Saturday, May 15, 2004
Reforming America's Intelligence Services
Friday's paper brought an excellent Op-Ed by Christopher Whitcomb on the problems of our intelligence agencies and how to reform them. Whitcomb has worked in the business both at the desk and in the field and brings this experience to his analysis. The main problem as he sees it is the myriad of agencies and divisions responsible for intelligence, each with a different mission. Unfortunately, his solution, making the CIA into an agency actually able to combine all the others into an integrated whole "with one mission", strikes me as likely to end up both more dangerous to our society and more inflexible than the patchwork that exists today.
However, one of his examples suggests a possible avenue for improving the system significantly. He offers this example of a key problem:
"Let's say a C.I.A. asset in Syria attends a meeting in which terrorists talk about plans to detonate a dirty bomb in a mall in Iowa. Common sense might dictate that the case officer immediately pass this information on to the local police or the F.B.I. — but that could never happen."
He then goes on to describe the many impediments. Police officers lack security clearances. Their actions might compromise the sources and methods of the CIA. Moreover, other agencies would want the information first, including the Department of Energy, the State department and FEMA, etc., etc. Simply deciding who gets access to this information could take hours. "Need to know" parameters would need to be established and so on.
The example is chilling. Yet it suggests that the key problem here is not so much the lack of a superagency as the lack of a reliable system for channeling urgent information. It should possible to develop a computer-assisted methodology for almost instantaneously channeling any urgent information of this sort to first providers, such as the Iowa police. The information could be automatically and almost instantaneously cleansed of what they do not need to know, such as where it came from, the agency doing the providing etc. Initially, they need only to know the specificity as to time and place that is available, the magnitude and nature of the danger, and the degree of confidence the system has in the information. The rules requiring putting information into this rapid response system should be spelled out for all possible participants, including ordinary citizens using 911.
Friday's paper brought an excellent Op-Ed by Christopher Whitcomb on the problems of our intelligence agencies and how to reform them. Whitcomb has worked in the business both at the desk and in the field and brings this experience to his analysis. The main problem as he sees it is the myriad of agencies and divisions responsible for intelligence, each with a different mission. Unfortunately, his solution, making the CIA into an agency actually able to combine all the others into an integrated whole "with one mission", strikes me as likely to end up both more dangerous to our society and more inflexible than the patchwork that exists today.
However, one of his examples suggests a possible avenue for improving the system significantly. He offers this example of a key problem:
"Let's say a C.I.A. asset in Syria attends a meeting in which terrorists talk about plans to detonate a dirty bomb in a mall in Iowa. Common sense might dictate that the case officer immediately pass this information on to the local police or the F.B.I. — but that could never happen."
He then goes on to describe the many impediments. Police officers lack security clearances. Their actions might compromise the sources and methods of the CIA. Moreover, other agencies would want the information first, including the Department of Energy, the State department and FEMA, etc., etc. Simply deciding who gets access to this information could take hours. "Need to know" parameters would need to be established and so on.
The example is chilling. Yet it suggests that the key problem here is not so much the lack of a superagency as the lack of a reliable system for channeling urgent information. It should possible to develop a computer-assisted methodology for almost instantaneously channeling any urgent information of this sort to first providers, such as the Iowa police. The information could be automatically and almost instantaneously cleansed of what they do not need to know, such as where it came from, the agency doing the providing etc. Initially, they need only to know the specificity as to time and place that is available, the magnitude and nature of the danger, and the degree of confidence the system has in the information. The rules requiring putting information into this rapid response system should be spelled out for all possible participants, including ordinary citizens using 911.
Thursday, May 13, 2004
Casualties
The steady drip of casualties on the structure of our Iraq adventure continues. One gets the impression that things are calming down, even as we pursue another offensive in Karbala. Let us then look at a chart of fatalities in the coalition forces:
These are fatalities. The wounded amount to about 4500. The Iraqi combatant loss may well be over 6000 by now. Civilian casualties are estimated at about 10,000. But these estimates are subject to great error. Perhaps it is enough to note that the daily reports generally report Iraqi combatant and civilian fatalities in numbers much larger than those for coalition forces. I have not seen an estimate for the number of non-Iraqi civilians that have been killed, but it has been growing.
Turning back to the table, if the war is being won and the society is stabilizing, then the daily average should decline. We see highs at the beginning, last November, and this April (the worst since the general offensive at the beginning). We are being warned to expect another rise in fighting before the turning over of the civil administration to Iraqis in June. We will see what that means on the ground both for security and who governs. But watch the daily averages.
