Saturday, June 26, 2004
A New American Strategy?
Today's paper analyzes in some detail what is said to be a new, and successful American strategy in Iraq. Their example is the effort made by the First Armored Division to stop and then destroy the Shiite militia of Moqtada al-Sadr. It combined rapid response with political action. Its units moved long distances in single days, engaging the militia in nearly every place that the Sadrist threatened to control south of Baghdad (there is no discussion here of the Sadr City area of Baghdad). The only area that they avoided attacking the Sadrists was the most holy shrine in Najaf — and this is the only area where the Sadrists are said to still have a significant presence in the South. At the same time, as it carried out this rather complex offensive, it began negotiations with all the parties that might help the effort. In particular, it made sure that after each battle money was spent, and locals were hired, to repair the damage that the fighting had entailed.
If even half this story checks out in the end, it is an important move forward. Let us hope our units can continue acting this effectively in the South. However, it may not be a strategy that can be easily transferred to the Triangle. The Falluja model seems in the end to be less than successful (although for a time it did solve our problem). (It may have actually been the Falluja example that may have inspired what the First Armored did.) The difference may be that the Sadrist militia was well-known to all involved while the forces that are striking so successfully in the Sunni regions are more amorphous, less easy to "get a handle on". Our enemies in the Triangle have so far, outside of Falluja, been less intent on taking and holding cities than the Sadrists were, making their units harder to corner and destroy. Thus, it may not be possible to replicate the First Armored's methods elsewhere.
Today's paper analyzes in some detail what is said to be a new, and successful American strategy in Iraq. Their example is the effort made by the First Armored Division to stop and then destroy the Shiite militia of Moqtada al-Sadr. It combined rapid response with political action. Its units moved long distances in single days, engaging the militia in nearly every place that the Sadrist threatened to control south of Baghdad (there is no discussion here of the Sadr City area of Baghdad). The only area that they avoided attacking the Sadrists was the most holy shrine in Najaf — and this is the only area where the Sadrists are said to still have a significant presence in the South. At the same time, as it carried out this rather complex offensive, it began negotiations with all the parties that might help the effort. In particular, it made sure that after each battle money was spent, and locals were hired, to repair the damage that the fighting had entailed.
If even half this story checks out in the end, it is an important move forward. Let us hope our units can continue acting this effectively in the South. However, it may not be a strategy that can be easily transferred to the Triangle. The Falluja model seems in the end to be less than successful (although for a time it did solve our problem). (It may have actually been the Falluja example that may have inspired what the First Armored did.) The difference may be that the Sadrist militia was well-known to all involved while the forces that are striking so successfully in the Sunni regions are more amorphous, less easy to "get a handle on". Our enemies in the Triangle have so far, outside of Falluja, been less intent on taking and holding cities than the Sadrists were, making their units harder to corner and destroy. Thus, it may not be possible to replicate the First Armored's methods elsewhere.
Rationing and Targeting Our International Forces
Even before 9/11, I had concluded that there were four states in the world that the United States should move urgently to transform with the help of the world community: North Korea, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Sudan. There were many other failed states in the world, such as Haiti or Somalia, but these four states stood out in terms of egregious human rights violations, denials of freedom on a scale far beyond that found in their neighbors. I was not in this regard concerned with dangers such as WMD, but certainly North Korea and Iraq were worthy of concern on this score. Nor was I concerned with al-Qaida in Afghanistan — the oppression of its women was reason enough — the shelling of the Buddhas was the last straw.
Now, and for other reasons, we have acted against the leadership in two of the four. Neither has been, nor is likely to be, transformed quickly into a paradise. But Afghanistanis and Iraqis lead lives today that offer possibilities that they did not have before. This will be the case in Iraq even if the Americans are "thrown out" in the near future. We have, however, not yet acted effectively to alter the situation in Sudan or North Korea. Each country presents its own special problems, and to resolve these we will eventually get the assistance of the international community.
The United States has been remarkably unconcerned about North Korea. Even if it had not had a nuclear buildup, the callous and thoughtless way its regime has crushed its people and allowed hundreds of thousands to starve for ideological reasons would have been reason enough to act long before now. Now, the continual off again, on again nuclear threat, apparently engineered as part of a giant blackmail scheme, gives an additional strong reason to act with little delay. Yet two of the other main players, China and Russia, still seem unwilling to take a strong stance. More important, our ally, South Korea, the country whose entire success, indeed existence, since World War has depended on continuous American protection is carrying on as though the North were a "normal state", if only a little poorer than most. If Americans cannot imagine why Iraqis think of us as an "occupying force", they should consider South Korea where a large and vocal segment of the population also believes that we are an occupying force. They seem convinced, against all evidence, that if the Americans left, all would be peace and quiet on the Peninsula, with the North adopting the good life of the South at its own pace.
It is tempting, of course, to consider North Korea something like the Soviet Union just before Perestroika. Unfortunately, North Korea is immeasurably more repressive. Many Russians knew that they were oppressed by communism and knew that the rest of the world was leaving them behind because of their system. There is little reason to believe that such beliefs are widespread in the North — although given the right conditions there could be an explosion that would make the North another version of East Germany with the wall torn down. I raise these possibilities not because I believe them, but to suggest that Southerners who think this way should not be totally dismissed. Meanwhile, the United States has to deal with an intolerable North and a politically hard to deal with South while continuing to bear the burden of preventing major nuclear destruction in the Far East (we cannot know it is all a bluff).
What has happened in the Sudan is that the long civil war between the North and South, of Muslims in the North against Christians and Animists in the South has claimed countless lives directly and indirectly in the last thirty years. Starting in the 1980s, this conflict spilled over into Darfur in the West where there had long been unrelated struggles among tribal and ethnic groups. Even though all groups were Muslim, some considered themselves "Arab" while others were seen as "black", some were settled farmers, and some were nomads. The government at first started arming groups to resist the Southern forces that had established a base. Later, after this base disintegrated, the Westerners started a revolutionary movement of their own, particularly among the non-Arabs. (Darfur was only incorporated in Sudan in 1917.) The government sent a relief force, but was badly beaten. In response, the government then began arming the nomadic groups, particularly the "janjaweed", loosely organized brigands. These appear to have been asked to solve the regional problem by driving out or killing the members of the principal settled tribes. (All agree that with environmental degradation, there is simply not enough land for the various groups, so in a brutal way this may have made sense in Khartoum.) The result has been a humanitarian tragedy that the Sudanese government instigated and has been unwilling or unable to stop. International relief organizations have found it extremely difficult to operate in the area, as well as in neighboring Chad where many refugees have fled. The reason has been the very difficult conditions, especially transportation, and the reluctance of the Sudanese government (and perhaps to some degree the Chadian) to allow them free access. At first, the United States and other major states were unwilling to press too hard on this issue because after many years of effort they thought they had reached a working agreement among the leaders of the North and South to settle their larger war. However, the world is at last turning its attention to Darfur. We do not know yet with what result.
