Iraq and Afghanistan

The United States is faced with a series of policy conundrums stretching from the Mediterranean to India. The area is unstable, several countries have nuclear weapons, and there is widespread hatred of the United States. In addition, the countries in this swath of territory have serious material and spiritual disagreements with their neighbors that periodically threaten renewed conflict. We do not like or distrust many of the regimes in the area, but we neither have a home front nor an international consensus that will reliably support the maintenance of peace nor our national interests through the repeated application of American military force. In theory, the United Nations should take the lead in controlling aggression and danger in the region. But it does not have either the will nor the ability to act effectively to tamp down contending forces. What to do?

Let me suggest that the United States should begin now to develop a series of overlapping guarantees to the governments of the region. We would guarantee that we would come to their assistance should they be attacked, and especially to punish any aggressor that should use WMD against them. These guarantees would start with Israel in the West, but also include the Palestine State, Lebanon, Syria, Turkey (we already have that through NATO), Saudi Arabia, the Gulf Sheikdoms, Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India. At first glance, this attempt at guaranteeing such countries would be viewed as uncalled for, imperialistic, and unbelievable. However, through patient diplomacy, carrots and sticks, we might be able eventually to make our initiative believable enough that we could develop this series of relationships. Of course, to not seem foolish to ourselves and the region's leaders, we must be quite clear about what we are guaranteeing and how we would respond in a variety of possible situations.

The primary advantage to this approach is that we would make full use of our capabilities without initiating any new military actions. We would be able to define through treaty a new America whose regional policy is based on the maintenance of peace rather than differential support of "friends or foes". Through this policy we would lay a basis for the prevention of proliferation of WMD or the maintenance of such weapons within the region that we simply do not have now.

The United States, the Iraqi government, and the Mahdi Army of al-Sadr are locked in a major battle taking place in many communities, from the "Sadr City" section of Baghdad down through a number of major cities to Basra in the south. Some sketchy details include fighting between American, Iraqi, and Mahdi Army insurgents that has resulted in high casualties for the Mahdi Army. So far the Army seems to have unlimited men and materiel. In addition to fighting there have been marches in these cities against the Americans. They are protesting fighting so close to the Shrine of Imam Ali in Najaf as well as the killing of so many Iraqis. The key situation is the standoff in Najaf where the Mahdi Army is trapped and surrounded in the immediate area of the Shrine, as well as in a nearby cemetery. (Cole believes they have underground passages that make "trapped" indeterminate.) At last report, still another truce was being discussed.

With his extensive information base (background plus informants) Juan Cole emphasizes the degree to which this whole affair is turning more and more of the Shiite population against the government and the Americans. He reports that the vice-governor of Najaf, a government appointee, has resigned his post in protest against the attacks on Najaf by the government and their American allies. Others have resigned elsewhere, while top Shi'a leaders have been identifying more and more with Muqtada. Cole reports that while it may be true that many of the people of Najaf itself are disgusted with the Mahdi Army, in the wider Shiite community Muqtada al-Sadr is becoming a more and more respected leader. Soon he, or his followers if he is killed or imprisoned, will be in a position to maintain indefinitely an insurgency throughout the south, similar to that the Baath and Jihadists have been able to maintain within the Sunni triangle.

This is not an encouraging picture. The problem is that with his family background within the Shi'a movement, Muqtada has been able to appeal to that broad segment of the Shi'a community that had welcomed the bringing down of Saddam, but were more and more disaffected by the continuing American presence. The more conservative Shi'a leaders have understood that the process initiated by the Americans would work eventually in their favor. But the masses could not see this and could not wait for this "eventually". (Incidentally, this willingness of the masses to violently support irrational objectives does not bode too well for democracy, if and when it emerges.) We can only hope that Cole is wrong and that the government will come out of this crisis with enough credibility and effectiveness on the ground to continue to meet the goals of the democratization calendar.

Nuclear Terrorism: The Suitcase Bomb Again

Back in the old days when I concentrated on nuclear threats, there was considerable discussion of nontraditional means of delivery, such as cargo vessels coming into port with a bomb aboard or so-called "suitcase bombs". Now in the age of al-Qaida terrorists I suppose the greater fear might be of small planes with a nuclear weapon aboard, or even more likely a truck with such a device. (The suicide bomb threat was probably more likely when we thought of a highly technical society such as the USSR building the device. Something highly effective of this size is probably beyond the capabilities of Pathan weapons factories.)

