Thursday, July 22, 2004
Invasion of Iran
Juan Cole in his latest thinks that another Bush administration would lead to an invasion of Iran. I do not know if this is necessarily so, but there certainly has been and continues to be a group in the White House that thinks this way, and has thought so since Iran was included in the Axis of Evil. There are also the nagging problems of Iran's continued playing with the idea of developing a nuclear weapon, a weapon that apparently many otherwise Western-oriented Iranians do not see why they should not have. There is also the matter of allowing al-Qaida agents to cross the country. This was at a time that Iran and the United States were acting like allies in bringing down the Taliban. One can only conclude that, like Pakistan, there is a group within the security services of Iran that thinks and acts quite differently than the government itself. Iran has also supported groups that the Israelis like to think of as terrorists, but are actually part of a national struggle against Israel. Their support for these groups is a major reason that the Iran haters would like to attack.
There are two major reasons that we should not attack Iran, almost no matter what the provocation. First, Iran is a much larger country than Iraq, in population in square miles, and in resources. Again, initially we might easily break through the country's defenses, but again this could lead to endless struggle against a people much larger and more united than the Iraqis.
There is also the important matter of human rights. Many people think that we were justified in going into Iraq primarily because it was under the rule of a monster and a monstrous system. Saddam was willing to sacrifice millions to his megalomania. We could find similar reasons to go into North Korea, with an even more egregiously evil government, and perhaps into Sudan and a few other states. However, Iran does not belong in this group. It is governed by a mixed theocratic-democratic system. Many liberals are being imprisoned and otherwise squelched. But it nevertheless has one of the most vibrant movie industries in the world. Unlike most of the Islamic world, its women take an active part in public life, restricted primarily by clothing requirements much less rigorous than those in Saudi Arabia or most of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Unlike North Korea and its peers, the Iranian government reacts to international pressure, relaxing its oppressions on many occasions to satisfy this audience. If we were to attack Iran for human rights violations we would have a long list of perhaps forty other states that should be on our agenda.
We cannot operate in the world in this way. Nor can we justify the casualties that inevitably accompany war in enterprises with a justification as flimsy as we would have in this case.
Juan Cole in his latest thinks that another Bush administration would lead to an invasion of Iran. I do not know if this is necessarily so, but there certainly has been and continues to be a group in the White House that thinks this way, and has thought so since Iran was included in the Axis of Evil. There are also the nagging problems of Iran's continued playing with the idea of developing a nuclear weapon, a weapon that apparently many otherwise Western-oriented Iranians do not see why they should not have. There is also the matter of allowing al-Qaida agents to cross the country. This was at a time that Iran and the United States were acting like allies in bringing down the Taliban. One can only conclude that, like Pakistan, there is a group within the security services of Iran that thinks and acts quite differently than the government itself. Iran has also supported groups that the Israelis like to think of as terrorists, but are actually part of a national struggle against Israel. Their support for these groups is a major reason that the Iran haters would like to attack.
There are two major reasons that we should not attack Iran, almost no matter what the provocation. First, Iran is a much larger country than Iraq, in population in square miles, and in resources. Again, initially we might easily break through the country's defenses, but again this could lead to endless struggle against a people much larger and more united than the Iraqis.
There is also the important matter of human rights. Many people think that we were justified in going into Iraq primarily because it was under the rule of a monster and a monstrous system. Saddam was willing to sacrifice millions to his megalomania. We could find similar reasons to go into North Korea, with an even more egregiously evil government, and perhaps into Sudan and a few other states. However, Iran does not belong in this group. It is governed by a mixed theocratic-democratic system. Many liberals are being imprisoned and otherwise squelched. But it nevertheless has one of the most vibrant movie industries in the world. Unlike most of the Islamic world, its women take an active part in public life, restricted primarily by clothing requirements much less rigorous than those in Saudi Arabia or most of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Unlike North Korea and its peers, the Iranian government reacts to international pressure, relaxing its oppressions on many occasions to satisfy this audience. If we were to attack Iran for human rights violations we would have a long list of perhaps forty other states that should be on our agenda.
We cannot operate in the world in this way. Nor can we justify the casualties that inevitably accompany war in enterprises with a justification as flimsy as we would have in this case.
