Saturday, May 22, 2004
Let Them Be
The United States military has been trying to adapt the Falluja approach to Karbala. The army has been withdrawn a couple of times, but then strong patrols have been sent back in. The attempt is to turn security over to Iraqi forces, an attempt that still seems to be in doubt. Even if this fails, it might be a good idea to just let the Sadrists control much of the town. The shi'a divines have asked all military forces to cease action in the holy cities. If we are clearly the ones who accept this request, then we will look relatively good, at least in their eyes. It seems to me that our interim goal should be to secure as much of the country as seems relatively easy, allowing a few places to be controlled by other forces for a while. This should reduce the confrontation, and losses on all sides, without seriously undermining our position. We will see if we are willing and able to undertake this approach, and whether it will be possible to really stabilize things on this knife edge.
The United States military has been trying to adapt the Falluja approach to Karbala. The army has been withdrawn a couple of times, but then strong patrols have been sent back in. The attempt is to turn security over to Iraqi forces, an attempt that still seems to be in doubt. Even if this fails, it might be a good idea to just let the Sadrists control much of the town. The shi'a divines have asked all military forces to cease action in the holy cities. If we are clearly the ones who accept this request, then we will look relatively good, at least in their eyes. It seems to me that our interim goal should be to secure as much of the country as seems relatively easy, allowing a few places to be controlled by other forces for a while. This should reduce the confrontation, and losses on all sides, without seriously undermining our position. We will see if we are willing and able to undertake this approach, and whether it will be possible to really stabilize things on this knife edge.
Patterns of Abuse
It appears that the famous pictures of mistreating prisoners in Iraq are only the tip of the iceberg. There were many other cases of mistreatment, in Afghanistan and elsewhere in Iraq. About eight murder investigations are being pursued. Yet it also appears that the level and flagrancy of mistreatment in a small area of Abu Ghraib was quite unusual. Clearly those directly involved in this, and activity, and this includes military intelligence officers, as well as perhaps CIA and contract persons, should be punished. Their immediate superiors and others that should have known what was going on should also get more than a slap on the wrist.
Beyond this it all gets murkier. There is documentary evidence that after 9/11 the government, specifically the Department of Justice, tried to develop ways to end run the Geneva Conventions. These efforts apparently infected the CIA, the FBI, and military intelligence. The result was the development of new interrogation limits that were applied in Afghanistan, later in Iraq (and one imagines Guantanamo Bay although little about this has come out). Such things as unclothing detainees, putting hoods on for long periods, many kinds of threats, use of dogs (at least as an implied threats) became accepted procedures — or it came to seem so for some of those involved. The military's JAG corps, which had been regularly present in interrogations in the first Gulf War, were excluded from interrogations in the second. They voiced complaints and fears and brought these to the New York Bar Association. All of this surely happened, but it was a "cultural development" and indicting persons for a cultural development may prove difficult. Incidentally, as Kristof explains in today's Op-Ed, no matter how much we may detest Secretary Rumsfeld he appears not to be a major player, nor does the President himself. Yet I do not doubt that from the top to the bottom there was a sense of "Get the information, everything else is secondary." How this played out for some in lower ranks we now know.
It appears that the famous pictures of mistreating prisoners in Iraq are only the tip of the iceberg. There were many other cases of mistreatment, in Afghanistan and elsewhere in Iraq. About eight murder investigations are being pursued. Yet it also appears that the level and flagrancy of mistreatment in a small area of Abu Ghraib was quite unusual. Clearly those directly involved in this, and activity, and this includes military intelligence officers, as well as perhaps CIA and contract persons, should be punished. Their immediate superiors and others that should have known what was going on should also get more than a slap on the wrist.
