Saturday, July 31, 2004
Continued Danger, Progress, and Confusion
The United Nations in the end got its way: the National Conference has been postponed so that more groups can be enticed into taking part. I was rather partial to the Iraqi argument that it was best to keep to a schedule, but the UN seems to have more on its side than I thought. It is also true that the more the Interim Government cooperates with the UN, the less it seems to be a tool of the United States. In theory anything that internationalizes the effort should help the image problems of both the United States and the new government.
The kidnapping campaign threatens to have a damaging psychological result, in that several countries are starting to withdraw or talk of withdrawing their small contingents. It is hard for their governments to resist, since back home the clamor of the "It's not our war" crowd is greatly intensified with each kidnapping. The effect on transportation into the country by the kidnapping of truck drivers may be more materially threatening to the new government. I have seen no estimate of how many foreign drivers there are. However, since so many Iraqis are out of work, and there seem to be long lines of those willing to join its even more dangerous security services, it should be possible to rapidly replace foreign drivers with Iraqi drivers. If training is necessary that should not take so long either. In any event, we have again to give credit to the insurgents for finding useful strategies to cause trouble if nothing else.
At the same time as some foreigners on the government side are leaving, there is talk of others coming in. The Saudis have the most talked about proposal now, but Jordanians, Bahrainis, Egyptians Pakistanis and others have also been discussed as possible sources of military forces. The Prime Minister said a little while back that he would be glad to have Muslims, but not from neighboring countries. (He said he feared "interference", which he no doubt does fear from Syria, run by another Baath party, and Iran with its special take on democracy.) Unfortunately, Saudi Arabia is also a neighboring country. Interesting to see how this all plays out. This internationalization of the effort could set the stage for an American withdrawal without loss of face, IF the foreign forces are adequately trained and motivated. There is also now an agreement to send a few NATO officers and men to conduct training in the near future. This should be all to the good.
The United Nations in the end got its way: the National Conference has been postponed so that more groups can be enticed into taking part. I was rather partial to the Iraqi argument that it was best to keep to a schedule, but the UN seems to have more on its side than I thought. It is also true that the more the Interim Government cooperates with the UN, the less it seems to be a tool of the United States. In theory anything that internationalizes the effort should help the image problems of both the United States and the new government.
The kidnapping campaign threatens to have a damaging psychological result, in that several countries are starting to withdraw or talk of withdrawing their small contingents. It is hard for their governments to resist, since back home the clamor of the "It's not our war" crowd is greatly intensified with each kidnapping. The effect on transportation into the country by the kidnapping of truck drivers may be more materially threatening to the new government. I have seen no estimate of how many foreign drivers there are. However, since so many Iraqis are out of work, and there seem to be long lines of those willing to join its even more dangerous security services, it should be possible to rapidly replace foreign drivers with Iraqi drivers. If training is necessary that should not take so long either. In any event, we have again to give credit to the insurgents for finding useful strategies to cause trouble if nothing else.
At the same time as some foreigners on the government side are leaving, there is talk of others coming in. The Saudis have the most talked about proposal now, but Jordanians, Bahrainis, Egyptians Pakistanis and others have also been discussed as possible sources of military forces. The Prime Minister said a little while back that he would be glad to have Muslims, but not from neighboring countries. (He said he feared "interference", which he no doubt does fear from Syria, run by another Baath party, and Iran with its special take on democracy.) Unfortunately, Saudi Arabia is also a neighboring country. Interesting to see how this all plays out. This internationalization of the effort could set the stage for an American withdrawal without loss of face, IF the foreign forces are adequately trained and motivated. There is also now an agreement to send a few NATO officers and men to conduct training in the near future. This should be all to the good.