Intelligence Reform or Defense Reform?
The 9/11 Commission Report recommends that major changes be made in our intelligence services. I have commented previously on what I think of this.
However, the key problem with the 9/11 report is how the problem is defined. The problem is in the first instance not the organization of intelligence but the organization of homeland defense. This is not the job of Tom Ridge no matter what the title of his office. Ridge was a Governor and his interests are essentially bureaucratic. He sees his job as organizing national resources of men and materiel at every level to respond to the manifold possibilities of terrorism. But in another crisis and in the weeks leading up to it what I would want to have is a military command responsible for immediate action. We that the presidential and NSC response to the actual 9/11 was chaotic and confused. The President and his office are not set up to handle this kind of emergency. We do need something new, but that new is a separate branch of the Department of Defense focusing on timely response to threats to the American homeland. This person should answer to the Chief of Staff on the one hand and to the President on the other.
This chief of this projected "Homeland Security Command" would be the person responsible if there were another 9/11 or comparable attack. The "buck would stop" at this person's doorstep. Notice the difference between this and an intelligence "czar". The intelligence czar's job would be to coordinate knowledge and reporting, not coordinate action and response. The intelligence czar would look for flaws and incompleteness in the reporting process, in the lack of communication among agencies. Such a czar could not have prevented 9/11. He might have improved the flow of information to the President and his staff. But they have such a broad agenda, and 9/11s come so intermittently, that even the best reporting might have gotten lost in the shuffle. Since the czar would not command forces, he would not be the person to demand information in a timely fashion for action. The very existence of the new Commander of Homeland Security, his responsibility, would make him demand of all the intelligence agencies the type of coordinated and useful information that they failed to provide before 9/11. If he had existed, and if this had been his only responsibility, he could easily have gathered much more actionable information than was gathered from the intelligence agencies as they already exist, and he could have acted on this information as no one else could. Whether this would have been enough to prevent the tragedy, one cannot say.
The 9/11 Commission Report recommends that major changes be made in our intelligence services. I have commented previously on what I think of this.
However, the key problem with the 9/11 report is how the problem is defined. The problem is in the first instance not the organization of intelligence but the organization of homeland defense. This is not the job of Tom Ridge no matter what the title of his office. Ridge was a Governor and his interests are essentially bureaucratic. He sees his job as organizing national resources of men and materiel at every level to respond to the manifold possibilities of terrorism. But in another crisis and in the weeks leading up to it what I would want to have is a military command responsible for immediate action. We that the presidential and NSC response to the actual 9/11 was chaotic and confused. The President and his office are not set up to handle this kind of emergency. We do need something new, but that new is a separate branch of the Department of Defense focusing on timely response to threats to the American homeland. This person should answer to the Chief of Staff on the one hand and to the President on the other.
This chief of this projected "Homeland Security Command" would be the person responsible if there were another 9/11 or comparable attack. The "buck would stop" at this person's doorstep. Notice the difference between this and an intelligence "czar". The intelligence czar's job would be to coordinate knowledge and reporting, not coordinate action and response. The intelligence czar would look for flaws and incompleteness in the reporting process, in the lack of communication among agencies. Such a czar could not have prevented 9/11. He might have improved the flow of information to the President and his staff. But they have such a broad agenda, and 9/11s come so intermittently, that even the best reporting might have gotten lost in the shuffle. Since the czar would not command forces, he would not be the person to demand information in a timely fashion for action. The very existence of the new Commander of Homeland Security, his responsibility, would make him demand of all the intelligence agencies the type of coordinated and useful information that they failed to provide before 9/11. If he had existed, and if this had been his only responsibility, he could easily have gathered much more actionable information than was gathered from the intelligence agencies as they already exist, and he could have acted on this information as no one else could. Whether this would have been enough to prevent the tragedy, one cannot say.
Wednesday, July 21, 2004
Juan Cole's Latest on Developments in Iraq
Professor Juan Cole, an authority on Shi'a history and Iraq produces a highly informative blog on Iraq and related matters. He can be read here. As was pointed out in previous references, he is an academic who long ago decided that President Bush and company have been dreadfully wrong. His animus is great enough that he finds it hard to believe anything is going right in Iraq. Nevertheless, he has many personal contacts on the inside and continually reviews a wide variety of outside sources. What he comes up with is invaluable (I wonder if our intelligence services know as much about what is going on as he does.) Here let me just make a few comments on information gleaned from his latest posts.
