Friday, June 18, 2004
The Killing and Destruction: How Much Can the System Take?
A suicide car bomb today killed nearly forty recruits and wounded a hundred and forty at an army recruiting center in Baghdad. This was echoed fifty miles north by another deadly car bomb. The new interim government says that it will institute "martial law" to stop all this. But in most of Iraq I would have thought that was pretty much what already existed. The U.S. is still "letting the Iraqis handle it", and both we and they seem to like it that way. Yet in what sense can the forces of the interim government, or we, effectively reduce the carnage? Whoever is behind the attacks, they seem to have plenty of volunteers and endless supplies of weapons (as a result of an enormous stockpiling of weapons by Saddam and the failure of the United States to adequately address these stockpiles). McCain and others continue to say we need more troops. I am sure he is right. But another division would only make a difference if we were to start using it effectively. What we desperately need is for the American commanders and the new government to work out their respective responsibilities, being sure to give U.S. forces a larger role in the immediate future than they seem to have now.
Incidentally, the beheading of the American engineer in Saudi Arabia looks very much like Zarqawi's beheading of another American in Iraq a few weeks back. At least some of what is going on in Iraq appears to be tied to the al-Qaida effort in Saudi Arabia; probably both are more closely tied than we have been led to believe to Bin Ladin and company on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border.
I remain dismayed by the extent to which the Times chooses to place happenings in Iraq on inside pages while spending page after page on the 9/11 inquiry and the mistakes of the Bush administration. I think this record is important. But right now we are in a desperate struggle in Iraq and the surrounding area. Finding that Cheney sticks foolishly to the stories that led us into Iraq or that pilots and their commanders on 9/11 failed to have or understand authorization to shoot down planes until it was too late is not critical right now. I would agree that exposing all the errors and so incompetancies of the past may (and I have my doubts) help Kerry defeat Bush. Yet the fact is we must deal now with Iraq. By the time Kerry gets in, if he does, the situation will either have brightened greatly or we may irretrievably be on our way out.
Finally, is it time for despair? Probably not yet. Remember that after the disastrous losses of American lives in April many commentators, including some of the nation's top defense intellectuals, thought we had lost. Their solution was simply to get out. But instead we started to reduce our presence on the streets without leaving, and the numbers of Americans killed dropped greatly in May. June may also be low. But what has changed is that now the danger is not so much American lives lost as Iraqi lives lost. It remains to be seen whether this challenge can be met. Let us give the situation another six weeks and then see how it's going.
A suicide car bomb today killed nearly forty recruits and wounded a hundred and forty at an army recruiting center in Baghdad. This was echoed fifty miles north by another deadly car bomb. The new interim government says that it will institute "martial law" to stop all this. But in most of Iraq I would have thought that was pretty much what already existed. The U.S. is still "letting the Iraqis handle it", and both we and they seem to like it that way. Yet in what sense can the forces of the interim government, or we, effectively reduce the carnage? Whoever is behind the attacks, they seem to have plenty of volunteers and endless supplies of weapons (as a result of an enormous stockpiling of weapons by Saddam and the failure of the United States to adequately address these stockpiles). McCain and others continue to say we need more troops. I am sure he is right. But another division would only make a difference if we were to start using it effectively. What we desperately need is for the American commanders and the new government to work out their respective responsibilities, being sure to give U.S. forces a larger role in the immediate future than they seem to have now.
Incidentally, the beheading of the American engineer in Saudi Arabia looks very much like Zarqawi's beheading of another American in Iraq a few weeks back. At least some of what is going on in Iraq appears to be tied to the al-Qaida effort in Saudi Arabia; probably both are more closely tied than we have been led to believe to Bin Ladin and company on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border.