Thursday, July 29, 2004
Iraqi Response to Suicide Bombings
Yesterday, the worst suicide bomber attack since the interim government was established took place in Baquba. Marked by violence in the recent past, Baquba is a town divided between Sunni and Shi'a. Many of those killed (all were Iraqis) were lining up for jobs in the police force. A policeman had evidently gone down the line just before the blast warning the people in line that they were setting up a target. It is quite possible that this was a Sunni versus Shi'a event, for the Shi'a may be more likely here to want to join the police. However, it was not so described. The Shi'a seem more inclined to the new government; the Sunni more fearful of eventual loss of status. There were apparently many Iraqis on the street who said this violence was senseless (but we do not know their affiliation). My guess would be that the suicide bomber was a Sunni, either a foreigner or one connected to the foreigners.
The bulk of the Sunni Arab population must be seriously conflicted. They hate the occupation and the loss of status that goes with Saddam's downfall. But they also want the killing to end. As long as it goes on they are in personal danger. If the new government cannot control the killing, they would be willing to consider an alternative that would stop it. They can imagine a Sunni dominated authoritarian regime emerging that might be in their long-term interest. But they know such a government can only emerge after the new government fails and the Americans leave (and how likely is the latter as long as security is not established?) They would accept nondemocracy, but would it be secular nationalist or jihadist? Most Sunni Arabs have gotten used to a secular life under Saddam and are probably loathe to give this up. The foreigner insurgents are Muslims, but they are still foreigners who do not seem to care how many Iraqis they kill.
The Sunni Kurds are conflicted in other ways. Many have gotten used to being a part of Iraq. For them, Baghdad is their capital too. The Kurds back in the enclaves, meanwhile, have gotten used to a relatively free and secular way of life outside of the control of Baghdad. Most of the violence in the enclaves is homegrown. This is not too bothersome, for they are used to that. What they have to decide is how important Iraq is for them as a community, and as individuals separately. They know they do not want to be part of a Sunni Arab state, nationalist or not. Whether they can accept being a minor part of a Shi'a dominated, more or less democratic, state is less clear. They know that whatever initial guarantees they may obtain, once their forces are dispersed in a new dispensation, these guarantees can be torn up.
I suspect that for most Shi'a, particularly outside the Sunni Triangle, issues are clearer. They know they have a chance to rule for the first time in their history if progress toward democracy continues. Although they may hate the Americans and may think the new regime is only a puppet regime, they know that the Americans do hold the Sunnis somewhat in check. For now Americans are the lesser evil. They hate most of these Arab foreigners with their suicide bombers because most of them are anti-Shi'a as well as anti-American. Some Shi'a want to recreate a secular state under democracy. But the Shi'a did not benefit from the Saddam state as much as the Sunni Arabs. So most Shi'a are probably not too sure just what the religious dimensions of the new state should be. The most aggressive leaders want a large religious component, but the most popular older generation of Shi'a leaders do not believe that the Ulema should take a direct part in running the state.
Yesterday, the worst suicide bomber attack since the interim government was established took place in Baquba. Marked by violence in the recent past, Baquba is a town divided between Sunni and Shi'a. Many of those killed (all were Iraqis) were lining up for jobs in the police force. A policeman had evidently gone down the line just before the blast warning the people in line that they were setting up a target. It is quite possible that this was a Sunni versus Shi'a event, for the Shi'a may be more likely here to want to join the police. However, it was not so described. The Shi'a seem more inclined to the new government; the Sunni more fearful of eventual loss of status. There were apparently many Iraqis on the street who said this violence was senseless (but we do not know their affiliation). My guess would be that the suicide bomber was a Sunni, either a foreigner or one connected to the foreigners.
The bulk of the Sunni Arab population must be seriously conflicted. They hate the occupation and the loss of status that goes with Saddam's downfall. But they also want the killing to end. As long as it goes on they are in personal danger. If the new government cannot control the killing, they would be willing to consider an alternative that would stop it. They can imagine a Sunni dominated authoritarian regime emerging that might be in their long-term interest. But they know such a government can only emerge after the new government fails and the Americans leave (and how likely is the latter as long as security is not established?) They would accept nondemocracy, but would it be secular nationalist or jihadist? Most Sunni Arabs have gotten used to a secular life under Saddam and are probably loathe to give this up. The foreigner insurgents are Muslims, but they are still foreigners who do not seem to care how many Iraqis they kill.
