Saturday, June 12, 2004
A Realignment of Forces and Growing Coalition Passivity
Today's paper suggests that the focus of opposition to the Coalition forces/Interim Government may be shifting more decisively to the old Sunni/Baathist/nationalists of the Sunni triangle and away from the Shiites. In Kufa, a sermon by a prominent Sadrist announces that Moktada now supports the interim government as long as it moves in the direction of freeing the country of the Americans. Many areas in the South now seem calmer, except in Najaf where the suspicion is that Mahdi militia elements may not be under Moktada's control. In Najaf also, there have been pitched battles between this militia and supporters of another Shiite grouping. In Baghdad, sporadic fighting continues between American forces and the Mahdi army; the U.S. seems not to feel it should cede any part of the city to the Sadrists.
Meanwhile in several Sunni mosques in Baghdad, the preachers are now openly asking the officers and experts of the old Iraq army to come back into the battle on the side of the resistance. Their message: "The absence of combat experts from the battlefield is treason . . . against God, the prophet, and the nation the experts belong to".
This suggests that what may emerge is a pattern in which Sunnis and Baathists, all those who benefited from Saddam's favoring of the Sunni Arabs, violently resisting the development of a new political system in which they will be a distinct minority, the Kurds (also Sunnis, but not in this political sense) opting out of the new system for the same reason, and the Shi'as gradually and grudgingly reaching a wait and see accommodation. This hasn't jelled yet, but it may.
Meanwhile, the American forces appear to be on hold. Many relax in glorious facilities built around the extravagant structures of Saddam. We already knew of the cloistered green zone with its palaces and other modern buildings in the center of Baghdad, and of the revitalized prison camps on the outskirts. Today's paper describes a huge American encampment built around a desert pleasure palace renamed "Camp Victory". Here, air conditioning has reached the freezing level in some buildings, the latest technologies are used to enjoy unequalled communications and instant battlefield overview, or to offer soldiers views of high school graduations. Outside of such facilities the troops are less active. Police are being driven from their stations in much of the country. Ten miles south of the city the police were driven from their station. They called the Americans for help, but it was said to take five hours for them to arrive. (We are sure there are thousands of coalition soldiers living through a hell everyday, risking their lives whenever they get out on the road. Yet relatively, it appears that the occupation forces are much more passive that in the recent past. We can only hope that they do not take too far and too quickly the reasonable idea that responsibility for security should be shifted to the Iraqis.)
Today's paper suggests that the focus of opposition to the Coalition forces/Interim Government may be shifting more decisively to the old Sunni/Baathist/nationalists of the Sunni triangle and away from the Shiites. In Kufa, a sermon by a prominent Sadrist announces that Moktada now supports the interim government as long as it moves in the direction of freeing the country of the Americans. Many areas in the South now seem calmer, except in Najaf where the suspicion is that Mahdi militia elements may not be under Moktada's control. In Najaf also, there have been pitched battles between this militia and supporters of another Shiite grouping. In Baghdad, sporadic fighting continues between American forces and the Mahdi army; the U.S. seems not to feel it should cede any part of the city to the Sadrists.
Meanwhile in several Sunni mosques in Baghdad, the preachers are now openly asking the officers and experts of the old Iraq army to come back into the battle on the side of the resistance. Their message: "The absence of combat experts from the battlefield is treason . . . against God, the prophet, and the nation the experts belong to".
This suggests that what may emerge is a pattern in which Sunnis and Baathists, all those who benefited from Saddam's favoring of the Sunni Arabs, violently resisting the development of a new political system in which they will be a distinct minority, the Kurds (also Sunnis, but not in this political sense) opting out of the new system for the same reason, and the Shi'as gradually and grudgingly reaching a wait and see accommodation. This hasn't jelled yet, but it may.