The tragedy in Sudan illustrates why the United States, no matter how powerful, must not waste its resources on ill-timed and poorly planned adventures. We should, for example, have waited a year before invading Iraq so that we might have maintained larger forces in Afghanistan that would have been able to provide protection for a much larger and well-protected development program for that country, and perhaps to capture Bin Ladin and Mullah Omar. Then, when we finally invaded Iraq, we should have immediately worked out an agreement with the former army that would have allowed a much quicker transfer of power to Iraqis. It would not have been to a well-formed democratic government, probably to something more on a par with that in Pakistan or Egypt. Following this script, by now our armed services would have been largely free of these extra burdens, able to be directed toward reducing the nefarious sway of the administrations of Sudan and North Korea. With this freedom, we could be far more aggressive and effective in meeting these new challenges than we are today.
Even before 9/11, I had concluded that there were four states in the world that the United States should move urgently to transform with the help of the world community: North Korea, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Sudan. There were many other failed states in the world, such as Haiti or Somalia, but these four states stood out in terms of egregious human rights violations, denials of freedom on a scale far beyond that found in their neighbors. I was not in this regard concerned with dangers such as WMD, but certainly North Korea and Iraq were worthy of concern on this score. Nor was I concerned with al-Qaida in Afghanistan — the oppression of its women was reason enough — the shelling of the Buddhas was the last straw.
Now, and for other reasons, we have acted against the leadership in two of the four. Neither has been, nor is likely to be, transformed quickly into a paradise. But Afghanistanis and Iraqis lead lives today that offer possibilities that they did not have before. This will be the case in Iraq even if the Americans are "thrown out" in the near future. We have, however, not yet acted effectively to alter the situation in Sudan or North Korea. Each country presents its own special problems, and to resolve these we will eventually get the assistance of the international community.
The United States has been remarkably unconcerned about North Korea. Even if it had not had a nuclear buildup, the callous and thoughtless way its regime has crushed its people and allowed hundreds of thousands to starve for ideological reasons would have been reason enough to act long before now. Now, the continual off again, on again nuclear threat, apparently engineered as part of a giant blackmail scheme, gives an additional strong reason to act with little delay. Yet two of the other main players, China and Russia, still seem unwilling to take a strong stance. More important, our ally, South Korea, the country whose entire success, indeed existence, since World War has depended on continuous American protection is carrying on as though the North were a "normal state", if only a little poorer than most. If Americans cannot imagine why Iraqis think of us as an "occupying force", they should consider South Korea where a large and vocal segment of the population also believes that we are an occupying force. They seem convinced, against all evidence, that if the Americans left, all would be peace and quiet on the Peninsula, with the North adopting the good life of the South at its own pace.
It is tempting, of course, to consider North Korea something like the Soviet Union just before Perestroika. Unfortunately, North Korea is immeasurably more repressive. Many Russians knew that they were oppressed by communism and knew that the rest of the world was leaving them behind because of their system. There is little reason to believe that such beliefs are widespread in the North — although given the right conditions there could be an explosion that would make the North another version of East Germany with the wall torn down. I raise these possibilities not because I believe them, but to suggest that Southerners who think this way should not be totally dismissed. Meanwhile, the United States has to deal with an intolerable North and a politically hard to deal with South while continuing to bear the burden of preventing major nuclear destruction in the Far East (we cannot know it is all a bluff).
What has happened in the Sudan is that the long civil war between the North and South, of Muslims in the North against Christians and Animists in the South has claimed countless lives directly and indirectly in the last thirty years. Starting in the 1980s, this conflict spilled over into Darfur in the West where there had long been unrelated struggles among tribal and ethnic groups. Even though all groups were Muslim, some considered themselves "Arab" while others were seen as "black", some were settled farmers, and some were nomads. The government at first started arming groups to resist the Southern forces that had established a base. Later, after this base disintegrated, the Westerners started a revolutionary movement of their own, particularly among the non-Arabs. (Darfur was only incorporated in Sudan in 1917.) The government sent a relief force, but was badly beaten. In response, the government then began arming the nomadic groups, particularly the "janjaweed", loosely organized brigands. These appear to have been asked to solve the regional problem by driving out or killing the members of the principal settled tribes. (All agree that with environmental degradation, there is simply not enough land for the various groups, so in a brutal way this may have made sense in Khartoum.) The result has been a humanitarian tragedy that the Sudanese government instigated and has been unwilling or unable to stop. International relief organizations have found it extremely difficult to operate in the area, as well as in neighboring Chad where many refugees have fled. The reason has been the very difficult conditions, especially transportation, and the reluctance of the Sudanese government (and perhaps to some degree the Chadian) to allow them free access. At first, the United States and other major states were unwilling to press too hard on this issue because after many years of effort they thought they had reached a working agreement among the leaders of the North and South to settle their larger war. However, the world is at last turning its attention to Darfur. We do not know yet with what result.
The tragedy in Sudan illustrates why the United States, no matter how powerful, must not waste its resources on ill-timed and poorly planned adventures. We should, for example, have waited a year before invading Iraq so that we might have maintained larger forces in Afghanistan that would have been able to provide protection for a much larger and well-protected development program for that country, and perhaps to capture Bin Ladin and Mullah Omar. Then, when we finally invaded Iraq, we should have immediately worked out an agreement with the former army that would have allowed a much quicker transfer of power to Iraqis. It would not have been to a well-formed democratic government, probably to something more on a par with that in Pakistan or Egypt. Following this script, by now our armed services would have been largely free of these extra burdens, able to be directed toward reducing the nefarious sway of the administrations of Sudan and North Korea. With this freedom, we could be far more aggressive and effective in meeting these new challenges than we are today.
Fahrenheit9/11
Since it is being universally discussed, we too should say something about this ugly documentary. Presented in a good cause, it has few scenes that add anything to public knowledge and many that do nothing but confuse. One of the surprising for me were a group of our Representatives trying to present a petition asking for a discussion of the election results at a joint session of Congress. They failed because they did not have the single senatorial signature they needed (the Senate is almost entirely white while they were mostly black). If I had known of this episode the time, I have forgotten. (But of course it was quite irrelevant to the main thesis of the film.) Another good scene was President Bush glued to his chair in a public school reading class as news of the 9/11 talks came in. He evidently simply did not know what to do. His aides came in twice without effect.