Beyond this it all gets murkier. There is documentary evidence that after 9/11 the government, specifically the Department of Justice, tried to develop ways to end run the Geneva Conventions. These efforts apparently infected the CIA, the FBI, and military intelligence. The result was the development of new interrogation limits that were applied in Afghanistan, later in Iraq (and one imagines Guantanamo Bay although little about this has come out). Such things as unclothing detainees, putting hoods on for long periods, many kinds of threats, use of dogs (at least as an implied threats) became accepted procedures — or it came to seem so for some of those involved. The military's JAG corps, which had been regularly present in interrogations in the first Gulf War, were excluded from interrogations in the second. They voiced complaints and fears and brought these to the New York Bar Association. All of this surely happened, but it was a "cultural development" and indicting persons for a cultural development may prove difficult. Incidentally, as Kristof explains in today's Op-Ed, no matter how much we may detest Secretary Rumsfeld he appears not to be a major player, nor does the President himself. Yet I do not doubt that from the top to the bottom there was a sense of "Get the information, everything else is secondary." How this played out for some in lower ranks we now know.
Friday, May 21, 2004
Ahmad Chalabi Raid
The raid on the offices and house of Ahmad Chalabi is curious and confusing to all concerned. Chalabi has had the strongest of supporters and detractors from the first time his name surfaced as one of the leaders in the attack Iraq brigade. He seems to still have support in some quarters — one general says Chalabi's people have regularly provided useful tactical intelligence. Recently Chalabi had seemed to turn against American support for a plan to transfer power to a new interim government rather than the one the Bremer established and of which he is a member. He claims his open criticism of the plan is the reason for the raid. I do not know. One could be paranoid and believe it is all a devious plot engineered by Chalabi himself to make him more acceptable to Iraqis as power in the country drifts away from the Americans.
Turning back to the charges, it is true that Chalabi has been developing links with the Iranians (he is a secular shi'a), links that might actually make the preservation of order easier in the unstable next months. He is accused of getting so close that he passed classified information to them, and perhaps he did. His people are also accused of economic crimes, and perhaps this is enough of an explanation. Unfortunately, whatever the explanation, it does not look good to the world, Iraqis, or the American Congress to have a person who has been supported this long, and who many see as one of the main movers of the war agenda, be now attacked and humiliated by the very people who were paying his bills up until a few days ago. Unless they accept the devious explanation, most observers will fall back on the simple explanation that U.S. reliance on, and support of, Chalabi was a major mistake. In other words, in this too our government was simply incompetent.
The raid on the offices and house of Ahmad Chalabi is curious and confusing to all concerned. Chalabi has had the strongest of supporters and detractors from the first time his name surfaced as one of the leaders in the attack Iraq brigade. He seems to still have support in some quarters — one general says Chalabi's people have regularly provided useful tactical intelligence. Recently Chalabi had seemed to turn against American support for a plan to transfer power to a new interim government rather than the one the Bremer established and of which he is a member. He claims his open criticism of the plan is the reason for the raid. I do not know. One could be paranoid and believe it is all a devious plot engineered by Chalabi himself to make him more acceptable to Iraqis as power in the country drifts away from the Americans.
Turning back to the charges, it is true that Chalabi has been developing links with the Iranians (he is a secular shi'a), links that might actually make the preservation of order easier in the unstable next months. He is accused of getting so close that he passed classified information to them, and perhaps he did. His people are also accused of economic crimes, and perhaps this is enough of an explanation. Unfortunately, whatever the explanation, it does not look good to the world, Iraqis, or the American Congress to have a person who has been supported this long, and who many see as one of the main movers of the war agenda, be now attacked and humiliated by the very people who were paying his bills up until a few days ago. Unless they accept the devious explanation, most observers will fall back on the simple explanation that U.S. reliance on, and support of, Chalabi was a major mistake. In other words, in this too our government was simply incompetent.
Thursday, May 20, 2004
Mistaken Targeting
The forty killed near the Syrian border may or may not have been a "wedding party". But the event is much too similar to another supposed wedding party in Afghanistan and many other less well reported apparent mistakes. Such mistakes will always occur. But in wars like this, they are especially costly.