First, he reports the killing of the acting Governor of Basra. His informants tell him that this is particularly important since the government of Basra has generally been supported by the people. In fact, the relatively free movement within Basra is one reason why it was so easy to pull off an assassination like this. It appears that some elements of the insurgency are uninterested in the character of the individuals killed. They only want to prove their power and sow havoc.
Second, he reports on a variety of fights within the Iraqi community, both among those who otherwise support the government and those who do not. In the Kirkuk region, the Kurds and Arabs are engaged in a particularly vicious sub-rosa struggle that involves the capturing of the children of one another's leaders. In Mosul, one of the Turkoman leaders was recently killed. The Turkoman community feels they are not being given sufficient attention and perhaps the Kurds or Arabs are fighting back. Turkey nearby is thought to be a supporter of their interests, something that may come up later. Within Baghdad and the Triangle there is continued struggle among Shi'a and Sunni, but also within both of these camps. Recently a leading Sunni divine was killed, probably by Baath or Salafist (extreme Sunnis) parties. Within the Shi'a world the standoff continues between al-Sadr and the rest, with al-Sadr apparently gaining some allies while he loses out on other fronts.
Again, I would emphasize that the insurgency seems doomed as long as it is merely destructive, sowing division and terror. They continue to operate without offering a plan to the people. Indeed, they could not have a plan when the extremist Sunni Islamists want a Sunni Shari'a-ruled state and the revolutionary Shi'a of the Mahdi Army want the same, only Shi'a, not Sunni. The nationalists, who may in fact have the most money and expertise, regardless of their numbers, simply want a modern, nationalist Iraq with themselves in charge.
Professor Juan Cole, an authority on Shi'a history and Iraq produces a highly informative blog on Iraq and related matters. He can be read here. As was pointed out in previous references, he is an academic who long ago decided that President Bush and company have been dreadfully wrong. His animus is great enough that he finds it hard to believe anything is going right in Iraq. Nevertheless, he has many personal contacts on the inside and continually reviews a wide variety of outside sources. What he comes up with is invaluable (I wonder if our intelligence services know as much about what is going on as he does.) Here let me just make a few comments on information gleaned from his latest posts.
First, he reports the killing of the acting Governor of Basra. His informants tell him that this is particularly important since the government of Basra has generally been supported by the people. In fact, the relatively free movement within Basra is one reason why it was so easy to pull off an assassination like this. It appears that some elements of the insurgency are uninterested in the character of the individuals killed. They only want to prove their power and sow havoc.
Second, he reports on a variety of fights within the Iraqi community, both among those who otherwise support the government and those who do not. In the Kirkuk region, the Kurds and Arabs are engaged in a particularly vicious sub-rosa struggle that involves the capturing of the children of one another's leaders. In Mosul, one of the Turkoman leaders was recently killed. The Turkoman community feels they are not being given sufficient attention and perhaps the Kurds or Arabs are fighting back. Turkey nearby is thought to be a supporter of their interests, something that may come up later. Within Baghdad and the Triangle there is continued struggle among Shi'a and Sunni, but also within both of these camps. Recently a leading Sunni divine was killed, probably by Baath or Salafist (extreme Sunnis) parties. Within the Shi'a world the standoff continues between al-Sadr and the rest, with al-Sadr apparently gaining some allies while he loses out on other fronts.
Again, I would emphasize that the insurgency seems doomed as long as it is merely destructive, sowing division and terror. They continue to operate without offering a plan to the people. Indeed, they could not have a plan when the extremist Sunni Islamists want a Sunni Shari'a-ruled state and the revolutionary Shi'a of the Mahdi Army want the same, only Shi'a, not Sunni. The nationalists, who may in fact have the most money and expertise, regardless of their numbers, simply want a modern, nationalist Iraq with themselves in charge.
Monday, July 19, 2004
Retooling Intelligence
There continues to be discussion in Washington of proposals to reorganize the intelligence services. The most talked about suggestion is that there should be appointed a new "czar" of intelligence with "cabinet rank". This evidently does not mean that individuals in this position would serve at the pleasure of particular administrations, since one of the proposals is that an appointee should have a guaranteed term of ten years. Yet essentially the new person would not be free of political pressure (remember Tenet was a Clinton appointee who was absorbed into the Bush administrative structure with what may have been disastrous results.)
