Saturday, July 17, 2004
Mixed Signals in Iraq
Today's news from Iraq is as confusing as ever. Zarqawi was quick to
claim "credit" for the assassination of the governor of Ninevah.
However, this may be a false claim. His group claimed that he had been
beheaded, when he was killed in an ambush. Of course, this could be
just a figure of speech, but in the context of recent actual beheadings
this seems unlikely.
The Mahdi Army of al-Sadr is congratulating itself on helping the
police put down common criminals in their recent sweeps. In spite of
their bravado and continued anti-Americanism, such cooperation can only
be seen as a good sign.
The American army reports that it is involved in a complex game of
measure and countermeasure with groups setting roadside bombs.
Evidently, we have been steadily improving our means of detecting such
devices, while the Iraqi insurgents have been steadily improving their
ability to defeat our detection devices. The army's judgment is that
the people behind this campaign are highly skilled technicians. The
army also seems to believe (on what evidence is unclear) that some of
those involved in this game are doing it simply for the money rather
than out of dedication to a cause. Whatever the case, it would seem to
me that this is more likely the work of the old Baath rather than
Zarqawi's fanatics — but in this confusing world it is hard to be sure.
Today's news from Iraq is as confusing as ever. Zarqawi was quick to
claim "credit" for the assassination of the governor of Ninevah.
However, this may be a false claim. His group claimed that he had been
beheaded, when he was killed in an ambush. Of course, this could be
just a figure of speech, but in the context of recent actual beheadings
this seems unlikely.
The Mahdi Army of al-Sadr is congratulating itself on helping the
police put down common criminals in their recent sweeps. In spite of
their bravado and continued anti-Americanism, such cooperation can only
be seen as a good sign.
The American army reports that it is involved in a complex game of
measure and countermeasure with groups setting roadside bombs.
Evidently, we have been steadily improving our means of detecting such
devices, while the Iraqi insurgents have been steadily improving their
ability to defeat our detection devices. The army's judgment is that
the people behind this campaign are highly skilled technicians. The
army also seems to believe (on what evidence is unclear) that some of
those involved in this game are doing it simply for the money rather
than out of dedication to a cause. Whatever the case, it would seem to
me that this is more likely the work of the old Baath rather than
Zarqawi's fanatics — but in this confusing world it is hard to be sure.
Freedom of Expression in a World of Terror
Today Kristof, the Op-Ed writer, asks us to take seriously the
implications of the "Left Behind" series of evangelical thrillers
based on a reading of the Christian "Book of Revelations". In the
latest, "Glorious Appearing", Jesus returns to earth to kill all
non-Christians, perhaps better said, to kill all persons who have not
accepted him as their saviour. When Jesus speaks, the bodies of
nonbelievers are ripped open in a mass extinction that causes their
flesh to dissolve and their eyes to melt until they finally "rattle to
the pavement". To me, this seems little more than another example of
the exploitation of violence that is rampant in popular "cultural" life
today. The only difference is that "Glorious Appearing", the
best-selling series of adult novels in America today, has sold 60
million copies worldwide.
As Kristof points out, were such a movie to be produced in Saudi
Arabia, depicting the spiritually justified and remorseless massacre of
Christians or Jews as its subject matter, our press and our Congress
would be infuriated, demand an investigation, perhaps even sever
relations with the offending state.
To this point Kristof makes sense. We surely must remove the "motes
from our eyes". We must be aware of how our literature looks to others,
and we must be willing to talk about the aspects of our literature that
promote intolerance at home and abroad. We must not give intolerance "a
pass". But then Kristof goes on to say: "People have a right to believe
in a racist God, or a God who throws millions of nonevangelicals into
hell. I don't think that we should ban books that say that. But we
should be embarrassed when our best-selling books gleefully celebrate
religious intolerance and violence against infidels."
Is this it? We should be embarrassed? Years of dedication to absolutist
positions in the media on freedom of expression and religious freedom
cause Kristof to go no further. But I disagree. We are engaged in a
worldwide cultural struggle that too easily degenerates into violence,
so far not seriously in this country, but certainly in the Middle East,
parts of Africa, and South and Southeast Asia. It is doubtful that we
can continue to countenance in our society the acceptance of
expressions of hatred that explicitly or implicitly advocate the death
and destruction of masses of people. If the Japanese had been quicker
to understand the writings of the Aum Shinrikyo, they would have
avoided the Sarin attack in the subways (as well as the much more
serious catastrophes that nearly occurred as a result of their
doctrines). Germany after World War II decided it could not live with
certain forms of the expression of Nazi ideology. It is not true, as I
read today on a pedophilia web site, that "if you ban ANYTHING, it
leads to tyranny!" Germany has not become a tyranny because of its
anti-Nazi laws. In a world of terror we should come to the same
conclusion as the Germans, for ourselves, and eventually for the
international community. We can no longer live with the idea that all
expression must be given a pass in a free society, no matter its
implications. In the modern world, "Left Behind" is equivalent to a cry
of "fire" in a crowed theatre.
Rethinking freedom of expression seriously, not in the casual manner of
the Patriot Act, should be high on the liberal agenda. This does not
mean checking on the reading habits of library patrons. It does not
mean arresting people for their beliefs. But it does mean that certain
inflammatory modes of expression and groups of ideas need to be
regulated. Just exactly how this is done, and where the lines are
drawn, will not be easy, and will take years of legislation and
interpretation, building on decisions and laws that are a basic part of
our tradition. I doubt if our society and international society can
hold together if our publicists and liberals continue to espouse an
absolutist position on freedom of expression or religious freedom.
Today Kristof, the Op-Ed writer, asks us to take seriously the
implications of the "Left Behind" series of evangelical thrillers
based on a reading of the Christian "Book of Revelations". In the
latest, "Glorious Appearing", Jesus returns to earth to kill all
non-Christians, perhaps better said, to kill all persons who have not
accepted him as their saviour. When Jesus speaks, the bodies of
nonbelievers are ripped open in a mass extinction that causes their
flesh to dissolve and their eyes to melt until they finally "rattle to
the pavement". To me, this seems little more than another example of
the exploitation of violence that is rampant in popular "cultural" life
today. The only difference is that "Glorious Appearing", the
best-selling series of adult novels in America today, has sold 60
million copies worldwide.
As Kristof points out, were such a movie to be produced in Saudi
Arabia, depicting the spiritually justified and remorseless massacre of
Christians or Jews as its subject matter, our press and our Congress
would be infuriated, demand an investigation, perhaps even sever
relations with the offending state.
To this point Kristof makes sense. We surely must remove the "motes
from our eyes". We must be aware of how our literature looks to others,
and we must be willing to talk about the aspects of our literature that
promote intolerance at home and abroad. We must not give intolerance "a
pass". But then Kristof goes on to say: "People have a right to believe
in a racist God, or a God who throws millions of nonevangelicals into
hell. I don't think that we should ban books that say that. But we
should be embarrassed when our best-selling books gleefully celebrate
religious intolerance and violence against infidels."
