Friday, July 02, 2004
Iran and Iraq: Analysis
In their latest "Strategic Comments", the International Institute for Strategic Studies analyzes the interests and activities of Iran in Iraq. They naturally have had and have a variety of different interests. One simple one is to thwart the development of American power in the area as long as their relations with the United States remain at a nadir. They are said to have thousands of agents in Iraq, yet one wonders because only a handful of Iranians have been arrested and imprisoned. (Another analysis says that the "foreigners" in the insurgency are coming over the Syrian border not the Iranian. ) Iran has been holding (sheltering?) a few al-Qaida agents primarily as an irritant to the United States (according to the analysis). Incidentally, one relationship the analysis does not consider adequately is that to the Kurds. Yes, Tehran formerly supported Talabani's Kurds versus Barzani's. But the leaders in Tehran are probably as nationalistic as ever when it comes to Kurdish independence. One can only assume that they would fear and oppose an essentially independent Kurdistan, just as the Turks do.
But what I find of most interest in the analysis of the relationship of the top clerics in Tehran to Iraqi Shiism. Their ambition after Khomeini has been to lead the Shiite world, replacing effectively the leadership formerly headquartered in Najaf and Karbala. Thus, they fear a loss of religious leadership if Iraq should emerge as a stable society. Aside from the question of pride of leadership, the analysis says that the doctrine of Velayat-i-Faqih, developed by Khomeini and incorporated into the Iranian Constitution, is not accepted by any leading Shiite cleric in Iraq. This doctrine, that religious leaders should directly rule the state, is anathema to Ayatollah Sistani in Iraq. Should Sistani and those around him come to be seen again as the intellectual leaders of Shiism, this would cast doubt on the legitimacy of the Iranian state. Tehran is also concerned about the nationalism of some Iraqi clerics, such as Moqtada al-Sadr. These clerics have voiced an extreme anti-Americanism, but clothed it as more nationalist than Shiite. I would conclude that Tehran has little reason to believe that Iraq under Shiite majority rule would be an Iraq they could live with.
In their latest "Strategic Comments", the International Institute for Strategic Studies analyzes the interests and activities of Iran in Iraq. They naturally have had and have a variety of different interests. One simple one is to thwart the development of American power in the area as long as their relations with the United States remain at a nadir. They are said to have thousands of agents in Iraq, yet one wonders because only a handful of Iranians have been arrested and imprisoned. (Another analysis says that the "foreigners" in the insurgency are coming over the Syrian border not the Iranian. ) Iran has been holding (sheltering?) a few al-Qaida agents primarily as an irritant to the United States (according to the analysis). Incidentally, one relationship the analysis does not consider adequately is that to the Kurds. Yes, Tehran formerly supported Talabani's Kurds versus Barzani's. But the leaders in Tehran are probably as nationalistic as ever when it comes to Kurdish independence. One can only assume that they would fear and oppose an essentially independent Kurdistan, just as the Turks do.
But what I find of most interest in the analysis of the relationship of the top clerics in Tehran to Iraqi Shiism. Their ambition after Khomeini has been to lead the Shiite world, replacing effectively the leadership formerly headquartered in Najaf and Karbala. Thus, they fear a loss of religious leadership if Iraq should emerge as a stable society. Aside from the question of pride of leadership, the analysis says that the doctrine of Velayat-i-Faqih, developed by Khomeini and incorporated into the Iranian Constitution, is not accepted by any leading Shiite cleric in Iraq. This doctrine, that religious leaders should directly rule the state, is anathema to Ayatollah Sistani in Iraq. Should Sistani and those around him come to be seen again as the intellectual leaders of Shiism, this would cast doubt on the legitimacy of the Iranian state. Tehran is also concerned about the nationalism of some Iraqi clerics, such as Moqtada al-Sadr. These clerics have voiced an extreme anti-Americanism, but clothed it as more nationalist than Shiite. I would conclude that Tehran has little reason to believe that Iraq under Shiite majority rule would be an Iraq they could live with.