The steady drip of casualties on the structure of our Iraq adventure continues. One gets the impression that things are calming down, even as we pursue another offensive in Karbala. Let us then look at a chart of fatalities in the coalition forces:
Military Fatalities: By Month:
| Period | US | UK | Other | Total | Avg | Days |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3-2003 | 65 | 27 | 0 | 92 | 7.67 | 12
|
| 4-2003 | 73 | 6 | 0 | 79 | 2.63 | 30
|
| 5-2003 | 37 | 4 | 0 | 41 | 1.32 | 31
|
| 6-2003 | 30 | 6 | 0 | 36 | 1.2 | 30
|
| 7-2003 | 47 | 1 | 0 | 48 | 1.55 | 31
|
| 8-2003 | 35 | 6 | 2 | 43 | 1.39 | 31
|
| 9-2003 | 31 | 1 | 1 | 33 | 1.1 | 30
|
| 10-2003 | 42 | 1 | 2 | 45 | 1.45 | 31
|
| 11-2003 | 82 | 1 | 27 | 110 | 3.67 | 30
|
| 12-2003 | 40 | 0 | 8 | 48 | 1.55 | 31
|
| 1-2004 | 47 | 5 | 0 | 52 | 1.68 | 31
|
| 2-2004 | 20 | 1 | 2 | 23 | 0.79 | 29
|
| 3-2004 | 52 | 0 | 0 | 52 | 1.68 | 31
|
| 4-2004 | 140 | 0 | 5 | 145 | 4.83 | 30
|
| 5-2004 | 32 | 0 | 3 | 35 | 2.92 | 12
|
| Total | 773 | 59 | 50 | 882 | 2.1 | 420
|
These are fatalities. The wounded amount to about 4500. The Iraqi combatant loss may well be over 6000 by now. Civilian casualties are estimated at about 10,000. But these estimates are subject to great error. Perhaps it is enough to note that the daily reports generally report Iraqi combatant and civilian fatalities in numbers much larger than those for coalition forces. I have not seen an estimate for the number of non-Iraqi civilians that have been killed, but it has been growing.
Turning back to the table, if the war is being won and the society is stabilizing, then the daily average should decline. We see highs at the beginning, last November, and this April (the worst since the general offensive at the beginning). We are being warned to expect another rise in fighting before the turning over of the civil administration to Iraqis in June. We will see what that means on the ground both for security and who governs. But watch the daily averages.
Torture
The news from the several fronts, including Washington, continues to sour the mood of the country. It is coming out that as many suspected after 9/11 the government, with many misgivings even in the CIA, developed new standards for how they would interrogate prisoners, particularly al-Qaeda. These were apparently especially meant for Guantanamo. But they quickly became almost a norm in Afghanistan and Iraq, in many cases for prisoners with no relation to al-Qaeda. What the new rules exactly were and the degree to which persons in the field extemporized is not yet clear. But we do know that picture taking was apparently widespread, that nakedness and hoods were used as punishments, and that threats (for example of drowning) became a part of the package. Kicking and beating became common, although this might not have been in "the instructions". How much of the more serious sexual humiliation was just overlooked or actually promoted, we do not know at this time. In any event, it is clear that untrained, inexperienced people were asked to "soften up" the prisoners before they were questioned and that they spent whole night with them apparently with little supervision. (One wonders that if we had inexperienced people handling such matters this time around, how much better the situation will be in the future after the government "recruits volunteers" to replace the people who have been punished for these activities?).
One can only hope that the result of this investigation is (1) adequate punishment of those officers who oversaw and planned these activities, (2) a rewritten set of regulations as to how information is to be obtained in the future under comparable conditions, and (3) the testing of any persons who will administer this process at any level in their understanding and acceptance of these new regulations.
The news from the several fronts, including Washington, continues to sour the mood of the country. It is coming out that as many suspected after 9/11 the government, with many misgivings even in the CIA, developed new standards for how they would interrogate prisoners, particularly al-Qaeda. These were apparently especially meant for Guantanamo. But they quickly became almost a norm in Afghanistan and Iraq, in many cases for prisoners with no relation to al-Qaeda. What the new rules exactly were and the degree to which persons in the field extemporized is not yet clear. But we do know that picture taking was apparently widespread, that nakedness and hoods were used as punishments, and that threats (for example of drowning) became a part of the package. Kicking and beating became common, although this might not have been in "the instructions". How much of the more serious sexual humiliation was just overlooked or actually promoted, we do not know at this time. In any event, it is clear that untrained, inexperienced people were asked to "soften up" the prisoners before they were questioned and that they spent whole night with them apparently with little supervision. (One wonders that if we had inexperienced people handling such matters this time around, how much better the situation will be in the future after the government "recruits volunteers" to replace the people who have been punished for these activities?).
One can only hope that the result of this investigation is (1) adequate punishment of those officers who oversaw and planned these activities, (2) a rewritten set of regulations as to how information is to be obtained in the future under comparable conditions, and (3) the testing of any persons who will administer this process at any level in their understanding and acceptance of these new regulations.
Waiting for Kerry
Two of the top NYT Op-Ed writers came out clearly today for Kerry. Tom Friedman said explicitly that the only way out of Iraq was to have "regime change" in Washington. Sadly, he may be right. But he is wrong to make this assertion in print, for no one can afford to throw up their hands about the events of the next ten months or so. By the time Kerry comes to the White House, if he does, events in Iraq may have gone so far that whatever he does may be inconsequential.
