Saturday, July 10, 2004
Waiting for the Next Shoe
Homeland Security tells us that there will be a major al-Qaida event soon. We have heard all this before, and yet one cannot help but believe that Bin Ladin and his associates will make a supreme effort to bring such an event off. There has been too great a hiatus — without something soon, we will find it hard to take them seriously any more.
Clearly, given their resources, and the small number of people they are evidently able to get into the United States, such an event, or series of coordinated events, will be difficult to successfully carry out. In spite of everyone's criticism of our intelligence services and Homeland security, they are probably more effective, more often, than we give them credit for. Since the opportunities of the opponent are so many and the gates to our country so many, this effectiveness is unlikely to be effective enough.
The main failure, the failure that is more likely than any other to contribute to another "Bin Ladin", will have been our failure to apprehend Bin Ladin and his major lieutenants, presumably living along the Afghan-Pakistani border. There is no doubt in my mind that the availability of the training and planning ground of Afghanistan was a major reason for the success of 9/11. Our invasion of Afghanistan greatly degraded this resource, but sadly it did not destroy it. Others have rightly pointed out that the worst effect of the Iraq War was that it diverted us from making a more effective effort in Afghanistan to complete the job. The border area is large and difficult to traverse, a large proportion of its people hate us, yet it is hard to believe that 100,000 American troops deployed the length of the border over the last two years could not have greatly increased our chances of eliminating this terror. I understand the difficulty of working with the Pakistanis, led by a general who could easily lose his life in a further anti-American reaction. But again, let us set our priorities where they belong, keep our focus, and do our best.
It is time now for all of us, the government, and the leaders of both parties to think through how we will respond to the next event, if it comes, and how our leaders will speak to the American people in its aftermath. The following very short list of what will have changed should be a start on thinking through this problem.
(1) Unlike 9/11, the event will not be unexpected.
(2) Unlike 9/11, we will be able to treat this event, or series of closely coordinated events, as an isolated episode, with little fear of subsequent or continuing attacks (such as we feared after 9/11).
(3) Past experience will allow us to focus more narrowly than in 9/11 on the recovery area in the immediate vicinity of the attacks and on the likely sources (including individuals) involved in them.
(4) Surmising that the attacks will again be against a major, internationally known target, we will then be able to focus more clearly on this kind of target, avoiding the shotgun approach of Homeland Security up to now.
Homeland Security tells us that there will be a major al-Qaida event soon. We have heard all this before, and yet one cannot help but believe that Bin Ladin and his associates will make a supreme effort to bring such an event off. There has been too great a hiatus — without something soon, we will find it hard to take them seriously any more.
Clearly, given their resources, and the small number of people they are evidently able to get into the United States, such an event, or series of coordinated events, will be difficult to successfully carry out. In spite of everyone's criticism of our intelligence services and Homeland security, they are probably more effective, more often, than we give them credit for. Since the opportunities of the opponent are so many and the gates to our country so many, this effectiveness is unlikely to be effective enough.
The main failure, the failure that is more likely than any other to contribute to another "Bin Ladin", will have been our failure to apprehend Bin Ladin and his major lieutenants, presumably living along the Afghan-Pakistani border. There is no doubt in my mind that the availability of the training and planning ground of Afghanistan was a major reason for the success of 9/11. Our invasion of Afghanistan greatly degraded this resource, but sadly it did not destroy it. Others have rightly pointed out that the worst effect of the Iraq War was that it diverted us from making a more effective effort in Afghanistan to complete the job. The border area is large and difficult to traverse, a large proportion of its people hate us, yet it is hard to believe that 100,000 American troops deployed the length of the border over the last two years could not have greatly increased our chances of eliminating this terror. I understand the difficulty of working with the Pakistanis, led by a general who could easily lose his life in a further anti-American reaction. But again, let us set our priorities where they belong, keep our focus, and do our best.
It is time now for all of us, the government, and the leaders of both parties to think through how we will respond to the next event, if it comes, and how our leaders will speak to the American people in its aftermath. The following very short list of what will have changed should be a start on thinking through this problem.
(1) Unlike 9/11, the event will not be unexpected.