I hark back to this time because Kristof's Op-Ed today is based on the conclusions of a recent meeting of the Aspen Strategy Group that came to the conclusion that the likelihood of a 10 kiloton nuclear weapon being smuggled into New York and detonated at Times Square was much greater than is usually believed. Apparently such a threat by al-Qaida was taken so seriously in October of 2001 that Cheney was sent out of town (in case they had the city wrong) and Bush dispatched nuclear experts to New York. This was all done without telling anyone in New York, including the mayor (which makes us ponder again the previous posting on this blog: what should have been done with this information?)

Graham Allison, a Harvard Professor whose new book "Nuclear Terrorism" includes this story, believes that the odds are that a nuclear terrorist attack will occur somewhere in the world in the next ten years. It is known that the Russians and their satellites have not had thorough control over the remains of their nuclear programs. The al-Qaida leaders have boasted of their purchases in this area. Allison and his colleagues in the Aspen Strategy Group believe that we should be making much more strenuous efforts than we are in combating nuclear proliferation. Certainly, our accomplishments in Libya were a step forward, and, whatever we may think of the priority of the effort, our achievements in Iraq certainly took that country off the list of worries for a while. But the essential problem is that as long as we allow the Israelis to maintain an unchallenged nuclear capability and as long as the United States and other leading states rely (at least in public pronouncements) on nuclear weapons as an essential "deterrent", eliminating the efforts of others to obtain and maintain nuclear weapons remains extremely difficult.

Informing, Alerting, and Warning

In today's Times, an Op-Ed by Philip Bobbitt, author of a forthcoming book entitled "The War on Terror", offers informed and commonsense definitions that should replace the ambiguous color coded alerts during these times of terror threats. Informing means putting out as much nonsensitive information on terrorist threats whenever it becomes available. If the government has general information on a possible threat, it should share this information with the public. Alerting refers to communications with public officials or others that might be directly affected in those cases where the government has concrete information about a threat to specific targets or classes of targets, but does not have information as to when such attacks might occur. Warning means telling both those mentioned under the alerting category and the general public about a threat that officials believe is real and imminent. Ideally, warnings should be coupled with advice or directions as to how the danger might be reduced. This is the only situation where Bobbitt thinks press conferences or other special events should be used as a means of communication.

Bobbitt offers these distinctions in the belief that too often Homeland Security or top political leaders have issued what appeared to be warnings when in fact the information they had should only have been communicated as general information or alerts to responsible parties. He feels that unless the government sticks to such limitations in its communications policy, it will exact a large and unnecessary tax on the economy. Ignoring his categorization will increase the return to terrorist groups of making threats and will eventually lead to a desensitized general public and security services that have been warned too often without the materialization of the threats.

Brookings Assessment of Progress in Iraq

Today's Times offers as an Op-Ed an assessment of the current situation in Iraq. It is compiled by two Brookings researchers. More complete information and the authors' sources are available as the Iraq Index. This Index is regularly updated. There seem to me some anomalies in this material, ones not completely removed in my mind by looking at the Index. For example, their estimate of Iraqi civilian casualties is far below what one normally sees. (They estimate about 2500; their notes point to other estimates more than twice that). I also wonder about the accuracy of polling data when it must be dangerous for even Iraqi pollsters to get into many areas. Nevertheless, Brookings is an earnest organization certainly without an Administration bias. So their statistics are probably as good as are available.

The authors point to definite improvement economically and in infrastructure. For example, the number of schools and hospitals in need of repair has steadily fallen. The availability of electricity and telephone service has increased. Perhaps most promising is the extent to which surveys show that Iraqis believe in and support their police and security forces. This is a much higher figure than that for support of the interim government, but that is not too bad either. Iraqis overwhelmingly expect their life to improve under the new government. The security forces are also growing rapidly since the debacle in April. The indicators for violence, including kidnapping, have not shown an improvement. Insurgent attacks on oil and gas facilities have rapidly escalated. (The al-Sadr threat to oil facilities in recent days has apparently shut down, at least temporarily, oil exports from the South.) This is at the same time that approval of foreign troops remaining in the country has fallen drastically, while approval of Muqtada al-Sadr has, at least up until recently, remained at a high level.

The picture is confusing, even more so if one looks at the back-up material. One can conclude that most Iraqis trust Iraqis, hate foreigners, hate violence, and like the promised democracy, and like Moqtada al-Sadr (apparently because of his anti-American diatribes). They are scared of the possibility of sectarian fighting. They want to run their own country, but do not seem too realistic as to how this might be achieved. They give little or no credit to the Americans, even for the good they have done. Very few want Saddam or the Baath back. When asked, most would say that the Americans should leave tomorrow, banking on a hope that violence sparked by their presence would decline and that Iraqi security forces would be able to handle remaining security problems. Many like the new leaders of the interim government; many do not. But they appear to prefer it to any alternative.