Saddam Hussein and New Directions
Knowledgeable commentators in today's New York Times, and coincidentally on this morning's Diane Riehm show, continue to speak a line of doom and gloom. Since they see little legitimacy for the interim government, they see America's forces sunk in a quagmire from which it will take years to emerge. They may be right. But I continue to see a silver lining that they are missing. In spite of an article in today's NYT claiming the contrary, the last few days have seen less violence in the country. What violence there is continues to be concentrated in the Sunni Triangle.
It seems to me we understand the mortification of Saddam before the court from the point of view of the Iraqi population as a whole.
Montefiore (Op-Ed, July 2) makes some thoughtful comparisons between Saddam Hussein and Stalin. Like Stalin, after the fact many Iraqis will treat Saddam as a national hero. However, the ways in which the comparison fails are also significant, particularly when related to the effect of Saddam's trial on the Iraqi people. Although a Georgian, Stalin became identified with the Russian people as a whole, and he did not single out any important ethnic segment of this population for oppression. Saddam, however, is reviled as their oppressor by the vast majority of the Shiites (60-65%) and Kurds (over 15-20%). He has had, and may still have, the loyalty of a majority of the Sunni Arab population (15%). This suggests that the current trial, with its attempt to further discredit Saddam, promises to help most of the country come together in support of the new government to an extent that was not possible in Russia. No matter how effective Saddam is before the court, and this effectiveness admittedly could be a problem, he is unlikely to sway more than people from the small group that felt empowered by his rule.
Thus, while we are hearing some pro-Saddam comments in interviews in Baghdad, within the Sunni community, I expect few we will hear few from outside this area. And we must remember that an important segment of the Sunni Arab community, particularly its intellectuals, also suffered under Saddam.
If anything like this interpretation is correct, then we should follow Brezezinski's suggestion and set an early time table for the departure of at least the bulk of our forces. In the interim, our forces should be concentrated in support of Iraqi security forces in the Sunni Triangle and positioned to guard major infrastructure facilities. We should then work out a much more limited presence in the rest of the country, so that in appearance and reality, these areas, at least, will no longer be "occupied" by the foreigner. On this basis, a time table should be developed to reduce and remove the American presence.
Knowledgeable commentators in today's New York Times, and coincidentally on this morning's Diane Riehm show, continue to speak a line of doom and gloom. Since they see little legitimacy for the interim government, they see America's forces sunk in a quagmire from which it will take years to emerge. They may be right. But I continue to see a silver lining that they are missing. In spite of an article in today's NYT claiming the contrary, the last few days have seen less violence in the country. What violence there is continues to be concentrated in the Sunni Triangle.
It seems to me we understand the mortification of Saddam before the court from the point of view of the Iraqi population as a whole.
Montefiore (Op-Ed, July 2) makes some thoughtful comparisons between Saddam Hussein and Stalin. Like Stalin, after the fact many Iraqis will treat Saddam as a national hero. However, the ways in which the comparison fails are also significant, particularly when related to the effect of Saddam's trial on the Iraqi people. Although a Georgian, Stalin became identified with the Russian people as a whole, and he did not single out any important ethnic segment of this population for oppression. Saddam, however, is reviled as their oppressor by the vast majority of the Shiites (60-65%) and Kurds (over 15-20%). He has had, and may still have, the loyalty of a majority of the Sunni Arab population (15%). This suggests that the current trial, with its attempt to further discredit Saddam, promises to help most of the country come together in support of the new government to an extent that was not possible in Russia. No matter how effective Saddam is before the court, and this effectiveness admittedly could be a problem, he is unlikely to sway more than people from the small group that felt empowered by his rule.
Thus, while we are hearing some pro-Saddam comments in interviews in Baghdad, within the Sunni community, I expect few we will hear few from outside this area. And we must remember that an important segment of the Sunni Arab community, particularly its intellectuals, also suffered under Saddam.
If anything like this interpretation is correct, then we should follow Brezezinski's suggestion and set an early time table for the departure of at least the bulk of our forces. In the interim, our forces should be concentrated in support of Iraqi security forces in the Sunni Triangle and positioned to guard major infrastructure facilities. We should then work out a much more limited presence in the rest of the country, so that in appearance and reality, these areas, at least, will no longer be "occupied" by the foreigner. On this basis, a time table should be developed to reduce and remove the American presence.