No, those who discuss these issues seriously have to write as though they can have an effect that could eventually color the decisions of the Republican Party and this administration. To the extent one is seen as little more than just another opposition hack, the ability to have any effect at all on the next few months is diminished. If by improving the performance of the Bush administration such a commentator helps put the President back in office, this cost must be paid. Preserving the ability of the United States to act effectively in the world is more important to this country and the world than who is elected this fall. In this regard, it should be remembered that regardless of what we may think of the performance of President Bush, he has certainly been open to change. Many of the positions he took at the beginning of his term have been abandoned; many of the positions his people have taken on what they would do or not do in Iraq have been changed, and changed again. In spite of the role of what many regard as fumblers and ideologues at the top, the President perforce leads an administration peopled by thousands of career officers in a myriad of governmental services. These officers are often of superior ability; in any event they will necessarily make up the vast bulk of any succeeding administration.
Two of the top NYT Op-Ed writers came out clearly today for Kerry. Tom Friedman said explicitly that the only way out of Iraq was to have "regime change" in Washington. Sadly, he may be right. But he is wrong to make this assertion in print, for no one can afford to throw up their hands about the events of the next ten months or so. By the time Kerry comes to the White House, if he does, events in Iraq may have gone so far that whatever he does may be inconsequential.
No, those who discuss these issues seriously have to write as though they can have an effect that could eventually color the decisions of the Republican Party and this administration. To the extent one is seen as little more than just another opposition hack, the ability to have any effect at all on the next few months is diminished. If by improving the performance of the Bush administration such a commentator helps put the President back in office, this cost must be paid. Preserving the ability of the United States to act effectively in the world is more important to this country and the world than who is elected this fall. In this regard, it should be remembered that regardless of what we may think of the performance of President Bush, he has certainly been open to change. Many of the positions he took at the beginning of his term have been abandoned; many of the positions his people have taken on what they would do or not do in Iraq have been changed, and changed again. In spite of the role of what many regard as fumblers and ideologues at the top, the President perforce leads an administration peopled by thousands of career officers in a myriad of governmental services. These officers are often of superior ability; in any event they will necessarily make up the vast bulk of any succeeding administration.
Waiting for Kerry
Two of the top NYT Op-Ed writers came out clearly today for Kerry. Tom Friedman said explicitly that the only way out of Iraq was to have "regime change" in Washington. Sadly, he may be right. But he is wrong to make this assertion in print, for no one can afford to throw up their hands about the events of the next ten months or so. By the time Kerry comes to the White House, if he does, events in Iraq may have gone so far that whatever he does may be inconsequential.
No, those who discuss these issues seriously have to write as though they can have an effect that could eventually color the decisions of the Republican Party and this administration. To the extent one is seen as little more than just another opposition hack, the ability to have any effect at all on the next few months is diminished. If by improving the performance of the Bush administration such a commentator helps put the President back in office, this cost must be paid. Preserving the ability of the United States to act effectively in the world is more important to this country and the world than who is elected this fall. In this regard, it should be remembered that regardless of what we may think of the performance of President Bush, he has certainly been open to change. Many of the positions he took at the beginning of his term have been abandoned; many of the positions his people have taken on what they would do or not do in Iraq have been changed, and changed again. In spite of the role of what many regard as fumblers and ideologues at the top, the President perforce leads an administration peopled by thousands of career officers in a myriad of governmental services. These officers are often of superior ability; in any event they will necessarily make up the vast bulk of any succeeding administration.
Two of the top NYT Op-Ed writers came out clearly today for Kerry. Tom Friedman said explicitly that the only way out of Iraq was to have "regime change" in Washington. Sadly, he may be right. But he is wrong to make this assertion in print, for no one can afford to throw up their hands about the events of the next ten months or so. By the time Kerry comes to the White House, if he does, events in Iraq may have gone so far that whatever he does may be inconsequential.
No, those who discuss these issues seriously have to write as though they can have an effect that could eventually color the decisions of the Republican Party and this administration. To the extent one is seen as little more than just another opposition hack, the ability to have any effect at all on the next few months is diminished. If by improving the performance of the Bush administration such a commentator helps put the President back in office, this cost must be paid. Preserving the ability of the United States to act effectively in the world is more important to this country and the world than who is elected this fall. In this regard, it should be remembered that regardless of what we may think of the performance of President Bush, he has certainly been open to change. Many of the positions he took at the beginning of his term have been abandoned; many of the positions his people have taken on what they would do or not do in Iraq have been changed, and changed again. In spite of the role of what many regard as fumblers and ideologues at the top, the President perforce leads an administration peopled by thousands of career officers in a myriad of governmental services. These officers are often of superior ability; in any event they will necessarily make up the vast bulk of any succeeding administration.
Waiting for Kerry
Two of the top NYT Op-Ed writers came out clearly today for Kerry. Tom Friedman said explicitly that the only way out of Iraq was to have "regime change" in Washington. Sadly, he may be right. But he is wrong to make this assertion in print, for no one can afford to throw up their hands about the events of the next ten months or so. By the time Kerry comes to the White House, if he does, events in Iraq may have gone so far that whatever he does may be inconsequential.