Is this it? We should be embarrassed? Years of dedication to absolutist
positions in the media on freedom of expression and religious freedom
cause Kristof to go no further. But I disagree. We are engaged in a
worldwide cultural struggle that too easily degenerates into violence,
so far not seriously in this country, but certainly in the Middle East,
parts of Africa, and South and Southeast Asia. It is doubtful that we
can continue to countenance in our society the acceptance of
expressions of hatred that explicitly or implicitly advocate the death
and destruction of masses of people. If the Japanese had been quicker
to understand the writings of the Aum Shinrikyo, they would have
avoided the Sarin attack in the subways (as well as the much more
serious catastrophes that nearly occurred as a result of their
doctrines). Germany after World War II decided it could not live with
certain forms of the expression of Nazi ideology. It is not true, as I
read today on a pedophilia web site, that "if you ban ANYTHING, it
leads to tyranny!" Germany has not become a tyranny because of its
anti-Nazi laws. In a world of terror we should come to the same
conclusion as the Germans, for ourselves, and eventually for the
international community. We can no longer live with the idea that all
expression must be given a pass in a free society, no matter its
implications. In the modern world, "Left Behind" is equivalent to a cry
of "fire" in a crowed theatre.
Rethinking freedom of expression seriously, not in the casual manner of
the Patriot Act, should be high on the liberal agenda. This does not
mean checking on the reading habits of library patrons. It does not
mean arresting people for their beliefs. But it does mean that certain
inflammatory modes of expression and groups of ideas need to be
regulated. Just exactly how this is done, and where the lines are
drawn, will not be easy, and will take years of legislation and
interpretation, building on decisions and laws that are a basic part of
our tradition. I doubt if our society and international society can
hold together if our publicists and liberals continue to espouse an
absolutist position on freedom of expression or religious freedom.
Thursday, July 15, 2004
Darfur and America's Global Responsibility
The continuing tragedy of Darfur represents a challenge to American foreign and defense policy that cannot be long deferred.
As most readers are aware, the story is this. The Darfur Province of western Sudan is inhabited by a number of Muslim ethnic groups. In very general terms, the problem of the area has been that the nomadic herdsmen in the drier north have developed increasingly hostile relations with the farmers of the south. This has been exacerbated by population pressures and lack of sufficient moisture. On the political side, the larger farming community has felt neglected by the government. This feeling, as well as the knowledge of the relative success of the non-Muslim insurgency in the south, has led to the development of an independence movement in the province. Failing to put this down with government troops, the government enlisted the support of the "janjaweed", mounted ruffians recruited among the nomads, to solve their problem by driving the farmers out of the country. Together, the army and the janjaweed have succeeded in driving hundreds of thousands, if not millions, off their farms and into refugee camps near Darfur cities and across the border in Chad. Hundred of villages may have been destroyed, with the houses burned and the livestock killed. In many villages the men have been killed and the women raped before being driven out. The evidence suggests an even worse campaign than the ethnic cleansing that occurred in parts of Bosnia.
At present, the chance of hundreds of thousands of additional deaths results from the inability of the international community to reach many of the displaced before they starve or die of disease. This inability is due to terrible roads and lack of cooperation, particularly by the Sudanese government, as well as by inadequate international response. In addition, in spite of many promises, the government seems both unwilling and unable to control the janjaweed. Cleansing is apparently continuing; certainly no one is being resettled back in their former communities.
Our commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan seem to rule out any major effort, such as that which occurred in Kosovo in defense of Albanians. The size of the problem also rules out an international effort such as saved the much smaller population of East Timor. Higher on the American national and even world security agenda must be the problem of North Korea, a country that one could say treats its whole population the way Sudan treats the people of Darfur — and in addition is somewhere between knowing how to make nuclear weapons and having them. In addition, Africa is ablaze with similar problems, although at present on a smaller scale. We have only to mention the ungovernable regions of the eastern Congo and Somalia.
If the international community gets its act together, and the United States must be a major actor here, we could pour a great deal more international assistance into the area and more quickly. This would greatly reduce the immediate suffering of over one million. However, this worthwhile rescue operation is not going to prove to the Sudanese and the international community that no government in the modern world can with impunity attack and destroy peoples within or without their boundaries.
Ideally, we would work out an agreement to mount another Kosovo operation, this time with a capable international force on the ground in support of an aerial offensive. Our argument in the Security Council would be that the developed world must prove to Africans that we value African lives and rights just as much as we value European or Indonesian. It would also be based on the experience that the Sudanese government is simply not a reliable partner for a long-term relief effort. Our goals here must be much more modest than in Iraq: no talk of instituting democracy, but rather of establishing a functioning society able to support itself with long-term international aid.
The likelihood the United States would undertake such a program is quite low. It would first require a commitment to spend a great deal more worldwide than we have been willing to do on both our military capacity and our foreign assistance programs. Intervention in the Sudan is not a program for budget cutters. It would also require that major American leaders, such as John Kerry, seriously address the issue. The popular response to such a proposal would be that we were taking on another entangling obligation at a time when we are just emerging (hopefully) from Iraq and Afghanistan, and still face the challenges of North Korea and global terrorism. Many Americans are familiar with the Sudan because of its problems in the south. But here American support was fueled largely by the fact that many southern rebels were Christians. Support for Muslims in the west could undercut what many believe is a growing acceptance by both sides of peace in the south — another reason for hesitancy.
To turn this policy stance around for Darfur and the Darfurs of the future, we badly need a long-term educational campaign in this country that teaches the importance of accepting the burden of responsibility that rests on the shoulders of the most powerful people in the world. At this moment in history, we do have unrivaled power and great wealth. But our people have still not accepted the fact that this places obligations on all Americans to play a leading role in the establishment of an international order that serves the interests of all peoples.
The continuing tragedy of Darfur represents a challenge to American foreign and defense policy that cannot be long deferred.
As most readers are aware, the story is this. The Darfur Province of western Sudan is inhabited by a number of Muslim ethnic groups. In very general terms, the problem of the area has been that the nomadic herdsmen in the drier north have developed increasingly hostile relations with the farmers of the south. This has been exacerbated by population pressures and lack of sufficient moisture. On the political side, the larger farming community has felt neglected by the government. This feeling, as well as the knowledge of the relative success of the non-Muslim insurgency in the south, has led to the development of an independence movement in the province. Failing to put this down with government troops, the government enlisted the support of the "janjaweed", mounted ruffians recruited among the nomads, to solve their problem by driving the farmers out of the country. Together, the army and the janjaweed have succeeded in driving hundreds of thousands, if not millions, off their farms and into refugee camps near Darfur cities and across the border in Chad. Hundred of villages may have been destroyed, with the houses burned and the livestock killed. In many villages the men have been killed and the women raped before being driven out. The evidence suggests an even worse campaign than the ethnic cleansing that occurred in parts of Bosnia.
