Friday, June 04, 2004
CIA and Responsibility for 9/11
The resignation of the CIA chief, George Tenet, has invited a great deal of commentary, mostly pointing out that he was about to have to endure several damning reports of what was done in his term.
However, an expert and former CIA analyst, Paul Pillar, brings us an Op-Ed today that casts doubt on whether Tenet should be singled out for criticism. He says that the intelligence services had by the mid-nineties identified Muslim terrorism and within that al-Qaida as the main dangers. The 1995 national intelligence estimate highlighted civil aviation as a vulnerable and attractive target. But they did this at a time when it was hard, and it remained hard, to effectively gain the attention of decision makers. He and a counterpart in the FBI briefed top Airline officials on this analysis. But they could not convince them that a major restructuring of airport security would be worth it. One of the problems, incidentally, was that the "best authorities" at the time were convinced the danger was in WMD rather than creative uses of more conventional means. He concludes with the sad thought that administrations do not make major changes in their thinking until after a tragedy, and that no amount of analytical work within an intelligence agency can be decisive. His second conclusion reiterates a statement of Tenet that "warning is not good enough without the structure to put it into action".
All of which makes a problem of relevancy for those many such as myself who spend a lifetime looking on from the bench.
The resignation of the CIA chief, George Tenet, has invited a great deal of commentary, mostly pointing out that he was about to have to endure several damning reports of what was done in his term.
However, an expert and former CIA analyst, Paul Pillar, brings us an Op-Ed today that casts doubt on whether Tenet should be singled out for criticism. He says that the intelligence services had by the mid-nineties identified Muslim terrorism and within that al-Qaida as the main dangers. The 1995 national intelligence estimate highlighted civil aviation as a vulnerable and attractive target. But they did this at a time when it was hard, and it remained hard, to effectively gain the attention of decision makers. He and a counterpart in the FBI briefed top Airline officials on this analysis. But they could not convince them that a major restructuring of airport security would be worth it. One of the problems, incidentally, was that the "best authorities" at the time were convinced the danger was in WMD rather than creative uses of more conventional means. He concludes with the sad thought that administrations do not make major changes in their thinking until after a tragedy, and that no amount of analytical work within an intelligence agency can be decisive. His second conclusion reiterates a statement of Tenet that "warning is not good enough without the structure to put it into action".
All of which makes a problem of relevancy for those many such as myself who spend a lifetime looking on from the bench.
CIA and Responsibility for 9/11
The resignation of the CIA chief, George Tenet, has invited a great deal of commentary, mostly pointing out that he was about to have to endure several damning reports of what was done in his term.
However, an expert and former CIA analyst, Paul Pillar, brings us an Op-Ed today that casts doubt on whether Tenet should be singled out for criticism. He says that the intelligence services had by the mid-nineties identified Muslim terrorism and within that al-Qaida as the main dangers. The 1995 national intelligence estimate highlighted civil aviation as a vulnerable and attractive target. But they did this at a time when it was hard, and it remained hard, to effectively gain the attention of decision makers. He and a counterpart in the FBI briefed top Airline officials on this analysis. But they could not convince them that a major restructuring of airport security would be worth it. One of the problems, incidentally, was that the "best authorities" at the time were convinced the danger was in WMD rather than creative uses of more conventional means. He concludes with the sad thought that administrations do not make major changes in their thinking until after a tragedy, and that no amount of analytical work within an intelligence agency can be decisive. His second conclusion reiterates a statement of Tenet that "warning is not good enough without the structure to put it into action".
All of which makes a problem of relevancy for those many such as myself who spend a lifetime looking on from the bench.
The resignation of the CIA chief, George Tenet, has invited a great deal of commentary, mostly pointing out that he was about to have to endure several damning reports of what was done in his term.
However, an expert and former CIA analyst, Paul Pillar, brings us an Op-Ed today that casts doubt on whether Tenet should be singled out for criticism. He says that the intelligence services had by the mid-nineties identified Muslim terrorism and within that al-Qaida as the main dangers. The 1995 national intelligence estimate highlighted civil aviation as a vulnerable and attractive target. But they did this at a time when it was hard, and it remained hard, to effectively gain the attention of decision makers. He and a counterpart in the FBI briefed top Airline officials on this analysis. But they could not convince them that a major restructuring of airport security would be worth it. One of the problems, incidentally, was that the "best authorities" at the time were convinced the danger was in WMD rather than creative uses of more conventional means. He concludes with the sad thought that administrations do not make major changes in their thinking until after a tragedy, and that no amount of analytical work within an intelligence agency can be decisive. His second conclusion reiterates a statement of Tenet that "warning is not good enough without the structure to put it into action".
All of which makes a problem of relevancy for those many such as myself who spend a lifetime looking on from the bench.
CIA and Responsibility for 9/11
The resignation of the CIA chief, George Tenet, has invited a great deal of commentary, mostly pointing out that he was about to have to endure several damning reports of what was done in his term.