No, those who discuss these issues seriously have to write as though they can have an effect that could eventually color the decisions of the Republican Party and this administration. To the extent one is seen as little more than just another opposition hack, the ability to have any effect at all on the next few months is diminished. If by improving the performance of the Bush administration such a commentator helps put the President back in office, this cost must be paid. Preserving the ability of the United States to act effectively in the world is more important to this country and the world than who is elected this fall. In this regard, it should be remembered that regardless of what we may think of the performance of President Bush, he has certainly been open to change. Many of the positions he took at the beginning of his term have been abandoned; many of the positions his people have taken on what they would do or not do in Iraq have been changed, and changed again. In spite of the role of what many regard as fumblers and ideologues at the top, the President perforce leads an administration peopled by thousands of career officers in a myriad of governmental services. These officers are often of superior ability; in any event they will necessarily make up the vast bulk of any succeeding administration.
Two of the top NYT Op-Ed writers came out clearly today for Kerry. Tom Friedman said explicitly that the only way out of Iraq was to have "regime change" in Washington. Sadly, he may be right. But he is wrong to make this assertion in print, for no one can afford to throw up their hands about the events of the next ten months or so. By the time Kerry comes to the White House, if he does, events in Iraq may have gone so far that whatever he does may be inconsequential.
No, those who discuss these issues seriously have to write as though they can have an effect that could eventually color the decisions of the Republican Party and this administration. To the extent one is seen as little more than just another opposition hack, the ability to have any effect at all on the next few months is diminished. If by improving the performance of the Bush administration such a commentator helps put the President back in office, this cost must be paid. Preserving the ability of the United States to act effectively in the world is more important to this country and the world than who is elected this fall. In this regard, it should be remembered that regardless of what we may think of the performance of President Bush, he has certainly been open to change. Many of the positions he took at the beginning of his term have been abandoned; many of the positions his people have taken on what they would do or not do in Iraq have been changed, and changed again. In spite of the role of what many regard as fumblers and ideologues at the top, the President perforce leads an administration peopled by thousands of career officers in a myriad of governmental services. These officers are often of superior ability; in any event they will necessarily make up the vast bulk of any succeeding administration.
Waiting for Kerry
Two of the top NYT Op-Ed writers came out clearly today for Kerry. Tom Friedman said explicitly that the only way out of Iraq was to have "regime change" in Washington. Sadly, he may be right. But he is wrong to make this assertion in print, for no one can afford to throw up their hands about the events of the next ten months or so. By the time Kerry comes to the White House, if he does, events in Iraq may have gone so far that whatever he does may be inconsequential.
No, those who discuss these issues seriously have to write as though they can have an effect that could eventually color the decisions of the Republican Party and this administration. To the extent one is seen as little more than just another opposition hack, the ability to have any effect at all on the next few months is diminished. If by improving the performance of the Bush administration such a commentator helps put the President back in office, this cost must be paid. Preserving the ability of the United States to act effectively in the world is more important to this country and the world than who is elected this fall. In this regard, it should be remembered that regardless of what we may think of the performance of President Bush, he has certainly been open to change. Many of the positions he took at the beginning of his term have been abandoned; many of the positions his people have taken on what they would do or not do in Iraq have been changed, and changed again. In spite of the role of what many regard as fumblers and ideologues at the top, the President perforce leads an administration peopled by thousands of career officers in a myriad of governmental services. These officers are often of superior ability; in any event they will necessarily make up the vast bulk of any succeeding administration.
Two of the top NYT Op-Ed writers came out clearly today for Kerry. Tom Friedman said explicitly that the only way out of Iraq was to have "regime change" in Washington. Sadly, he may be right. But he is wrong to make this assertion in print, for no one can afford to throw up their hands about the events of the next ten months or so. By the time Kerry comes to the White House, if he does, events in Iraq may have gone so far that whatever he does may be inconsequential.
No, those who discuss these issues seriously have to write as though they can have an effect that could eventually color the decisions of the Republican Party and this administration. To the extent one is seen as little more than just another opposition hack, the ability to have any effect at all on the next few months is diminished. If by improving the performance of the Bush administration such a commentator helps put the President back in office, this cost must be paid. Preserving the ability of the United States to act effectively in the world is more important to this country and the world than who is elected this fall. In this regard, it should be remembered that regardless of what we may think of the performance of President Bush, he has certainly been open to change. Many of the positions he took at the beginning of his term have been abandoned; many of the positions his people have taken on what they would do or not do in Iraq have been changed, and changed again. In spite of the role of what many regard as fumblers and ideologues at the top, the President perforce leads an administration peopled by thousands of career officers in a myriad of governmental services. These officers are often of superior ability; in any event they will necessarily make up the vast bulk of any succeeding administration.
Waiting for Kerry
Two of the top NYT Op-Ed writers came out clearly today for Kerry. Tom Friedman said explicitly that the only way out of Iraq was to have "regime change" in Washington. Sadly, he may be right. But he is wrong to make this assertion in print, for no one can afford to throw up their hands about the events of the next ten months or so. By the time Kerry comes to the White House, if he does, events in Iraq may have gone so far that whatever he does may be inconsequential.