I remain dismayed by the extent to which the Times chooses to place happenings in Iraq on inside pages while spending page after page on the 9/11 inquiry and the mistakes of the Bush administration. I think this record is important. But right now we are in a desperate struggle in Iraq and the surrounding area. Finding that Cheney sticks foolishly to the stories that led us into Iraq or that pilots and their commanders on 9/11 failed to have or understand authorization to shoot down planes until it was too late is not critical right now. I would agree that exposing all the errors and so incompetancies of the past may (and I have my doubts) help Kerry defeat Bush. Yet the fact is we must deal now with Iraq. By the time Kerry gets in, if he does, the situation will either have brightened greatly or we may irretrievably be on our way out.
Finally, is it time for despair? Probably not yet. Remember that after the disastrous losses of American lives in April many commentators, including some of the nation's top defense intellectuals, thought we had lost. Their solution was simply to get out. But instead we started to reduce our presence on the streets without leaving, and the numbers of Americans killed dropped greatly in May. June may also be low. But what has changed is that now the danger is not so much American lives lost as Iraqi lives lost. It remains to be seen whether this challenge can be met. Let us give the situation another six weeks and then see how it's going.
Wednesday, June 16, 2004
Iraq's Sunni Resistance: Baath or al-Qaida?
The daily death toll in Iraq and the success of the resistance's anti-infrastructure campaign wears down all those trying to secure the peace: the Coalition forces, the Iraqi civilians, and the interim government security forces. But who is doing what?
Recently I suggested that a pattern was developing in which the resistance was coming more and more to look like a Baath-Sunni struggle against the spectre of an emerging political system in which they will play a much diminished role. The idea that this is the emerging pattern was strengthened by the news of massive Shi'a demonstrations in Baghdad against what they said was a Sunni imam's call for the killing of six Shi'a truck drivers in Falluja. This could, of course, have been a provocation deliberately engineered by the resistance in the spirit of the much discussed letter of Zarqawi in which he proposes that the emerging system can be derailed by igniting a sectarian war of Shi'a and Sunni.
But the events of the last few days, and the increasing role of Sunni religious leaders in the resistance, also suggest that I might have been mistaken in thinking that our principal enemy was a remnant of the Baath structure. Baath was, after all, a fascist party modeled on that of the National Socialists. It was anti-religious and modernist, dedicated to moving the country forcibly into the modern world. It is true that toward the end of his rule Saddam increasingly used religious symbols and slogans to "rally the troops", but it is unlikely anyone really believed him. Yet now the actions in Iraq in which Zarqawi, a person claiming allegiance and connection to al-Qaida, and parallel actions in Saudi Arabia seem to fit better than my old assumption into an al-Qaida pattern that is fueled primarily by religious fanaticism. Zarqawi is, in fact, claiming a role in recent murders. The fact that the major efforts in the last few days have often been the product of suicide missions also fit the al-Qaida pattern better than the Baathist (although the history of the Sri Lankan Tamil movement shows that suicide missions need not have a religious component).
So where are we? First, we must remember that al-Qaida has and has had, only a handful of "card-carrying" members. Most of what the media and the government speaks of as "al-Qaida" refers to a body of extremists in many nations loosely linked together by a common overall objective (killing Americans and their allies, killing all non-Muslims that get in the way, killing all Muslims who differ with their methods in the Jihad against the foreigner). These persons labeled "al-Qaida" do not, however, necessarily take orders from Bin Ladin or his close associates. They are helped when possible by the center, and their memberships present a willing cadre of people that can be enlisted by Bin Ladin and his associates for major operations (such as the presumed to be planned attack in the near future within the United States).