But so much of the film is devoted to innuendo, proof that isn't proof or to wailing and weeping. One of the most egregious examples is the picturing of the happy lives of Iraqis followed immediately by bursts of bombs destroying their way of life. There is no hint that the war had any other purpose than corporate greed, the enriching of the wealthiest Americans. Most of the film had the flavor of an old Communist picture decrying the crimes of capitalism and the wealthy combined with the flavor of paranoiacs trying to "connect the dots" of vast conspiracies, as in a famous Kennedy Assassination film. But my greatest objection might be to Michael Moore himself, a coarse egotist who, as detailed by David Brooks in today's Op-Ed, goes around the world attacking not just American policy but the American people as stupid — and picturing our opponents in Iraq as the true revolutionaries of our day.
It is all too bad. There is more than enough good material (much of it in the film) to make an effective and damning picture of Bush policy over the last few years. But for me this is the wrong picture.
Since it is being universally discussed, we too should say something about this ugly documentary. Presented in a good cause, it has few scenes that add anything to public knowledge and many that do nothing but confuse. One of the surprising for me were a group of our Representatives trying to present a petition asking for a discussion of the election results at a joint session of Congress. They failed because they did not have the single senatorial signature they needed (the Senate is almost entirely white while they were mostly black). If I had known of this episode the time, I have forgotten. (But of course it was quite irrelevant to the main thesis of the film.) Another good scene was President Bush glued to his chair in a public school reading class as news of the 9/11 talks came in. He evidently simply did not know what to do. His aides came in twice without effect.
But so much of the film is devoted to innuendo, proof that isn't proof or to wailing and weeping. One of the most egregious examples is the picturing of the happy lives of Iraqis followed immediately by bursts of bombs destroying their way of life. There is no hint that the war had any other purpose than corporate greed, the enriching of the wealthiest Americans. Most of the film had the flavor of an old Communist picture decrying the crimes of capitalism and the wealthy combined with the flavor of paranoiacs trying to "connect the dots" of vast conspiracies, as in a famous Kennedy Assassination film. But my greatest objection might be to Michael Moore himself, a coarse egotist who, as detailed by David Brooks in today's Op-Ed, goes around the world attacking not just American policy but the American people as stupid — and picturing our opponents in Iraq as the true revolutionaries of our day.
It is all too bad. There is more than enough good material (much of it in the film) to make an effective and damning picture of Bush policy over the last few years. But for me this is the wrong picture.
Guantanamo, Abu Ghraib, and All That
The last few days have seen another explosion of news about American imprisonment and torture policy since 9/11. The questions are not going to go away. And it important for our ability to operate successfully in the world in the future. And this is important for all mankind. Let us look again briefly at the issues.
First, we have to cut out attempts to work out a way that the rules do not apply to us, at least when individuals are "safely" in our control. We are in the world and the world's opinion counts, for them and for us. It may be that torture does not pay in terms of information gained. But whether it does or not, we must bite the bullet and ignore the gains that bending the rules might bring. Note that above I said once persons are in our control, such as in a detention or a prison camp. The situation on the battlefield itself is somewhat different for two reasons. First, this is where it is said in Iraq that the most useful intelligence is gained. Second, the people involved on our side are servicemen fighting for their lives. In this situation, threatening a person who has just surrendered to find out where arms are cached or where his fellows are is probably an inescapable part of human nature. Very often in this situation the surrendering person is simply killed and he knows this. We can define such as response by our soldiers as murder and reduce the incidence of such killing, but perhaps we cannot and should not stop all intimidation in this situation.
Second, we need to rethink the conditions under which persons can be held for long periods. We seem to think we are fighting a "war" against terrorists. Yet we do not have a definition of when such a war might end. This has led us to institute what are in effect indeterminate sentences without trial. Ultimately, neither world nor American opinion will accept this. On the other hand, perhaps half of those held at Guantanamo Bay would go back to trying to kill Americans if they were set free. They also may see themselves as involved in an indeterminate war. This implies two things. First, we must develop procedures that can more surely and more quickly determine who is in this dangerous group and who is not. If not, then they should be released back to the place in which they were captured. If they have been incarcerated for any length of time, then they should be compensated for this time.
The problem then becomes what to do with those who appear to be "dangerous". They should be tried in American courts (not special courts) as conspirators or worse. They should be given a chance to prove their innocence (read "peacefulness"). If proven guilty then they should be sentenced to a period of time long enough to separate their lives from the battlefield as we define it in this strange "war".
The last few days have seen another explosion of news about American imprisonment and torture policy since 9/11. The questions are not going to go away. And it important for our ability to operate successfully in the world in the future. And this is important for all mankind. Let us look again briefly at the issues.
First, we have to cut out attempts to work out a way that the rules do not apply to us, at least when individuals are "safely" in our control. We are in the world and the world's opinion counts, for them and for us. It may be that torture does not pay in terms of information gained. But whether it does or not, we must bite the bullet and ignore the gains that bending the rules might bring. Note that above I said once persons are in our control, such as in a detention or a prison camp. The situation on the battlefield itself is somewhat different for two reasons. First, this is where it is said in Iraq that the most useful intelligence is gained. Second, the people involved on our side are servicemen fighting for their lives. In this situation, threatening a person who has just surrendered to find out where arms are cached or where his fellows are is probably an inescapable part of human nature. Very often in this situation the surrendering person is simply killed and he knows this. We can define such as response by our soldiers as murder and reduce the incidence of such killing, but perhaps we cannot and should not stop all intimidation in this situation.
Second, we need to rethink the conditions under which persons can be held for long periods. We seem to think we are fighting a "war" against terrorists. Yet we do not have a definition of when such a war might end. This has led us to institute what are in effect indeterminate sentences without trial. Ultimately, neither world nor American opinion will accept this. On the other hand, perhaps half of those held at Guantanamo Bay would go back to trying to kill Americans if they were set free. They also may see themselves as involved in an indeterminate war. This implies two things. First, we must develop procedures that can more surely and more quickly determine who is in this dangerous group and who is not. If not, then they should be released back to the place in which they were captured. If they have been incarcerated for any length of time, then they should be compensated for this time.
The problem then becomes what to do with those who appear to be "dangerous". They should be tried in American courts (not special courts) as conspirators or worse. They should be given a chance to prove their innocence (read "peacefulness"). If proven guilty then they should be sentenced to a period of time long enough to separate their lives from the battlefield as we define it in this strange "war".
