahdi Army whose administration is becoming more and more entrenched. More ominously, the Army is increasingly be able to exert its power throughout the city. Their forces appear able to raid almost at will even in the center. In a recent symbolic victory, an Iraqi-American attempt to set up a curfew in Sadr City was answered by a Sadrist announcement of a curfew for the entire city, one that was respected almost everywhere.

What are we left with? Within the well-protected area reserved for American and Iraqi administrations in Baghdad and in military camps throughout the country, as well as in Kurdish areas, there is the reality of a state progressing toward democracy under our auspices. But the bulk of the country appears to be sliding away from us and Allawi's administration. I can only hope that this pessimistic assessment is wrong.

It has been a while since I issued my most pessimistic blogs in April; unfortunately, it appears to be time to put on my pessimist hat again.

For a long while, it has been assumed that our basic problem is the Sunni Triangle, the Jihadists and the Baathists. But concern about the threat they represent needs now to be set on a back burner. Muqtada al-Sadr can no longer be dismissed as a hot-headed leader of a bunch of unorganized thugs from the Shi'a underclass. No longer should we imagine that the more conservative Shi'a hierarchy will rein him in. They would like to, but appear unable to even if they continued to want to. Muqtada has managed to oppose the Americans and the new government cleverly and effectively, apparently building as he does so a reservoir of support throughout the country. It would appear now that he does have a less than laughable objective, which is to run the country.

These comments reflect the last few days' fighting in Najaf, Cole's latest comments, and a NYT report on the role of the Mahdi Army in Baghdad. The Americans and Iraqis are at a loss as to what to do in Najaf. They do not want to destroy the holiest of Shi'a shrines and yet the Mahdi Army continues to use it as their main base in the city. If they do go in with all guns blazing as they have threatened, they will be alienating both the Shi'as of Iraq and those far beyond. If they do not, then the reputation of Muqtada is enhanced. A major Ayatollah of Iraq (encamped in Qom until the Americans leave) has issued a fatwa saying that no Iraqi Muslim may fight on behalf of the government or the Americans. Shi'as are said to be streaming to Najaf from every direction to join up with the Army. Another report has most of the country below Najaf out of control of the government (this seems unlikely but could soon be so). The Shi'a continue to attack in a dozen other cities, the Americans responding with bombing that wins the day but does not help in the longer term. The latest reports suggest that the Americans and the Interim Government have effectively ceded the Sadr City area of Baghdad to the Mahdi Army whose administration is becoming more and more entrenched. More ominously, the Army is increasingly be able to exert its power throughout the city. Their forces appear able to raid almost at will even in the center. In a recent symbolic victory, an Iraqi-American attempt to set up a curfew in Sadr City was answered by a Sadrist announcement of a curfew for the entire city, one that was respected almost everywhere.

What are we left with? Within the well-protected area reserved for American and Iraqi administrations in Baghdad and in military camps throughout the country, as well as in Kurdish areas, there is the reality of a state progressing toward democracy under our auspices. But the bulk of the country appears to be sliding away from us and Allawi's administration. I can only hope that this pessimistic assessment is wrong.

It has been a while since I issued my most pessimistic blogs in April; unfortunately, it appears to be time to put on my pessimist hat again.

For a long while, it has been assumed that our basic problem is the Sunni Triangle, the Jihadists and the Baathists. But concern about the threat they represent needs now to be set on a back burner. Muqtada al-Sadr can no longer be dismissed as a hot-headed leader of a bunch of unorganized thugs from the Shi'a underclass. No longer should we imagine that the more conservative Shi'a hierarchy will rein him in. They would like to, but appear unable to even if they continued to want to. Muqtada has managed to oppose the Americans and the new government cleverly and effectively, apparently building as he does so a reservoir of support throughout the country. It would appear now that he does have a less than laughable objective, which is to run the country.