However, an expert and former CIA analyst, Paul Pillar, brings us an Op-Ed today that casts doubt on whether Tenet should be singled out for criticism. He says that the intelligence services had by the mid-nineties identified Muslim terrorism and within that al-Qaida as the main dangers. The 1995 national intelligence estimate highlighted civil aviation as a vulnerable and attractive target. But they did this at a time when it was hard, and it remained hard, to effectively gain the attention of decision makers. He and a counterpart in the FBI briefed top Airline officials on this analysis. But they could not convince them that a major restructuring of airport security would be worth it. One of the problems, incidentally, was that the "best authorities" at the time were convinced the danger was in WMD rather than creative uses of more conventional means. He concludes with the sad thought that administrations do not make major changes in their thinking until after a tragedy, and that no amount of analytical work within an intelligence agency can be decisive. His second conclusion reiterates a statement of Tenet that "warning is not good enough without the structure to put it into action".
All of which makes a problem of relevancy for those many such as myself who spend a lifetime looking on from the bench.
The resignation of the CIA chief, George Tenet, has invited a great deal of commentary, mostly pointing out that he was about to have to endure several damning reports of what was done in his term.
However, an expert and former CIA analyst, Paul Pillar, brings us an Op-Ed today that casts doubt on whether Tenet should be singled out for criticism. He says that the intelligence services had by the mid-nineties identified Muslim terrorism and within that al-Qaida as the main dangers. The 1995 national intelligence estimate highlighted civil aviation as a vulnerable and attractive target. But they did this at a time when it was hard, and it remained hard, to effectively gain the attention of decision makers. He and a counterpart in the FBI briefed top Airline officials on this analysis. But they could not convince them that a major restructuring of airport security would be worth it. One of the problems, incidentally, was that the "best authorities" at the time were convinced the danger was in WMD rather than creative uses of more conventional means. He concludes with the sad thought that administrations do not make major changes in their thinking until after a tragedy, and that no amount of analytical work within an intelligence agency can be decisive. His second conclusion reiterates a statement of Tenet that "warning is not good enough without the structure to put it into action".
All of which makes a problem of relevancy for those many such as myself who spend a lifetime looking on from the bench.
CIA and Responsibility for 9/11
The resignation of the CIA chief, George Tenet, has invited a great deal of commentary, mostly pointing out that he was about to have to endure several damning reports of what was done in his term.
However, an expert and former CIA analyst, Paul Pillar, brings us an Op-Ed today that casts doubt on whether Tenet should be singled out for criticism. He says that the intelligence services had by the mid-nineties identified Muslim terrorism and within that al-Qaida as the main dangers. The 1995 national intelligence estimate highlighted civil aviation as a vulnerable and attractive target. But they did this at a time when it was hard, and it remained hard, to effectively gain the attention of decision makers. He and a counterpart in the FBI briefed top Airline officials on this analysis. But they could not convince them that a major restructuring of airport security would be worth it. One of the problems, incidentally, was that the "best authorities" at the time were convinced the danger was in WMD rather than creative uses of more conventional means. He concludes with the sad thought that administrations do not make major changes in their thinking until after a tragedy, and that no amount of analytical work within an intelligence agency can be decisive. His second conclusion reiterates a statement of Tenet that "warning is not good enough without the structure to put it into action".
All of which makes a problem of relevancy for those many such as myself who spend a lifetime looking on from the bench.
The resignation of the CIA chief, George Tenet, has invited a great deal of commentary, mostly pointing out that he was about to have to endure several damning reports of what was done in his term.
However, an expert and former CIA analyst, Paul Pillar, brings us an Op-Ed today that casts doubt on whether Tenet should be singled out for criticism. He says that the intelligence services had by the mid-nineties identified Muslim terrorism and within that al-Qaida as the main dangers. The 1995 national intelligence estimate highlighted civil aviation as a vulnerable and attractive target. But they did this at a time when it was hard, and it remained hard, to effectively gain the attention of decision makers. He and a counterpart in the FBI briefed top Airline officials on this analysis. But they could not convince them that a major restructuring of airport security would be worth it. One of the problems, incidentally, was that the "best authorities" at the time were convinced the danger was in WMD rather than creative uses of more conventional means. He concludes with the sad thought that administrations do not make major changes in their thinking until after a tragedy, and that no amount of analytical work within an intelligence agency can be decisive. His second conclusion reiterates a statement of Tenet that "warning is not good enough without the structure to put it into action".
All of which makes a problem of relevancy for those many such as myself who spend a lifetime looking on from the bench.
CIA and Responsibility for 9/11
The resignation of the CIA chief, George Tenet, has invited a great deal of commentary, mostly pointing out that he was about to have to endure several damning reports of what was done in his term.