Friday, June 25, 2004
Death in Iraq
Yesterday was one of the worst days of the war for the Iraqis: 100 killed and 300 wounded according to reports. Five areas were hit in the Sunni triangle and Mosul, with the objective apparently being the killing of police, destroying police stations, demonstrating a kind of invincibility. One Times account included as an aside that this was believed to be the work of Sunnis and Shi'a together. However, I see little evidence yet of the latter. Rather the area impacted, the fact that Zarqawi and former Baathists are evidently involved makes this doubtful. Zarqawi famously sought to foment trouble between Shiites and Sunnis. Today there seem to have been no major attacks. But it is said that the insurgency threatens now to conquer at least parts of Baghdad.
The interpretations of the current efforts range from the idea this is the beginning of the end for the new government to the thought that it shows a last burst of energy before the end of the insurgency. Certainly if the insurgents expose themselves in the cities too early, they may regret it. It is significant that in the last couple of days American forces have again become active in Falluja, entering it briefly yesterday and again bombing a so-called "safe house" today. This suggests that the Falluja solution of letting the Iraqis do it has been abandoned, at least in the triangle. It is evident that the insurgents find attacking Iraqis much more productive and much less dangerous than attacking Americans directly. Of course, this forces the Americans to once again do the attacking in the cities, thereby further alienating Iraqis. It is also significant that the insurgents seem not to care how many Iraqis are killed in their war. This disregard for civilian life has happened in other similar insurgencies, as in Algeria, but the outcome does not necessarily favor the insurgents.
Clearly the insurgents are taking seriously the handing over of power to the interim government on July 1, no matter how circumscribed its power might be. If they have the men (they have the materiel), the insurgents will continue and broaden their attacks to demonstrate to all the fecklessness of Iraq's new security forces. This will then force American forces back into the field in a big way, once again proving to many Iraqis that we are merely an occupying force bent on killing Iraqis. In any event, massive insurgent attacks in the next few days are what the interim government and the American command claim they expect and are preparing for.
I am reminded of the Tet offensive in Vietnam. It was disastrous for the Viet Cong, essentially eliminating them as a fighting force (the subsequent several years war was strictly between North and American-aided South). However, the fact the Communists were able to come into all the cities and inflict massive casualties on South Vietnamese and American forces in the initial stages of their offensive, played in the United States as a Communist victory. On the basis of this interpretation, America made a decision to get out. The difference, of course, is that the Iraqi resistance does not have hundreds of thousands of troops waiting just across the border to come to their assistance. Yet the thinness of our forces in Iraq, and the way Americans feel now about this war, and with good reason, this fact may not be enough in the face of an impressive show of insurgent power — no matter what their losses.
Yesterday was one of the worst days of the war for the Iraqis: 100 killed and 300 wounded according to reports. Five areas were hit in the Sunni triangle and Mosul, with the objective apparently being the killing of police, destroying police stations, demonstrating a kind of invincibility. One Times account included as an aside that this was believed to be the work of Sunnis and Shi'a together. However, I see little evidence yet of the latter. Rather the area impacted, the fact that Zarqawi and former Baathists are evidently involved makes this doubtful. Zarqawi famously sought to foment trouble between Shiites and Sunnis. Today there seem to have been no major attacks. But it is said that the insurgency threatens now to conquer at least parts of Baghdad.
The interpretations of the current efforts range from the idea this is the beginning of the end for the new government to the thought that it shows a last burst of energy before the end of the insurgency. Certainly if the insurgents expose themselves in the cities too early, they may regret it. It is significant that in the last couple of days American forces have again become active in Falluja, entering it briefly yesterday and again bombing a so-called "safe house" today. This suggests that the Falluja solution of letting the Iraqis do it has been abandoned, at least in the triangle. It is evident that the insurgents find attacking Iraqis much more productive and much less dangerous than attacking Americans directly. Of course, this forces the Americans to once again do the attacking in the cities, thereby further alienating Iraqis. It is also significant that the insurgents seem not to care how many Iraqis are killed in their war. This disregard for civilian life has happened in other similar insurgencies, as in Algeria, but the outcome does not necessarily favor the insurgents.
Clearly the insurgents are taking seriously the handing over of power to the interim government on July 1, no matter how circumscribed its power might be. If they have the men (they have the materiel), the insurgents will continue and broaden their attacks to demonstrate to all the fecklessness of Iraq's new security forces. This will then force American forces back into the field in a big way, once again proving to many Iraqis that we are merely an occupying force bent on killing Iraqis. In any event, massive insurgent attacks in the next few days are what the interim government and the American command claim they expect and are preparing for.
I am reminded of the Tet offensive in Vietnam. It was disastrous for the Viet Cong, essentially eliminating them as a fighting force (the subsequent several years war was strictly between North and American-aided South). However, the fact the Communists were able to come into all the cities and inflict massive casualties on South Vietnamese and American forces in the initial stages of their offensive, played in the United States as a Communist victory. On the basis of this interpretation, America made a decision to get out. The difference, of course, is that the Iraqi resistance does not have hundreds of thousands of troops waiting just across the border to come to their assistance. Yet the thinness of our forces in Iraq, and the way Americans feel now about this war, and with good reason, this fact may not be enough in the face of an impressive show of insurgent power — no matter what their losses.
Wednesday, June 23, 2004
The Fight Against al-Qaida
The FBI and CIA (through an unnamed author) are reported today as giving their particular slants on the fight against al-Qaida and where we should go from here.
According to the New York Times, the CIA agent's new book, "Imperial Hubris" castigates his superiors and both administrations for mishandling the "terrorism problem". He writes: "U.S. leaders refuse to accept the obvious: We are fighting a worldwide Islamic insurgency — not criminality or terrorism — and our policy and procedures have failed to make more than a modest dent in enemy forces." The NYT reports that the author says "the threat is rooted not in opposition to American values, but to policies and actions, particularly in the Islamic world." He claims that the attack on Iraq was an unprovoked war against a foe that presented no threat, remarking that Ussama bin Ladin could not have asked for anything better than our attack on, and occupation of, Iraq. He sees us as having waged two failed half-wars, leaving behind little but seething anger. He believes al Qaida is readying another massive attack on the United states worse than the last, possibly including MWD. After this, he says, "heads will roll within the intelligence community". Overall, the remarkable fact that this man remains in the CIA, that his book was vetted by the CIA, and was evidently published with little censorship suggests that there may be considerable support for his views within Langley.