Renewed effort should be made to reduce their frequency. Someday I would hope that we once again revisit treaty limits on the use of "non-lethal" or incapacitating agents in warfare. The Pentagon is interested in the issue. Unfortunately, the heavy weight of academic and world opinion against anything of the kind would make such an introduction at this point in this war counterproductive, no matter how many lives might be saved. So this reconsideration will have to wait for another war.
Right now the obvious approach would be to place a higher priority on distinguishing between targets that need to be hit immediately (for example, because the persons targeted are immediately threatening or are in the process of escaping) and those that do not require immediate response. In both the best-known cases (this one and that wedding in Afghanistan) it would seem that immediate action was not actually necessary. I suspect a higher number of targets could be placed in the "let's look more closely" category than has been the case. We have excellent means of surveillance and equipment that can "see in the dark". Let us use it more often and let us have interpreters of the results that are familiar with both the enemy and the culture of the area we are operating in.
Careful consideration of a series of such mistakes may well lead to still more creative and carefully designed means of lessening such mistakes. If this consideration is being urgently undertaken as these lines are written, we can all be thankful.
The forty killed near the Syrian border may or may not have been a "wedding party". But the event is much too similar to another supposed wedding party in Afghanistan and many other less well reported apparent mistakes. Such mistakes will always occur. But in wars like this, they are especially costly.
Renewed effort should be made to reduce their frequency. Someday I would hope that we once again revisit treaty limits on the use of "non-lethal" or incapacitating agents in warfare. The Pentagon is interested in the issue. Unfortunately, the heavy weight of academic and world opinion against anything of the kind would make such an introduction at this point in this war counterproductive, no matter how many lives might be saved. So this reconsideration will have to wait for another war.
Right now the obvious approach would be to place a higher priority on distinguishing between targets that need to be hit immediately (for example, because the persons targeted are immediately threatening or are in the process of escaping) and those that do not require immediate response. In both the best-known cases (this one and that wedding in Afghanistan) it would seem that immediate action was not actually necessary. I suspect a higher number of targets could be placed in the "let's look more closely" category than has been the case. We have excellent means of surveillance and equipment that can "see in the dark". Let us use it more often and let us have interpreters of the results that are familiar with both the enemy and the culture of the area we are operating in.
Careful consideration of a series of such mistakes may well lead to still more creative and carefully designed means of lessening such mistakes. If this consideration is being urgently undertaken as these lines are written, we can all be thankful.
Wednesday, May 19, 2004
Iran, Iraq and the United States
The NYT Op-Ed editor, Nicholas Kristof, follows up on his pleasant experiences in Iran with a warning that no matter how pro-American its people are today, they will still resent any heavy-handed attempt by the United States to force Iran to abandon its nuclear weapons program. He believes that such an attempt would cement the power of the ayatollahs and fail to achieve its objectives. It is too bad that nationalism should lead Iran to this point, but it makes sense for Middle Easterners when they consider that Israel has nuclear weapons and we say nothing about them — not to mention the weapons we are tacitly accept for Pakistan and India. Kristof would like to see us enter into a "grand bargain" that would include reestablishing diplomatic relations, business investment, tourism, and educational exchanges. (This is remarkably similar to the more urgent bargain proposed with North Korea, so far with no results. Still, the Iranian regime should not be compared to North Korea's.) He believes that an evolving "Islamic democracy", headquartered in Tehran, could become the center of Middle Eastern democratic transformation if Baghdad does not pan out.
All of which reminds us that what we do in Iraq has potential repercussions in Iran and vice-versa. I say potential, for what is remarkable is that so far our fumbling in Iraq has cost us little in Iranian public opinion. If this is not simply a matter of reporting, this grace period may not last. It should be remembered that for Iranians, the vast majority of whom are Shi'as, the shrines of Ali and Hussein in Najaf and Karbala are the centers of the spiritual world, more important than shrines in Iran itself. The grand ayatollahs in Iraq have also been seen at least until recently as superior in status to any of those living in Iran.