Today, the Times reported the "amazing fact" that a relatively small intelligence agency in the State Department, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, with "only" 165 analysts (compared to over 3000 in the CIA) seemed to have understood intelligence issues during the critical period leading up to 9/11 and the Iraq War better than the larger agencies. Its staff members tend to remain in I&R for relatively long periods, and to specialize in particular fields for longer than their counterparts. Even though its staff is not privy to all the information the CIA or DIA might have, its academically recruited experts appear to do a much better job of analyzing available data.
This "amazing fact" brings me back to my favorite idea of fully funding several intelligence agencies such as I&R and then maintaining them indefinitely in a private-public sector. One might be a contract agency attached to the RAND Corporation. Another might be a special part of the GAO, and therefore funded by Congress. Another might be a purely private agency funded by extremely wealthy individuals in a consortium perhaps with leading universities. The heart of the concept is that these sources of analysis should be separate from any government or administration pressure and that they should be able to recruit as full-time employees and consultants some of the best intellects and most knowledgeable persons in the country. Some staff members or consultants would want to have clearances; others would prefer not. In any event, these are the types of people that should be regularly going over threat assessments and the quality of our responses. They should report in a variety of ways. But over time I would suspect that no administration would be able to ignore what they have to say.
There continues to be discussion in Washington of proposals to reorganize the intelligence services. The most talked about suggestion is that there should be appointed a new "czar" of intelligence with "cabinet rank". This evidently does not mean that individuals in this position would serve at the pleasure of particular administrations, since one of the proposals is that an appointee should have a guaranteed term of ten years. Yet essentially the new person would not be free of political pressure (remember Tenet was a Clinton appointee who was absorbed into the Bush administrative structure with what may have been disastrous results.)
Today, the Times reported the "amazing fact" that a relatively small intelligence agency in the State Department, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, with "only" 165 analysts (compared to over 3000 in the CIA) seemed to have understood intelligence issues during the critical period leading up to 9/11 and the Iraq War better than the larger agencies. Its staff members tend to remain in I&R for relatively long periods, and to specialize in particular fields for longer than their counterparts. Even though its staff is not privy to all the information the CIA or DIA might have, its academically recruited experts appear to do a much better job of analyzing available data.
This "amazing fact" brings me back to my favorite idea of fully funding several intelligence agencies such as I&R and then maintaining them indefinitely in a private-public sector. One might be a contract agency attached to the RAND Corporation. Another might be a special part of the GAO, and therefore funded by Congress. Another might be a purely private agency funded by extremely wealthy individuals in a consortium perhaps with leading universities. The heart of the concept is that these sources of analysis should be separate from any government or administration pressure and that they should be able to recruit as full-time employees and consultants some of the best intellects and most knowledgeable persons in the country. Some staff members or consultants would want to have clearances; others would prefer not. In any event, these are the types of people that should be regularly going over threat assessments and the quality of our responses. They should report in a variety of ways. But over time I would suspect that no administration would be able to ignore what they have to say.
Iraq: Improvement Continues
With car bombs and assassinations continuing in Iraq, it seems perverse to write about "improvement". But as long as the overall direction continues to be positive, there is improvement. One can only hope that soon this "improvement" will occur quickly enough that the interim government will still have enough members to function. Let us look at the good straws:
(1) Foreign reporters feel that they can now go more freely into the field; this after several months of staying holed up in the safer Baghdad enclaves. This does not mean that it is not still dangerous in the field. It is. But the tension is going down. They particularly note that they are more likely these days to be welcomed by those they encounter than they were a few weeks ago.
(2) The Prime Minister announced that he has ordered the reopening of the newspaper of the Mahdi Army, Al Hawza. Remember that it was the closing of this paper by the Americans that sparked the al-Sadr rebellion a few months ago. This move has risks, but for now it is welcomed by many, and it seems part of a more general, if sputtering, rapprochement between the government and Moqtada al-Sadr.