These comments reflect the last few days' fighting in Najaf, Cole's latest comments, and a NYT report on the role of the Mahdi Army in Baghdad. The Americans and Iraqis are at a loss as to what to do in Najaf. They do not want to destroy the holiest of Shi'a shrines and yet the Mahdi Army continues to use it as their main base in the city. If they do go in with all guns blazing as they have threatened, they will be alienating both the Shi'as of Iraq and those far beyond. If they do not, then the reputation of Muqtada is enhanced. A major Ayatollah of Iraq (encamped in Qom until the Americans leave) has issued a fatwa saying that no Iraqi Muslim may fight on behalf of the government or the Americans. Shi'as are said to be streaming to Najaf from every direction to join up with the Army. Another report has most of the country below Najaf out of control of the government (this seems unlikely but could soon be so). The Shi'a continue to attack in a dozen other cities, the Americans responding with bombing that wins the day but does not help in the longer term. The latest reports suggest that the Americans and the Interim Government have effectively ceded the Sadr City area of Baghdad to the Mahdi Army whose administration is becoming more and more entrenched. More ominously, the Army is increasingly be able to exert its power throughout the city. Their forces appear able to raid almost at will even in the center. In a recent symbolic victory, an Iraqi-American attempt to set up a curfew in Sadr City was answered by a Sadrist announcement of a curfew for the entire city, one that was respected almost everywhere.

What are we left with? Within the well-protected area reserved for American and Iraqi administrations in Baghdad and in military camps throughout the country, as well as in Kurdish areas, there is the reality of a state progressing toward democracy under our auspices. But the bulk of the country appears to be sliding away from us and Allawi's administration. I can only hope that this pessimistic assessment is wrong.

It has been a while since I issued my most pessimistic blogs in April; unfortunately, it appears to be time to put on my pessimist hat again.

For a long while, it has been assumed that our basic problem is the Sunni Triangle, the Jihadists and the Baathists. But concern about the threat they represent needs now to be set on a back burner. Muqtada al-Sadr can no longer be dismissed as a hot-headed leader of a bunch of unorganized thugs from the Shi'a underclass. No longer should we imagine that the more conservative Shi'a hierarchy will rein him in. They would like to, but appear unable to even if they continued to want to. Muqtada has managed to oppose the Americans and the new government cleverly and effectively, apparently building as he does so a reservoir of support throughout the country. It would appear now that he does have a less than laughable objective, which is to run the country.

These comments reflect the last few days' fighting in Najaf, Cole's latest comments, and a NYT report on the role of the Mahdi Army in Baghdad. The Americans and Iraqis are at a loss as to what to do in Najaf. They do not want to destroy the holiest of Shi'a shrines and yet the Mahdi Army continues to use it as their main base in the city. If they do go in with all guns blazing as they have threatened, they will be alienating both the Shi'as of Iraq and those far beyond. If they do not, then the reputation of Muqtada is enhanced. A major Ayatollah of Iraq (encamped in Qom until the Americans leave) has issued a fatwa saying that no Iraqi Muslim may fight on behalf of the government or the Americans. Shi'as are said to be streaming to Najaf from every direction to join up with the Army. Another report has most of the country below Najaf out of control of the government (this seems unlikely but could soon be so). The Shi'a continue to attack in a dozen other cities, the Americans responding with bombing that wins the day but does not help in the longer term. The latest reports suggest that the Americans and the Interim Government have effectively ceded the Sadr City area of Baghdad to the Mahdi Army whose administration is becoming more and more entrenched. More ominously, the Army is increasingly be able to exert its power throughout the city. Their forces appear able to raid almost at will even in the center. In a recent symbolic victory, an Iraqi-American attempt to set up a curfew in Sadr City was answered by a Sadrist announcement of a curfew for the entire city, one that was respected almost everywhere.

What are we left with? Within the well-protected area reserved for American and Iraqi administrations in Baghdad and in military camps throughout the country, as well as in Kurdish areas, there is the reality of a state progressing toward democracy under our auspices. But the bulk of the country appears to be sliding away from us and Allawi's administration. I can only hope that this pessimistic assessment is wrong.

It has been a while since I issued my most pessimistic blogs in April; unfortunately, it appears to be time to put on my pessimist hat again.

For a long while, it has been assumed that our basic problem is the Sunni Triangle, the Jihadists and the Baathists. But concern about the threat they represent needs now to be set on a back burner. Muqtada al-Sadr can no longer be dismissed as a hot-headed leader of a bunch of unorganized thugs from the Shi'a underclass. No longer should we imagine that the more conservative Shi'a hierarchy will rein him in. They would like to, but appear unable to even if they continued to want to. Muqtada has managed to oppose the Americans and the new government cleverly and effectively, apparently building as he does so a reservoir of support throughout the country. It would appear now that he does have a less than laughable objective, which is to run the country.