In this book, as in the recent book by the former right-hand man to Condoleezza Rice, Richard Clarke, we see righteous anger boiling over. I wish there was not so much of this, for it makes the outsider believe that where there is so much fire, there might not be much smoke. Yet he is obviously making some good points. I would agree that al-Qaida's opposition to us is more to policies than values, although it is also important to know what our opponents say they are about and give that some credit too. But I believe that our actions, and their continuation in Afghanistan, and our pressure on Islamabad, have made al-Qaida efforts much more difficult than this agent appears to think. They have lost their excellent training grounds, being reduced to perhaps something in Lebanon and some small new training bases in Afghanistan. They are now getting experience in Iraq, although not for large actions against the continental United States. In the end, if Iraq ends up dominated by Shiites and Kurds, al-Qaida may not find that a very useful haven either. One can agree that, given their propaganda objectives, they should mount a major attack on the United States. I have been thinking this for a couple of years now, but it has not happened. My conclusion is that al-Qaida has few operatives in the U.S. Our security people must be doing something right. My suspicion also is that when the fabled attack comes, it is likely not to be with WMD.
On a more hopeful note, Robert Mueller, FBI director suggests that we are in the process of forming an anti-terrorism alliance including, and parallel to, NATO. This seems to be an urgent need; one wonders why it has not acted on seriously much earlier (probably the same issue as with FBI/CIA, losing control over and suspicion of sources). He wants a new intelligence directorate within the FBI that would help prioritize what leads should be pursued — again an urgent and long overdue move. He estimates that the total number of Islamic extremists (i.e. potential al-Qaida) is in the low thousands worldwide. However, al-Qaida is recruiting "outside the Middle East" to find sympathizers better able to melt into American society.
The FBI and CIA (through an unnamed author) are reported today as giving their particular slants on the fight against al-Qaida and where we should go from here.
According to the New York Times, the CIA agent's new book, "Imperial Hubris" castigates his superiors and both administrations for mishandling the "terrorism problem". He writes: "U.S. leaders refuse to accept the obvious: We are fighting a worldwide Islamic insurgency — not criminality or terrorism — and our policy and procedures have failed to make more than a modest dent in enemy forces." The NYT reports that the author says "the threat is rooted not in opposition to American values, but to policies and actions, particularly in the Islamic world." He claims that the attack on Iraq was an unprovoked war against a foe that presented no threat, remarking that Ussama bin Ladin could not have asked for anything better than our attack on, and occupation of, Iraq. He sees us as having waged two failed half-wars, leaving behind little but seething anger. He believes al Qaida is readying another massive attack on the United states worse than the last, possibly including MWD. After this, he says, "heads will roll within the intelligence community". Overall, the remarkable fact that this man remains in the CIA, that his book was vetted by the CIA, and was evidently published with little censorship suggests that there may be considerable support for his views within Langley.
In this book, as in the recent book by the former right-hand man to Condoleezza Rice, Richard Clarke, we see righteous anger boiling over. I wish there was not so much of this, for it makes the outsider believe that where there is so much fire, there might not be much smoke. Yet he is obviously making some good points. I would agree that al-Qaida's opposition to us is more to policies than values, although it is also important to know what our opponents say they are about and give that some credit too. But I believe that our actions, and their continuation in Afghanistan, and our pressure on Islamabad, have made al-Qaida efforts much more difficult than this agent appears to think. They have lost their excellent training grounds, being reduced to perhaps something in Lebanon and some small new training bases in Afghanistan. They are now getting experience in Iraq, although not for large actions against the continental United States. In the end, if Iraq ends up dominated by Shiites and Kurds, al-Qaida may not find that a very useful haven either. One can agree that, given their propaganda objectives, they should mount a major attack on the United States. I have been thinking this for a couple of years now, but it has not happened. My conclusion is that al-Qaida has few operatives in the U.S. Our security people must be doing something right. My suspicion also is that when the fabled attack comes, it is likely not to be with WMD.
On a more hopeful note, Robert Mueller, FBI director suggests that we are in the process of forming an anti-terrorism alliance including, and parallel to, NATO. This seems to be an urgent need; one wonders why it has not acted on seriously much earlier (probably the same issue as with FBI/CIA, losing control over and suspicion of sources). He wants a new intelligence directorate within the FBI that would help prioritize what leads should be pursued — again an urgent and long overdue move. He estimates that the total number of Islamic extremists (i.e. potential al-Qaida) is in the low thousands worldwide. However, al-Qaida is recruiting "outside the Middle East" to find sympathizers better able to melt into American society.
Terrorism Data
The last few days have seen extended discussion of the U. S. State Department's report on terrorism in 2003. The first version that came out showed an improvement in terms of the number of incidents and casualties. Now a corrected report shows that the number of significant incidents and the number wounded was much greater in 2003 than 2002, while the number of fatalities has gone down to 625. However, a closer reading of the information now available suggests that the report is not very meaningful. For example, anyone killed in Iraq or Afghanistan fighting the bad guys is not considered a victim of terrorism (even though the Bush Administration argues, and to some degree correctly, that large numbers of terrorists have now come to Iraq to fight us — thereby depleting, of course, their numbers elsewhere). Since the report is on "international terrorism", it ignores terrorism that is national in character. U.S. law prohibits including in the figures the killing of people by people who are citizens of the same country. Therefore, most of the terrorism in Chechnya is presumably not included. The terrorism of the Tamils in Sri Lanka should not on this basis have been included.
Seeing these statistics as significant derives in part from the mistaken idea of a generalized "war on terror". For America today, the important issue is the war against al-Qaida, understood as an extremely loosely organized movement directing its attacks against Americans, non-Muslims, or other perceived "enemies". Losses on both sides in this war should be regularly toted up. Saudis killed in Saudi Arabia as well as foreigners killed there by persons saying they are part of al-Qaida should be added to the totals. The persons killed in Spain in the recent attack on trains should be added. All those killed in Afghanistan on either side should be added somewhere to the terrorism statistics, while Iraq should be considered a separate issue for the time being, with none of the casualties there seen as terrorist. If a foreigner is killed by a suicide bomb in Israel it is regrettable, but events there should be considered those of another war regardless of the nationality of the victims. (Statistically, the Israeli-Palestine conflict a strange case, since suicide bombings are recorded but revenge attacks against the bombers are not.) Considering the wars in Chechnya and elsewhere in Russia and the former USSR should be added to the picture, although just how will be difficult to determine. Since it is in the interest of the Russians and the Central Asian governments to call all their enemies al-Qaida, getting the right totals will be difficult. All of this discussion shows the extreme difficulty of distinguishing guerilla war, reprisals, police actions, and terrorism in mixed situations.