(3) At a about the same time as the announcement, it was announced that the Americans had again made an air strike on what they described as an Zarqawi position in Fallujah. But this time, it was announced that the attack was made only after the interim government gave its blessing.
(4) The new American Ambassador, Negroponte, is going out of his way to be less visible, for example by excluding TV cameras from his briefings. Iraqi security personnel are taking the lead in more sweeps, especially in Baghdad. Iraq's Second Battalion now prides itself in making sweeps without any American presence. This approach appears to result in a much more welcoming public.
With car bombs and assassinations continuing in Iraq, it seems perverse to write about "improvement". But as long as the overall direction continues to be positive, there is improvement. One can only hope that soon this "improvement" will occur quickly enough that the interim government will still have enough members to function. Let us look at the good straws:
(1) Foreign reporters feel that they can now go more freely into the field; this after several months of staying holed up in the safer Baghdad enclaves. This does not mean that it is not still dangerous in the field. It is. But the tension is going down. They particularly note that they are more likely these days to be welcomed by those they encounter than they were a few weeks ago.
(2) The Prime Minister announced that he has ordered the reopening of the newspaper of the Mahdi Army, Al Hawza. Remember that it was the closing of this paper by the Americans that sparked the al-Sadr rebellion a few months ago. This move has risks, but for now it is welcomed by many, and it seems part of a more general, if sputtering, rapprochement between the government and Moqtada al-Sadr.
(3) At a about the same time as the announcement, it was announced that the Americans had again made an air strike on what they described as an Zarqawi position in Fallujah. But this time, it was announced that the attack was made only after the interim government gave its blessing.
(4) The new American Ambassador, Negroponte, is going out of his way to be less visible, for example by excluding TV cameras from his briefings. Iraqi security personnel are taking the lead in more sweeps, especially in Baghdad. Iraq's Second Battalion now prides itself in making sweeps without any American presence. This approach appears to result in a much more welcoming public.
Homeland Security: Priorities Worsen
The latest news is that with the encouragement of the FBI, the CIA is sending a force into the field to brief local communities around the country on the terrorism threat. This is not a matter of briefing communities on which the CIA has particular information, or which are located near to a possible target (such as a nuclear power facility or a large dam). No, it is simply telling people everywhere what to watch for and how to respond when terrorism strikes.
As we have discussed before in these posts, the Homeland Security program that attempts to reach into every village and town is itself a major misplacement of priorities. Now we are adding to the CIA agenda an equally foolish job. Of course, one can say that terrorism can strike anywhere and it can. But we must spend our resources in men and materiel and attention on the higher priorities. If Homeland Security and the CIA have done all they can to protect major identifiable targets, such as the major cities, Boulder Dam and the Golden Gate Bridge, then let them gradually move down the list to less probable targets.
I try not to think that such exercises are actually undertaken to keep the entire country in a general state of low-level panic, thereby increasing the power of government and protecting the incumbency of the President. A alternate explanation is that this is just an another example of bureaucratic expansionism, fueled in part by the use of the over-general term "terrorism" (which can include high school bombers) rather than that of our real enemy today, identified loosely with the term "al-Qaida".
The latest news is that with the encouragement of the FBI, the CIA is sending a force into the field to brief local communities around the country on the terrorism threat. This is not a matter of briefing communities on which the CIA has particular information, or which are located near to a possible target (such as a nuclear power facility or a large dam). No, it is simply telling people everywhere what to watch for and how to respond when terrorism strikes.
As we have discussed before in these posts, the Homeland Security program that attempts to reach into every village and town is itself a major misplacement of priorities. Now we are adding to the CIA agenda an equally foolish job. Of course, one can say that terrorism can strike anywhere and it can. But we must spend our resources in men and materiel and attention on the higher priorities. If Homeland Security and the CIA have done all they can to protect major identifiable targets, such as the major cities, Boulder Dam and the Golden Gate Bridge, then let them gradually move down the list to less probable targets.
I try not to think that such exercises are actually undertaken to keep the entire country in a general state of low-level panic, thereby increasing the power of government and protecting the incumbency of the President. A alternate explanation is that this is just an another example of bureaucratic expansionism, fueled in part by the use of the over-general term "terrorism" (which can include high school bombers) rather than that of our real enemy today, identified loosely with the term "al-Qaida".