Meanwhile, the American forces appear to be on hold. Many relax in glorious facilities built around the extravagant structures of Saddam. We already knew of the cloistered green zone with its palaces and other modern buildings in the center of Baghdad, and of the revitalized prison camps on the outskirts. Today's paper describes a huge American encampment built around a desert pleasure palace renamed "Camp Victory". Here, air conditioning has reached the freezing level in some buildings, the latest technologies are used to enjoy unequalled communications and instant battlefield overview, or to offer soldiers views of high school graduations. Outside of such facilities the troops are less active. Police are being driven from their stations in much of the country. Ten miles south of the city the police were driven from their station. They called the Americans for help, but it was said to take five hours for them to arrive. (We are sure there are thousands of coalition soldiers living through a hell everyday, risking their lives whenever they get out on the road. Yet relatively, it appears that the occupation forces are much more passive that in the recent past. We can only hope that they do not take too far and too quickly the reasonable idea that responsibility for security should be shifted to the Iraqis.)
Friday, June 11, 2004
America Continues Its Retreat in Iraq
Today's news brings two and one-half items that betray our continuing retirement. First, in Najaf the Sadrists made a major attack against a police station, killing Iraqis, and later burned eight cars. This spells the end of the latest peace agreement, even though there is some doubt that these particular Sadrists are under the control of Muqtada al-Sadr. The Americans took no part and did not move to intervene. The local government chief said that he didn't want the Americans to come in, the police would handle it (would that they would). Now the Falluja approach seems institutionalized here also, again without Americans and certainly without peace. Taking the position that anything is better than having the Americans fighting in Najaf, as Professor Juan Cole would assert, this is just what we should be doing.
On the Kurdish front, the Kurds are looking for the United States to intervene, the Kurds feel deeply that they have been betrayed by the Americans when they failed to get the provisional constitution enshrined in the U.N. resolution. Larry Diamond, the democracy expert who has recently returned from a stint in Iraq, says that the Americans must work hard to forge an agreement between the Shiites and the Kurds that both sides can agree to. Otherwise, the country goes up in flames and in the flames will be many of the liberal, secular principles that we fought so hard to put in the provisional constitution. However, the Times reports that American officials "reject the idea that American diplomats should try to mediate a solution to Iraqi federalism. . . . Rather the United States [has] created a situation where the Kurds will have to negotiate their future with supporters of Ayatollah Sistani, and seek their own accommodations." In effect, they are washing their hands of the problem, doing exactly what the Kurds accuse them of doing. "It's their problem now".
On the infrastructure front, it has been admitted that the faceless enemy has set destruction of electrical power grid as one of its top priorities. Although much has been rebuilt, the rate of attacks has recently increased. The U.S. contractor remarks that his firm has been putting in lots of alternate lines, so that the system is getting more robust all the time. Each break now makes less of a difference. He says he has been asked to develop quick reaction teams that can locate and repair breaks more quickly. Again we note that the U.S. army seems strangely quiet. The occupation authority is not concentrating on actually defending the system, but rather on the use of contractors to rebuild it faster than it can be destroyed. This approach may be cost effective, but psychologically it represents another form of pull back.
Today's news brings two and one-half items that betray our continuing retirement. First, in Najaf the Sadrists made a major attack against a police station, killing Iraqis, and later burned eight cars. This spells the end of the latest peace agreement, even though there is some doubt that these particular Sadrists are under the control of Muqtada al-Sadr. The Americans took no part and did not move to intervene. The local government chief said that he didn't want the Americans to come in, the police would handle it (would that they would). Now the Falluja approach seems institutionalized here also, again without Americans and certainly without peace. Taking the position that anything is better than having the Americans fighting in Najaf, as Professor Juan Cole would assert, this is just what we should be doing.
On the Kurdish front, the Kurds are looking for the United States to intervene, the Kurds feel deeply that they have been betrayed by the Americans when they failed to get the provisional constitution enshrined in the U.N. resolution. Larry Diamond, the democracy expert who has recently returned from a stint in Iraq, says that the Americans must work hard to forge an agreement between the Shiites and the Kurds that both sides can agree to. Otherwise, the country goes up in flames and in the flames will be many of the liberal, secular principles that we fought so hard to put in the provisional constitution. However, the Times reports that American officials "reject the idea that American diplomats should try to mediate a solution to Iraqi federalism. . . . Rather the United States [has] created a situation where the Kurds will have to negotiate their future with supporters of Ayatollah Sistani, and seek their own accommodations." In effect, they are washing their hands of the problem, doing exactly what the Kurds accuse them of doing. "It's their problem now".