No, those who discuss these issues seriously have to write as though they can have an effect that could eventually color the decisions of the Republican Party and this administration. To the extent one is seen as little more than just another opposition hack, the ability to have any effect at all on the next few months is diminished. If by improving the performance of the Bush administration such a commentator helps put the President back in office, this cost must be paid. Preserving the ability of the United States to act effectively in the world is more important to this country and the world than who is elected this fall. In this regard, it should be remembered that regardless of what we may think of the performance of President Bush, he has certainly been open to change. Many of the positions he took at the beginning of his term have been abandoned; many of the positions his people have taken on what they would do or not do in Iraq have been changed, and changed again. In spite of the role of what many regard as fumblers and ideologues at the top, the President perforce leads an administration peopled by thousands of career officers in a myriad of governmental services. These officers are often of superior ability; in any event they will necessarily make up the vast bulk of any succeeding administration.
Two of the top NYT Op-Ed writers came out clearly today for Kerry. Tom Friedman said explicitly that the only way out of Iraq was to have "regime change" in Washington. Sadly, he may be right. But he is wrong to make this assertion in print, for no one can afford to throw up their hands about the events of the next ten months or so. By the time Kerry comes to the White House, if he does, events in Iraq may have gone so far that whatever he does may be inconsequential.
No, those who discuss these issues seriously have to write as though they can have an effect that could eventually color the decisions of the Republican Party and this administration. To the extent one is seen as little more than just another opposition hack, the ability to have any effect at all on the next few months is diminished. If by improving the performance of the Bush administration such a commentator helps put the President back in office, this cost must be paid. Preserving the ability of the United States to act effectively in the world is more important to this country and the world than who is elected this fall. In this regard, it should be remembered that regardless of what we may think of the performance of President Bush, he has certainly been open to change. Many of the positions he took at the beginning of his term have been abandoned; many of the positions his people have taken on what they would do or not do in Iraq have been changed, and changed again. In spite of the role of what many regard as fumblers and ideologues at the top, the President perforce leads an administration peopled by thousands of career officers in a myriad of governmental services. These officers are often of superior ability; in any event they will necessarily make up the vast bulk of any succeeding administration.
Waiting for Kerry
Two of the top NYT Op-Ed writers came out clearly today for Kerry. Tom Friedman said explicitly that the only way out of Iraq was to have "regime change" in Washington. Sadly, he may be right. But he is wrong to make this assertion in print, for no one can afford to throw up their hands about the events of the next ten months or so. By the time Kerry comes to the White House, if he does, events in Iraq may have gone so far that whatever he does may be inconsequential.
No, those who discuss these issues seriously have to write as though they can have an effect that could eventually color the decisions of the Republican Party and this administration. To the extent one is seen as little more than just another opposition hack, the ability to have any effect at all on the next few months is diminished. If by improving the performance of the Bush administration such a commentator helps put the President back in office, this cost must be paid. Preserving the ability of the United States to act effectively in the world is more important to this country and the world than who is elected this fall. In this regard, it should be remembered that regardless of what we may think of the performance of President Bush, he has certainly been open to change. Many of the positions he took at the beginning of his term have been abandoned; many of the positions his people have taken on what they would do or not do in Iraq have been changed, and changed again. In spite of the role of what many regard as fumblers and ideologues at the top, the President perforce leads an administration peopled by thousands of career officers in a myriad of governmental services. These officers are often of superior ability; in any event they will necessarily make up the vast bulk of any succeeding administration.
Two of the top NYT Op-Ed writers came out clearly today for Kerry. Tom Friedman said explicitly that the only way out of Iraq was to have "regime change" in Washington. Sadly, he may be right. But he is wrong to make this assertion in print, for no one can afford to throw up their hands about the events of the next ten months or so. By the time Kerry comes to the White House, if he does, events in Iraq may have gone so far that whatever he does may be inconsequential.
No, those who discuss these issues seriously have to write as though they can have an effect that could eventually color the decisions of the Republican Party and this administration. To the extent one is seen as little more than just another opposition hack, the ability to have any effect at all on the next few months is diminished. If by improving the performance of the Bush administration such a commentator helps put the President back in office, this cost must be paid. Preserving the ability of the United States to act effectively in the world is more important to this country and the world than who is elected this fall. In this regard, it should be remembered that regardless of what we may think of the performance of President Bush, he has certainly been open to change. Many of the positions he took at the beginning of his term have been abandoned; many of the positions his people have taken on what they would do or not do in Iraq have been changed, and changed again. In spite of the role of what many regard as fumblers and ideologues at the top, the President perforce leads an administration peopled by thousands of career officers in a myriad of governmental services. These officers are often of superior ability; in any event they will necessarily make up the vast bulk of any succeeding administration.
Waiting for Kerry
Two of the top NYT Op-Ed writers came out clearly today for Kerry. Tom Friedman said explicitly that the only way out of Iraq was to have "regime change" in Washington. Sadly, he may be right. But he is wrong to make this assertion in print, for no one can afford to throw up their hands about the events of the next ten months or so. By the time Kerry comes to the White House, if he does, events in Iraq may have gone so far that whatever he does may be inconsequential.