However, an expert and former CIA analyst, Paul Pillar, brings us an Op-Ed today that casts doubt on whether Tenet should be singled out for criticism. He says that the intelligence services had by the mid-nineties identified Muslim terrorism and within that al-Qaida as the main dangers. The 1995 national intelligence estimate highlighted civil aviation as a vulnerable and attractive target. But they did this at a time when it was hard, and it remained hard, to effectively gain the attention of decision makers. He and a counterpart in the FBI briefed top Airline officials on this analysis. But they could not convince them that a major restructuring of airport security would be worth it. One of the problems, incidentally, was that the "best authorities" at the time were convinced the danger was in WMD rather than creative uses of more conventional means. He concludes with the sad thought that administrations do not make major changes in their thinking until after a tragedy, and that no amount of analytical work within an intelligence agency can be decisive. His second conclusion reiterates a statement of Tenet that "warning is not good enough without the structure to put it into action".
All of which makes a problem of relevancy for those many such as myself who spend a lifetime looking on from the bench.
The resignation of the CIA chief, George Tenet, has invited a great deal of commentary, mostly pointing out that he was about to have to endure several damning reports of what was done in his term.
However, an expert and former CIA analyst, Paul Pillar, brings us an Op-Ed today that casts doubt on whether Tenet should be singled out for criticism. He says that the intelligence services had by the mid-nineties identified Muslim terrorism and within that al-Qaida as the main dangers. The 1995 national intelligence estimate highlighted civil aviation as a vulnerable and attractive target. But they did this at a time when it was hard, and it remained hard, to effectively gain the attention of decision makers. He and a counterpart in the FBI briefed top Airline officials on this analysis. But they could not convince them that a major restructuring of airport security would be worth it. One of the problems, incidentally, was that the "best authorities" at the time were convinced the danger was in WMD rather than creative uses of more conventional means. He concludes with the sad thought that administrations do not make major changes in their thinking until after a tragedy, and that no amount of analytical work within an intelligence agency can be decisive. His second conclusion reiterates a statement of Tenet that "warning is not good enough without the structure to put it into action".
All of which makes a problem of relevancy for those many such as myself who spend a lifetime looking on from the bench.
CIA and Responsibility for 9/11
The resignation of the CIA chief, George Tenet, has invited a great deal of commentary, mostly pointing out that he was about to have to endure several damning reports of what was done in his term.
However, an expert and former CIA analyst, Paul Pillar, brings us an Op-Ed today that casts doubt on whether Tenet should be singled out for criticism. He says that the intelligence services had by the mid-nineties identified Muslim terrorism and within that al-Qaida as the main dangers. The 1995 national intelligence estimate highlighted civil aviation as a vulnerable and attractive target. But they did this at a time when it was hard, and it remained hard, to effectively gain the attention of decision makers. He and a counterpart in the FBI briefed top Airline officials on this analysis. But they could not convince them that a major restructuring of airport security would be worth it. One of the problems, incidentally, was that the "best authorities" at the time were convinced the danger was in WMD rather than creative uses of more conventional means. He concludes with the sad thought that administrations do not make major changes in their thinking until after a tragedy, and that no amount of analytical work within an intelligence agency can be decisive. His second conclusion reiterates a statement of Tenet that "warning is not good enough without the structure to put it into action".
All of which makes a problem of relevancy for those many such as myself who spend a lifetime looking on from the bench.
The resignation of the CIA chief, George Tenet, has invited a great deal of commentary, mostly pointing out that he was about to have to endure several damning reports of what was done in his term.
However, an expert and former CIA analyst, Paul Pillar, brings us an Op-Ed today that casts doubt on whether Tenet should be singled out for criticism. He says that the intelligence services had by the mid-nineties identified Muslim terrorism and within that al-Qaida as the main dangers. The 1995 national intelligence estimate highlighted civil aviation as a vulnerable and attractive target. But they did this at a time when it was hard, and it remained hard, to effectively gain the attention of decision makers. He and a counterpart in the FBI briefed top Airline officials on this analysis. But they could not convince them that a major restructuring of airport security would be worth it. One of the problems, incidentally, was that the "best authorities" at the time were convinced the danger was in WMD rather than creative uses of more conventional means. He concludes with the sad thought that administrations do not make major changes in their thinking until after a tragedy, and that no amount of analytical work within an intelligence agency can be decisive. His second conclusion reiterates a statement of Tenet that "warning is not good enough without the structure to put it into action".
All of which makes a problem of relevancy for those many such as myself who spend a lifetime looking on from the bench.
CIA and Responsibility for 9/11
The resignation of the CIA chief, George Tenet, has invited a great deal of commentary, mostly pointing out that he was about to have to endure several damning reports of what was done in his term.
However, an expert and former CIA analyst, Paul Pillar, brings us an Op-Ed today that casts doubt on whether Tenet should be singled out for criticism. He says that the intelligence services had by the mid-nineties identified Muslim terrorism and within that al-Qaida as the main dangers. The 1995 national intelligence estimate highlighted civil aviation as a vulnerable and attractive target. But they did this at a time when it was hard, and it remained hard, to effectively gain the attention of decision makers. He and a counterpart in the FBI briefed top Airline officials on this analysis. But they could not convince them that a major restructuring of airport security would be worth it. One of the problems, incidentally, was that the "best authorities" at the time were convinced the danger was in WMD rather than creative uses of more conventional means. He concludes with the sad thought that administrations do not make major changes in their thinking until after a tragedy, and that no amount of analytical work within an intelligence agency can be decisive. His second conclusion reiterates a statement of Tenet that "warning is not good enough without the structure to put it into action".