Wednesday, June 30, 2004
Biological Warfare: Can Defense be Counterproductive?
In the June 29th Science section of the NYT, the campaign of Richard Ebright against new super secure laboratories is discussed. It seems that in the wake of 9/11, some of the leading institutions and experts in the biological warfare field have argued that we need new laboratories devoted to developing, and testing the defenses against, a new class of super bugs that have not yet been developed. Ebright, now a rather lonely expert in the field, says these plans should not be realized. He argues that the proposed laboratories will be expensive, are unnecessary, and are quite likely to actually make more likely the threats they are designed to protect against. He argues that for the near future terrorist biological warfare will in all probability be devised on the basis of already existing agents. He also points out that the main source of such weapons in the past have been the existing laboratories. Thus, instead of protecting us, the laboratories, by requiring hundreds of new workers and the need to develop new procedures, could make available extremely serious agents that would otherwise not exist.
Without knowing enough to comment, I nevertheless sympathize with his case. Too often, people in a field look to the wondrous future that government funds might provide for their institutions and careers. I do not want to say that scientists and scientific entrepreneurs are often willfully dishonest. But as enthusiasts seeking new frontiers, they find it easy to convince themselves that cherished new programs are in the interest of us all. I hope Ebright's arguments are taken seriously.
In the June 29th Science section of the NYT, the campaign of Richard Ebright against new super secure laboratories is discussed. It seems that in the wake of 9/11, some of the leading institutions and experts in the biological warfare field have argued that we need new laboratories devoted to developing, and testing the defenses against, a new class of super bugs that have not yet been developed. Ebright, now a rather lonely expert in the field, says these plans should not be realized. He argues that the proposed laboratories will be expensive, are unnecessary, and are quite likely to actually make more likely the threats they are designed to protect against. He argues that for the near future terrorist biological warfare will in all probability be devised on the basis of already existing agents. He also points out that the main source of such weapons in the past have been the existing laboratories. Thus, instead of protecting us, the laboratories, by requiring hundreds of new workers and the need to develop new procedures, could make available extremely serious agents that would otherwise not exist.
Without knowing enough to comment, I nevertheless sympathize with his case. Too often, people in a field look to the wondrous future that government funds might provide for their institutions and careers. I do not want to say that scientists and scientific entrepreneurs are often willfully dishonest. But as enthusiasts seeking new frontiers, they find it easy to convince themselves that cherished new programs are in the interest of us all. I hope Ebright's arguments are taken seriously.
Pause or a Shift in the Weather?
We have heard of little violence for the last two days. Every respite is a welcome one, but what does this mean? It could mean that the opposition was putting all its marbles on a spectacular or series of spectaculars on June 30, and became confused or maybe just delayed by the early transition. It may be the insurgents are simply taking a breather. Or it could mean that many Iraqi anti-Americans are pulling back from the battle, waiting to see what will happen. It is significant that the Islamic Press seems to have been at least as positive about the change as our elite press has been. Official Egypt played up the transfer. Official Syria called it a positive step that they hoped would lead to full sovereignty. The reaction of the Iranian Foreign Ministry was the same. Its spokesman added: "The interim government is expected to provide grounds for the restoration of full sovereignty, the real end of the occupation and free and timely general elections."
A former CIA expert (Reuel Gerecht) in today's Op-Ed argues that for now the people will give the new government the benefit of the doubt. He says most Sunnis and Shiites are tired of the fighting and they are tired of the fundamentalists that in some areas have taken control away from the local insurgents, their traditional leaders, even from former Baathists. He suggests, however, that Allawi's approach is too heavily based on reviving the army in all its glory (five divisions). He seems altogether too comfortable with the Sunni Baathist officers with which he spent most of his career. Gerecht argues that unless Shiite militias are integrated fairly soon into top positions in this new army, the Shi'a community may see it as little more than a revival of the old Sunni state, and rise once again. He advises that we press the new government to replicate elected local government such as that in Mosul to develop a sound and believable basis for an early return to democracy, a route he sees preferable to overemphasis on security.