(2) Unlike 9/11, we will be able to treat this event, or series of closely coordinated events, as an isolated episode, with little fear of subsequent or continuing attacks (such as we feared after 9/11).
(3) Past experience will allow us to focus more narrowly than in 9/11 on the recovery area in the immediate vicinity of the attacks and on the likely sources (including individuals) involved in them.
(4) Surmising that the attacks will again be against a major, internationally known target, we will then be able to focus more clearly on this kind of target, avoiding the shotgun approach of Homeland Security up to now.
Intelligence Failures: Is There a Way Out?
The papers the last two days have been full of the Senate Intelligence Committee Report. It condemns with exhaustive detail the failure of the intelligence community, especially the CIA, to obtain information on, analyze reasonably or report effectively on the major issues facing the country in the terrorism area, particularly as this relates to the decision to go to war with Iraq and what has happened subsequently. The Republicans want the blame to stop with the intelligence community; the Democrats want to see it as a more widespread failure involving the NSC and the White House.
It is clear that there have been failures here, partially as a result of the "business as usual attitude" that has characterized our intelligence and military efforts since Korea. The resources put into both Iraq and Afghanistan were minimal, a "just enough" approach that reminds me of the modern approach of businesses to stockpiling. An exception has been our willingness to fight from the air, in fact to do almost everything from the air. The major reasons: lower casualties and lower dollar cost. Our "9 to 5" approach was symbolized by a response of Mr. Tenet when asked why we had almost no human intelligence resources in Iraq before the war. His said it was "too dangerous to be in Iraq then". I cannot imagine this response in World War II. That war was taken seriously and we enlisted serious people in its fighting. (Incidentally, I am not personally a hero and do not mean to imply I would do any different. But this does not lessen the problem.)
In his Friday commentary on the Lehrer show, David Brooks made an apposite comment that somehow our system must take to heart. He said that whoever wins in November, the intelligence problem will remain as the biggest security hurdle we face. He reported that the ignorance appears to have not been lessened as the threat has grown. He was just back from a trip to Iraq where he had been startled to learn that we still seem to know very little about who we are fighting. He was amazed, for example, that our forces do not know if the insurgency has 5000 or 20,000 militants fighting for it.
My conclusion as I follow events from the sidelines is that the people we rely on in these areas are simply not intelligent enough to do the job that needs to be done. I do not want to say their IQs are not high enough, for intelligence useful in this business comes in many forms, some of which might not show up in an IQ test. But too often the obvious seems to be missed through reliance on SOP thinking, or reliance on computers to do the thinking. I suspect that there has been a long-term and continuing decline in the intelligence services due primarily to the quality of the people recruited to both these services and the Foreign Service. There was a time when these services recruited the best and the brightest. But this seems to be no longer the case. Two reasons might be suggested. First, young people are now more likely than in the past to see exciting and rewarding futures in other areas, for example, world business. Secondly, the attitude of one's peers toward services as the CIA, or even public service in general, has become so negative that persons choosing such a direction would be ashamed to admit it. After the gatekeeping function of recruitment, fossilized bureaucracies whose leaders seem less and less impressive are also unlikely to retain the better workers that they have managed to obtain.
Perhaps what we need in these areas, as in many others less critical, is a major effort to recruit better people, an effort that should be undertaken on many levels, including improving the environment and working conditions of recruits. Perhaps we need to develop new structures, new institutions, not so much because what we have now are organizationally inadequate, but because we need to offer new contexts where youthful idealism can be made to mature into lifetimes of effective service.
The papers the last two days have been full of the Senate Intelligence Committee Report. It condemns with exhaustive detail the failure of the intelligence community, especially the CIA, to obtain information on, analyze reasonably or report effectively on the major issues facing the country in the terrorism area, particularly as this relates to the decision to go to war with Iraq and what has happened subsequently. The Republicans want the blame to stop with the intelligence community; the Democrats want to see it as a more widespread failure involving the NSC and the White House.