Second, what started as a purely nationalist struggle (at least in the triangle) has metamorphosed into a religious-nationalist struggle. We must begin this reassessment by affirming the unsurprising conclusion of the 9/11 staff that Saddam and al-Qaida did not have a working relationship prior to 9/11. But what has happened since? We can assume that in spite of the self-serving over-estimation of the number of "foreigners" estimated by our government as having come into Iraq to fight the Coalition forces, in fact there has been a significant movement of foreigners into Iraq since our invasion, a movement instigated, aided, and abetted by al-Qaida. We may mean hundreds, perhaps more than 1000. These are well-trained, dedicated persons, some of whom have held leadership positions in other contexts. They have come to aid the Baathists because the Baathists are the group most active in killing Americans. The result has probably been an unavoidable growing together of the two movements, with the fanaticism and religious values of the newcomers serving to complement the nationalism, military background, and local know how of the old Saddam structure. At this point it might be hard to determine "who is in control". Probably no one. In many ways this makes the problem more difficult.
The daily death toll in Iraq and the success of the resistance's anti-infrastructure campaign wears down all those trying to secure the peace: the Coalition forces, the Iraqi civilians, and the interim government security forces. But who is doing what?
Recently I suggested that a pattern was developing in which the resistance was coming more and more to look like a Baath-Sunni struggle against the spectre of an emerging political system in which they will play a much diminished role. The idea that this is the emerging pattern was strengthened by the news of massive Shi'a demonstrations in Baghdad against what they said was a Sunni imam's call for the killing of six Shi'a truck drivers in Falluja. This could, of course, have been a provocation deliberately engineered by the resistance in the spirit of the much discussed letter of Zarqawi in which he proposes that the emerging system can be derailed by igniting a sectarian war of Shi'a and Sunni.
But the events of the last few days, and the increasing role of Sunni religious leaders in the resistance, also suggest that I might have been mistaken in thinking that our principal enemy was a remnant of the Baath structure. Baath was, after all, a fascist party modeled on that of the National Socialists. It was anti-religious and modernist, dedicated to moving the country forcibly into the modern world. It is true that toward the end of his rule Saddam increasingly used religious symbols and slogans to "rally the troops", but it is unlikely anyone really believed him. Yet now the actions in Iraq in which Zarqawi, a person claiming allegiance and connection to al-Qaida, and parallel actions in Saudi Arabia seem to fit better than my old assumption into an al-Qaida pattern that is fueled primarily by religious fanaticism. Zarqawi is, in fact, claiming a role in recent murders. The fact that the major efforts in the last few days have often been the product of suicide missions also fit the al-Qaida pattern better than the Baathist (although the history of the Sri Lankan Tamil movement shows that suicide missions need not have a religious component).
So where are we? First, we must remember that al-Qaida has and has had, only a handful of "card-carrying" members. Most of what the media and the government speaks of as "al-Qaida" refers to a body of extremists in many nations loosely linked together by a common overall objective (killing Americans and their allies, killing all non-Muslims that get in the way, killing all Muslims who differ with their methods in the Jihad against the foreigner). These persons labeled "al-Qaida" do not, however, necessarily take orders from Bin Ladin or his close associates. They are helped when possible by the center, and their memberships present a willing cadre of people that can be enlisted by Bin Ladin and his associates for major operations (such as the presumed to be planned attack in the near future within the United States).
Second, what started as a purely nationalist struggle (at least in the triangle) has metamorphosed into a religious-nationalist struggle. We must begin this reassessment by affirming the unsurprising conclusion of the 9/11 staff that Saddam and al-Qaida did not have a working relationship prior to 9/11. But what has happened since? We can assume that in spite of the self-serving over-estimation of the number of "foreigners" estimated by our government as having come into Iraq to fight the Coalition forces, in fact there has been a significant movement of foreigners into Iraq since our invasion, a movement instigated, aided, and abetted by al-Qaida. We may mean hundreds, perhaps more than 1000. These are well-trained, dedicated persons, some of whom have held leadership positions in other contexts. They have come to aid the Baathists because the Baathists are the group most active in killing Americans. The result has probably been an unavoidable growing together of the two movements, with the fanaticism and religious values of the newcomers serving to complement the nationalism, military background, and local know how of the old Saddam structure. At this point it might be hard to determine "who is in control". Probably no one. In many ways this makes the problem more difficult.