All of which makes a problem of relevancy for those many such as myself who spend a lifetime looking on from the bench.
The resignation of the CIA chief, George Tenet, has invited a great deal of commentary, mostly pointing out that he was about to have to endure several damning reports of what was done in his term.
However, an expert and former CIA analyst, Paul Pillar, brings us an Op-Ed today that casts doubt on whether Tenet should be singled out for criticism. He says that the intelligence services had by the mid-nineties identified Muslim terrorism and within that al-Qaida as the main dangers. The 1995 national intelligence estimate highlighted civil aviation as a vulnerable and attractive target. But they did this at a time when it was hard, and it remained hard, to effectively gain the attention of decision makers. He and a counterpart in the FBI briefed top Airline officials on this analysis. But they could not convince them that a major restructuring of airport security would be worth it. One of the problems, incidentally, was that the "best authorities" at the time were convinced the danger was in WMD rather than creative uses of more conventional means. He concludes with the sad thought that administrations do not make major changes in their thinking until after a tragedy, and that no amount of analytical work within an intelligence agency can be decisive. His second conclusion reiterates a statement of Tenet that "warning is not good enough without the structure to put it into action".
All of which makes a problem of relevancy for those many such as myself who spend a lifetime looking on from the bench.
CIA and Responsibility for 9/11
The resignation of the CIA chief, George Tenet, has invited a great deal of commentary, mostly pointing out that he was about to have to endure several damning reports of what was done in his term.
However, an expert and former CIA analyst, Paul Pillar, brings us an Op-Ed today that casts doubt on whether Tenet should be singled out for criticism. He says that the intelligence services had by the mid-nineties identified Muslim terrorism and within that al-Qaida as the main dangers. The 1995 national intelligence estimate highlighted civil aviation as a vulnerable and attractive target. But they did this at a time when it was hard, and it remained hard, to effectively gain the attention of decision makers. He and a counterpart in the FBI briefed top Airline officials on this analysis. But they could not convince them that a major restructuring of airport security would be worth it. One of the problems, incidentally, was that the "best authorities" at the time were convinced the danger was in WMD rather than creative uses of more conventional means. He concludes with the sad thought that administrations do not make major changes in their thinking until after a tragedy, and that no amount of analytical work within an intelligence agency can be decisive. His second conclusion reiterates a statement of Tenet that "warning is not good enough without the structure to put it into action".
All of which makes a problem of relevancy for those many such as myself who spend a lifetime looking on from the bench.
The resignation of the CIA chief, George Tenet, has invited a great deal of commentary, mostly pointing out that he was about to have to endure several damning reports of what was done in his term.
However, an expert and former CIA analyst, Paul Pillar, brings us an Op-Ed today that casts doubt on whether Tenet should be singled out for criticism. He says that the intelligence services had by the mid-nineties identified Muslim terrorism and within that al-Qaida as the main dangers. The 1995 national intelligence estimate highlighted civil aviation as a vulnerable and attractive target. But they did this at a time when it was hard, and it remained hard, to effectively gain the attention of decision makers. He and a counterpart in the FBI briefed top Airline officials on this analysis. But they could not convince them that a major restructuring of airport security would be worth it. One of the problems, incidentally, was that the "best authorities" at the time were convinced the danger was in WMD rather than creative uses of more conventional means. He concludes with the sad thought that administrations do not make major changes in their thinking until after a tragedy, and that no amount of analytical work within an intelligence agency can be decisive. His second conclusion reiterates a statement of Tenet that "warning is not good enough without the structure to put it into action".
All of which makes a problem of relevancy for those many such as myself who spend a lifetime looking on from the bench.
CIA and Responsibility for 9/11
The resignation of the CIA chief, George Tenet, has invited a great deal of commentary, mostly pointing out that he was about to have to endure several damning reports of what was done in his term.
However, an expert and former CIA analyst, Paul Pillar, brings us an Op-Ed today that casts doubt on whether Tenet should be singled out for criticism. He says that the intelligence services had by the mid-nineties identified Muslim terrorism and within that al-Qaida as the main dangers. The 1995 national intelligence estimate highlighted civil aviation as a vulnerable and attractive target. But they did this at a time when it was hard, and it remained hard, to effectively gain the attention of decision makers. He and a counterpart in the FBI briefed top Airline officials on this analysis. But they could not convince them that a major restructuring of airport security would be worth it. One of the problems, incidentally, was that the "best authorities" at the time were convinced the danger was in WMD rather than creative uses of more conventional means. He concludes with the sad thought that administrations do not make major changes in their thinking until after a tragedy, and that no amount of analytical work within an intelligence agency can be decisive. His second conclusion reiterates a statement of Tenet that "warning is not good enough without the structure to put it into action".
All of which makes a problem of relevancy for those many such as myself who spend a lifetime looking on from the bench.