As we proceed with our efforts in Iraq, it is also important to note that the Kurds have had a national movement in Iran as well as Turkey, Iraq, Syria and elsewhere. While Kurds on the Iranian side of the border might welcome a semi-independent Kurdistan within Iraq, this will not be welcomed in Tehran nor Ankara. The Kurds have an appealing case for international recognition. They were turned down by the world community after World War I. They were sold out several times by American governments who found after supporting them for a while that they had larger considerations to consider. They were our best friends during our recent invasion of Iraq and their enclave remains the safest area for Americans. Yet we show little sign of commitment to their interests as a new Iraq evolves. Again, we are likely to have larger issues to attend to. But we should keep Kurdish interests at least at the back of our minds, attempting to work out as best we can a better deal for them in a new Iraq. Our friends are few enough in the area; it will be costly to alienate the Kurds once again.
The NYT Op-Ed editor, Nicholas Kristof, follows up on his pleasant experiences in Iran with a warning that no matter how pro-American its people are today, they will still resent any heavy-handed attempt by the United States to force Iran to abandon its nuclear weapons program. He believes that such an attempt would cement the power of the ayatollahs and fail to achieve its objectives. It is too bad that nationalism should lead Iran to this point, but it makes sense for Middle Easterners when they consider that Israel has nuclear weapons and we say nothing about them — not to mention the weapons we are tacitly accept for Pakistan and India. Kristof would like to see us enter into a "grand bargain" that would include reestablishing diplomatic relations, business investment, tourism, and educational exchanges. (This is remarkably similar to the more urgent bargain proposed with North Korea, so far with no results. Still, the Iranian regime should not be compared to North Korea's.) He believes that an evolving "Islamic democracy", headquartered in Tehran, could become the center of Middle Eastern democratic transformation if Baghdad does not pan out.
All of which reminds us that what we do in Iraq has potential repercussions in Iran and vice-versa. I say potential, for what is remarkable is that so far our fumbling in Iraq has cost us little in Iranian public opinion. If this is not simply a matter of reporting, this grace period may not last. It should be remembered that for Iranians, the vast majority of whom are Shi'as, the shrines of Ali and Hussein in Najaf and Karbala are the centers of the spiritual world, more important than shrines in Iran itself. The grand ayatollahs in Iraq have also been seen at least until recently as superior in status to any of those living in Iran.
As we proceed with our efforts in Iraq, it is also important to note that the Kurds have had a national movement in Iran as well as Turkey, Iraq, Syria and elsewhere. While Kurds on the Iranian side of the border might welcome a semi-independent Kurdistan within Iraq, this will not be welcomed in Tehran nor Ankara. The Kurds have an appealing case for international recognition. They were turned down by the world community after World War I. They were sold out several times by American governments who found after supporting them for a while that they had larger considerations to consider. They were our best friends during our recent invasion of Iraq and their enclave remains the safest area for Americans. Yet we show little sign of commitment to their interests as a new Iraq evolves. Again, we are likely to have larger issues to attend to. But we should keep Kurdish interests at least at the back of our minds, attempting to work out as best we can a better deal for them in a new Iraq. Our friends are few enough in the area; it will be costly to alienate the Kurds once again.
Thoughts on Nationalism and Religion in Iraq
Many years ago I wrote a research paper on Kurdish nationalist movements in the nineteenth century. Using the term "nationalist" was risky, for it was unclear whether the Kurds actually thought of themselves as a "nationality" at the time. Perhaps they were defined as "Kurds" by outsiders simply because they spoke one or another Kurdish dialect. The Kurdish national movement that exists now was largely a result of the spread of the idea of "nationality" to the region in the twentieth century. In any event, what I found was that the Kurdish movements of the nineteenth century against the Ottomans were actually movements led by one or another local leader for ostensibly "religious" reasons. This experience has come to mind when the media discuss nationalism and religion in Iraq today. To many, but hardly all, of the people labeled with one or another religious or ethnic label in Iraq the labels are symbols of group affiliation with a transient meaning akin to the affiliations of Westerners to athletic teams. When writing of Iraq, the media often write of the struggle of Shi'a and Sunni. These are, however, actually broad groupings of people, each divided into many subgroups, based on theological differences, identifications with particular religious leaders, or cross-cutting affiliations The Kurds, for example, are most Sunni. Yet commentators do not include them as "Sunni" when speaking of potential bases for conflict in the country. They assume that nationality trumps religion for most Kurds when political issues are involved. Yet the Kurds have historically been divided among themselves more than they have been together, divisions that for the moment they seem to have set aside.