The last few days have seen extended discussion of the U. S. State Department's report on terrorism in 2003. The first version that came out showed an improvement in terms of the number of incidents and casualties. Now a corrected report shows that the number of significant incidents and the number wounded was much greater in 2003 than 2002, while the number of fatalities has gone down to 625. However, a closer reading of the information now available suggests that the report is not very meaningful. For example, anyone killed in Iraq or Afghanistan fighting the bad guys is not considered a victim of terrorism (even though the Bush Administration argues, and to some degree correctly, that large numbers of terrorists have now come to Iraq to fight us — thereby depleting, of course, their numbers elsewhere). Since the report is on "international terrorism", it ignores terrorism that is national in character. U.S. law prohibits including in the figures the killing of people by people who are citizens of the same country. Therefore, most of the terrorism in Chechnya is presumably not included. The terrorism of the Tamils in Sri Lanka should not on this basis have been included.
Seeing these statistics as significant derives in part from the mistaken idea of a generalized "war on terror". For America today, the important issue is the war against al-Qaida, understood as an extremely loosely organized movement directing its attacks against Americans, non-Muslims, or other perceived "enemies". Losses on both sides in this war should be regularly toted up. Saudis killed in Saudi Arabia as well as foreigners killed there by persons saying they are part of al-Qaida should be added to the totals. The persons killed in Spain in the recent attack on trains should be added. All those killed in Afghanistan on either side should be added somewhere to the terrorism statistics, while Iraq should be considered a separate issue for the time being, with none of the casualties there seen as terrorist. If a foreigner is killed by a suicide bomb in Israel it is regrettable, but events there should be considered those of another war regardless of the nationality of the victims. (Statistically, the Israeli-Palestine conflict a strange case, since suicide bombings are recorded but revenge attacks against the bombers are not.) Considering the wars in Chechnya and elsewhere in Russia and the former USSR should be added to the picture, although just how will be difficult to determine. Since it is in the interest of the Russians and the Central Asian governments to call all their enemies al-Qaida, getting the right totals will be difficult. All of this discussion shows the extreme difficulty of distinguishing guerilla war, reprisals, police actions, and terrorism in mixed situations.
International Shiism and American Policy in Iraq
In an Op-Ed today, Youssef Ibrahim makes a knowledgeable argument that the United States must be more aware than it has been of the existence of an international Shi'a audience for what it does in Iraq. It is an argument that professor Cole, an authority on the Shi'a has often made. However, in the details of the argument he makes some misleading assertions that should be corrected.
(1) He compares the relationship of Ayatollah Sistani and Moqtada al-Sadr to that of (implicitly) Ayatollah Shariatmadari and Ayatollah Khomeini. It is true that like Khomeini, Moqtada is a fiery but lower ranked cleric. However, here the similarities end. First, Khomeini instigated and brought to a successful conclusion a national revolution against the Shah of Iran, a feat that Moqtada will not have an opportunity to equal regardless of what transpires in the next few months. Second, Khomeini had been a leader of Iranian religious dissidents for a generation. Third, although he was not as highly ranked as Shariatmadari, he was a man of equivalent age (important in religious circles) had attained the rank of an Ayatollah, and had published widely on religion and politics. In particular, his treatise on rule by an Islamic high jurist was considered by many a blueprint for the Iranian system that emerged. These remarks do not imply, however, that we should be careful not to take Moqtada lightly. He is positioned to play an important part. We should also be careful not to make al-Sadr a martyr, for Shi'ism was founded on martyrdom. (We can only hope that Zarqawi or someone similar doesn't try to martyr him and throw the onus on us.)
(2) In his discussion of the "Hawza", Ibrahim assumes a much more tightly knit Shi'ite world than I believe exists. While it is true that there developed over recent centuries a religious hierarchy of sorts among Shi'a communities that ignored national boundaries, this was always a flexible arrangement. The ayatollahs scattered throughout the Shi'a world might see another ayatollah or a small group of other ayatollahs as their religious superiors, but would nevertheless feel no compulsion to agree with their edicts, indeed, custom enjoined them to not copy the edicts of others. Similarly, on other more secular levels, only the loosest structures for consultation exist. It is true that Shi'as everywhere will be following what happens to Shi'as in Iraq, but they will not necessarily see themselves directly involved in these events.
(3) Ibrahim concludes by writing: "Any hopes for a secular Iraq should also be abandoned — the Shiites will dominate by force of numbers". There is actually no reason to accept the necessity of a non-secular Iraq because the Shiites will dominate numerically. Spain, for example, is dominated by Catholics, yet the Pope is very aware that it is a secular state. Ayatollah Sistani believes that his community should dominate Iraq, but he also believes that religious leaders should stay out of politics. He may wish to see some "religious principles" accepted by the new system, but the followers of President Bush and many members of the Catholic hierarchy in the United States would be likely to agree with him on many of these principles.
In an Op-Ed today, Youssef Ibrahim makes a knowledgeable argument that the United States must be more aware than it has been of the existence of an international Shi'a audience for what it does in Iraq. It is an argument that professor Cole, an authority on the Shi'a has often made. However, in the details of the argument he makes some misleading assertions that should be corrected.
(1) He compares the relationship of Ayatollah Sistani and Moqtada al-Sadr to that of (implicitly) Ayatollah Shariatmadari and Ayatollah Khomeini. It is true that like Khomeini, Moqtada is a fiery but lower ranked cleric. However, here the similarities end. First, Khomeini instigated and brought to a successful conclusion a national revolution against the Shah of Iran, a feat that Moqtada will not have an opportunity to equal regardless of what transpires in the next few months. Second, Khomeini had been a leader of Iranian religious dissidents for a generation. Third, although he was not as highly ranked as Shariatmadari, he was a man of equivalent age (important in religious circles) had attained the rank of an Ayatollah, and had published widely on religion and politics. In particular, his treatise on rule by an Islamic high jurist was considered by many a blueprint for the Iranian system that emerged. These remarks do not imply, however, that we should be careful not to take Moqtada lightly. He is positioned to play an important part. We should also be careful not to make al-Sadr a martyr, for Shi'ism was founded on martyrdom. (We can only hope that Zarqawi or someone similar doesn't try to martyr him and throw the onus on us.)