At present, the chance of hundreds of thousands of additional deaths results from the inability of the international community to reach many of the displaced before they starve or die of disease. This inability is due to terrible roads and lack of cooperation, particularly by the Sudanese government, as well as by inadequate international response. In addition, in spite of many promises, the government seems both unwilling and unable to control the janjaweed. Cleansing is apparently continuing; certainly no one is being resettled back in their former communities.
Our commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan seem to rule out any major effort, such as that which occurred in Kosovo in defense of Albanians. The size of the problem also rules out an international effort such as saved the much smaller population of East Timor. Higher on the American national and even world security agenda must be the problem of North Korea, a country that one could say treats its whole population the way Sudan treats the people of Darfur — and in addition is somewhere between knowing how to make nuclear weapons and having them. In addition, Africa is ablaze with similar problems, although at present on a smaller scale. We have only to mention the ungovernable regions of the eastern Congo and Somalia.
If the international community gets its act together, and the United States must be a major actor here, we could pour a great deal more international assistance into the area and more quickly. This would greatly reduce the immediate suffering of over one million. However, this worthwhile rescue operation is not going to prove to the Sudanese and the international community that no government in the modern world can with impunity attack and destroy peoples within or without their boundaries.
Ideally, we would work out an agreement to mount another Kosovo operation, this time with a capable international force on the ground in support of an aerial offensive. Our argument in the Security Council would be that the developed world must prove to Africans that we value African lives and rights just as much as we value European or Indonesian. It would also be based on the experience that the Sudanese government is simply not a reliable partner for a long-term relief effort. Our goals here must be much more modest than in Iraq: no talk of instituting democracy, but rather of establishing a functioning society able to support itself with long-term international aid.
The likelihood the United States would undertake such a program is quite low. It would first require a commitment to spend a great deal more worldwide than we have been willing to do on both our military capacity and our foreign assistance programs. Intervention in the Sudan is not a program for budget cutters. It would also require that major American leaders, such as John Kerry, seriously address the issue. The popular response to such a proposal would be that we were taking on another entangling obligation at a time when we are just emerging (hopefully) from Iraq and Afghanistan, and still face the challenges of North Korea and global terrorism. Many Americans are familiar with the Sudan because of its problems in the south. But here American support was fueled largely by the fact that many southern rebels were Christians. Support for Muslims in the west could undercut what many believe is a growing acceptance by both sides of peace in the south — another reason for hesitancy.
To turn this policy stance around for Darfur and the Darfurs of the future, we badly need a long-term educational campaign in this country that teaches the importance of accepting the burden of responsibility that rests on the shoulders of the most powerful people in the world. At this moment in history, we do have unrivaled power and great wealth. But our people have still not accepted the fact that this places obligations on all Americans to play a leading role in the establishment of an international order that serves the interests of all peoples.
Security in Iraq
The violence in Iraq continues. But it also continues to take on a more promising coloration.
First, a couple of days ago the Iraqi policemen rounded up nearly 500 persons suspected of criminal rather than insurgent/terrorist activity. Apparently in the streets of Baghdad, the fear of the average person is at least as much a fear of violent crime as it is of being caught in the crossfire of the internal warfare. This kind of crackdown is likely to be widely applauded on the streets. It is also good for morale, since while policemen were killed in the effort, it remains quite a bit easier to move against street criminals than against the better armed and motivated insurgents. Unlike insurgents in some areas, the criminals are unlikely to be able to rely on a friendly a population base.
It should be noted in passing that what is judged to be common criminality is often a spin-off of insurgent violence. For one thing, insurgent success often clears the streets of the police force that criminals would otherwise confront. In addition, in many insurgencies idealistic violence frequently degenerates into self-interested violence. Initial reasons for the change can come from the need for money and arms by any insurgent group as well as the natural rivalries of subgroup leaders (who become gang leaders) within any violent movement. To a lesser degree, this transformation also happens within the armed forces and police on the "government side". The end result in Colombia, for example, has been a transformation of the "insurgency" problem into that of controlling a variety of large gangs fighting one another largely for economic gain (fueled here by drugs), as well as a need for a widespread purging of the security forces.
Second, the suicide attack yesterday in the middle of Baghdad was directed entirely at Iraqis. Similar in nature was the ambush and killing of the new Governor of Ninevah Province (Mosul) in the North. The Governor was apparently a well-liked individual who had striven to bring together the many ethnic groups in his area. Both of these events will maintain a high level of fear. But neither is likely to be popular with more than a small segment of Iraqi public opinion.
Americans continue to be killed. They continue to become involved in fire fights, such as one yesterday in which Marines turned an attack on their position into the killing of 20 insurgents. But the overall impression is that battle casualties continue to go down, Americans are initiating fewer contacts, and, as important, fewer Iraqi civilians are being killed by American soldiers or by American support planes attacking insurgent positions. Perhaps our forces should be doing more. There is much that could be done. The Governor was ambushed on a stretch of road well known for previous attacks. Yet if we can preserve our lower, less inflammatory profile, and the Iraqis can actually take over where we left off, our prospects are promising.
The violence in Iraq continues. But it also continues to take on a more promising coloration.
First, a couple of days ago the Iraqi policemen rounded up nearly 500 persons suspected of criminal rather than insurgent/terrorist activity. Apparently in the streets of Baghdad, the fear of the average person is at least as much a fear of violent crime as it is of being caught in the crossfire of the internal warfare. This kind of crackdown is likely to be widely applauded on the streets. It is also good for morale, since while policemen were killed in the effort, it remains quite a bit easier to move against street criminals than against the better armed and motivated insurgents. Unlike insurgents in some areas, the criminals are unlikely to be able to rely on a friendly a population base.
It should be noted in passing that what is judged to be common criminality is often a spin-off of insurgent violence. For one thing, insurgent success often clears the streets of the police force that criminals would otherwise confront. In addition, in many insurgencies idealistic violence frequently degenerates into self-interested violence. Initial reasons for the change can come from the need for money and arms by any insurgent group as well as the natural rivalries of subgroup leaders (who become gang leaders) within any violent movement. To a lesser degree, this transformation also happens within the armed forces and police on the "government side". The end result in Colombia, for example, has been a transformation of the "insurgency" problem into that of controlling a variety of large gangs fighting one another largely for economic gain (fueled here by drugs), as well as a need for a widespread purging of the security forces.
Second, the suicide attack yesterday in the middle of Baghdad was directed entirely at Iraqis. Similar in nature was the ambush and killing of the new Governor of Ninevah Province (Mosul) in the North. The Governor was apparently a well-liked individual who had striven to bring together the many ethnic groups in his area. Both of these events will maintain a high level of fear. But neither is likely to be popular with more than a small segment of Iraqi public opinion.