It "seems" as though what we are fighting in Iraq now is largely a nationalist movement deriving its primary strength from an intense desire to throw the Americans out. The fact that the movement uses suicide bombers suggests to some religious motivation, since to their minds only belief in a divine mission would justify such sacrifice. Yet recent studies have pointed out that suicide attacks are as likely to have nationalist as religious motivation, with the Tamil movement in Sri Lanka a case in point. The willingness of the Shi'a and Sunni groups to help one another in Falluja and now in the holy cities fits a nationalist pattern, as does the willingness of the Sadrist forces to endanger the country's holiest shrines in spite of repeated calls by Shi'a religious leaders to demilitarize the shrine areas. We also recall that the Baathist movement was an extreme nationalist movement modelled on Germany's National Socialist Party. The Baathists suppressed religious groups in general and were hated by conservative Muslims of all stripes, including for many years bin Ladin. There are today some foreigners fighting in Iraq, presumably for religious reasons. But here again, are they not more the product of an "Islamic Nationalism" or "Arab Nationalism" than of religious zealotry?
Finally, there is the question of how powerful and lasting we imagine "Iraqi nationalism" itself to be. After all, Iraq's existence in modern times dates no further back than the end of World War I, and it was formed and maintained under British tutelage until the 1950s. We can be sure, I believe, that because of the extreme nationalist propaganda of the Baathist period, and the bloody struggle with Iran followed by the first and second wars with the United States and the sanctions of the 1990s that many Iraqis have rapidly developed a strong sense of national identification, one that for the time being the Kurdish leaders are willing to buy into. Yet we should be cautious. The world has had a great deal of experience lately with "failed" African countries formed during the colonialist period. It is hard to imagine that Iraq will end up falling into this pattern; it is perhaps too middle class for that. But the possibility remains.
Many years ago I wrote a research paper on Kurdish nationalist movements in the nineteenth century. Using the term "nationalist" was risky, for it was unclear whether the Kurds actually thought of themselves as a "nationality" at the time. Perhaps they were defined as "Kurds" by outsiders simply because they spoke one or another Kurdish dialect. The Kurdish national movement that exists now was largely a result of the spread of the idea of "nationality" to the region in the twentieth century. In any event, what I found was that the Kurdish movements of the nineteenth century against the Ottomans were actually movements led by one or another local leader for ostensibly "religious" reasons. This experience has come to mind when the media discuss nationalism and religion in Iraq today. To many, but hardly all, of the people labeled with one or another religious or ethnic label in Iraq the labels are symbols of group affiliation with a transient meaning akin to the affiliations of Westerners to athletic teams. When writing of Iraq, the media often write of the struggle of Shi'a and Sunni. These are, however, actually broad groupings of people, each divided into many subgroups, based on theological differences, identifications with particular religious leaders, or cross-cutting affiliations The Kurds, for example, are most Sunni. Yet commentators do not include them as "Sunni" when speaking of potential bases for conflict in the country. They assume that nationality trumps religion for most Kurds when political issues are involved. Yet the Kurds have historically been divided among themselves more than they have been together, divisions that for the moment they seem to have set aside.