On the infrastructure front, it has been admitted that the faceless enemy has set destruction of electrical power grid as one of its top priorities. Although much has been rebuilt, the rate of attacks has recently increased. The U.S. contractor remarks that his firm has been putting in lots of alternate lines, so that the system is getting more robust all the time. Each break now makes less of a difference. He says he has been asked to develop quick reaction teams that can locate and repair breaks more quickly. Again we note that the U.S. army seems strangely quiet. The occupation authority is not concentrating on actually defending the system, but rather on the use of contractors to rebuild it faster than it can be destroyed. This approach may be cost effective, but psychologically it represents another form of pull back.
Thursday, June 10, 2004
Friedman and Security in Iraq
In his important Op-Ed today, Thomas Friedman asserts that violence in Iraq is caused by an assortment of Baathists, Islamists, foreigners and thugs whose only objective is to cause Americans to react violently, thereby further delegitimizing our effort. The killings by these enemies are often random and seem to be supported by no list of demands or particular ideology. He concludes that we must keep our heads down, react as little as possible, and concentrate on training new Iraqi security forces. For, he says, security is the key issue, and only Iraqi forces will be able to guarantee security as we retire, as we must. He quotes General Petraeus as saying that we no longer strive to get Iraqis to love us. What we want now is to get them to love the new Iraq.
This all makes sense. However, we should more carefully consider the killers who oppose us. They are evidently a diverse group with many objectives. But we should take more cognizance of the fact that the basic objective of most of the units violently attacking Iraqis and Americans is to improve their position in what is to be a scramble for local, regional. and national power. Falluja, for example, is now under the control of Iraqis. In the opinion of the Times it has become a "safe haven for anti-American forces". But killing within Falluja continues because of rivalries among the anti-Americans. Peace agreements in Sadr City (part of Baghdad), Najaf, Kerbala, and Kufa were supposed to get the Sadrists off the streets, but forces calling themselves Sadrists continue to be armed, continue to attack police stations. The suspicion is that Sadrist forces are split into many subgroups willing and able to war with one another, other Shiite militias, Iraqi security services, and the Americans. We know there are also a variety of Shiite groups arrayed against them in the South, often armed, and these groups will continue to be armed whether or not disarmament if the agreement du jour.
At first, shortly after we took Baghdad, the unifying principle of the guerrillas or terrorists, in so far as they had one, was to defend Saddam and the Baathist ideology and structure. This has probably long since evolved into a simple nationalism, "get the Americans out", "kill those who cooperate with the foreigners". Now that the Americans are apparently on their way out, this unity is bound to also collapse. At least the Kurds are a known entity and it makes some sense for them to have a separate existence. For the rest of the country no such easy solution may be available. For the United States to train in the space of a few months, effective local forces that have loyalty only to "the new Iraq" is the right task, but it may not be doable. After a great deal of effort, we still do not have more than a few thousand soldiers in Afghanistan's national army. The Kabul government knows that for many years it will have to rely on a patchwork of local armies. But at least these local armies have many years of tribal history behind them and represent known quantities.
Note: Today we read that Iraq's new Prime Minister has assured the Kurds that the constitution will not be changed until after the elections. This must be cold comfort. The Kurds always knew the problem would be after the elections when the Shiites would have an absolute majority and be able to change the constitution any way they wanted. Unfortunately for the Kurds, if they wait too long to make their break, they may no longer have the forces and the administrative structures that make possible their effective departure today.
In his important Op-Ed today, Thomas Friedman asserts that violence in Iraq is caused by an assortment of Baathists, Islamists, foreigners and thugs whose only objective is to cause Americans to react violently, thereby further delegitimizing our effort. The killings by these enemies are often random and seem to be supported by no list of demands or particular ideology. He concludes that we must keep our heads down, react as little as possible, and concentrate on training new Iraqi security forces. For, he says, security is the key issue, and only Iraqi forces will be able to guarantee security as we retire, as we must. He quotes General Petraeus as saying that we no longer strive to get Iraqis to love us. What we want now is to get them to love the new Iraq.