Monday, June 14, 2004
Further Shift toward a Sunni-Baathist Dominated Resistance
The latest news reinforces the idea that the struggle in Iraq could resolve into a struggle of the extreme nationalists headquartered in the "Sunni triangle" against the occupation forces and the Interim Government. On the one hand, continuing attacks, against foreigners and Iraqis, seem to be once again primarily in this area. Two leading officials of the new Interim government have already been assassinated in the last two days and attempts have been made against others. On the other hand, in spite of continued violence by the Sadrists, particularly in Sadr City, it was announced yesterday that Moktada al-Sadr may establish a political party to contest the upcoming election. This acceptance of the emerging system by even the most extreme Shi'a leader fits the logic of the situation, as was suggested yesterday.
If this scenario plays out as I think it might, it will have two consequences. First, the best armed and organized resistance movement will continue as the leader of the opposition. Its top officers are generals high on our playing card list who were never apprehended. They are making a very creditable effort to maintain a high level of fear, thereby severely reducing cooperation with the new government. Officials at all levels from ordinary policemen to cabinet members who are Sunni or who live in the triangle may become increasing unable or unwilling to serve the interim administration. The Sunni resistance is also holding back the development of adequate oil production and electrical supplies, both of which are critical to the success of the new government. Second, and equally important, this concentration of the resistance on the old Saddam forces will greatly reduce the base on which the resistance can be sustained. It will further raise the confidence of the Shi'a majority that the future will be theirs rather than a replay of the past in which the Sunnis dominated.
It should be remembered, however, that numbers are not everything. Many resistance movements have managed to be quite successful and even take power with no more than the support of fifteen percent of the population. For example, with about 15% of the population, the Tutsi ethnic group (or so-labeled population) have managed to play a decisive role in both Rwanda and Burundi. In particular, after the genocide in Rwanda in which nearly one million Tutsi were killed, the Tutsis managed to regroup and return to take over the country in the 1990s. Not coincidentally, they were the group that had traditionally ruled the country.
The latest news reinforces the idea that the struggle in Iraq could resolve into a struggle of the extreme nationalists headquartered in the "Sunni triangle" against the occupation forces and the Interim Government. On the one hand, continuing attacks, against foreigners and Iraqis, seem to be once again primarily in this area. Two leading officials of the new Interim government have already been assassinated in the last two days and attempts have been made against others. On the other hand, in spite of continued violence by the Sadrists, particularly in Sadr City, it was announced yesterday that Moktada al-Sadr may establish a political party to contest the upcoming election. This acceptance of the emerging system by even the most extreme Shi'a leader fits the logic of the situation, as was suggested yesterday.
If this scenario plays out as I think it might, it will have two consequences. First, the best armed and organized resistance movement will continue as the leader of the opposition. Its top officers are generals high on our playing card list who were never apprehended. They are making a very creditable effort to maintain a high level of fear, thereby severely reducing cooperation with the new government. Officials at all levels from ordinary policemen to cabinet members who are Sunni or who live in the triangle may become increasing unable or unwilling to serve the interim administration. The Sunni resistance is also holding back the development of adequate oil production and electrical supplies, both of which are critical to the success of the new government. Second, and equally important, this concentration of the resistance on the old Saddam forces will greatly reduce the base on which the resistance can be sustained. It will further raise the confidence of the Shi'a majority that the future will be theirs rather than a replay of the past in which the Sunnis dominated.
It should be remembered, however, that numbers are not everything. Many resistance movements have managed to be quite successful and even take power with no more than the support of fifteen percent of the population. For example, with about 15% of the population, the Tutsi ethnic group (or so-labeled population) have managed to play a decisive role in both Rwanda and Burundi. In particular, after the genocide in Rwanda in which nearly one million Tutsi were killed, the Tutsis managed to regroup and return to take over the country in the 1990s. Not coincidentally, they were the group that had traditionally ruled the country.