The resignation of the CIA chief, George Tenet, has invited a great deal of commentary, mostly pointing out that he was about to have to endure several damning reports of what was done in his term.
However, an expert and former CIA analyst, Paul Pillar, brings us an Op-Ed today that casts doubt on whether Tenet should be singled out for criticism. He says that the intelligence services had by the mid-nineties identified Muslim terrorism and within that al-Qaida as the main dangers. The 1995 national intelligence estimate highlighted civil aviation as a vulnerable and attractive target. But they did this at a time when it was hard, and it remained hard, to effectively gain the attention of decision makers. He and a counterpart in the FBI briefed top Airline officials on this analysis. But they could not convince them that a major restructuring of airport security would be worth it. One of the problems, incidentally, was that the "best authorities" at the time were convinced the danger was in WMD rather than creative uses of more conventional means. He concludes with the sad thought that administrations do not make major changes in their thinking until after a tragedy, and that no amount of analytical work within an intelligence agency can be decisive. His second conclusion reiterates a statement of Tenet that "warning is not good enough without the structure to put it into action".
All of which makes a problem of relevancy for those many such as myself who spend a lifetime looking on from the bench.
Progress in Iraq
The most positive indicator of progress in Iraq that I have seen was revealed by the New York Times this morning: There was no mention of Iraq on the front page!
Less clear but in my mind positive was the reaction of Ayatollah Sistani to the new interim government. Most of the media thought that it was significant that he did not condemn the new government. Instead of condemnation, he said that it would have been better if it had been elected (that has been his position for a long time) but that he hoped that it would govern efficiently and honestly. The Times chose to see this in a negative light. In its daily summary it only mentioned that he had "expressed dissatisfaction". In its slightly longer piece it concluded that he had "offered more caution than support". The rest of the media saw his statement as a somewhat grudging acceptance of the new leadership. Under a Washington Post and AP byline we read that Sistani "guardedly endorsed the new government". This piece pointed out that his statement was much more positive than anything he had said about the Governing Council. It expressed wishes for God's help for the new administration and emphasized that it must "provide security in all parts of the country and end all organized crimes and other criminal acts." Considering his position and the pressures on him, I would say this is pretty positive. It offers a thoroughly Iraqi basis on which we might construct a workable system and achieve the security and total sovereignty both we and he strive for.
The most positive indicator of progress in Iraq that I have seen was revealed by the New York Times this morning: There was no mention of Iraq on the front page!
Less clear but in my mind positive was the reaction of Ayatollah Sistani to the new interim government. Most of the media thought that it was significant that he did not condemn the new government. Instead of condemnation, he said that it would have been better if it had been elected (that has been his position for a long time) but that he hoped that it would govern efficiently and honestly. The Times chose to see this in a negative light. In its daily summary it only mentioned that he had "expressed dissatisfaction". In its slightly longer piece it concluded that he had "offered more caution than support". The rest of the media saw his statement as a somewhat grudging acceptance of the new leadership. Under a Washington Post and AP byline we read that Sistani "guardedly endorsed the new government". This piece pointed out that his statement was much more positive than anything he had said about the Governing Council. It expressed wishes for God's help for the new administration and emphasized that it must "provide security in all parts of the country and end all organized crimes and other criminal acts." Considering his position and the pressures on him, I would say this is pretty positive. It offers a thoroughly Iraqi basis on which we might construct a workable system and achieve the security and total sovereignty both we and he strive for.
Wednesday, June 02, 2004
The New American Strategy
Yesterday's news brought word of a new American strategy for Iraq. It was announced by Lt. General Thomas Metz who is said to be in command of day to day operations in Iraq. The new strategy will be essentially defensive. The general announced that in the future we will concentrate on defending the infrastructure, defending our forces and on developing an Iraqi capacity to deal with security threats. Since Falluja, this has been the direction that the Americans have been moving. As problems have proliferated we have scaled down our objectives, and I believe reasonably so. I noted that in a recent statement by our President, he spoke of Iraq achieving a "representative government", while in the past he has spoken of creating a "democracy". If it could entrench a representative government, and the result were accepted by the people, even if reaching a more perfect goal were abandoned for a while, we would have accomplished a good deal. It might allow for a way station on the road to democracy during which the country could develop the governmental institutions that successful democracy will require.
The only problem that I have with the new military strategy is that when fighting a guerrilla movement, or forces acting in part like guerrillas (as in Vietnam), a defensive strategy requires an enormous buildup of forces to be successful. They only have to hit here and there; you have to defend everywhere. So the success of our new strategy will depend on whether we are facing a movement in Iraq that can effectively sustain itself in the face of what we hope will be a growing hope that Iraqis can once again handle their own affairs under the new dispensation, that more fighting will not be necessary to throw the Americans out.