Nir Rosen's report in the July 5 New Yorker on several visits he made into Falluja offers a valuable glimpse into the insurgency in what may be the most effectively anti-American of the Sunni centers of power. At the beginning of his tale the locals appeared very proud of the fact that they had driven the Americans out. He found Falluja full of armed groups of every description, often in competition with one another. Increasingly it appeared that the "foreigners", better armed and more cohesive were displacing the local sheikhs and imams from their positions of undisputed power. They put some areas under extreme conservative religious rule, a way of life few Iraqis want. It was no doubt they who had the Shi'a truck drivers killed. Thus, while the Falluja brigade that was supposed to bring peace eventually failed to control the area, the extreme forces that in large part defeated them seem to be in the process of alienating the general populace. (Psychologically, this is somewhat parallel to the activity in some Shi'a cities where the welcome for the Mahdi army was short-lived.)
The insurgency's fatal flaw may be that it has been unable to develop a coherent vision of how Iraq would be ruled were the Americans driven out. The Shi'a have two visions, one a replay of Iran, the other a more secular democratic state with legal space for Islam. The secular westernizers have the implicit vision of a more or less western democracy with a secular constitution, a vision that harkens back to the system developing in Iraq before the Baathists. The Baathists probably want a revived authoritarian state without the excesses of the past (although they have not spelled this out; it is this vision that Gerecht seems to fear Allawi, a former Baathist, actually has in the back of his mind). Others may have the vision of a more traditional, tribal state — this also has not been spelled out. The Kurds want either a federal state or several states. So the average Iraqi may be confused once he thinks beyond getting his nation back. Again, the interim government may be something a little more concrete than he has been offered by the insurgents.
In any event, we can hope that Zarqawi and other foreigners have overplayed their hand in many parts of Iraq, leaving the general populace willing for the time being to support the interim government as the most credible road to peace under Iraqi control that is open to them.
We have heard of little violence for the last two days. Every respite is a welcome one, but what does this mean? It could mean that the opposition was putting all its marbles on a spectacular or series of spectaculars on June 30, and became confused or maybe just delayed by the early transition. It may be the insurgents are simply taking a breather. Or it could mean that many Iraqi anti-Americans are pulling back from the battle, waiting to see what will happen. It is significant that the Islamic Press seems to have been at least as positive about the change as our elite press has been. Official Egypt played up the transfer. Official Syria called it a positive step that they hoped would lead to full sovereignty. The reaction of the Iranian Foreign Ministry was the same. Its spokesman added: "The interim government is expected to provide grounds for the restoration of full sovereignty, the real end of the occupation and free and timely general elections."
A former CIA expert (Reuel Gerecht) in today's Op-Ed argues that for now the people will give the new government the benefit of the doubt. He says most Sunnis and Shiites are tired of the fighting and they are tired of the fundamentalists that in some areas have taken control away from the local insurgents, their traditional leaders, even from former Baathists. He suggests, however, that Allawi's approach is too heavily based on reviving the army in all its glory (five divisions). He seems altogether too comfortable with the Sunni Baathist officers with which he spent most of his career. Gerecht argues that unless Shiite militias are integrated fairly soon into top positions in this new army, the Shi'a community may see it as little more than a revival of the old Sunni state, and rise once again. He advises that we press the new government to replicate elected local government such as that in Mosul to develop a sound and believable basis for an early return to democracy, a route he sees preferable to overemphasis on security.
Nir Rosen's report in the July 5 New Yorker on several visits he made into Falluja offers a valuable glimpse into the insurgency in what may be the most effectively anti-American of the Sunni centers of power. At the beginning of his tale the locals appeared very proud of the fact that they had driven the Americans out. He found Falluja full of armed groups of every description, often in competition with one another. Increasingly it appeared that the "foreigners", better armed and more cohesive were displacing the local sheikhs and imams from their positions of undisputed power. They put some areas under extreme conservative religious rule, a way of life few Iraqis want. It was no doubt they who had the Shi'a truck drivers killed. Thus, while the Falluja brigade that was supposed to bring peace eventually failed to control the area, the extreme forces that in large part defeated them seem to be in the process of alienating the general populace. (Psychologically, this is somewhat parallel to the activity in some Shi'a cities where the welcome for the Mahdi army was short-lived.)