The Sunni Kurds are conflicted in other ways. Many have gotten used to being a part of Iraq. For them, Baghdad is their capital too. The Kurds back in the enclaves, meanwhile, have gotten used to a relatively free and secular way of life outside of the control of Baghdad. Most of the violence in the enclaves is homegrown. This is not too bothersome, for they are used to that. What they have to decide is how important Iraq is for them as a community, and as individuals separately. They know they do not want to be part of a Sunni Arab state, nationalist or not. Whether they can accept being a minor part of a Shi'a dominated, more or less democratic, state is less clear. They know that whatever initial guarantees they may obtain, once their forces are dispersed in a new dispensation, these guarantees can be torn up.
I suspect that for most Shi'a, particularly outside the Sunni Triangle, issues are clearer. They know they have a chance to rule for the first time in their history if progress toward democracy continues. Although they may hate the Americans and may think the new regime is only a puppet regime, they know that the Americans do hold the Sunnis somewhat in check. For now Americans are the lesser evil. They hate most of these Arab foreigners with their suicide bombers because most of them are anti-Shi'a as well as anti-American. Some Shi'a want to recreate a secular state under democracy. But the Shi'a did not benefit from the Saddam state as much as the Sunni Arabs. So most Shi'a are probably not too sure just what the religious dimensions of the new state should be. The most aggressive leaders want a large religious component, but the most popular older generation of Shi'a leaders do not believe that the Ulema should take a direct part in running the state.
Tuesday, July 27, 2004
Kidnapping and a National Conference
Two news items have dominated the last two days. First is the continuation of the kidnapping campaign that seems intended to drive out the truck drivers and other workers who are assisting the Americans and Iraqis in the country. Second is the selection of delegates to a National Conference of 1000 Iraqis that is to then turn around and select from among their number a 100 seat Transitional Council to help to balance the new interim executive until elections next year.
The kidnapping campaign seems on one level to be succeeding. The Filipinos have withdrawn their forces a few weeks before they planned to. The Jordanian truck company says it will cease operations to meet the kidnappers demand. Other countries have suggested a greater unwillingness to get their nationals involved. The situation remains confused, however, as the kidnappers let the Egyptian diplomat go. This leads to three thoughts. One, how do we and the government oppose this campaign? We can only hope that the new Iraqi intelligence agency can come up with some useful information quickly. Second, the kidnappers may well represent a variety of groups. The Indian government says it believes some are in it for the money; this may be true, as this is a development that has quickly occurred in analogous cases. Third, I know of no case where kidnapping has actually led to a victory of the kidnappers. It is more a terrorist tactic than a guerrilla or insurgency tactic. And terrorists seldom win.
The selection of delegates to the National Conference has been plagued by the abstention of a number of important groups in the country. The Muslim Scholars Association is staying out, as is Moqtada al-Sadr's group and several national factions. The United Nations has been urging delay until more groups can be brought on board. However, the Iraqi government insists on going ahead. There is evidence that the exercise has a surprising degree of support. This includes many groups that have not so far backed the interim government, including the Dawa Party, the largest Shiite party. It is also encouraging that one of the "problems" that the organizers have had is that too many(!) people have been competing for the seats in the Conference. In Baghdad, 436 are competing for 40 seats. In Kut 1200 for 22 seats, in Najaf, 920 for 20 seats. Remember that candidacies are announced publicly, names are posted, candidates work the crowds. This outpouring of candidacies shows remarkable courage, which in turn shows a great desire in the minds of a large number of people that something come of this exercise. So far the overall impression is certainly positive.