Yesterday's news brought word of a new American strategy for Iraq. It was announced by Lt. General Thomas Metz who is said to be in command of day to day operations in Iraq. The new strategy will be essentially defensive. The general announced that in the future we will concentrate on defending the infrastructure, defending our forces and on developing an Iraqi capacity to deal with security threats. Since Falluja, this has been the direction that the Americans have been moving. As problems have proliferated we have scaled down our objectives, and I believe reasonably so. I noted that in a recent statement by our President, he spoke of Iraq achieving a "representative government", while in the past he has spoken of creating a "democracy". If it could entrench a representative government, and the result were accepted by the people, even if reaching a more perfect goal were abandoned for a while, we would have accomplished a good deal. It might allow for a way station on the road to democracy during which the country could develop the governmental institutions that successful democracy will require.
The only problem that I have with the new military strategy is that when fighting a guerrilla movement, or forces acting in part like guerrillas (as in Vietnam), a defensive strategy requires an enormous buildup of forces to be successful. They only have to hit here and there; you have to defend everywhere. So the success of our new strategy will depend on whether we are facing a movement in Iraq that can effectively sustain itself in the face of what we hope will be a growing hope that Iraqis can once again handle their own affairs under the new dispensation, that more fighting will not be necessary to throw the Americans out.
The New Iraqi Government
The interim government announced this week is a cooperative project of the United Nations, the American Government, and the Iraqi Governing Council, with the additional assistance of a variety of other tribal and ethnic leaders. The end result has not given us the President we might have desired, Adnan Pachachi, but it did produce what appears to be a well-balanced roster. It allows both Iraqis and Americans to go to the Security Council with a united front. It also makes it possible for the members of the government to say that they are not simply American appointees. The only loser so far seems to be Chalabi, and even he may reemerge, this time as an Iraqi nationalist who has thumbed his nose at the Americans.
The Times tells us that the result has little legitimacy. But I think we should wait and see. Brahimi wanted a government of technocrats who would not have further political ambitions. We have gotten the opposite. But this result means that most of the members of this new government have at least some built-in backing in the country. The question now is how much will this government be challenged by those armed groups that want to derail it. In the security area, the new government will have to simultaneously do three things: work out a way to use the Americans for major security purposes without seeming to be (more than they already are) a tool of the occupation, develop reasonably effective security forces of their own (police and army), and work out deals with those militias and other armed groups that are willing to settle for control and or freedom of action in closely defined areas. Of course, what we expect to happen in Kurdish areas provides the easiest model, Falluja may provide another.
The interim government announced this week is a cooperative project of the United Nations, the American Government, and the Iraqi Governing Council, with the additional assistance of a variety of other tribal and ethnic leaders. The end result has not given us the President we might have desired, Adnan Pachachi, but it did produce what appears to be a well-balanced roster. It allows both Iraqis and Americans to go to the Security Council with a united front. It also makes it possible for the members of the government to say that they are not simply American appointees. The only loser so far seems to be Chalabi, and even he may reemerge, this time as an Iraqi nationalist who has thumbed his nose at the Americans.
The Times tells us that the result has little legitimacy. But I think we should wait and see. Brahimi wanted a government of technocrats who would not have further political ambitions. We have gotten the opposite. But this result means that most of the members of this new government have at least some built-in backing in the country. The question now is how much will this government be challenged by those armed groups that want to derail it. In the security area, the new government will have to simultaneously do three things: work out a way to use the Americans for major security purposes without seeming to be (more than they already are) a tool of the occupation, develop reasonably effective security forces of their own (police and army), and work out deals with those militias and other armed groups that are willing to settle for control and or freedom of action in closely defined areas. Of course, what we expect to happen in Kurdish areas provides the easiest model, Falluja may provide another.
Tuesday, June 01, 2004
New Commentary by Juan Cole
I again suggest that the reader look at Juan Cole's web log at http://www.juancole.com/ (referred to earlier in this log's entry for April 27 below). Today I was reading the entries for late May to June 1 and find them extremely useful. He brings in many "guests" to add commentary and information to his own thoughts and he also offers many Internet references. Cole is an excellent example of the involved academic. He has deep knowledge of the Middle East and many sources that one does not ordinarily have access to. He is, nevertheless, an academic with some of the failures that are ascribed to them. He has a liberal ideology and his bitter anti-Bush rhetoric sometimes blinds him. That said, he apparently has nearly all his facts rights and I would agree with most of his commentary.
Among the newer pieces of information from Cole is the extent of anti-American demonstrations by shi'as around the world because of our fighting in Najaf and Karbala. Iran, Lebanon, Pakistan and other centers have had mobs come out into the streets protesting this desecration. This is important, although perhaps not as important as Cole makes out. Many of the protesters and their instigators were anti-US long before this, and our attacks simply provide another pretext.
Reading between the lines, it is noteworthy that Cole has relatively little to say about the negative reaction within Iraq to Abu Ghuraib. Our torturing of Iraqis surely has not helped, but it is not the blow that it is in the rest of the world. It would appear that more important to the decline in Iraqi support for the American forces has been (1) our inability to bring security to the country and (2) the continued killing, imprisonment, etc. of Iraqis in our attempts to bring security. Cole's figures on the percentage of people who want us out are chilling. The change has been steady from almost the first months and today the vast majority seem to want us out (or say they do; they may actually not want any of the other alternatives either).