The insurgency's fatal flaw may be that it has been unable to develop a coherent vision of how Iraq would be ruled were the Americans driven out. The Shi'a have two visions, one a replay of Iran, the other a more secular democratic state with legal space for Islam. The secular westernizers have the implicit vision of a more or less western democracy with a secular constitution, a vision that harkens back to the system developing in Iraq before the Baathists. The Baathists probably want a revived authoritarian state without the excesses of the past (although they have not spelled this out; it is this vision that Gerecht seems to fear Allawi, a former Baathist, actually has in the back of his mind). Others may have the vision of a more traditional, tribal state — this also has not been spelled out. The Kurds want either a federal state or several states. So the average Iraqi may be confused once he thinks beyond getting his nation back. Again, the interim government may be something a little more concrete than he has been offered by the insurgents.
In any event, we can hope that Zarqawi and other foreigners have overplayed their hand in many parts of Iraq, leaving the general populace willing for the time being to support the interim government as the most credible road to peace under Iraqi control that is open to them.
Tuesday, June 29, 2004
MoveOn Gets Stuck
MoveOn spends its funds on a full-page advertisement in today's New York Times attacking the transfer of power in Iraq as a "fumble". Actually, anything Bush might have done yesterday in Iraq would have been so characterized. Echoing this, Paul Krugman entitles his Op-Ed "Who Lost Iraq?" It is another recitation of some of the well-known errors of the adventure as well as some not so well known. To me these attacks are very much like harping on the mistakes surrounding 9/11. Yes, we made mistakes. Gore would have made mistakes. Yes, it would be good to have a new Administration in a few months. But right now we have Iraq. People are dying there, Americans, Iraqis and others who have come to work Iraq. It may make us feel good to spend our energy painting new coats of disaster on the Iraq adventure, but this is not responsible citizenship.
The turnover of power in Iraq may turn out to be merely another chapter in a sorry story. But as I suggested in yesterday's entry, there are several reasons to hope for a better outcome. And for the sake of Iraqis we must help to make this more rather than less probable. The more it becomes clear to Iraqis that many Americans expect us to fail in Iraq, indeed have invested so much already in this failure that they want the United States to fail there (see Michael Moore's "documentary"), the more the resistance is encouraged to hold out and the more people on the government's side will lose heart. As we have all been taught too many times, communications media do not live in separate national boxes any more — what is expressed in one country, particularly the USA, will soon be known to observers everywhere. This is a major reason Kerry has played a very responsible role so far. Let us hope he continues.
The military exit remains tricky. Last night Zbigniew Brezezinski proposed again that we set a definite date for Coalition forces to leave. This sounds like a good idea. It will avoid an Iraqi government feeling for nationalistic reasons that it must ask us to leave. It does not mean, of course, that we have to stay until the date announced (just as it did not mean this for the turnover). Nevertheless, it is hard to tell ahead of time where we will be at any particular point in the future. We do not know now the reasons any President, Bush or Kerry, might legitimately want to keep troops in Iraq after any given date. One could say, for example, that if the Iraqis cannot control their own country by June 30, 2005, we should do as we did in Vietnam — leave and let those left behind suffer the consequences. But I do not think this is wise or just. Whatever we may think of our adventure, we started it. We brought death and destruction to the Iraqis along with some of the good that we intended. Many Iraqis hate us, but we have persuaded millions of others to support our objectives, to identify their future with our success. To these we have a responsibility that cannot be lightly dismissed, even though some day dismiss it we might.
MoveOn spends its funds on a full-page advertisement in today's New York Times attacking the transfer of power in Iraq as a "fumble". Actually, anything Bush might have done yesterday in Iraq would have been so characterized. Echoing this, Paul Krugman entitles his Op-Ed "Who Lost Iraq?" It is another recitation of some of the well-known errors of the adventure as well as some not so well known. To me these attacks are very much like harping on the mistakes surrounding 9/11. Yes, we made mistakes. Gore would have made mistakes. Yes, it would be good to have a new Administration in a few months. But right now we have Iraq. People are dying there, Americans, Iraqis and others who have come to work Iraq. It may make us feel good to spend our energy painting new coats of disaster on the Iraq adventure, but this is not responsible citizenship.