The War with the Mahdi Army: An End Game?

The United States and the Interim Government, personified by PM Allawi and the Governor of Najaf, have apparently decided once and for all to destroy the Mahdi Army of Muqtada al-Sadr. They may be succeeding in the South, unfortunately at the cost of many lives and much destruction in central Najaf. We do not hear a great deal about successes against the Mahdi Army in Baghdad. There may in fact be more than one "army", or at least the Sadrist organization is not tightly controlled. In any event, both sides have called somewhat theatrically for a war to the death.

What are we to make of this? My analysis has been that the Shi'a have much more to gain from a successful completion of the planned road to democracy than from continued fighting. Muqtada may feel, however, that the only chance for him is to make the country into a theatre for holy war before the democratic process in completed. He would then hope to emerge as a national hero who would be able to control the country, either in the traditional manner of a Middle Eastern despot or through the new democratic institutions. If Muqtada takes this approach, he would be assuming that without a holy war the more traditional and majority Shi'a parties would continue to reject him. We should note that the other Shi'a parties came together in the last few days in Karbala to condemn the fighting in Najaf and to condemn the Americans and the government. This may or may not signify a change of heart for these parties.

Another analysis would hearken back to Juan Cole's suggestion that Allawi (in spite of his Shi'a origins) may in fact want to establish something like a new Baath regime relying on the Sunni neighbors of Iraq for support. This would explain why he has been negotiating recently with his Arab neighbors while refusing to negotiate with Iran, which he condemns for interfering in Iraq's affairs. This explanation becomes a little more plausible when we note the criminal charges now being hurled at Chalabi and his nephew. Remember that although Chalabi was originally introduced to Americans as the darling of the Pentagon, he has also become increasing close to the Iranians. Indeed, he has been accused of passing state secrets to the Iranians. (He also appears to have recently purchased a vacation house above Tehran.)

This tangled tale becomes even more confused by the renewed drumbeat of accusations being hurled at the Iranians by the American government. These have included an accusation that they have allowed al-Qaida operatives to pass through the country. We have now also renewed our demand that Iran end its nuclear weapons program, a demand that may have a threat hidden there somewhere. It has been said that the real reason we are so determined to check the Iranian nuclear development (rather than the equally dangerous North Korean) is that Israel demands that we either stop it or they will (with an aerial attack such as they made on Iraq's earlier capacity much earlier).

All this is possible. But I do not see how the United States would be able to present to the world acquiescence in actions that would in effect scrap democratic development in Iraq in favor of a new authoritarian state. Of course, Egyptian-style elections with foregone conclusions could be held. But applying this fig leaf might be hard with everyone watching. I still think that such an abandonment of our original policy to bring democracy to the area would be unlikely even in the cynical world of high politics. But it could happen. Or at least this scenario may be what many Iraqis Shiites are beginning to fear.

Security of Transport: Continued Failure in Iraq

This morning's Times gives us a detailed account of the problems of trucking on the main artery between Jordan and Baghdad, one of the most important routes for the movement of both civilian and military supplies. While the account relies heavily on anecdotal evidence, it strikes the reader as only too believable. Jordanians make up the bulk of the drivers and their organizations are now advising their drivers that the trips are too dangerous. Many drivers have been stopped more than once before they decided to quit. Those who intercept the trucks roughly fall into three groups. The first includes insurgents intent on stopping all traffic. The second includes insurgents intent on stopping the carrying of supplies only to the Americans. (They frequently ask to see evidence of where the goods are being taken, evidence that may or may not be believed.) The third is made up of highway robbers with simpler objectives. These groups are not clearly identified: some of the insurgents are not averse to making a profit.

The highway is apparently still in reasonably good condition, unlike so many in the developing world. Like a superhighway, it generally goes near but not through cities. The police and security forces along the highway appear to be scattered and outnumbered, seldom emerging from their checkpoints. (When American patrols appear, the hijackers flee, but this is not often). The American Embassy is aware that many drivers have been killed or kidnapped bringing in American goods, but its officials make little effort to ease the pain for the drivers or their families.

This is another priority mission that we are either unable to undertake because of lack of resources or are foolishly ignoring. It would not seem impossible to maintain at least a daylight aerial surveillance of this and other major arteries, with high level reconnaissance planes supplemented by quick reaction helicopters. We might even consider a convoying system such as we had across the Atlantic in two wars. Whatever the answer, responding effectively to this problem would seem to be a great deal easier than sorting out the relations of Shi'a and Sunni factions.