It is clear that there have been failures here, partially as a result of the "business as usual attitude" that has characterized our intelligence and military efforts since Korea. The resources put into both Iraq and Afghanistan were minimal, a "just enough" approach that reminds me of the modern approach of businesses to stockpiling. An exception has been our willingness to fight from the air, in fact to do almost everything from the air. The major reasons: lower casualties and lower dollar cost. Our "9 to 5" approach was symbolized by a response of Mr. Tenet when asked why we had almost no human intelligence resources in Iraq before the war. His said it was "too dangerous to be in Iraq then". I cannot imagine this response in World War II. That war was taken seriously and we enlisted serious people in its fighting. (Incidentally, I am not personally a hero and do not mean to imply I would do any different. But this does not lessen the problem.)
In his Friday commentary on the Lehrer show, David Brooks made an apposite comment that somehow our system must take to heart. He said that whoever wins in November, the intelligence problem will remain as the biggest security hurdle we face. He reported that the ignorance appears to have not been lessened as the threat has grown. He was just back from a trip to Iraq where he had been startled to learn that we still seem to know very little about who we are fighting. He was amazed, for example, that our forces do not know if the insurgency has 5000 or 20,000 militants fighting for it.
My conclusion as I follow events from the sidelines is that the people we rely on in these areas are simply not intelligent enough to do the job that needs to be done. I do not want to say their IQs are not high enough, for intelligence useful in this business comes in many forms, some of which might not show up in an IQ test. But too often the obvious seems to be missed through reliance on SOP thinking, or reliance on computers to do the thinking. I suspect that there has been a long-term and continuing decline in the intelligence services due primarily to the quality of the people recruited to both these services and the Foreign Service. There was a time when these services recruited the best and the brightest. But this seems to be no longer the case. Two reasons might be suggested. First, young people are now more likely than in the past to see exciting and rewarding futures in other areas, for example, world business. Secondly, the attitude of one's peers toward services as the CIA, or even public service in general, has become so negative that persons choosing such a direction would be ashamed to admit it. After the gatekeeping function of recruitment, fossilized bureaucracies whose leaders seem less and less impressive are also unlikely to retain the better workers that they have managed to obtain.
Perhaps what we need in these areas, as in many others less critical, is a major effort to recruit better people, an effort that should be undertaken on many levels, including improving the environment and working conditions of recruits. Perhaps we need to develop new structures, new institutions, not so much because what we have now are organizationally inadequate, but because we need to offer new contexts where youthful idealism can be made to mature into lifetimes of effective service.
Najaf and the Sadrists again
Today's paper suggests that we have been too optimistic about the retreat of the Sadrists into participation in the regular election process. They have said they would, but they also continue to say the opposite. A report from Najaf finds that the shrine of the Imam Ali and the surrounding area are under the complete control of Moqtada al-Sadr and his forces. To hear them tell it, his people are literally dying to be martyrs for Moqtada. At the same time, the lucrative pilgrimage business in the area has ground to a halt. Najaf's governor and the new administration seem as buffaloed by this as the situation in Falluja. The governor insists he needs an agreement from the Mahdi Army to disband, but at the same time he believes trying to arrest Sadr would entail too high a risk of an fanatical reaction. Stay tuned.
Today's paper suggests that we have been too optimistic about the retreat of the Sadrists into participation in the regular election process. They have said they would, but they also continue to say the opposite. A report from Najaf finds that the shrine of the Imam Ali and the surrounding area are under the complete control of Moqtada al-Sadr and his forces. To hear them tell it, his people are literally dying to be martyrs for Moqtada. At the same time, the lucrative pilgrimage business in the area has ground to a halt. Najaf's governor and the new administration seem as buffaloed by this as the situation in Falluja. The governor insists he needs an agreement from the Mahdi Army to disband, but at the same time he believes trying to arrest Sadr would entail too high a risk of an fanatical reaction. Stay tuned.
Thursday, July 08, 2004
Saddam on Trial . . . and the U.S.?
The trial of Saddam Hussein has an additional drawback that I had not thought of. It seems that the lawyer for Saddam intends to connect as much of Hussein's crimes to the United States as he can. It is certainly true that we helped Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War. Whether we were complicit in the crimes of that war, such as the gassing of the Kurds or the murder of Shi'as, I do not know. The accusation has been made that we helped Iraq develop its chemical weapons. I certainly do not think that we were directly involved in planning or suggesting the attacks on civilians. But a clever lawyer can put together a story that will imply that we were. This will not help our image in Iraq or the Arab world. Ideally, it would have been better to have had an international court try Hussein and his court at some date after the shooting is over. But we wanted to let the Iraqis do what they wanted to do. Perhaps the people who should have thought first, once again did not think deeply enough about this.