The turnover of power in Iraq may turn out to be merely another chapter in a sorry story. But as I suggested in yesterday's entry, there are several reasons to hope for a better outcome. And for the sake of Iraqis we must help to make this more rather than less probable. The more it becomes clear to Iraqis that many Americans expect us to fail in Iraq, indeed have invested so much already in this failure that they want the United States to fail there (see Michael Moore's "documentary"), the more the resistance is encouraged to hold out and the more people on the government's side will lose heart. As we have all been taught too many times, communications media do not live in separate national boxes any more — what is expressed in one country, particularly the USA, will soon be known to observers everywhere. This is a major reason Kerry has played a very responsible role so far. Let us hope he continues.
The military exit remains tricky. Last night Zbigniew Brezezinski proposed again that we set a definite date for Coalition forces to leave. This sounds like a good idea. It will avoid an Iraqi government feeling for nationalistic reasons that it must ask us to leave. It does not mean, of course, that we have to stay until the date announced (just as it did not mean this for the turnover). Nevertheless, it is hard to tell ahead of time where we will be at any particular point in the future. We do not know now the reasons any President, Bush or Kerry, might legitimately want to keep troops in Iraq after any given date. One could say, for example, that if the Iraqis cannot control their own country by June 30, 2005, we should do as we did in Vietnam — leave and let those left behind suffer the consequences. But I do not think this is wise or just. Whatever we may think of our adventure, we started it. We brought death and destruction to the Iraqis along with some of the good that we intended. Many Iraqis hate us, but we have persuaded millions of others to support our objectives, to identify their future with our success. To these we have a responsibility that cannot be lightly dismissed, even though some day dismiss it we might.
Monday, June 28, 2004
The Transfer of Power I
The Iraqis have formally taken over. Paul Bremer has left the country and Ambassador Negroponte had taken over for the American side. Apparently Bremer and the Prime Minister had decided several days ago that in order to avoid violence on Wednesday, they would transfer power early. So they set up a ceremony, everyone was sworn in, and the new government is under way. It was a smart move. It avoids giving the opposition a chance to bring off a final spectacular just before and during the transfer ceremonies. Unfortunately, it may also contribute to perceptions in Iraq and abroad that the transfer is all a facade or that we are on the run from the insurgents. Many commentators, including Professor Cole, are quite dismissive of the new government and its prospects. They claim that nearly everyone is against the new regime. American military polls, for what they are worth, show the opposite. Analytically, at least, there are several reasons to be a little positive.
(1) In the last few days violence had been directed almost entirely at Iraqis and almost entirely in the Sunni Triangle or nearby. (This is not too reassuring since Baghdad is in this area.) Some of it is obviously well organized, but much of it appears to be random anti-foreign or anti-collaborator violence. Most of the country appears relatively calm.
(2) The recent insurgent emphasis on kidnapping and beheading is characteristic of a terrorist campaign rather than an insurgency or guerrilla war. It is more of the Bin Ladin type of thing, rather than a campaign to take over a country and rule it. Moreover some of the efforts have resulted in indiscriminate killing that is bound to turn off many Iraqis.
(3) The new government and its Coalition supporters are now dedicated to the idea that they can succeed only by combining political and military action. Allawi has reaffirmed keeping to the election date and he is talking of amnesty, allowing electoral participation, for some of those who have been in the opposition, particularly for the "Mahdi Army" of the Sadrists.
(4) Professor Cole reports that the new government is trying to reconstitute both Saddam's army and his secret police. He laments the latter. Yet the Americans and the interim government are in a bind. With the personnel they now have our side simply does not have the intelligence to fight this enemy. I imagine the American approach has broken down even further after the prison scandals. What we need now is an army and an intelligence group no longer identified with us that can fight back. Since nearly every member of the interim government suffered from Saddam's rule, I doubt if they are simply going to reestablish its institutions and reconstitute the horrors of the past. We must remember that Putin was a high ranking officer in the KGB before he became head of Russia. That fact helps him rule a difficult country, but it has not meant that Stalinism or anything approaching it has been reestablished in Russia. So let us monitor without jumping to conclusions what Allawi and al-Yawar are doing, hoping to help them succeed without losing their direction. (It is what we as citizens have to do in the U.S. with the Patriot Act and similar measures pushed through ostensibly to respond to our fears of terrorism.)