Americans continue to be killed. They continue to become involved in fire fights, such as one yesterday in which Marines turned an attack on their position into the killing of 20 insurgents. But the overall impression is that battle casualties continue to go down, Americans are initiating fewer contacts, and, as important, fewer Iraqi civilians are being killed by American soldiers or by American support planes attacking insurgent positions. Perhaps our forces should be doing more. There is much that could be done. The Governor was ambushed on a stretch of road well known for previous attacks. Yet if we can preserve our lower, less inflammatory profile, and the Iraqis can actually take over where we left off, our prospects are promising.
Darfur and America's Global Responsibility
The continuing tragedy of Darfur represents a challenge to American foreign and defense policy that cannot be long deferred.
As most readers are aware, the story is this. The Darfur Province of western Sudan is inhabited by a number of Muslim ethnic groups. In very general terms, the problem of the area has been that the nomadic herdsmen in the drier north have developed increasingly hostile relations with the farmers of the south. This has been exacerbated by population pressures and lack of sufficient moisture. On the political side, the larger farming community has felt neglected by the government. This feeling, as well as the knowledge of the relative success of the non-Muslim insurgency in the south, has led to the development of an independence movement in the province. Failing to put this down with government troops, the government enlisted the support of the "janjaweed", mounted ruffians recruited among the nomads, to solve their problem by driving the farmers out of the country. Together, the army and the janjaweed have succeeded in driving hundreds of thousands, if not millions, off their farms and into refugee camps near Darfur cities and across the border in Chad. Hundred of villages may have been destroyed, with the houses burned and the livestock killed. In many villages the men have been killed and the women raped before being driven out. The evidence suggests an even worse campaign than the ethnic cleansing that occurred in parts of Bosnia.
At present, the chance of hundreds of thousands of additional deaths results from the inability of the international community to reach many of the displaced before they starve or die of disease. This inability is due to terrible roads and lack of cooperation, particularly by the Sudanese government, as well as by inadequate international response. In addition, in spite of many promises, the government seems both unwilling and unable to control the janjaweed. Cleansing is apparently continuing; certainly no one is being resettled back in their former communities.
Our commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan seem to rule out any major effort, such as that which occurred in Kosovo in defense of Albanians. The size of the problem also rules out an international effort such as saved the much smaller population of East Timor. Higher on the American national and even world security agenda must be the problem of North Korea, a country that one could say treats its whole population the way Sudan treats the people of Darfur — and in addition is somewhere between knowing how to make nuclear weapons and having them. In addition, Africa is ablaze with similar problems, although at present on a smaller scale. We have only to mention the ungovernable regions of the eastern Congo and Somalia.
If the international community gets its act together, and the United States must be a major actor here, we could pour a great deal more international assistance into the area and more quickly. This would greatly reduce the immediate suffering of over one million. However, this worthwhile rescue operation is not going to prove to the Sudanese and the international community that no government in the modern world can with impunity attack and destroy peoples within or without their boundaries.
Ideally, we would work out an agreement to mount another Kosovo operation, this time with a capable international force on the ground in support of an aerial offensive. Our argument in the Security Council would be that the developed world must prove to Africans that we value African lives and rights just as much as we value European or Indonesian. It would also be based on the experience that the Sudanese government is simply not a reliable partner for a long-term relief effort. Our goals here must be much more modest than in Iraq: no talk of instituting democracy, but rather of establishing a functioning society able to support itself with long-term international aid.
The likelihood the United States would undertake such a program is quite low. It would first require a commitment to spend a great deal more worldwide than we have been willing to do on both our military capacity and our foreign assistance programs. Intervention in the Sudan is not a program for budget cutters. It would also require that major American leaders, such as John Kerry, seriously address the issue. The popular response to such a proposal would be that we were taking on another entangling obligation at a time when we are just emerging (hopefully) from Iraq and Afghanistan, and still face the challenges of North Korea and global terrorism. Many Americans are familiar with the Sudan because of its problems in the south. But here American support was fueled largely by the fact that many southern rebels were Christians. Support for Muslims in the west could undercut what many believe is a growing acceptance by both sides of peace in the south — another reason for hesitancy.
To turn this policy stance around for Darfur and the Darfurs of the future, we badly need a long-term educational campaign in this country that teaches the importance of accepting the burden of responsibility that rests on the shoulders of the most powerful people in the world. At this moment in history, we do have unrivaled power and great wealth. But our people have still not accepted the fact that this places obligations on all Americans to play a leading role in the establishment of an international order that serves the interests of all peoples.
The continuing tragedy of Darfur represents a challenge to American foreign and defense policy that cannot be long deferred.
As most readers are aware, the story is this. The Darfur Province of western Sudan is inhabited by a number of Muslim ethnic groups. In very general terms, the problem of the area has been that the nomadic herdsmen in the drier north have developed increasingly hostile relations with the farmers of the south. This has been exacerbated by population pressures and lack of sufficient moisture. On the political side, the larger farming community has felt neglected by the government. This feeling, as well as the knowledge of the relative success of the non-Muslim insurgency in the south, has led to the development of an independence movement in the province. Failing to put this down with government troops, the government enlisted the support of the "janjaweed", mounted ruffians recruited among the nomads, to solve their problem by driving the farmers out of the country. Together, the army and the janjaweed have succeeded in driving hundreds of thousands, if not millions, off their farms and into refugee camps near Darfur cities and across the border in Chad. Hundred of villages may have been destroyed, with the houses burned and the livestock killed. In many villages the men have been killed and the women raped before being driven out. The evidence suggests an even worse campaign than the ethnic cleansing that occurred in parts of Bosnia.
At present, the chance of hundreds of thousands of additional deaths results from the inability of the international community to reach many of the displaced before they starve or die of disease. This inability is due to terrible roads and lack of cooperation, particularly by the Sudanese government, as well as by inadequate international response. In addition, in spite of many promises, the government seems both unwilling and unable to control the janjaweed. Cleansing is apparently continuing; certainly no one is being resettled back in their former communities.
Our commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan seem to rule out any major effort, such as that which occurred in Kosovo in defense of Albanians. The size of the problem also rules out an international effort such as saved the much smaller population of East Timor. Higher on the American national and even world security agenda must be the problem of North Korea, a country that one could say treats its whole population the way Sudan treats the people of Darfur — and in addition is somewhere between knowing how to make nuclear weapons and having them. In addition, Africa is ablaze with similar problems, although at present on a smaller scale. We have only to mention the ungovernable regions of the eastern Congo and Somalia.
If the international community gets its act together, and the United States must be a major actor here, we could pour a great deal more international assistance into the area and more quickly. This would greatly reduce the immediate suffering of over one million. However, this worthwhile rescue operation is not going to prove to the Sudanese and the international community that no government in the modern world can with impunity attack and destroy peoples within or without their boundaries.