No, those who discuss these issues seriously have to write as though they can have an effect that could eventually color the decisions of the Republican Party and this administration. To the extent one is seen as little more than just another opposition hack, the ability to have any effect at all on the next few months is diminished. If by improving the performance of the Bush administration such a commentator helps put the President back in office, this cost must be paid. Preserving the ability of the United States to act effectively in the world is more important to this country and the world than who is elected this fall. In this regard, it should be remembered that regardless of what we may think of the performance of President Bush, he has certainly been open to change. Many of the positions he took at the beginning of his term have been abandoned; many of the positions his people have taken on what they would do or not do in Iraq have been changed, and changed again. In spite of the role of what many regard as fumblers and ideologues at the top, the President perforce leads an administration peopled by thousands of career officers in a myriad of governmental services. These officers are often of superior ability; in any event they will necessarily make up the vast bulk of any succeeding administration.
Two of the top NYT Op-Ed writers came out clearly today for Kerry. Tom Friedman said explicitly that the only way out of Iraq was to have "regime change" in Washington. Sadly, he may be right. But he is wrong to make this assertion in print, for no one can afford to throw up their hands about the events of the next ten months or so. By the time Kerry comes to the White House, if he does, events in Iraq may have gone so far that whatever he does may be inconsequential.
No, those who discuss these issues seriously have to write as though they can have an effect that could eventually color the decisions of the Republican Party and this administration. To the extent one is seen as little more than just another opposition hack, the ability to have any effect at all on the next few months is diminished. If by improving the performance of the Bush administration such a commentator helps put the President back in office, this cost must be paid. Preserving the ability of the United States to act effectively in the world is more important to this country and the world than who is elected this fall. In this regard, it should be remembered that regardless of what we may think of the performance of President Bush, he has certainly been open to change. Many of the positions he took at the beginning of his term have been abandoned; many of the positions his people have taken on what they would do or not do in Iraq have been changed, and changed again. In spite of the role of what many regard as fumblers and ideologues at the top, the President perforce leads an administration peopled by thousands of career officers in a myriad of governmental services. These officers are often of superior ability; in any event they will necessarily make up the vast bulk of any succeeding administration.
Waiting for Kerry
Two of the top NYT Op-Ed writers came out clearly today for Kerry. Tom Friedman said explicitly that the only way out of Iraq was to have "regime change" in Washington. Sadly, he may be right. But he is wrong to make this assertion in print, for no one can afford to throw up their hands about the events of the next ten months or so. By the time Kerry comes to the White House, if he does, events in Iraq may have gone so far that whatever he does may be inconsequential.
No, those who discuss these issues seriously have to write as though they can have an effect that could eventually color the decisions of the Republican Party and this administration. To the extent one is seen as little more than just another opposition hack, the ability to have any effect at all on the next few months is diminished. If by improving the performance of the Bush administration such a commentator helps put the President back in office, this cost must be paid. Preserving the ability of the United States to act effectively in the world is more important to this country and the world than who is elected this fall. In this regard, it should be remembered that regardless of what we may think of the performance of President Bush, he has certainly been open to change. Many of the positions he took at the beginning of his term have been abandoned; many of the positions his people have taken on what they would do or not do in Iraq have been changed, and changed again. In spite of the role of what many regard as fumblers and ideologues at the top, the President perforce leads an administration peopled by thousands of career officers in a myriad of governmental services. These officers are often of superior ability; in any event they will necessarily make up the vast bulk of any succeeding administration.
Two of the top NYT Op-Ed writers came out clearly today for Kerry. Tom Friedman said explicitly that the only way out of Iraq was to have "regime change" in Washington. Sadly, he may be right. But he is wrong to make this assertion in print, for no one can afford to throw up their hands about the events of the next ten months or so. By the time Kerry comes to the White House, if he does, events in Iraq may have gone so far that whatever he does may be inconsequential.
No, those who discuss these issues seriously have to write as though they can have an effect that could eventually color the decisions of the Republican Party and this administration. To the extent one is seen as little more than just another opposition hack, the ability to have any effect at all on the next few months is diminished. If by improving the performance of the Bush administration such a commentator helps put the President back in office, this cost must be paid. Preserving the ability of the United States to act effectively in the world is more important to this country and the world than who is elected this fall. In this regard, it should be remembered that regardless of what we may think of the performance of President Bush, he has certainly been open to change. Many of the positions he took at the beginning of his term have been abandoned; many of the positions his people have taken on what they would do or not do in Iraq have been changed, and changed again. In spite of the role of what many regard as fumblers and ideologues at the top, the President perforce leads an administration peopled by thousands of career officers in a myriad of governmental services. These officers are often of superior ability; in any event they will necessarily make up the vast bulk of any succeeding administration.
Tuesday, May 11, 2004
CIA Inadequacies
In today's NYT a long investigative article details the inadequacy of CIA staff to handle the international scene once it has been enlivened by terrorism. After the Cold War, staff able to operate overseas decline regularly because of staffing cuts, morale, and perhaps simple inattention. This decline persisted until 9/11, but even after this event it has been hard to increase the agency's capabilities in terms of overseas agents with adequate linguistic capabilities. Many reasons are brought forward, but there seem to be few new ideas.