This all makes sense. However, we should more carefully consider the killers who oppose us. They are evidently a diverse group with many objectives. But we should take more cognizance of the fact that the basic objective of most of the units violently attacking Iraqis and Americans is to improve their position in what is to be a scramble for local, regional. and national power. Falluja, for example, is now under the control of Iraqis. In the opinion of the Times it has become a "safe haven for anti-American forces". But killing within Falluja continues because of rivalries among the anti-Americans. Peace agreements in Sadr City (part of Baghdad), Najaf, Kerbala, and Kufa were supposed to get the Sadrists off the streets, but forces calling themselves Sadrists continue to be armed, continue to attack police stations. The suspicion is that Sadrist forces are split into many subgroups willing and able to war with one another, other Shiite militias, Iraqi security services, and the Americans. We know there are also a variety of Shiite groups arrayed against them in the South, often armed, and these groups will continue to be armed whether or not disarmament if the agreement du jour.
At first, shortly after we took Baghdad, the unifying principle of the guerrillas or terrorists, in so far as they had one, was to defend Saddam and the Baathist ideology and structure. This has probably long since evolved into a simple nationalism, "get the Americans out", "kill those who cooperate with the foreigners". Now that the Americans are apparently on their way out, this unity is bound to also collapse. At least the Kurds are a known entity and it makes some sense for them to have a separate existence. For the rest of the country no such easy solution may be available. For the United States to train in the space of a few months, effective local forces that have loyalty only to "the new Iraq" is the right task, but it may not be doable. After a great deal of effort, we still do not have more than a few thousand soldiers in Afghanistan's national army. The Kabul government knows that for many years it will have to rely on a patchwork of local armies. But at least these local armies have many years of tribal history behind them and represent known quantities.
Note: Today we read that Iraq's new Prime Minister has assured the Kurds that the constitution will not be changed until after the elections. This must be cold comfort. The Kurds always knew the problem would be after the elections when the Shiites would have an absolute majority and be able to change the constitution any way they wanted. Unfortunately for the Kurds, if they wait too long to make their break, they may no longer have the forces and the administrative structures that make possible their effective departure today.
Wednesday, June 09, 2004
Kurdish Secession
The euphoria produced by the unanimous acceptance of the Security Council resolution on Iraq was soured by the announcement that the Kurdish leaders were seriously thinking of abandoning the effort to make a federalist Iraq, taking their troops and loyalties back to the hills. In a letter from their two top leaders to President Bush they gave an ultimatum. Either you guarantee that the new government in Iraq will not undercut the provisional constitution that gives us a special right to veto any attempt to curtail our autonomy or we will no longer take part. Their major complaints are two-fold. First, in the resolution they did not get the guarantee they sought that the federal system would not be altered and second they felt that the United States had failed them by not giving a Kurd one of the top four positions in the new government. In effect we sent a special representative, Blackwill, to tell them what was going to happen, a mission that also did not sit well with them. Our change of position, what they see as yet another sellout, was occasioned by our focus on attaining and keeping the support of the Ayatollah Sistani, who has not been bashful in asserting the new Iraq must be a unified state under Shiite control (albeit through the ballot box).
We face an almost insurmountable problem. We feel we must keep the support of the Shiites, and the Shiite leaders, including Sistani himself, feel that to maintaining their control over their followers (and fend off the Sadrists) they must stick to a hard line guaranteeing Shiite supremacy. The Kurdish leaders face a similar need within their ranks. They have not achieved their positions by caving in to outside pressures Thus while we must work hard to resolve the problem, at the end of the day we may have to accept a divided Iraq.
Nevertheless, we must make the effort to mediate the problem. For one thing, the international community and the Arab world are looking to us to hold the country together. It may be that the apparent intransigence of the Kurdish leaders is just an act. After all, a large part of the Kurdish population of Iraq, especially the best educated and well off, live in Baghdad and other major cities outside the Kurdish area. If it is, then, mostly a bluff, then we have a chance. But the report is that city offices are being closed, Kurds are on the move, it does not look promising.
If we fail at mediation, then in the long run we should plan to help both sides economically and culturally, but we should avoid the use or threat of military force. The Kurds have already said they want our military protection (protection we offered by air under Saddam). However, for the immediate future the Kurds will have stronger non-coalition forces along their regional borders than the other Iraqis. If the Kurds then try to extend their ethnic borders (and they are not all that well defined), they may well end up attacking non-Kurds who might in turn ask for our assistance. In both cases, we should concentrate on mediation of such conflicts to reduce the chance that Americans die either for a unified Iraq or for an independent Kurdistan.