Two news items have dominated the last two days. First is the continuation of the kidnapping campaign that seems intended to drive out the truck drivers and other workers who are assisting the Americans and Iraqis in the country. Second is the selection of delegates to a National Conference of 1000 Iraqis that is to then turn around and select from among their number a 100 seat Transitional Council to help to balance the new interim executive until elections next year.
The kidnapping campaign seems on one level to be succeeding. The Filipinos have withdrawn their forces a few weeks before they planned to. The Jordanian truck company says it will cease operations to meet the kidnappers demand. Other countries have suggested a greater unwillingness to get their nationals involved. The situation remains confused, however, as the kidnappers let the Egyptian diplomat go. This leads to three thoughts. One, how do we and the government oppose this campaign? We can only hope that the new Iraqi intelligence agency can come up with some useful information quickly. Second, the kidnappers may well represent a variety of groups. The Indian government says it believes some are in it for the money; this may be true, as this is a development that has quickly occurred in analogous cases. Third, I know of no case where kidnapping has actually led to a victory of the kidnappers. It is more a terrorist tactic than a guerrilla or insurgency tactic. And terrorists seldom win.
The selection of delegates to the National Conference has been plagued by the abstention of a number of important groups in the country. The Muslim Scholars Association is staying out, as is Moqtada al-Sadr's group and several national factions. The United Nations has been urging delay until more groups can be brought on board. However, the Iraqi government insists on going ahead. There is evidence that the exercise has a surprising degree of support. This includes many groups that have not so far backed the interim government, including the Dawa Party, the largest Shiite party. It is also encouraging that one of the "problems" that the organizers have had is that too many(!) people have been competing for the seats in the Conference. In Baghdad, 436 are competing for 40 seats. In Kut 1200 for 22 seats, in Najaf, 920 for 20 seats. Remember that candidacies are announced publicly, names are posted, candidates work the crowds. This outpouring of candidacies shows remarkable courage, which in turn shows a great desire in the minds of a large number of people that something come of this exercise. So far the overall impression is certainly positive.
Sunday, July 25, 2004
An Ideological War with al-Qaida?
In the last two days, Richard Clarke, the government's former terrorism expert, and David Brooks, the somewhat conservative Times Op-Ed columnist, have taken off from the 9/11's report's criticism of the way in which the "war on terrorism" is understood and fought. All three point out, as we have several times here and on our terrorism site, that there cannot be a "war against terrorism", for terrorism is after all a concept or a tactic. Neither should we answer the call to wage war on all "terrorists". Rather, the government's urgent task is to oppose that group of Islamic jihadists who are loosely associated with the term al-Qaida. These writers conclude that what we are fighting is primarily an intellectual or ideological movement rather than a military one. Brooks believes we need to mount an intellectual counteroffensive, much as we did against communism in the Cold War. Clarke would emphasize the promotion of economic development and openness in the Islamic world, as well as the encouragement of Islamic scholars and others to compete more effectively with the message of the extremists.
All of this should be done. But yet we should remember that the democracies did not defeat communism by besting their ideologues. Communism collapsed because it was not able to provide for the spiritual and material needs of the people of communist countries as well as the democracies provide for these needs in the West. Communist countries failed to achieve the goals in power or territory or progress that their leaders had set for them. This suggests that the ideologies of al-Qaida, the Salafists, the Wahabis and other extremists will be defeated (1) to the extent that they fail to disestablish existing Islamic regimes, and (2) if they do disestablish such regimes, they will fail to the extent that they fail to satisfy the spiritual and material needs of their new subjects.
Afghanistan might be considered a test case. The Taliban won initially because they were able to provide the security that competing groups could not. They were in turn rather easily defeated by the United States and its Northern Alliance allies because the Taliban had failed once in power to improve the lives of average Afghans. If the Taliban comes back to power, it will be because of the continuing low level of security in the country and the relative failure (partly as a result) of economic development outside Kabul. In this real and hypothetical struggle, the ideology of the Taliban will have neither been defeated nor will it have "won". Of course, the weak moral standards of the anti-Taliban (in areas such as corruption and cooperation) has helped the Taliban's position while the moral repression that attends Taliban rule has caused many to abandon their cause.