As we learned in Afghanistan, the United States must be extremely careful when it decides to help others in violent conflicts. Perhaps we should think out some new rules for such situations, for they will arise again.
The trial of Saddam Hussein has an additional drawback that I had not thought of. It seems that the lawyer for Saddam intends to connect as much of Hussein's crimes to the United States as he can. It is certainly true that we helped Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War. Whether we were complicit in the crimes of that war, such as the gassing of the Kurds or the murder of Shi'as, I do not know. The accusation has been made that we helped Iraq develop its chemical weapons. I certainly do not think that we were directly involved in planning or suggesting the attacks on civilians. But a clever lawyer can put together a story that will imply that we were. This will not help our image in Iraq or the Arab world. Ideally, it would have been better to have had an international court try Hussein and his court at some date after the shooting is over. But we wanted to let the Iraqis do what they wanted to do. Perhaps the people who should have thought first, once again did not think deeply enough about this.
As we learned in Afghanistan, the United States must be extremely careful when it decides to help others in violent conflicts. Perhaps we should think out some new rules for such situations, for they will arise again.
The New York Times and Dr. Allawi
Apparently out of a warped and unrealistic idealism, the New York Times has been campaigning against the new Iraqi prime minister ever since he was appointed. It is true that Dr. Allawi was at one time a Baathist. It is also true that he enlisted the support of the CIA in the 1990s in a failed attempt to overthrow Saddam Hussein. However, as mentioned previously here, this does not implicate him in the major crimes of the Baathists, nor does it suggest that he is uninterested in reforming Iraq. He may well have "authoritarian tendencies" as the Times believes, but this may be exactly what Iraq is looking for right now. They want someone able and willing to gather together the threads of authority in Iraq and bring them together for a new beginning. Few Iraqis understand liberal democracy, few have the background necessary for a successful liberal democracy, and liberal democracy is certainly not an Iraqi priority right now.
The latest attack by the Times is in a lead editorial "Shades of the Old Iraq" (July 8). It focuses on the chances for misuse of Allawi's new martial law decree. They fear that Allawi will use the new powers to intimidate rising groups in the society, thereby sounding the death kneel for the possibility of effective democracy, the "main rationale for the war". In doing so, they make two errors. First, they ignore the careful manner in which the degree hedges the power, limiting it in time and requiring that the leaders of the main ethnic groups sign off before it can be invoked. Second, and most important, the reasonable case for intervention in Iraq was to bring to an end the monstrous rule of a leader who egregiously ignored even the most elemental human rights standards who commanded military resources he had not been loathe to use aggressively in the past. We did not invade Jordan or Egypt or Pakistan, even though they are hardly democracies. We work with most Middle Eastern states because they are responsible members of a world community. We would like to see all of them democracies some day. We would like Iraq to be a fully functioning democracies. We might have imposed democracy with a post-World War II sized effort stretched over a period of many years. But we did it on the cheap, and we will probably leave soon, so we have to be satisfied with much less. It is finally up to the Iraqis whether our dream becomes theirs.
Apparently out of a warped and unrealistic idealism, the New York Times has been campaigning against the new Iraqi prime minister ever since he was appointed. It is true that Dr. Allawi was at one time a Baathist. It is also true that he enlisted the support of the CIA in the 1990s in a failed attempt to overthrow Saddam Hussein. However, as mentioned previously here, this does not implicate him in the major crimes of the Baathists, nor does it suggest that he is uninterested in reforming Iraq. He may well have "authoritarian tendencies" as the Times believes, but this may be exactly what Iraq is looking for right now. They want someone able and willing to gather together the threads of authority in Iraq and bring them together for a new beginning. Few Iraqis understand liberal democracy, few have the background necessary for a successful liberal democracy, and liberal democracy is certainly not an Iraqi priority right now.