If the breakup occurs, we would be well advised to help make the parts work as separate units. This is certainly what we did in Yugoslavia. The separate units all have done better democratically and economically than Serbia, the heart of the country. We have been willing within Serbia to support with international forces and agreements what is in essence a secessionist Albania, a state that only formally is denied independent status and will surely have it one day. It does not seem to me that Iraq is any more a state than Yugoslavia was. It might be best for it to stay unified, but if the parts do not want that we should not make a great effort to force them to stay together.
I also agree with William Safire (a rare occurrence) that we have a responsibility to the Kurds. They have fought our battles on many occasions. They now have a secular government closer to a democracy than the rest of the country. They helped us in our invasion, much as the Northern Alliance helped our efforts in Afghanistan. I also agree that while Turkey and Iran, with their own Kurdish secessionist movements might not be happy with this outcome, they are unlikely to interfere with it violently.
The euphoria produced by the unanimous acceptance of the Security Council resolution on Iraq was soured by the announcement that the Kurdish leaders were seriously thinking of abandoning the effort to make a federalist Iraq, taking their troops and loyalties back to the hills. In a letter from their two top leaders to President Bush they gave an ultimatum. Either you guarantee that the new government in Iraq will not undercut the provisional constitution that gives us a special right to veto any attempt to curtail our autonomy or we will no longer take part. Their major complaints are two-fold. First, in the resolution they did not get the guarantee they sought that the federal system would not be altered and second they felt that the United States had failed them by not giving a Kurd one of the top four positions in the new government. In effect we sent a special representative, Blackwill, to tell them what was going to happen, a mission that also did not sit well with them. Our change of position, what they see as yet another sellout, was occasioned by our focus on attaining and keeping the support of the Ayatollah Sistani, who has not been bashful in asserting the new Iraq must be a unified state under Shiite control (albeit through the ballot box).
We face an almost insurmountable problem. We feel we must keep the support of the Shiites, and the Shiite leaders, including Sistani himself, feel that to maintaining their control over their followers (and fend off the Sadrists) they must stick to a hard line guaranteeing Shiite supremacy. The Kurdish leaders face a similar need within their ranks. They have not achieved their positions by caving in to outside pressures Thus while we must work hard to resolve the problem, at the end of the day we may have to accept a divided Iraq.
Nevertheless, we must make the effort to mediate the problem. For one thing, the international community and the Arab world are looking to us to hold the country together. It may be that the apparent intransigence of the Kurdish leaders is just an act. After all, a large part of the Kurdish population of Iraq, especially the best educated and well off, live in Baghdad and other major cities outside the Kurdish area. If it is, then, mostly a bluff, then we have a chance. But the report is that city offices are being closed, Kurds are on the move, it does not look promising.
If we fail at mediation, then in the long run we should plan to help both sides economically and culturally, but we should avoid the use or threat of military force. The Kurds have already said they want our military protection (protection we offered by air under Saddam). However, for the immediate future the Kurds will have stronger non-coalition forces along their regional borders than the other Iraqis. If the Kurds then try to extend their ethnic borders (and they are not all that well defined), they may well end up attacking non-Kurds who might in turn ask for our assistance. In both cases, we should concentrate on mediation of such conflicts to reduce the chance that Americans die either for a unified Iraq or for an independent Kurdistan.
If the breakup occurs, we would be well advised to help make the parts work as separate units. This is certainly what we did in Yugoslavia. The separate units all have done better democratically and economically than Serbia, the heart of the country. We have been willing within Serbia to support with international forces and agreements what is in essence a secessionist Albania, a state that only formally is denied independent status and will surely have it one day. It does not seem to me that Iraq is any more a state than Yugoslavia was. It might be best for it to stay unified, but if the parts do not want that we should not make a great effort to force them to stay together.