(2) In his discussion of the "Hawza", Ibrahim assumes a much more tightly knit Shi'ite world than I believe exists. While it is true that there developed over recent centuries a religious hierarchy of sorts among Shi'a communities that ignored national boundaries, this was always a flexible arrangement. The ayatollahs scattered throughout the Shi'a world might see another ayatollah or a small group of other ayatollahs as their religious superiors, but would nevertheless feel no compulsion to agree with their edicts, indeed, custom enjoined them to not copy the edicts of others. Similarly, on other more secular levels, only the loosest structures for consultation exist. It is true that Shi'as everywhere will be following what happens to Shi'as in Iraq, but they will not necessarily see themselves directly involved in these events.
(3) Ibrahim concludes by writing: "Any hopes for a secular Iraq should also be abandoned — the Shiites will dominate by force of numbers". There is actually no reason to accept the necessity of a non-secular Iraq because the Shiites will dominate numerically. Spain, for example, is dominated by Catholics, yet the Pope is very aware that it is a secular state. Ayatollah Sistani believes that his community should dominate Iraq, but he also believes that religious leaders should stay out of politics. He may wish to see some "religious principles" accepted by the new system, but the followers of President Bush and many members of the Catholic hierarchy in the United States would be likely to agree with him on many of these principles.
Monday, June 21, 2004
Americans and Iraqis: Deciding on Responsibilities
The recent bombing of what was said to be a "safe house" for foreign terrorists within Falluja again raises the question of the boundaries of Iraqi and American action. Apparently, the American Marines and a group of Iraqis ginned up by a Colonel Latif worked out an arrangement several weeks back that the Americans would no longer try to take control of Falluja. Instead an Iraqi force made up of former Baathists and other insurgents (or whoever) would man the barricades and police the city. Not surprisingly, the Americans have not been happy with the result. Parts of Falluja have evidently become bases for militants. The Iraqi brigade "keeps the peace" most of the time, but it does not make a great effort to interfere with insurgents as long as they do not fight them in the city. Frustrated, the Americans made the air attack. Locals said all they killed were civilians. The Iraqi government says that they did kill some serious insurgents, possible of the Zarqawi group. The Times reports today that this version now seems accepted by many of the men in the street of Falluja — they don't appreciate the foreigners anyhow. As Juan Cole says of this and similar cases, it is hard for outsiders to ever know.
The new government (not yet installed, but acting as though it is) continues to talk of martial law. It sees such things as curfews, and unlimited searches, and no-go areas as instruments to be applied on a case by case basis, starting perhaps with Sadr City and Falluja. It is significant that the leaders of the interim government now see their forces as the main forces for counterinsurgency force in the heart of the country, believing that the Americans would do better controlling the country's borders. To me this makes sense, if they can do it. But it is the exact opposite of how the Americans had imagined originally they would divide up chores (placing the new Iraqi forces on the borders). The Iraqi leaders believe they can succeed better than the Americans in urban warfare because they can more easily tell the good guys from the bad guys, and they can more easily control a situation through mediation with all the parties involved than can Americans. Thus, they hope to succeed with much less firepower. This may eventually lead to the division of the country into many fiefdoms under the effective control of tribal, sectarian, or party leaders. But this may be the best that they or we can do.
Meanwhile, to the north, the Kurds are steadily expanding their frontiers and are not about to disband their militias (peshmerga). The expansion is justified as merely righting the injustice of the Saddam years when the Kurds were relocated out of these areas. But the guys with the guns may get greedy. And those newly displaced may find their own leaders to help them fight back. It is said that the new government is cooperating with Chalabi, using him as a mediator of the dispute of the new government with the Kurds. They are also actively working in bringing Moqtada al-Sadr into the new political world, and he seems to be moving in their direction. Interim government leaders are also claiming that disbanding the army was our worst mistake and that they are going to reverse that decision — a process that in a murky way seems well under way. Clearly, the interim leaders are able in the midst of assassinations and chaos to make concessions and visualize directions that the Americans have been unable to.
The Times (indirectly) and Middle East experts such as Professor Cole continue to denigrate the new civilian leaders, believing that little has change with the establishment of the new system. But it seems to me that we will have to wait and see. The new (or newly positioned) leaders are quite active and brave. As long as they can dodge assassination bullets and build a capability to tamp down the destruction, keeping rebuilding ahead of new destruction, they will come to be taken more seriously. Shifting the burden to them was essential. We needed to do it now and we did. They are our best bet. Let us hope that they get discriminating and effective support from our military and political leaders on the ground.
The recent bombing of what was said to be a "safe house" for foreign terrorists within Falluja again raises the question of the boundaries of Iraqi and American action. Apparently, the American Marines and a group of Iraqis ginned up by a Colonel Latif worked out an arrangement several weeks back that the Americans would no longer try to take control of Falluja. Instead an Iraqi force made up of former Baathists and other insurgents (or whoever) would man the barricades and police the city. Not surprisingly, the Americans have not been happy with the result. Parts of Falluja have evidently become bases for militants. The Iraqi brigade "keeps the peace" most of the time, but it does not make a great effort to interfere with insurgents as long as they do not fight them in the city. Frustrated, the Americans made the air attack. Locals said all they killed were civilians. The Iraqi government says that they did kill some serious insurgents, possible of the Zarqawi group. The Times reports today that this version now seems accepted by many of the men in the street of Falluja — they don't appreciate the foreigners anyhow. As Juan Cole says of this and similar cases, it is hard for outsiders to ever know.
The new government (not yet installed, but acting as though it is) continues to talk of martial law. It sees such things as curfews, and unlimited searches, and no-go areas as instruments to be applied on a case by case basis, starting perhaps with Sadr City and Falluja. It is significant that the leaders of the interim government now see their forces as the main forces for counterinsurgency force in the heart of the country, believing that the Americans would do better controlling the country's borders. To me this makes sense, if they can do it. But it is the exact opposite of how the Americans had imagined originally they would divide up chores (placing the new Iraqi forces on the borders). The Iraqi leaders believe they can succeed better than the Americans in urban warfare because they can more easily tell the good guys from the bad guys, and they can more easily control a situation through mediation with all the parties involved than can Americans. Thus, they hope to succeed with much less firepower. This may eventually lead to the division of the country into many fiefdoms under the effective control of tribal, sectarian, or party leaders. But this may be the best that they or we can do.
Meanwhile, to the north, the Kurds are steadily expanding their frontiers and are not about to disband their militias (peshmerga). The expansion is justified as merely righting the injustice of the Saddam years when the Kurds were relocated out of these areas. But the guys with the guns may get greedy. And those newly displaced may find their own leaders to help them fight back. It is said that the new government is cooperating with Chalabi, using him as a mediator of the dispute of the new government with the Kurds. They are also actively working in bringing Moqtada al-Sadr into the new political world, and he seems to be moving in their direction. Interim government leaders are also claiming that disbanding the army was our worst mistake and that they are going to reverse that decision — a process that in a murky way seems well under way. Clearly, the interim leaders are able in the midst of assassinations and chaos to make concessions and visualize directions that the Americans have been unable to.