This suggests that the first task of an anti-al Qaida struggle will be to make sure that it does not achieve another beachhead like it did in Afghanistan, and to help in the recovery of any beachheads that it does achieve. This is primarily a military and police task. The second task is to make regimes threatened by al-Qaida meet the spiritual and economic needs of their peoples. By "spiritual" we do not mean only or primarily "religious". We include needs such as those for self-expression, freedom from fear, access to education, and hope for the future. We include freedom from humiliation, a feeling of pride that is composed of a combination of feelings of national, sectarian, tribal, familial, and personal pride. These are the fronts on which we must work, fronts more educational and developmental than ideological. To achieve these we must also help in the creation and maintenance of an international order that balances the needs and aspirations of peoples in a manner that appears fairer to those affected than is often the case today. This is partly a sales job, but it is sales job whose clients are all peoples, not just those of the Islamic world.
In the last two days, Richard Clarke, the government's former terrorism expert, and David Brooks, the somewhat conservative Times Op-Ed columnist, have taken off from the 9/11's report's criticism of the way in which the "war on terrorism" is understood and fought. All three point out, as we have several times here and on our terrorism site, that there cannot be a "war against terrorism", for terrorism is after all a concept or a tactic. Neither should we answer the call to wage war on all "terrorists". Rather, the government's urgent task is to oppose that group of Islamic jihadists who are loosely associated with the term al-Qaida. These writers conclude that what we are fighting is primarily an intellectual or ideological movement rather than a military one. Brooks believes we need to mount an intellectual counteroffensive, much as we did against communism in the Cold War. Clarke would emphasize the promotion of economic development and openness in the Islamic world, as well as the encouragement of Islamic scholars and others to compete more effectively with the message of the extremists.
All of this should be done. But yet we should remember that the democracies did not defeat communism by besting their ideologues. Communism collapsed because it was not able to provide for the spiritual and material needs of the people of communist countries as well as the democracies provide for these needs in the West. Communist countries failed to achieve the goals in power or territory or progress that their leaders had set for them. This suggests that the ideologies of al-Qaida, the Salafists, the Wahabis and other extremists will be defeated (1) to the extent that they fail to disestablish existing Islamic regimes, and (2) if they do disestablish such regimes, they will fail to the extent that they fail to satisfy the spiritual and material needs of their new subjects.
Afghanistan might be considered a test case. The Taliban won initially because they were able to provide the security that competing groups could not. They were in turn rather easily defeated by the United States and its Northern Alliance allies because the Taliban had failed once in power to improve the lives of average Afghans. If the Taliban comes back to power, it will be because of the continuing low level of security in the country and the relative failure (partly as a result) of economic development outside Kabul. In this real and hypothetical struggle, the ideology of the Taliban will have neither been defeated nor will it have "won". Of course, the weak moral standards of the anti-Taliban (in areas such as corruption and cooperation) has helped the Taliban's position while the moral repression that attends Taliban rule has caused many to abandon their cause.
This suggests that the first task of an anti-al Qaida struggle will be to make sure that it does not achieve another beachhead like it did in Afghanistan, and to help in the recovery of any beachheads that it does achieve. This is primarily a military and police task. The second task is to make regimes threatened by al-Qaida meet the spiritual and economic needs of their peoples. By "spiritual" we do not mean only or primarily "religious". We include needs such as those for self-expression, freedom from fear, access to education, and hope for the future. We include freedom from humiliation, a feeling of pride that is composed of a combination of feelings of national, sectarian, tribal, familial, and personal pride. These are the fronts on which we must work, fronts more educational and developmental than ideological. To achieve these we must also help in the creation and maintenance of an international order that balances the needs and aspirations of peoples in a manner that appears fairer to those affected than is often the case today. This is partly a sales job, but it is sales job whose clients are all peoples, not just those of the Islamic world.