I also agree with William Safire (a rare occurrence) that we have a responsibility to the Kurds. They have fought our battles on many occasions. They now have a secular government closer to a democracy than the rest of the country. They helped us in our invasion, much as the Northern Alliance helped our efforts in Afghanistan. I also agree that while Turkey and Iran, with their own Kurdish secessionist movements might not be happy with this outcome, they are unlikely to interfere with it violently.
The Infrastructure Battle
Yesterday I said the key to the success of the new interim government was the extent to which they could bring down the number of Iraqi casualties caused by those opposed to the new political structures developing in Iraq. (The number of civilians killed by Americans is declining and is likely to continue declining as our forces spend more time in their base camps and in training Iraqis.) This remains true (on an otherwise quiet front 15 policemen were killed today by mortars in Falluja, smaller numbers elsewhere). But yesterday I should have added that a parallel challenge is the protection of existing infrastructure as well as infrastructure that is in the process of rehabilitation. This means first of all a transportation system secure enough that potential users are willing to risk making use of it. It also means the protection of oil extraction, transportation and refining facilities. (A major pipeline was blown up today.) For many city dwellers, it means the provision of enough electrical energy to run their air conditioners. All of this shows on the one hand the extent to which Iraq is not an undeveloped country. But it also shows that the more developed it is, the more it can be damaged by relatively small attacks against key nodes in the system. I understand that with all that has happened, there is generally a steady upward trend in the status and condition of the infrastructure. The new government must see that it continues. For the Americans will become less and less willing to be everywhere, guarding everything.
Yesterday I said the key to the success of the new interim government was the extent to which they could bring down the number of Iraqi casualties caused by those opposed to the new political structures developing in Iraq. (The number of civilians killed by Americans is declining and is likely to continue declining as our forces spend more time in their base camps and in training Iraqis.) This remains true (on an otherwise quiet front 15 policemen were killed today by mortars in Falluja, smaller numbers elsewhere). But yesterday I should have added that a parallel challenge is the protection of existing infrastructure as well as infrastructure that is in the process of rehabilitation. This means first of all a transportation system secure enough that potential users are willing to risk making use of it. It also means the protection of oil extraction, transportation and refining facilities. (A major pipeline was blown up today.) For many city dwellers, it means the provision of enough electrical energy to run their air conditioners. All of this shows on the one hand the extent to which Iraq is not an undeveloped country. But it also shows that the more developed it is, the more it can be damaged by relatively small attacks against key nodes in the system. I understand that with all that has happened, there is generally a steady upward trend in the status and condition of the infrastructure. The new government must see that it continues. For the Americans will become less and less willing to be everywhere, guarding everything.
Tuesday, June 08, 2004
Democracy in Afghanistan
Today we learn that Hamid Karzai is gathering the support of the majority of warlords in the country for the upcoming elections. He will apparently be overwhelmingly elected in a free and fair election with their support. The downside is, of course, that this will mean the continuing control by these warlords of their fiefdoms. Some of these people are not well intentioned, some are. All have strong followings, and all are able to coerce the support of those in their area when they cannot use more gentle persuasion. Many in the more liberal human rights community in the country and outside are appalled.
Karzai does this simply because he sees no other way to hold the country together, and, incidentally, to maintain himself in power. The United States and its allies have not provided him the firepower or other resources to run the country any other way. But this Karzai "democracy" should not be considered a disaster. Much of the American South was for a century ruled this way (political scientists would call it "traditional political leadership"), and many newer democracies have had similar arrangements. It lays a social and political basis that can be converted later into more effective nation building if a strong enough leader or the opportunity presents itself. For the time being we should content to support the process. Power will end up being diffused by the process, the system will be roughly representative, democratic forms will be learned, and justice and human rights might at least prevail in Kabul.
To my mind what is happening in Afghanistan lays a basis for what we might expect in Iraq. We note that in the last few days the Times has described the importance of tribal identities in Iraq, identities that often transcend ethnic or religious distinctions. The new President is a tribal leader with ties to the Saudi princes. The Kurdish territories are divided among two old time chieftains. The Shi'a divide into several groups, each with its own leader. The latest word is that the militias of such sub groups will be disbanded, but this may be more superficial than not. When the election season comes we can expect that the country's power brokers, perhaps similar to warlords, will be able to organize and turn out the vote in their fiefdoms. Don't be surprised if we find some areas voting nearly 100% for X and others nearly 100% for Y. Again, the result may not be so bad. Of course, Iraq could surprise us. Iraqis are much more literate than Afghanis, more likely to be willing and able to think for themselves irrespective of built-in loyalties. But whatever happens, let us be sure that we outsiders go with the flow, showing ourselves willing to accept less than pure Western democracy, if this means the rebirth of an independent and freer Iraq.