Ideally, we would work out an agreement to mount another Kosovo operation, this time with a capable international force on the ground in support of an aerial offensive. Our argument in the Security Council would be that the developed world must prove to Africans that we value African lives and rights just as much as we value European or Indonesian. It would also be based on the experience that the Sudanese government is simply not a reliable partner for a long-term relief effort. Our goals here must be much more modest than in Iraq: no talk of instituting democracy, but rather of establishing a functioning society able to support itself with long-term international aid.
The likelihood the United States would undertake such a program is quite low. It would first require a commitment to spend a great deal more worldwide than we have been willing to do on both our military capacity and our foreign assistance programs. Intervention in the Sudan is not a program for budget cutters. It would also require that major American leaders, such as John Kerry, seriously address the issue. The popular response to such a proposal would be that we were taking on another entangling obligation at a time when we are just emerging (hopefully) from Iraq and Afghanistan, and still face the challenges of North Korea and global terrorism. Many Americans are familiar with the Sudan because of its problems in the south. But here American support was fueled largely by the fact that many southern rebels were Christians. Support for Muslims in the west could undercut what many believe is a growing acceptance by both sides of peace in the south — another reason for hesitancy.
To turn this policy stance around for Darfur and the Darfurs of the future, we badly need a long-term educational campaign in this country that teaches the importance of accepting the burden of responsibility that rests on the shoulders of the most powerful people in the world. At this moment in history, we do have unrivaled power and great wealth. But our people have still not accepted the fact that this places obligations on all Americans to play a leading role in the establishment of an international order that serves the interests of all peoples.
Security in Iraq
The violence in Iraq continues. But it also continues to take on a more promising coloration.
First, a couple of days ago the Iraqi policemen rounded up nearly 500 persons suspected of criminal rather than insurgent/terrorist activity. Apparently in the streets of Baghdad, the fear of the average person is at least as much a fear of violent crime as it is of being caught in the crossfire of the internal warfare. This kind of crackdown is likely to be widely applauded on the streets. It is also good for morale, since while policemen were killed in the effort, it remains quite a bit easier to move against street criminals than against the better armed and motivated insurgents. Unlike insurgents in some areas, the criminals are unlikely to be able to rely on a friendly a population base.
It should be noted in passing that what is judged to be common criminality is often a spin-off of insurgent violence. For one thing, insurgent success often clears the streets of the police force that criminals would otherwise confront. In addition, in many insurgencies idealistic violence frequently degenerates into self-interested violence. Initial reasons for the change can come from the need for money and arms by any insurgent group as well as the natural rivalries of subgroup leaders (who become gang leaders) within any violent movement. To a lesser degree, this transformation also happens within the armed forces and police on the "government side". The end result in Colombia, for example, has been a transformation of the "insurgency" problem into that of controlling a variety of large gangs fighting one another largely for economic gain (fueled here by drugs), as well as a need for a widespread purging of the security forces.
Second, the suicide attack yesterday in the middle of Baghdad was directed entirely at Iraqis. Similar in nature was the ambush and killing of the new Governor of Ninevah Province (Mosul) in the North. The Governor was apparently a well-liked individual who had striven to bring together the many ethnic groups in his area. Both of these events will maintain a high level of fear. But neither is likely to be popular with more than a small segment of Iraqi public opinion.
Americans continue to be killed. They continue to become involved in fire fights, such as one yesterday in which Marines turned an attack on their position into the killing of 20 insurgents. But the overall impression is that battle casualties continue to go down, Americans are initiating fewer contacts, and, as important, fewer Iraqi civilians are being killed by American soldiers or by American support planes attacking insurgent positions. Perhaps our forces should be doing more. There is much that could be done. The Governor was ambushed on a stretch of road well known for previous attacks. Yet if we can preserve our lower, less inflammatory profile, and the Iraqis can actually take over where we left off, our prospects are promising.
The violence in Iraq continues. But it also continues to take on a more promising coloration.
First, a couple of days ago the Iraqi policemen rounded up nearly 500 persons suspected of criminal rather than insurgent/terrorist activity. Apparently in the streets of Baghdad, the fear of the average person is at least as much a fear of violent crime as it is of being caught in the crossfire of the internal warfare. This kind of crackdown is likely to be widely applauded on the streets. It is also good for morale, since while policemen were killed in the effort, it remains quite a bit easier to move against street criminals than against the better armed and motivated insurgents. Unlike insurgents in some areas, the criminals are unlikely to be able to rely on a friendly a population base.
It should be noted in passing that what is judged to be common criminality is often a spin-off of insurgent violence. For one thing, insurgent success often clears the streets of the police force that criminals would otherwise confront. In addition, in many insurgencies idealistic violence frequently degenerates into self-interested violence. Initial reasons for the change can come from the need for money and arms by any insurgent group as well as the natural rivalries of subgroup leaders (who become gang leaders) within any violent movement. To a lesser degree, this transformation also happens within the armed forces and police on the "government side". The end result in Colombia, for example, has been a transformation of the "insurgency" problem into that of controlling a variety of large gangs fighting one another largely for economic gain (fueled here by drugs), as well as a need for a widespread purging of the security forces.
Second, the suicide attack yesterday in the middle of Baghdad was directed entirely at Iraqis. Similar in nature was the ambush and killing of the new Governor of Ninevah Province (Mosul) in the North. The Governor was apparently a well-liked individual who had striven to bring together the many ethnic groups in his area. Both of these events will maintain a high level of fear. But neither is likely to be popular with more than a small segment of Iraqi public opinion.
Americans continue to be killed. They continue to become involved in fire fights, such as one yesterday in which Marines turned an attack on their position into the killing of 20 insurgents. But the overall impression is that battle casualties continue to go down, Americans are initiating fewer contacts, and, as important, fewer Iraqi civilians are being killed by American soldiers or by American support planes attacking insurgent positions. Perhaps our forces should be doing more. There is much that could be done. The Governor was ambushed on a stretch of road well known for previous attacks. Yet if we can preserve our lower, less inflammatory profile, and the Iraqis can actually take over where we left off, our prospects are promising.
Security in Iraq
The violence in Iraq continues. But it also continues to take on a more promising coloration.
First, a couple of days ago the Iraqi policemen rounded up nearly 500 persons suspected of criminal rather than insurgent/terrorist activity. Apparently in the streets of Baghdad, the fear of the average person is at least as much a fear of violent crime as it is of being caught in the crossfire of the internal warfare. This kind of crackdown is likely to be widely applauded on the streets. It is also good for morale, since while policemen were killed in the effort, it remains quite a bit easier to move against street criminals than against the better armed and motivated insurgents. Unlike insurgents in some areas, the criminals are unlikely to be able to rely on a friendly a population base.
It should be noted in passing that what is judged to be common criminality is often a spin-off of insurgent violence. For one thing, insurgent success often clears the streets of the police force that criminals would otherwise confront. In addition, in many insurgencies idealistic violence frequently degenerates into self-interested violence. Initial reasons for the change can come from the need for money and arms by any insurgent group as well as the natural rivalries of subgroup leaders (who become gang leaders) within any violent movement. To a lesser degree, this transformation also happens within the armed forces and police on the "government side". The end result in Colombia, for example, has been a transformation of the "insurgency" problem into that of controlling a variety of large gangs fighting one another largely for economic gain (fueled here by drugs), as well as a need for a widespread purging of the security forces.