It "seems" as though what we are fighting in Iraq now is largely a nationalist movement deriving its primary strength from an intense desire to throw the Americans out. The fact that the movement uses suicide bombers suggests to some religious motivation, since to their minds only belief in a divine mission would justify such sacrifice. Yet recent studies have pointed out that suicide attacks are as likely to have nationalist as religious motivation, with the Tamil movement in Sri Lanka a case in point. The willingness of the Shi'a and Sunni groups to help one another in Falluja and now in the holy cities fits a nationalist pattern, as does the willingness of the Sadrist forces to endanger the country's holiest shrines in spite of repeated calls by Shi'a religious leaders to demilitarize the shrine areas. We also recall that the Baathist movement was an extreme nationalist movement modelled on Germany's National Socialist Party. The Baathists suppressed religious groups in general and were hated by conservative Muslims of all stripes, including for many years bin Ladin. There are today some foreigners fighting in Iraq, presumably for religious reasons. But here again, are they not more the product of an "Islamic Nationalism" or "Arab Nationalism" than of religious zealotry?
Finally, there is the question of how powerful and lasting we imagine "Iraqi nationalism" itself to be. After all, Iraq's existence in modern times dates no further back than the end of World War I, and it was formed and maintained under British tutelage until the 1950s. We can be sure, I believe, that because of the extreme nationalist propaganda of the Baathist period, and the bloody struggle with Iran followed by the first and second wars with the United States and the sanctions of the 1990s that many Iraqis have rapidly developed a strong sense of national identification, one that for the time being the Kurdish leaders are willing to buy into. Yet we should be cautious. The world has had a great deal of experience lately with "failed" African countries formed during the colonialist period. It is hard to imagine that Iraq will end up falling into this pattern; it is perhaps too middle class for that. But the possibility remains.
Tuesday, May 18, 2004
Muddling Through
Today's paper brings another condemnation by Krugman of the Bush enterprise in Iraq, concentrating as is his wont on an inability to face up to the expense of the Iraq undertaking. But more interesting is the thoughtful, perhaps wrong-headed, discussion by David Brooks of our "muddling through" strategy in Iraq. It has now occurred to him that the outcome of the too easily criticized course of events in Iraq may actually be a limited success. He is impressed, as I have been, that in spite of everything the situation has not spiraled out of control as quickly as it seemed likely only a few weeks back. He is cheered by the fact that whenever we run up against an obstacle we improvise, try something new. King Abdullah II of Jordan advises that what we need to manage the next few months in Iraq is a "strongman", probably a general from the former Iraqi army that commands widespread respect and is able to hold the country together until elections. We appear open enough to improvisation to accept the advice, as long as a face-saving transition to acceptance comes along. The problem right now would be the United Nations in the person of Brahimi. He is well along toward finding his own interim leaders, persons who may not fit in with this new "project". But keep tuned.
Today's paper brings another condemnation by Krugman of the Bush enterprise in Iraq, concentrating as is his wont on an inability to face up to the expense of the Iraq undertaking. But more interesting is the thoughtful, perhaps wrong-headed, discussion by David Brooks of our "muddling through" strategy in Iraq. It has now occurred to him that the outcome of the too easily criticized course of events in Iraq may actually be a limited success. He is impressed, as I have been, that in spite of everything the situation has not spiraled out of control as quickly as it seemed likely only a few weeks back. He is cheered by the fact that whenever we run up against an obstacle we improvise, try something new. King Abdullah II of Jordan advises that what we need to manage the next few months in Iraq is a "strongman", probably a general from the former Iraqi army that commands widespread respect and is able to hold the country together until elections. We appear open enough to improvisation to accept the advice, as long as a face-saving transition to acceptance comes along. The problem right now would be the United Nations in the person of Brahimi. He is well along toward finding his own interim leaders, persons who may not fit in with this new "project". But keep tuned.
Monday, May 17, 2004
The War Goes On
Today's paper "cuts the war down to size." The violent events of the previous 24 hours are essentially listed in a small article on page A-11. In condensed form, violence included: three Iraqi women killed because they worked for Americans. Two Iraqi fighters killed and 20 wounded in a fight on a bridge. Six Italian soldiers were wounded in a gun battle in Nasiriyah. Civilian staffers were then evacuated. In Basra, an Iraqi mortar attack killed four Iraqi civilians. An American soldier was killed when a bomb exploded by his vehicle. Later in the day came news that the head of the Iraqi Governing Council had been killed by a suicide attack in Baghdad.