Today we learn that Hamid Karzai is gathering the support of the majority of warlords in the country for the upcoming elections. He will apparently be overwhelmingly elected in a free and fair election with their support. The downside is, of course, that this will mean the continuing control by these warlords of their fiefdoms. Some of these people are not well intentioned, some are. All have strong followings, and all are able to coerce the support of those in their area when they cannot use more gentle persuasion. Many in the more liberal human rights community in the country and outside are appalled.
Karzai does this simply because he sees no other way to hold the country together, and, incidentally, to maintain himself in power. The United States and its allies have not provided him the firepower or other resources to run the country any other way. But this Karzai "democracy" should not be considered a disaster. Much of the American South was for a century ruled this way (political scientists would call it "traditional political leadership"), and many newer democracies have had similar arrangements. It lays a social and political basis that can be converted later into more effective nation building if a strong enough leader or the opportunity presents itself. For the time being we should content to support the process. Power will end up being diffused by the process, the system will be roughly representative, democratic forms will be learned, and justice and human rights might at least prevail in Kabul.
To my mind what is happening in Afghanistan lays a basis for what we might expect in Iraq. We note that in the last few days the Times has described the importance of tribal identities in Iraq, identities that often transcend ethnic or religious distinctions. The new President is a tribal leader with ties to the Saudi princes. The Kurdish territories are divided among two old time chieftains. The Shi'a divide into several groups, each with its own leader. The latest word is that the militias of such sub groups will be disbanded, but this may be more superficial than not. When the election season comes we can expect that the country's power brokers, perhaps similar to warlords, will be able to organize and turn out the vote in their fiefdoms. Don't be surprised if we find some areas voting nearly 100% for X and others nearly 100% for Y. Again, the result may not be so bad. Of course, Iraq could surprise us. Iraqis are much more literate than Afghanis, more likely to be willing and able to think for themselves irrespective of built-in loyalties. But whatever happens, let us be sure that we outsiders go with the flow, showing ourselves willing to accept less than pure Western democracy, if this means the rebirth of an independent and freer Iraq.
Security Council
Today the Security Council passed the much awaited resolution on Iraq. It lays a basis for international support for the process that is now occurring in Iraq and also wipes away much of the confusion stemming from the failed American attempt to go it alone. Juan Cole and others have voiced many criticisms by themselves and others about the details of this resolution and of other measures such as the proposed voting law. However, to my mind, no matter how faulty all of this might be, the important issue on the ground is the extent to which the Iraqis who count regard the process as proceeding in their direction and away from American control. I believe they sense that now. This may not stop the violence immediately, but as long as this sense holds in most of the country, the country will be moving in the right direction. It appears to me now that the trend of violence in Iraq is toward more and more attacks on Iraqis and away from attempts to drive Americans out of the country. Of course, the new government must succeed in working with Americans for reducing this killing. But they will have a few months now to do this, and such an opportunity has not existed for the last several months.
Today the Security Council passed the much awaited resolution on Iraq. It lays a basis for international support for the process that is now occurring in Iraq and also wipes away much of the confusion stemming from the failed American attempt to go it alone. Juan Cole and others have voiced many criticisms by themselves and others about the details of this resolution and of other measures such as the proposed voting law. However, to my mind, no matter how faulty all of this might be, the important issue on the ground is the extent to which the Iraqis who count regard the process as proceeding in their direction and away from American control. I believe they sense that now. This may not stop the violence immediately, but as long as this sense holds in most of the country, the country will be moving in the right direction. It appears to me now that the trend of violence in Iraq is toward more and more attacks on Iraqis and away from attempts to drive Americans out of the country. Of course, the new government must succeed in working with Americans for reducing this killing. But they will have a few months now to do this, and such an opportunity has not existed for the last several months.