Second, the suicide attack yesterday in the middle of Baghdad was directed entirely at Iraqis. Similar in nature was the ambush and killing of the new Governor of Ninevah Province (Mosul) in the North. The Governor was apparently a well-liked individual who had striven to bring together the many ethnic groups in his area. Both of these events will maintain a high level of fear. But neither is likely to be popular with more than a small segment of Iraqi public opinion.
Americans continue to be killed. They continue to become involved in fire fights, such as one yesterday in which Marines turned an attack on their position into the killing of 20 insurgents. But the overall impression is that battle casualties continue to go down, Americans are initiating fewer contacts, and, as important, fewer Iraqi civilians are being killed by American soldiers or by American support planes attacking insurgent positions. Perhaps our forces should be doing more. There is much that could be done. The Governor was ambushed on a stretch of road well known for previous attacks. Yet if we can preserve our lower, less inflammatory profile, and the Iraqis can actually take over where we left off, our prospects are promising.
The violence in Iraq continues. But it also continues to take on a more promising coloration.
First, a couple of days ago the Iraqi policemen rounded up nearly 500 persons suspected of criminal rather than insurgent/terrorist activity. Apparently in the streets of Baghdad, the fear of the average person is at least as much a fear of violent crime as it is of being caught in the crossfire of the internal warfare. This kind of crackdown is likely to be widely applauded on the streets. It is also good for morale, since while policemen were killed in the effort, it remains quite a bit easier to move against street criminals than against the better armed and motivated insurgents. Unlike insurgents in some areas, the criminals are unlikely to be able to rely on a friendly a population base.
It should be noted in passing that what is judged to be common criminality is often a spin-off of insurgent violence. For one thing, insurgent success often clears the streets of the police force that criminals would otherwise confront. In addition, in many insurgencies idealistic violence frequently degenerates into self-interested violence. Initial reasons for the change can come from the need for money and arms by any insurgent group as well as the natural rivalries of subgroup leaders (who become gang leaders) within any violent movement. To a lesser degree, this transformation also happens within the armed forces and police on the "government side". The end result in Colombia, for example, has been a transformation of the "insurgency" problem into that of controlling a variety of large gangs fighting one another largely for economic gain (fueled here by drugs), as well as a need for a widespread purging of the security forces.
Second, the suicide attack yesterday in the middle of Baghdad was directed entirely at Iraqis. Similar in nature was the ambush and killing of the new Governor of Ninevah Province (Mosul) in the North. The Governor was apparently a well-liked individual who had striven to bring together the many ethnic groups in his area. Both of these events will maintain a high level of fear. But neither is likely to be popular with more than a small segment of Iraqi public opinion.
Americans continue to be killed. They continue to become involved in fire fights, such as one yesterday in which Marines turned an attack on their position into the killing of 20 insurgents. But the overall impression is that battle casualties continue to go down, Americans are initiating fewer contacts, and, as important, fewer Iraqi civilians are being killed by American soldiers or by American support planes attacking insurgent positions. Perhaps our forces should be doing more. There is much that could be done. The Governor was ambushed on a stretch of road well known for previous attacks. Yet if we can preserve our lower, less inflammatory profile, and the Iraqis can actually take over where we left off, our prospects are promising.
Tuesday, July 13, 2004
The Confusions of Terrorists
This morning's paper brings us a long discussion of the life and activities of the Jordanian who now goes by the name "Abu Musab al Zarqawi". The picture that comes across is that of a poor and confused young man who subsequently tried a number of avenues to make something of himself. He did poorly in school, being regarded by acquaintances as barely literate. He was not particularly religious; he drank heavily and had himself tattooed. In 1989 he went to Afghanistan to fight the Russians, but got there too late, so took to interviewing recent jihadists. At this time he was actually pro-American. Back in Jordan, he began associating with militants and ended up in jail. He also began to spend much of his time with the Quran. He became so attached to the Quran that he would attack those around him for reading anything else. In prison, he was into body building. Eventually he came to be seen as a leader, a "tough guy" who could boss others around simply because they were afraid of him. Released in an amnesty in 1999, he went back to Afghanistan where he set up a terrorist training camp. Soon he was forced to leave, ending up with the Ansar al-Islam in Iraqi Kurdistan. Subsequently, he is said to have slipped in and out of Jordan. He is accused of masterminding killings there and more recently in Iraq. He was sentenced in absentia in Jordan and we now have a $25 million reward out for his capture. However, our information is confused. Many doubt he is actually an al-Qaida agent, but then "al-Qaida" is both a meaningful and extremely loose designation. We do not seem to know whether he actually was the person who beheaded the American in the well-known video, or whether he actually wrote the 6700 word letter outlining a strategy for dragging Iraq into civil war. Those who know him say he was incapable of writing so well, and was also not a thinker able to conceive of grand strategies. Perhaps "Zarqawi" is a smoke screen obscuring someone quite different.
What I find enlightening is how Zarqawi's story fits in with the stories of other terrorists as described in the government report "Who Becomes a Terrorist and Why?" (a staff report of the Library of Congress edited by Rex Hudson, 1999). The pattern that such studies find is in fact no pattern. Terrorists are well educated and poorly educated, at the top of their class, early dropouts. After a confused searching around for a direction, or, perhaps better, for a way to make something of themselves, they fall into terrorism almost by chance. Once they become involved, surrounded by a small group of persons similarly involved and similarly "wanted", they become emotionally trapped into a way of life from which there are few exits. Terrorists are not as a group distinguished by any distinctive deprivations or attacks on their egos by either "the system" or their families. They are not generally deep or consistent thinkers, people who have understood the world and chosen terrorism as the only way to "fight back". Of course, they do latch onto real or imagined "injustices" in society as a way to explain their actions to themselves or others. But it does not appear that fighting injustice is the best way to explain their actions.
We have a long way to go before we can figure out how we might reduce the incidence of such life stories in the world. An easier task is the reduce the number of people who are enticed in the short term into supporting their actions. Today in Iraq, this is what we must concentrate on.
(Incidentally, we should remember that in Iraq we are fighting both terrorists like Zarqawi and guerrillas or insurgents such as the Mahdi Army and the nationalists. Our discussion of terrorists is largely irrelevant when considering the latter.)