(5) NATO has just agreed to send aid, particularly in the form of trainers. At least, this gives a more international flavor to the effort than we have had before.
In the meantime, the Iraqi security forces have got to show that they will do more than stand by as the country goes up in flames. It will be wonderful when they are well trained and so on. But the problem is now. What is required now is an area by area agreement as to who does what. Where Iraqi forces are weak and demoralized, penetrated by insurgents etc., and there are many places in the Triangle where this is true, we must work out something better than the Falluja solution while at the same time reducing the killing and destruction incident to American interventions. Where more authority and responsibility can be given to the Iraqi forces on the ground, we should back off, while preparing to respond quickly when needed. It is my impression that working this out is what the Iraqis and Americans are in the process of doing now. One can hope.
The Iraqis have formally taken over. Paul Bremer has left the country and Ambassador Negroponte had taken over for the American side. Apparently Bremer and the Prime Minister had decided several days ago that in order to avoid violence on Wednesday, they would transfer power early. So they set up a ceremony, everyone was sworn in, and the new government is under way. It was a smart move. It avoids giving the opposition a chance to bring off a final spectacular just before and during the transfer ceremonies. Unfortunately, it may also contribute to perceptions in Iraq and abroad that the transfer is all a facade or that we are on the run from the insurgents. Many commentators, including Professor Cole, are quite dismissive of the new government and its prospects. They claim that nearly everyone is against the new regime. American military polls, for what they are worth, show the opposite. Analytically, at least, there are several reasons to be a little positive.
(1) In the last few days violence had been directed almost entirely at Iraqis and almost entirely in the Sunni Triangle or nearby. (This is not too reassuring since Baghdad is in this area.) Some of it is obviously well organized, but much of it appears to be random anti-foreign or anti-collaborator violence. Most of the country appears relatively calm.
(2) The recent insurgent emphasis on kidnapping and beheading is characteristic of a terrorist campaign rather than an insurgency or guerrilla war. It is more of the Bin Ladin type of thing, rather than a campaign to take over a country and rule it. Moreover some of the efforts have resulted in indiscriminate killing that is bound to turn off many Iraqis.
(3) The new government and its Coalition supporters are now dedicated to the idea that they can succeed only by combining political and military action. Allawi has reaffirmed keeping to the election date and he is talking of amnesty, allowing electoral participation, for some of those who have been in the opposition, particularly for the "Mahdi Army" of the Sadrists.
(4) Professor Cole reports that the new government is trying to reconstitute both Saddam's army and his secret police. He laments the latter. Yet the Americans and the interim government are in a bind. With the personnel they now have our side simply does not have the intelligence to fight this enemy. I imagine the American approach has broken down even further after the prison scandals. What we need now is an army and an intelligence group no longer identified with us that can fight back. Since nearly every member of the interim government suffered from Saddam's rule, I doubt if they are simply going to reestablish its institutions and reconstitute the horrors of the past. We must remember that Putin was a high ranking officer in the KGB before he became head of Russia. That fact helps him rule a difficult country, but it has not meant that Stalinism or anything approaching it has been reestablished in Russia. So let us monitor without jumping to conclusions what Allawi and al-Yawar are doing, hoping to help them succeed without losing their direction. (It is what we as citizens have to do in the U.S. with the Patriot Act and similar measures pushed through ostensibly to respond to our fears of terrorism.)
(5) NATO has just agreed to send aid, particularly in the form of trainers. At least, this gives a more international flavor to the effort than we have had before.
In the meantime, the Iraqi security forces have got to show that they will do more than stand by as the country goes up in flames. It will be wonderful when they are well trained and so on. But the problem is now. What is required now is an area by area agreement as to who does what. Where Iraqi forces are weak and demoralized, penetrated by insurgents etc., and there are many places in the Triangle where this is true, we must work out something better than the Falluja solution while at the same time reducing the killing and destruction incident to American interventions. Where more authority and responsibility can be given to the Iraqi forces on the ground, we should back off, while preparing to respond quickly when needed. It is my impression that working this out is what the Iraqis and Americans are in the process of doing now. One can hope.