These comments reflect the last few days' fighting in Najaf, Cole's latest comments, and a NYT report on the role of the Mahdi Army in Baghdad. The Americans and Iraqis are at a loss as to what to do in Najaf. They do not want to destroy the holiest of Shi'a shrines and yet the Mahdi Army continues to use it as their main base in the city. If they do go in with all guns blazing as they have threatened, they will be alienating both the Shi'as of Iraq and those far beyond. If they do not, then the reputation of Muqtada is enhanced. A major Ayatollah of Iraq (encamped in Qom until the Americans leave) has issued a fatwa saying that no Iraqi Muslim may fight on behalf of the government or the Americans. Shi'as are said to be streaming to Najaf from every direction to join up with the Army. Another report has most of the country below Najaf out of control of the government (this seems unlikely but could soon be so). The Shi'a continue to attack in a dozen other cities, the Americans responding with bombing that wins the day but does not help in the longer term. The latest reports suggest that the Americans and the Interim Government have effectively ceded the Sadr City area of Baghdad to the Mahdi Army whose administration is becoming more and more entrenched. More ominously, the Army is increasingly be able to exert its power throughout the city. Their forces appear able to raid almost at will even in the center. In a recent symbolic victory, an Iraqi-American attempt to set up a curfew in Sadr City was answered by a Sadrist announcement of a curfew for the entire city, one that was respected almost everywhere.

What are we left with? Within the well-protected area reserved for American and Iraqi administrations in Baghdad and in military camps throughout the country, as well as in Kurdish areas, there is the reality of a state progressing toward democracy under our auspices. But the bulk of the country appears to be sliding away from us and Allawi's administration. I can only hope that this pessimistic assessment is wrong.

It has been a while since I issued my most pessimistic blogs in April; unfortunately, it appears to be time to put on my pessimist hat again.

For a long while, it has been assumed that our basic problem is the Sunni Triangle, the Jihadists and the Baathists. But concern about the threat they represent needs now to be set on a back burner. Muqtada al-Sadr can no longer be dismissed as a hot-headed leader of a bunch of unorganized thugs from the Shi'a underclass. No longer should we imagine that the more conservative Shi'a hierarchy will rein him in. They would like to, but appear unable to even if they continued to want to. Muqtada has managed to oppose the Americans and the new government cleverly and effectively, apparently building as he does so a reservoir of support throughout the country. It would appear now that he does have a less than laughable objective, which is to run the country.

These comments reflect the last few days' fighting in Najaf, Cole's latest comments, and a NYT report on the role of the Mahdi Army in Baghdad. The Americans and Iraqis are at a loss as to what to do in Najaf. They do not want to destroy the holiest of Shi'a shrines and yet the Mahdi Army continues to use it as their main base in the city. If they do go in with all guns blazing as they have threatened, they will be alienating both the Shi'as of Iraq and those far beyond. If they do not, then the reputation of Muqtada is enhanced. A major Ayatollah of Iraq (encamped in Qom until the Americans leave) has issued a fatwa saying that no Iraqi Muslim may fight on behalf of the government or the Americans. Shi'as are said to be streaming to Najaf from every direction to join up with the Army. Another report has most of the country below Najaf out of control of the government (this seems unlikely but could soon be so). The Shi'a continue to attack in a dozen other cities, the Americans responding with bombing that wins the day but does not help in the longer term. The latest reports suggest that the Americans and the Interim Government have effectively ceded the Sadr City area of Baghdad to the Mahdi Army whose administration is becoming more and more entrenched. More ominously, the Army is increasingly be able to exert its power throughout the city. Their forces appear able to raid almost at will even in the center. In a recent symbolic victory, an Iraqi-American attempt to set up a curfew in Sadr City was answered by a Sadrist announcement of a curfew for the entire city, one that was respected almost everywhere.

What are we left with? Within the well-protected area reserved for American and Iraqi administrations in Baghdad and in military camps throughout the country, as well as in Kurdish areas, there is the reality of a state progressing toward democracy under our auspices. But the bulk of the country appears to be sliding away from us and Allawi's administration. I can only hope that this pessimistic assessment is wrong.