One other new piece of information is in regard to the NY Times self-flagellation over its failure to question evidence that was used to bring us into the war. An issue I discussed recently. It seems that there was a chapter before that in which Andrew Sullivan bitterly attacked the paper and its editor at the time for being anti-American, indeed for almost being pro-terrorist in its left-wing willingness to believe everything said against the Administration and its war. It was after the editor so pilloried, Raines, left that the Times published pieces that have been judged in retrospect as too pro-Bush, not questioning enough.
I again suggest that the reader look at Juan Cole's web log at http://www.juancole.com/ (referred to earlier in this log's entry for April 27 below). Today I was reading the entries for late May to June 1 and find them extremely useful. He brings in many "guests" to add commentary and information to his own thoughts and he also offers many Internet references. Cole is an excellent example of the involved academic. He has deep knowledge of the Middle East and many sources that one does not ordinarily have access to. He is, nevertheless, an academic with some of the failures that are ascribed to them. He has a liberal ideology and his bitter anti-Bush rhetoric sometimes blinds him. That said, he apparently has nearly all his facts rights and I would agree with most of his commentary.
Among the newer pieces of information from Cole is the extent of anti-American demonstrations by shi'as around the world because of our fighting in Najaf and Karbala. Iran, Lebanon, Pakistan and other centers have had mobs come out into the streets protesting this desecration. This is important, although perhaps not as important as Cole makes out. Many of the protesters and their instigators were anti-US long before this, and our attacks simply provide another pretext.
Reading between the lines, it is noteworthy that Cole has relatively little to say about the negative reaction within Iraq to Abu Ghuraib. Our torturing of Iraqis surely has not helped, but it is not the blow that it is in the rest of the world. It would appear that more important to the decline in Iraqi support for the American forces has been (1) our inability to bring security to the country and (2) the continued killing, imprisonment, etc. of Iraqis in our attempts to bring security. Cole's figures on the percentage of people who want us out are chilling. The change has been steady from almost the first months and today the vast majority seem to want us out (or say they do; they may actually not want any of the other alternatives either).
One other new piece of information is in regard to the NY Times self-flagellation over its failure to question evidence that was used to bring us into the war. An issue I discussed recently. It seems that there was a chapter before that in which Andrew Sullivan bitterly attacked the paper and its editor at the time for being anti-American, indeed for almost being pro-terrorist in its left-wing willingness to believe everything said against the Administration and its war. It was after the editor so pilloried, Raines, left that the Times published pieces that have been judged in retrospect as too pro-Bush, not questioning enough.
Monday, May 31, 2004
Three Short Subjects
The truce engineered for Najaf and Kufa is not holding. The American commander suggests that the sadrists may not have been clear as to whether it should affect Kufa as well as Najaf. There is also a difference in interpretation. The Americans interpret the agreement to say that any armed Mahdist is fair game; the sadrists seem to think that they can have arms as long as they do not fire them first. Keep tuned.
The Times discusses at length the rise of the Sunni clergy as a force in their own right. In the absence of politicians (at least in public) the clergy have become de facto politicians who are virulent in their denunciation of the Americans. One problem is that the sunni clergy is divided into many factions, so can hardly operate as a united front (The shi'a, in spite of their divisions, have historically had more of a sense of hierarchical organization of the clergy than have the sunni, and each of the ayatollas has his own "built-in" following.
The Times continues to be bothered by the way in which the interim government is being chosen, describing today at length the loss of control of the process by the United Nations envoy, Brahimi. Supposedly, he is now letting the United States and the Governing Council call the shots. I find this a little incredible. Brahimi has been regarded as strong person with backing from the top of the United Nations, and therefore much of the world. Why he would be truckling under to the Americans is quite unclear. It may just be possible that he is still trying to put together the best candidates that will both be acceptable to Iraqis and be able to govern, and in the process he is listening to America's quite knowledgeable representatives and those of the Governing Council.
The truce engineered for Najaf and Kufa is not holding. The American commander suggests that the sadrists may not have been clear as to whether it should affect Kufa as well as Najaf. There is also a difference in interpretation. The Americans interpret the agreement to say that any armed Mahdist is fair game; the sadrists seem to think that they can have arms as long as they do not fire them first. Keep tuned.
The Times discusses at length the rise of the Sunni clergy as a force in their own right. In the absence of politicians (at least in public) the clergy have become de facto politicians who are virulent in their denunciation of the Americans. One problem is that the sunni clergy is divided into many factions, so can hardly operate as a united front (The shi'a, in spite of their divisions, have historically had more of a sense of hierarchical organization of the clergy than have the sunni, and each of the ayatollas has his own "built-in" following.
The Times continues to be bothered by the way in which the interim government is being chosen, describing today at length the loss of control of the process by the United Nations envoy, Brahimi. Supposedly, he is now letting the United States and the Governing Council call the shots. I find this a little incredible. Brahimi has been regarded as strong person with backing from the top of the United Nations, and therefore much of the world. Why he would be truckling under to the Americans is quite unclear. It may just be possible that he is still trying to put together the best candidates that will both be acceptable to Iraqis and be able to govern, and in the process he is listening to America's quite knowledgeable representatives and those of the Governing Council.