The latest attack by the Times is in a lead editorial "Shades of the Old Iraq" (July 8). It focuses on the chances for misuse of Allawi's new martial law decree. They fear that Allawi will use the new powers to intimidate rising groups in the society, thereby sounding the death kneel for the possibility of effective democracy, the "main rationale for the war". In doing so, they make two errors. First, they ignore the careful manner in which the degree hedges the power, limiting it in time and requiring that the leaders of the main ethnic groups sign off before it can be invoked. Second, and most important, the reasonable case for intervention in Iraq was to bring to an end the monstrous rule of a leader who egregiously ignored even the most elemental human rights standards who commanded military resources he had not been loathe to use aggressively in the past. We did not invade Jordan or Egypt or Pakistan, even though they are hardly democracies. We work with most Middle Eastern states because they are responsible members of a world community. We would like to see all of them democracies some day. We would like Iraq to be a fully functioning democracies. We might have imposed democracy with a post-World War II sized effort stretched over a period of many years. But we did it on the cheap, and we will probably leave soon, so we have to be satisfied with much less. It is finally up to the Iraqis whether our dream becomes theirs.
Holding Our Breath
Since the turnover of power, there has been an only relative, yet still remarkable, lull. Not as many Iraqis or Coalition forces seem to be attacked. There was a skirmish yesterday in Baghdad involving both Iraqi and American defense forces. Yet in spite of a great deal of shooting, the casualty count remained low.
On the terrorism in Iraq front, two possibly important signs. First, the group holding the Marine seems to have released rather than decapitated him. Second, the papers yesterday reported that a new underground movement calling itself the "Salvation Front" warned Zarqawi that they would kill him unless he left the country. If there is such a group and this is not simply misinformation, this implies a breakup of the insurgency.
Another hint of change along the same line comes from Falluja. On the one hand, today's paper reports that it has become a center for organizing the resistance. Our decision to "leave it to the Iraqis" seems to have failed in this instance (however as an example of unintended consequences, it was this very decision that seemed to be copied elsewhere, such as against the Sadrists, with success). On the other hand, there are also reports that the "Falluja Brigade" (made up of Baathists and locals) may be becoming increasingly hostile to the foreigners who are using the city as a base. This would fit in with the "Salvation Front" report.
Meanwhile, as we begin to congratulate ourselves, Falluja and its environs, and perhaps some other hot spots such as Samarra, remain outside our control or that of the interim government. It does not have the requisite firepower to take Falluja yet and if we did it, it would kill too many. This is a conundrum that will have to be solved. Quarantining such places sounds fine, let them "stew in their own juices", except that it is said that bombs and missions are developed and directed from these centers.
Since the turnover of power, there has been an only relative, yet still remarkable, lull. Not as many Iraqis or Coalition forces seem to be attacked. There was a skirmish yesterday in Baghdad involving both Iraqi and American defense forces. Yet in spite of a great deal of shooting, the casualty count remained low.
On the terrorism in Iraq front, two possibly important signs. First, the group holding the Marine seems to have released rather than decapitated him. Second, the papers yesterday reported that a new underground movement calling itself the "Salvation Front" warned Zarqawi that they would kill him unless he left the country. If there is such a group and this is not simply misinformation, this implies a breakup of the insurgency.
Another hint of change along the same line comes from Falluja. On the one hand, today's paper reports that it has become a center for organizing the resistance. Our decision to "leave it to the Iraqis" seems to have failed in this instance (however as an example of unintended consequences, it was this very decision that seemed to be copied elsewhere, such as against the Sadrists, with success). On the other hand, there are also reports that the "Falluja Brigade" (made up of Baathists and locals) may be becoming increasingly hostile to the foreigners who are using the city as a base. This would fit in with the "Salvation Front" report.
Meanwhile, as we begin to congratulate ourselves, Falluja and its environs, and perhaps some other hot spots such as Samarra, remain outside our control or that of the interim government. It does not have the requisite firepower to take Falluja yet and if we did it, it would kill too many. This is a conundrum that will have to be solved. Quarantining such places sounds fine, let them "stew in their own juices", except that it is said that bombs and missions are developed and directed from these centers.