The Times (indirectly) and Middle East experts such as Professor Cole continue to denigrate the new civilian leaders, believing that little has change with the establishment of the new system. But it seems to me that we will have to wait and see. The new (or newly positioned) leaders are quite active and brave. As long as they can dodge assassination bullets and build a capability to tamp down the destruction, keeping rebuilding ahead of new destruction, they will come to be taken more seriously. Shifting the burden to them was essential. We needed to do it now and we did. They are our best bet. Let us hope that they get discriminating and effective support from our military and political leaders on the ground.
Priority Problems in Homeland Security
On Friday (Saturday's paper), the House rejected in an urban-rural split a plan to transfer $446 million of a $33 billion Homeland Security budget from a fund generally distributed to every part of the country to high-risk cities. The Mayor of New York was rightly incensed. While New York receives $5.47 a person in anti-terrorism financing, Vermont and Wyoming receive over $30.00. The Homeland Security operation reflects another remarkable inability to prioritize. In Connecticut, for example, all of its nearly 200 towns are to get a cut of the pie, with slices so small that they are essentially meaningless. It is becoming a kind of joke, a diversion.
The priority problem stems in part from the fact that terrorism is too generally defined. While there may be a terrorist next door who is tinkering with chemical agents, what Homeland Security was established to resist was the danger from major international terrorist groups such as al-Qaida. It was not set up to stop another Oklahoma City bombing or another high school shoot-out. If this distinction could be remembered, then Homeland Security resources would be directed toward what international terrorists target, that is "symbolic targets", targets whose destruction will make a major impression throughout the world. This means its objective would be understood to prevent or ameliorate attacks on major targets in the largest cities, or at least the people of these cities, and attacks against major governmental targets, especially in Washington, D.C. At the other extreme, it would not mean attacks against people or value targets in Alpine, California or Redding, Connecticut.
Homeland Security should do an adequate target assessment from this standpoint, then distribute money in its terms. It should then give money within states to (1) large cities such as New York or Chicago, and (2) state governments, to be used, for example, by state health services or state police.
On Friday (Saturday's paper), the House rejected in an urban-rural split a plan to transfer $446 million of a $33 billion Homeland Security budget from a fund generally distributed to every part of the country to high-risk cities. The Mayor of New York was rightly incensed. While New York receives $5.47 a person in anti-terrorism financing, Vermont and Wyoming receive over $30.00. The Homeland Security operation reflects another remarkable inability to prioritize. In Connecticut, for example, all of its nearly 200 towns are to get a cut of the pie, with slices so small that they are essentially meaningless. It is becoming a kind of joke, a diversion.
The priority problem stems in part from the fact that terrorism is too generally defined. While there may be a terrorist next door who is tinkering with chemical agents, what Homeland Security was established to resist was the danger from major international terrorist groups such as al-Qaida. It was not set up to stop another Oklahoma City bombing or another high school shoot-out. If this distinction could be remembered, then Homeland Security resources would be directed toward what international terrorists target, that is "symbolic targets", targets whose destruction will make a major impression throughout the world. This means its objective would be understood to prevent or ameliorate attacks on major targets in the largest cities, or at least the people of these cities, and attacks against major governmental targets, especially in Washington, D.C. At the other extreme, it would not mean attacks against people or value targets in Alpine, California or Redding, Connecticut.
Homeland Security should do an adequate target assessment from this standpoint, then distribute money in its terms. It should then give money within states to (1) large cities such as New York or Chicago, and (2) state governments, to be used, for example, by state health services or state police.
Sunday, June 20, 2004
American Responsibilities and the Promotion of Democracy
In Saturday's Op-Ed columns we find juxtaposed the priorities of ideology and responsibility. On the right side of the page, David Brooks attacks Kerry for his implicit threat to once again base American foreign policy on the realism of Bush senior and those who served him. Instead, he says we should stick to the new idealism of junior that recognizes the right of all peoples to freedom. Then on the left side of the page, we are once again treated to Kristof's reporting of the latest chapter in the tragic story of the existence of Sudan as a state. In this installment hundreds of thousands in the Darfur region are being killed or driven across its borders.
One would not want to hear Brooks tell us we will solve this latest tragedy by promoting democracy in the Sudan as we have in Iraq. The fact is there are many troubles countries in the world for which our ideology should be the last rather than the first arrow in our quiver. Sudan and North Korea and Libya, and so many other states need above all else responsible governments that can provide basic security and live by international norms. What we need now in Pakistan, and what the Pakistanis need, is not another attempt to resurrect their democratic forms. As we have found in many countries, we can work with nondemocratic leaders to achieve valuable interim goals for their peoples and for all peoples before we press on to achieve their thorough transformation. Instead of relying on ideology, we must approach each situation in its own terms. Sometimes, a determined policy for the achievement of democracy in the short term is the correct choice. Many times it will not be. We would hope that a Kerry administration might be able to make these distinctions.
In Saturday's Op-Ed columns we find juxtaposed the priorities of ideology and responsibility. On the right side of the page, David Brooks attacks Kerry for his implicit threat to once again base American foreign policy on the realism of Bush senior and those who served him. Instead, he says we should stick to the new idealism of junior that recognizes the right of all peoples to freedom. Then on the left side of the page, we are once again treated to Kristof's reporting of the latest chapter in the tragic story of the existence of Sudan as a state. In this installment hundreds of thousands in the Darfur region are being killed or driven across its borders.
One would not want to hear Brooks tell us we will solve this latest tragedy by promoting democracy in the Sudan as we have in Iraq. The fact is there are many troubles countries in the world for which our ideology should be the last rather than the first arrow in our quiver. Sudan and North Korea and Libya, and so many other states need above all else responsible governments that can provide basic security and live by international norms. What we need now in Pakistan, and what the Pakistanis need, is not another attempt to resurrect their democratic forms. As we have found in many countries, we can work with nondemocratic leaders to achieve valuable interim goals for their peoples and for all peoples before we press on to achieve their thorough transformation. Instead of relying on ideology, we must approach each situation in its own terms. Sometimes, a determined policy for the achievement of democracy in the short term is the correct choice. Many times it will not be. We would hope that a Kerry administration might be able to make these distinctions.