And then there was the alarming but still vague report that the Americans had bombed Karbala. The fighting had already been within a block of its most sacred shi'a shrine. Whether the supposed bombing was actually an escalation on our side is not clear. Muslim clerics were said to have come from Falluja to show their support for Muqtada al-Sadr's militia. A caravan of supplies for Sadrists also arrived at Kufa to show support for the Sadrists. The Sadrists have driven a significant Italian garrison out of Nasiriyah. (Opinion in Italy is turning sharply against the war because of the prison scandals and their losses in Iraq.) Sadrist strength seems to be growing in Najaf, Karbala and several other cities. Meanwhile, the more conservative clergy has taken the highly unusual step of closing the shrines to tourists in view of the situation.
There is increasing confusion about the handing over of power at the end of June, yet it is my impression that many Iraqis are looking forward to it, no matter how unclear its meaning might be. The Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq has urged American forces to remain until order is restored. This shi'a group opposes the Sadrists, but how much power it now has is unclear. Incidentally the late leader of the Governing Council was also a leader of the Dawa party, the oldest and at one time most influential anti-Saddam shi'a political party.
More information comes out on the way in which the Administration reacted to 9/11 by casting doubt on the continued applicability of the Geneva conventions "in some situations". This attitude may well have perculated throughout the system as Seymour Hersh is saying in his damning article in the New Yorker. We will see how many smoking guns will be discovered. From another perspective, reports on National Public Radio and in the New York Times suggest that the morale of our soldiers is so low and the confusion of the troops on the ground is so great as to what they are doing and how they are to react to Iraqis that many soldiers say they can well understand the abuse by guards of prisoners in the absence of clear and continuous monitoring of the guards' behavior by higher officers.
Today's paper "cuts the war down to size." The violent events of the previous 24 hours are essentially listed in a small article on page A-11. In condensed form, violence included: three Iraqi women killed because they worked for Americans. Two Iraqi fighters killed and 20 wounded in a fight on a bridge. Six Italian soldiers were wounded in a gun battle in Nasiriyah. Civilian staffers were then evacuated. In Basra, an Iraqi mortar attack killed four Iraqi civilians. An American soldier was killed when a bomb exploded by his vehicle. Later in the day came news that the head of the Iraqi Governing Council had been killed by a suicide attack in Baghdad.
And then there was the alarming but still vague report that the Americans had bombed Karbala. The fighting had already been within a block of its most sacred shi'a shrine. Whether the supposed bombing was actually an escalation on our side is not clear. Muslim clerics were said to have come from Falluja to show their support for Muqtada al-Sadr's militia. A caravan of supplies for Sadrists also arrived at Kufa to show support for the Sadrists. The Sadrists have driven a significant Italian garrison out of Nasiriyah. (Opinion in Italy is turning sharply against the war because of the prison scandals and their losses in Iraq.) Sadrist strength seems to be growing in Najaf, Karbala and several other cities. Meanwhile, the more conservative clergy has taken the highly unusual step of closing the shrines to tourists in view of the situation.
There is increasing confusion about the handing over of power at the end of June, yet it is my impression that many Iraqis are looking forward to it, no matter how unclear its meaning might be. The Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq has urged American forces to remain until order is restored. This shi'a group opposes the Sadrists, but how much power it now has is unclear. Incidentally the late leader of the Governing Council was also a leader of the Dawa party, the oldest and at one time most influential anti-Saddam shi'a political party.
More information comes out on the way in which the Administration reacted to 9/11 by casting doubt on the continued applicability of the Geneva conventions "in some situations". This attitude may well have perculated throughout the system as Seymour Hersh is saying in his damning article in the New Yorker. We will see how many smoking guns will be discovered. From another perspective, reports on National Public Radio and in the New York Times suggest that the morale of our soldiers is so low and the confusion of the troops on the ground is so great as to what they are doing and how they are to react to Iraqis that many soldiers say they can well understand the abuse by guards of prisoners in the absence of clear and continuous monitoring of the guards' behavior by higher officers.