Perhaps we need to take another look at our "go-it-alone" strategy in this area as well. If we could develop improved working relationships with the intelligence services of all responsible countries in the world, developed and developing, we could achieve much the same result as we could with a larger and more adequately trained American CIA. This attempt should, of course, be accompanied by a rethinking of the quality of the interface that exists between American and other agents in order to maximize the gains and minimize the dangers of such a change. The article laments the fact that the "official cover" given by embassies reduces the effectiveness of many officers. It suggests more full-time agents with unofficial cover. Another part of the solution would be to involve and give training to a larger number of Americans working overseas in a variety of roles. These would, in effect, be part-time agents. The CIA has always depended on such persons to some degree. But it may be useful to rethink and augment our approach in this area as well.
Both of these approaches would be made more acceptable to the governments and private actors involved if the United States "joined the world" as a full-time player. This means taking a more supportive role in regard to many international agreements, particularly by becoming a party to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court International Court of Justice, or through reopening the discussion in such as way that we can be.
In today's NYT a long investigative article details the inadequacy of CIA staff to handle the international scene once it has been enlivened by terrorism. After the Cold War, staff able to operate overseas decline regularly because of staffing cuts, morale, and perhaps simple inattention. This decline persisted until 9/11, but even after this event it has been hard to increase the agency's capabilities in terms of overseas agents with adequate linguistic capabilities. Many reasons are brought forward, but there seem to be few new ideas.
Perhaps we need to take another look at our "go-it-alone" strategy in this area as well. If we could develop improved working relationships with the intelligence services of all responsible countries in the world, developed and developing, we could achieve much the same result as we could with a larger and more adequately trained American CIA. This attempt should, of course, be accompanied by a rethinking of the quality of the interface that exists between American and other agents in order to maximize the gains and minimize the dangers of such a change. The article laments the fact that the "official cover" given by embassies reduces the effectiveness of many officers. It suggests more full-time agents with unofficial cover. Another part of the solution would be to involve and give training to a larger number of Americans working overseas in a variety of roles. These would, in effect, be part-time agents. The CIA has always depended on such persons to some degree. But it may be useful to rethink and augment our approach in this area as well.
Both of these approaches would be made more acceptable to the governments and private actors involved if the United States "joined the world" as a full-time player. This means taking a more supportive role in regard to many international agreements, particularly by becoming a party to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court International Court of Justice, or through reopening the discussion in such as way that we can be.
A Win-Win Situation?
In his latest NYT Op-Ed, David Brooks argues that "For the Iraqis to Win, the U.S.Must Lose". He means that for the United States to leave behind a united and effective Iraq, the persons or parties that come to power in our wake must be seen to have thrown the Americans out. Brooks is right, but he could just as well have written "For the U.S. to Win, the Iraqis Must Win". For our job now is to simultaneously build up the credibility of Iraqis capable of governing the country and lay a basis for the restoration of the credibility of American and Coalition forces. In our discussions with past and present allies in the United Nations and NATO we must make clear that this is our course. And on the ground, we must keep sufficiently ahead of events that American troops can withdraw as needed without suffering serious defeat or causing unnecessary blood-letting on both sides. If our actions can be seen as part of an evolving master plan to restore sovereignty, then the end result will be understood in retrospect as a victory.
As Brooks pointed out in another recent column, the worst result of defeat in Iraq will be the loss to the world of an America willing to effectively confront new security and human rights crises for a generation. Regardless of what we might think of this Administration and its errors, this is not an outcome that anyone should welcome.
In his latest NYT Op-Ed, David Brooks argues that "For the Iraqis to Win, the U.S.Must Lose". He means that for the United States to leave behind a united and effective Iraq, the persons or parties that come to power in our wake must be seen to have thrown the Americans out. Brooks is right, but he could just as well have written "For the U.S. to Win, the Iraqis Must Win". For our job now is to simultaneously build up the credibility of Iraqis capable of governing the country and lay a basis for the restoration of the credibility of American and Coalition forces. In our discussions with past and present allies in the United Nations and NATO we must make clear that this is our course. And on the ground, we must keep sufficiently ahead of events that American troops can withdraw as needed without suffering serious defeat or causing unnecessary blood-letting on both sides. If our actions can be seen as part of an evolving master plan to restore sovereignty, then the end result will be understood in retrospect as a victory.
As Brooks pointed out in another recent column, the worst result of defeat in Iraq will be the loss to the world of an America willing to effectively confront new security and human rights crises for a generation. Regardless of what we might think of this Administration and its errors, this is not an outcome that anyone should welcome.
Monday, May 10, 2004
Pause, Complexity, or a Possible Modus Vivendi?
Recent days have seemed, in spite of the "pictures", to have witnessed a slackening of the anti-U.S. war effort in Iraq. For the moment, Falluja remains out of the nightly news. Apparently the new Iraqi force in the city is calming things down, although just why and for whom is unclear. It is suspected that the Iraqi guerrillas will reemerge if the Americans really try to come back. The question is, "Why not just let the present situation ride?" Perhaps this is the answer many places.