This morning's paper brings us a long discussion of the life and activities of the Jordanian who now goes by the name "Abu Musab al Zarqawi". The picture that comes across is that of a poor and confused young man who subsequently tried a number of avenues to make something of himself. He did poorly in school, being regarded by acquaintances as barely literate. He was not particularly religious; he drank heavily and had himself tattooed. In 1989 he went to Afghanistan to fight the Russians, but got there too late, so took to interviewing recent jihadists. At this time he was actually pro-American. Back in Jordan, he began associating with militants and ended up in jail. He also began to spend much of his time with the Quran. He became so attached to the Quran that he would attack those around him for reading anything else. In prison, he was into body building. Eventually he came to be seen as a leader, a "tough guy" who could boss others around simply because they were afraid of him. Released in an amnesty in 1999, he went back to Afghanistan where he set up a terrorist training camp. Soon he was forced to leave, ending up with the Ansar al-Islam in Iraqi Kurdistan. Subsequently, he is said to have slipped in and out of Jordan. He is accused of masterminding killings there and more recently in Iraq. He was sentenced in absentia in Jordan and we now have a $25 million reward out for his capture. However, our information is confused. Many doubt he is actually an al-Qaida agent, but then "al-Qaida" is both a meaningful and extremely loose designation. We do not seem to know whether he actually was the person who beheaded the American in the well-known video, or whether he actually wrote the 6700 word letter outlining a strategy for dragging Iraq into civil war. Those who know him say he was incapable of writing so well, and was also not a thinker able to conceive of grand strategies. Perhaps "Zarqawi" is a smoke screen obscuring someone quite different.
What I find enlightening is how Zarqawi's story fits in with the stories of other terrorists as described in the government report "Who Becomes a Terrorist and Why?" (a staff report of the Library of Congress edited by Rex Hudson, 1999). The pattern that such studies find is in fact no pattern. Terrorists are well educated and poorly educated, at the top of their class, early dropouts. After a confused searching around for a direction, or, perhaps better, for a way to make something of themselves, they fall into terrorism almost by chance. Once they become involved, surrounded by a small group of persons similarly involved and similarly "wanted", they become emotionally trapped into a way of life from which there are few exits. Terrorists are not as a group distinguished by any distinctive deprivations or attacks on their egos by either "the system" or their families. They are not generally deep or consistent thinkers, people who have understood the world and chosen terrorism as the only way to "fight back". Of course, they do latch onto real or imagined "injustices" in society as a way to explain their actions to themselves or others. But it does not appear that fighting injustice is the best way to explain their actions.
We have a long way to go before we can figure out how we might reduce the incidence of such life stories in the world. An easier task is the reduce the number of people who are enticed in the short term into supporting their actions. Today in Iraq, this is what we must concentrate on.
(Incidentally, we should remember that in Iraq we are fighting both terrorists like Zarqawi and guerrillas or insurgents such as the Mahdi Army and the nationalists. Our discussion of terrorists is largely irrelevant when considering the latter.)
Monday, July 12, 2004
The Patriot Act and Civil Liberties
The House defeated by a margin of one vote (actually deadlocked) a measure to restrict the government's right to demand library records under the Patriot Act. This has always been one of the most controversial aspects of the act. Many Representatives in both parties hoped that it could be chipped away at, but the effort failed. We can take comfort in the fact that Congress has still not been willing to extend the term of the Patriot Act as the President has requested.
Unfortunately, the government's security measures through this Act, as well as in countless other ways relating to security, such as the holding of suspects indefinitely, have been at least as great a threat to our freedoms as the efforts of al-Qaida. If al-Qaida wants to attack our way of life, in this respect at least they have succeeded very well.
Yet there is no doubt that in the fight against terrorism, we will have to question whether certain freedoms can be maintained at the level to which we have become accustomed. This leads us to the question as to which fundamental rights are most important, that is to the question as to where we should we draw the line against the invasions of the security folk.
I believe that I have addressed this issue previously in this blog. But let me again suggest a guiding principle: There is more legitimate room to restrict freedoms of expression and association than there is room to restrict freedoms of thought and conscience and privacy. There are many types of "speech" (including writings, Internet web sites etc.) calling for violence against others or presenting ways to harm others (bomb manufacture, chemical weapon formulas etc.) that may reasonably be interpreted as representing immediate threats to society. In times of crisis, these should be restricted. There is, however, little legitimate reason to control or interfere with the private thoughts of people or their reading habits. One thinks and reads and listens in order to understand. It is impossible to know whether an individual's activities in these areas are directed against hurting others: they may or may not be. If I read about how to concoct a biological weapon on the Internet, I may be trying to understand the topic or simply to find out the type of information that is "out there". But if I express to others in a public manner the thought that all Jews or Muslims should be killed, or if I put my favorite bomb formulas on the Internet, I am acting in ways that are much more questionable, that can more directly harm others, and that society should consider restricting in its own defense.
The threats to libraries and library patrons incorporated in the Patriot Act fall into the category of threats against freedom of thought that should be restricted only in the most extreme circumstances.
The House defeated by a margin of one vote (actually deadlocked) a measure to restrict the government's right to demand library records under the Patriot Act. This has always been one of the most controversial aspects of the act. Many Representatives in both parties hoped that it could be chipped away at, but the effort failed. We can take comfort in the fact that Congress has still not been willing to extend the term of the Patriot Act as the President has requested.
Unfortunately, the government's security measures through this Act, as well as in countless other ways relating to security, such as the holding of suspects indefinitely, have been at least as great a threat to our freedoms as the efforts of al-Qaida. If al-Qaida wants to attack our way of life, in this respect at least they have succeeded very well.
Yet there is no doubt that in the fight against terrorism, we will have to question whether certain freedoms can be maintained at the level to which we have become accustomed. This leads us to the question as to which fundamental rights are most important, that is to the question as to where we should we draw the line against the invasions of the security folk.
I believe that I have addressed this issue previously in this blog. But let me again suggest a guiding principle: There is more legitimate room to restrict freedoms of expression and association than there is room to restrict freedoms of thought and conscience and privacy. There are many types of "speech" (including writings, Internet web sites etc.) calling for violence against others or presenting ways to harm others (bomb manufacture, chemical weapon formulas etc.) that may reasonably be interpreted as representing immediate threats to society. In times of crisis, these should be restricted. There is, however, little legitimate reason to control or interfere with the private thoughts of people or their reading habits. One thinks and reads and listens in order to understand. It is impossible to know whether an individual's activities in these areas are directed against hurting others: they may or may not be. If I read about how to concoct a biological weapon on the Internet, I may be trying to understand the topic or simply to find out the type of information that is "out there". But if I express to others in a public manner the thought that all Jews or Muslims should be killed, or if I put my favorite bomb formulas on the Internet, I am acting in ways that are much more questionable, that can more directly harm others, and that society should consider restricting in its own defense.
The threats to libraries and library patrons incorporated in the Patriot Act fall into the category of threats against freedom of thought that should be restricted only in the most extreme circumstances.