Media Self-Flagellation
The New York Times recently responded to liberal and international criticism of media coverage that supposedly allowed the Administration to take the country to war with Iraq on the basis of evidence that Saddam had stockpiled and was ready to use weapons of mass destruction (WMD). It did a special editorial and then later a special ombudsman column admitting the error of their ways. Their point was that they had carelessly allowed claims for the existence of WMD in Iraq and claims of pre-war contacts with al-Qaida to enter their pages without making clear that their sources were in the Administration and that the evidence had not been independently checked. Unfortunately, in making this mea culpa the Times has done more to undermine its credibility than to restore it. It is saying, in effect: "We had a point of view, reported from this point of view; now we have another point of view, now we need to expunge the paper trail that represents our former position."
As a careful reader of the Times, I was never convinced by reports in the Times before or after our invasion that Saddam had stockpiled weapons of mass destruction. Some reports from administration sources said they did, but it was clear what the sources were. Other reports and commentary in the Times pointed out the likelihood that "evidence" of Iraqi WMD or cooperation with al-Qaida was manufactured in whole or in part by persons in government or in the Iraqi exile community that wanted the United States to intervene. The Times did not lead me astray. Instead, I was glad that its pages contained both accounts reporting the evidence supporting Administration views and accounts casting doubt on this evidence. I was allowed to choose. I hope I always have that opportunity.
This is, of course, a larger problem than the Times and its internal and external critics. The accusation is now general a general one against the American media, an accusation that simply does not accord with my experience.
The New York Times recently responded to liberal and international criticism of media coverage that supposedly allowed the Administration to take the country to war with Iraq on the basis of evidence that Saddam had stockpiled and was ready to use weapons of mass destruction (WMD). It did a special editorial and then later a special ombudsman column admitting the error of their ways. Their point was that they had carelessly allowed claims for the existence of WMD in Iraq and claims of pre-war contacts with al-Qaida to enter their pages without making clear that their sources were in the Administration and that the evidence had not been independently checked. Unfortunately, in making this mea culpa the Times has done more to undermine its credibility than to restore it. It is saying, in effect: "We had a point of view, reported from this point of view; now we have another point of view, now we need to expunge the paper trail that represents our former position."
As a careful reader of the Times, I was never convinced by reports in the Times before or after our invasion that Saddam had stockpiled weapons of mass destruction. Some reports from administration sources said they did, but it was clear what the sources were. Other reports and commentary in the Times pointed out the likelihood that "evidence" of Iraqi WMD or cooperation with al-Qaida was manufactured in whole or in part by persons in government or in the Iraqi exile community that wanted the United States to intervene. The Times did not lead me astray. Instead, I was glad that its pages contained both accounts reporting the evidence supporting Administration views and accounts casting doubt on this evidence. I was allowed to choose. I hope I always have that opportunity.
This is, of course, a larger problem than the Times and its internal and external critics. The accusation is now general a general one against the American media, an accusation that simply does not accord with my experience.
Casualties
The casualty figures are out for May. Using the same system that we used last month, there were 82 total and 78 American. This represents a considerable decline from April, but leaving April aside it is still well above the figures for any other months except November, 2003 and April and March 2003 (during the offensive). So no one should proclaim a positive trend yet.
Two notes. First, the figures given in this analysis for wounded run in the 4000 range. Yet in a responsible television broadcast discussing the wounded passing through Germany, the figure of 12,000 wounded in Iraq was given. No idea of why the discrepancy. Second, I do not understand why the dead in Iraq should be more important than those in Afghanistan. The Lehrer shows regularly shows in silence the pictures on the service men and women most recently killed in Iraq. Last night on 60 Minutes for Memorial Day, we were shown all 800 plus killed in Iraq, but again nothing on Afghanistan. This is clearly the forgotten war. (Actually I believe we have more troops there than we have ever had.) Fatalities are given at about eighty, which seems low, but this is only an impression.
The casualty figures are out for May. Using the same system that we used last month, there were 82 total and 78 American. This represents a considerable decline from April, but leaving April aside it is still well above the figures for any other months except November, 2003 and April and March 2003 (during the offensive). So no one should proclaim a positive trend yet.
Two notes. First, the figures given in this analysis for wounded run in the 4000 range. Yet in a responsible television broadcast discussing the wounded passing through Germany, the figure of 12,000 wounded in Iraq was given. No idea of why the discrepancy. Second, I do not understand why the dead in Iraq should be more important than those in Afghanistan. The Lehrer shows regularly shows in silence the pictures on the service men and women most recently killed in Iraq. Last night on 60 Minutes for Memorial Day, we were shown all 800 plus killed in Iraq, but again nothing on Afghanistan. This is clearly the forgotten war. (Actually I believe we have more troops there than we have ever had.) Fatalities are given at about eighty, which seems low, but this is only an impression.