Wednesday, July 07, 2004
Casualty Trends
As can be seen from the following tables, based on DoD figures, there has been a marked decline in American or coalition casualties since their high point in April. The decline in June was remarkable. Unfortunately, the decline for contractors has not been noticeable. Through June there were 106 fatalities, with no decline from the proceeding months. Unfortunately, we do not have good information on Iraqi civilian casualties. But with the intensity of the war slackening off, they are probably also down, in spite of the suicide bombings.
Military Fatalities: By Month
Period US UK Other* Total Avg Days
7-2004 9 0 2 11 1.83 6
6-2004 42 1 7 50 1.67 30
5-2004 80 0 4 84 2.71 31
4-2004 135 0 5 140 4.67 30
3-2004 52 0 0 52 1.68 31
2-2004 20 1 2 23 0.79 29
1-2004 47 5 0 52 1.68 31
12-2003 40 0 8 48 1.55 31
11-2003 82 1 27 110 3.67 30
10-2003 43 1 2 46 1.48 31
9-2003 30 1 1 32 1.07 30
8-2003 35 6 2 43 1.39 31
7-2003 47 1 0 48 1.55 31
6-2003 30 6 0 36 1.2 30
5-2003 37 4 0 41 1.32 31
4-2003 73 6 0 79 2.63 30
3-2003 65 27 0 92 7.67 12
Total 867 60 60 987 2.08 475
Wounded In Action According to The DoD
Period Wounded
Jun-2004 197
May-2004 738
Apr-2004 1153
Mar-2004 307
Feb-2004 146
Jan-2004 186
Dec-2003 261
Nov-2003 337
Oct-2003 413
Sep-2003 247
Aug-2003 181
Jul-2003 226
Jun-2003 147
May-2003 54
Apr-2003 340
Mar-2003 205
Total 5138
Tuesday, July 06, 2004
Shi'a-Sunni Struggles in Iraq
Juan Cole reports several recent clashes of Sunni and Shi'a in the Baghdad area. It seems according to one report that the Sunnis in part of the Sunni Triangle are driving out Shi'a in an attempt to develop a Shi'a-free band around Baghdad. In Samarra there have been major rallies (after televising the trial) in support of Saddam. He suspects that the Shi'as here are grumbling in silence since they suffered so much from Saddam. Mogtada al-Sadr's people have been demanding Saddam's execution from the pulpit and in marches. A Shi'a imam in Baghdad has been preaching against Saddam's lawyers, saying they will be killed if they come into the country. Cole thinks that the trial may really enflame these feelings.
The fact is that the al-Qaida, Wahhabi, and Salafi Sunnis that now dominate much of the resistance, especially in Falluja, are also bitterly opposed to Shiite doctrine and the Shi'a community. If worst comes to worst, what we could have is a struggle with the old Baathists (secular) and Arab Sunnis, on the one side (with most of the Arab world potentially behind them) and the Shi'as (religious and secular), with Iran potentially behind them.
(Incidentally, Cole, who has generally disparaged the interim government was at least quite impressed with the most recent interview with Allawi's latest interview. Allawi came across as a moderate Arab nationalist willing to work with a wide variety of interests.)
Juan Cole reports several recent clashes of Sunni and Shi'a in the Baghdad area. It seems according to one report that the Sunnis in part of the Sunni Triangle are driving out Shi'a in an attempt to develop a Shi'a-free band around Baghdad. In Samarra there have been major rallies (after televising the trial) in support of Saddam. He suspects that the Shi'as here are grumbling in silence since they suffered so much from Saddam. Mogtada al-Sadr's people have been demanding Saddam's execution from the pulpit and in marches. A Shi'a imam in Baghdad has been preaching against Saddam's lawyers, saying they will be killed if they come into the country. Cole thinks that the trial may really enflame these feelings.
The fact is that the al-Qaida, Wahhabi, and Salafi Sunnis that now dominate much of the resistance, especially in Falluja, are also bitterly opposed to Shiite doctrine and the Shi'a community. If worst comes to worst, what we could have is a struggle with the old Baathists (secular) and Arab Sunnis, on the one side (with most of the Arab world potentially behind them) and the Shi'as (religious and secular), with Iran potentially behind them.
(Incidentally, Cole, who has generally disparaged the interim government was at least quite impressed with the most recent interview with Allawi's latest interview. Allawi came across as a moderate Arab nationalist willing to work with a wide variety of interests.)