The Fight Within the Fight
Sunday's paper confirms the picture that has been emerging of a split in the Sunni camp between the Iraqi national resistance and the foreigner-inspired extremist resistance. The nationalist resistance is especially incensed by the widespread use of car bombs and other munitions against largely civilian targets. Surprisingly, both groups seem to have their headquarters in Falluja. Zarqawi has been attacked in opposition media, and now he lashes back with attacks on their "weakness". The goals of the nationalists have been expressed in purely patriotic terms, in terms of support for Hussein, and in terms of getting Sunnis into more positions of power. The fact Allawi is a former Baathist is causing some of this group to think again about opposition. But the one thing that unites all the opposition at present is the continued presence of American troops.
Would that we could simply leave. Again, we should heed the good advice to give a firm date for leaving. We have shown that we live up to other dates. Perhaps this one would be believed.
Sunday's paper confirms the picture that has been emerging of a split in the Sunni camp between the Iraqi national resistance and the foreigner-inspired extremist resistance. The nationalist resistance is especially incensed by the widespread use of car bombs and other munitions against largely civilian targets. Surprisingly, both groups seem to have their headquarters in Falluja. Zarqawi has been attacked in opposition media, and now he lashes back with attacks on their "weakness". The goals of the nationalists have been expressed in purely patriotic terms, in terms of support for Hussein, and in terms of getting Sunnis into more positions of power. The fact Allawi is a former Baathist is causing some of this group to think again about opposition. But the one thing that unites all the opposition at present is the continued presence of American troops.
Would that we could simply leave. Again, we should heed the good advice to give a firm date for leaving. We have shown that we live up to other dates. Perhaps this one would be believed.
Karzai and the "Militias"?
There is a curious front page story in today's paper that reports President Karzai's assertion that the main enemy in Afghanistan is no longer the Taliban, but rather the "militias", which one might translate as the warlords, but this time maybe not. Attacks on workers attempting to register the population for a parliamentary vote have been so frequent lately that the parliamentary vote has had to be postponed to next year. This experience may have led to this reappraisal. However, many of these attacks have been on women, and therefore presumeably related to Taliban-like activity. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (a religious-warrior leader active in the anti-Soviet war) has often been cited as the leader of such efforts. On the other hand, the warlord leaders of at least the old Northern Alliance are thought to be major supporters of Karzai's campaign for another term as President, an election he is expected to win easily this fall.
The question that bothers me is why he would have downgraded the importance of the Taliban in this situation. He is surely not about to seriously take on the major warlords that are his backers. Or is he?
There is a curious front page story in today's paper that reports President Karzai's assertion that the main enemy in Afghanistan is no longer the Taliban, but rather the "militias", which one might translate as the warlords, but this time maybe not. Attacks on workers attempting to register the population for a parliamentary vote have been so frequent lately that the parliamentary vote has had to be postponed to next year. This experience may have led to this reappraisal. However, many of these attacks have been on women, and therefore presumeably related to Taliban-like activity. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (a religious-warrior leader active in the anti-Soviet war) has often been cited as the leader of such efforts. On the other hand, the warlord leaders of at least the old Northern Alliance are thought to be major supporters of Karzai's campaign for another term as President, an election he is expected to win easily this fall.
The question that bothers me is why he would have downgraded the importance of the Taliban in this situation. He is surely not about to seriously take on the major warlords that are his backers. Or is he?
John Kerry and the War in Iraq
Kerry and Edwards on 60 Minutes this Sunday were again asked whether they would have voted against the authorization to violently attack Iraq if they knew what they know now as reported by the Senate Intelligence Committee. They replied that they oppose the way in which the President used the authorization to go to war. Senator Rockefeller and a few other Senators have said they would not have voted for war. But our candidates hold out for a more nuanced position. The confusion is that there was no vote "for war". (Indeed, this remains an undeclared war) The vote that is referred to was an "authorization" given to President Bush in October 2002. This was actually a carefully limited grant of power to the President to use force in Iraq if necessary to ensure the security of the United States.
The difficulty is that the stance of the democratic candidates comes across as a serious case of waffling. They do oppose and reject almost everything about the war: the dismissal of the objections of allies, the use of false information (some of it known to be false) to justify the war, and the poor planning for the immediate and longer aftermaths. However, they still do not want to say they oppose the war. Evidently, they fear that opposition would be seen as opposing our military forces who have lost lives and opposing the removal of Saddam Hussein that they heartily approve of.
They need to bite the bullet. Yes, there are many good things about the war. But the fact is, as they have readily agreed in other forums, the war was the result of massively misplaced priorities. It was based on a preemptive strategy that only made sense if we were in imminent danger. We were not. So they should state clearly that had they known how the authorization would be misused, they would have voted against the war. They were misled. They made a mistake. Now admit it, and go on.
Their message should be that we have, whether for good reasons or bad, taken on a responsibility to the Iraqi people and the Americans who have sacrificed their lives or suffered grievous injury in Iraq. They intend to live up to this responsibility. While working to withdraw American soldiers from the country as soon as feasible, they will increase assistance to the Iraqi government and people so that they might very soon again take full control of their country's future. They will also make sure that the strategic and tactical mistakes that led us into this quagmire not be repeated during their term in office. In particular, they will make sure that the idea of preemptive attack is never again used to justify military actions that are not essential to the security of the United States.
Kerry and Edwards on 60 Minutes this Sunday were again asked whether they would have voted against the authorization to violently attack Iraq if they knew what they know now as reported by the Senate Intelligence Committee. They replied that they oppose the way in which the President used the authorization to go to war. Senator Rockefeller and a few other Senators have said they would not have voted for war. But our candidates hold out for a more nuanced position. The confusion is that there was no vote "for war". (Indeed, this remains an undeclared war) The vote that is referred to was an "authorization" given to President Bush in October 2002. This was actually a carefully limited grant of power to the President to use force in Iraq if necessary to ensure the security of the United States.
The difficulty is that the stance of the democratic candidates comes across as a serious case of waffling. They do oppose and reject almost everything about the war: the dismissal of the objections of allies, the use of false information (some of it known to be false) to justify the war, and the poor planning for the immediate and longer aftermaths. However, they still do not want to say they oppose the war. Evidently, they fear that opposition would be seen as opposing our military forces who have lost lives and opposing the removal of Saddam Hussein that they heartily approve of.
They need to bite the bullet. Yes, there are many good things about the war. But the fact is, as they have readily agreed in other forums, the war was the result of massively misplaced priorities. It was based on a preemptive strategy that only made sense if we were in imminent danger. We were not. So they should state clearly that had they known how the authorization would be misused, they would have voted against the war. They were misled. They made a mistake. Now admit it, and go on.
Their message should be that we have, whether for good reasons or bad, taken on a responsibility to the Iraqi people and the Americans who have sacrificed their lives or suffered grievous injury in Iraq. They intend to live up to this responsibility. While working to withdraw American soldiers from the country as soon as feasible, they will increase assistance to the Iraqi government and people so that they might very soon again take full control of their country's future. They will also make sure that the strategic and tactical mistakes that led us into this quagmire not be repeated during their term in office. In particular, they will make sure that the idea of preemptive attack is never again used to justify military actions that are not essential to the security of the United States.