In his most recent blog pages, Professor Cole (see earlier reference) makes some interesting points. First, he suggests that one American mistake has been to assume that the Baathist regime was a military regime, that our enemy, therefore, has been and is the military. Actually, he points out, Saddam was never in the military. His movement was civilian. (This is similar to the relation of Hitler and the top Nazis to the regular German army.) Second, he points to the fact that the Shi'a have many different militias or potential militias, none of which are sympathetic to Muqtada al-Sadr. They may well be pleased to have the Americans going after Muqtada. It offers them more of an opening for the future. However, if Muqtada is killed by the Americans, many Shiites might turn against those groups that profited by American advances and join the Sadrist uprising. Muqtada has also been attempting to form a front with the Sunnis. Meanwhile, back in Baghdad, Cole's information is that the Sadrists are essentially in control of their part of Baghdad, man the road blocks, provide services etc.
The morning paper today speaks of a major American effort to work with tribal chieftains and Shiite leaders in the south to reform and strengthen Iraqi security forces, somewhat on the model adopted for Falluja. The exact status of the effort is, like everything else, still unclear. But promising.
Perhaps a temporary but manageable modus vivendi is emerging. This will consist of (1) areas under control of pro-Coalition or at least temporarily cooperative groups (most Kurdish areas are an obvious example), (2) areas under the control of less cooperative Iraqis content to manage and secure their own areas (Falluja perhaps, as well as eventually holy cities such as Najaf and Karbala), and (3) areas under the control of those who wish to maintain and enflame a larger fight. If areas defined as (3) do not interfere too much with transportation and development needs (civilian and military), then we may be able to stabilize the situation long enough to go through the stages of political transformation that have been suggested by the United States, the United Nations, and increasingly by interested Iraqi groups. As stated in a previous entry, elections could initially be held in the country in relatively secure areas (say areas defined as 1 or 2), with later elections held in areas defined as (3) if and when these areas are made a part of a functioning Iraqi political system under Iraqi control.
The pace at which security responsibilities are transferred and the promised date on which the bulk of coalition forces will leave Iraq have to be carefully monitored and adjusted in tandem with the degree to which the suggested modus vivendi actually emerges and with changing estimates as to how long it can be held without the situation deteriorating once again.
Recent days have seemed, in spite of the "pictures", to have witnessed a slackening of the anti-U.S. war effort in Iraq. For the moment, Falluja remains out of the nightly news. Apparently the new Iraqi force in the city is calming things down, although just why and for whom is unclear. It is suspected that the Iraqi guerrillas will reemerge if the Americans really try to come back. The question is, "Why not just let the present situation ride?" Perhaps this is the answer many places.
In his most recent blog pages, Professor Cole (see earlier reference) makes some interesting points. First, he suggests that one American mistake has been to assume that the Baathist regime was a military regime, that our enemy, therefore, has been and is the military. Actually, he points out, Saddam was never in the military. His movement was civilian. (This is similar to the relation of Hitler and the top Nazis to the regular German army.) Second, he points to the fact that the Shi'a have many different militias or potential militias, none of which are sympathetic to Muqtada al-Sadr. They may well be pleased to have the Americans going after Muqtada. It offers them more of an opening for the future. However, if Muqtada is killed by the Americans, many Shiites might turn against those groups that profited by American advances and join the Sadrist uprising. Muqtada has also been attempting to form a front with the Sunnis. Meanwhile, back in Baghdad, Cole's information is that the Sadrists are essentially in control of their part of Baghdad, man the road blocks, provide services etc.
The morning paper today speaks of a major American effort to work with tribal chieftains and Shiite leaders in the south to reform and strengthen Iraqi security forces, somewhat on the model adopted for Falluja. The exact status of the effort is, like everything else, still unclear. But promising.
Perhaps a temporary but manageable modus vivendi is emerging. This will consist of (1) areas under control of pro-Coalition or at least temporarily cooperative groups (most Kurdish areas are an obvious example), (2) areas under the control of less cooperative Iraqis content to manage and secure their own areas (Falluja perhaps, as well as eventually holy cities such as Najaf and Karbala), and (3) areas under the control of those who wish to maintain and enflame a larger fight. If areas defined as (3) do not interfere too much with transportation and development needs (civilian and military), then we may be able to stabilize the situation long enough to go through the stages of political transformation that have been suggested by the United States, the United Nations, and increasingly by interested Iraqi groups. As stated in a previous entry, elections could initially be held in the country in relatively secure areas (say areas defined as 1 or 2), with later elections held in areas defined as (3) if and when these areas are made a part of a functioning Iraqi political system under Iraqi control.
The pace at which security responsibilities are transferred and the promised date on which the bulk of coalition forces will leave Iraq have to be carefully monitored and adjusted in tandem with the degree to which the suggested modus vivendi actually emerges and with changing estimates as to how long it can be held without the situation deteriorating once again.
Sunday, May 09, 2004
Choices for Exit
A couple of days ago, David Brooks suggested that the greatest danger of American incompetence in Iraq will be a parting resolution by this and successive American Administrations of "never again" (at least for a while). The resulting world-wide security gap will be one that will be hard to fill. For the world is going to have other crises, other issues that have to be forcibly solved — and the United States will not be there to carry the torch. North Korea and the Sudan come to mind for the agenda next month, but there will surely be many to follow. Brooks thinks the United Nations is not up to the task. This is surely the case if we mean the United Nations as a primary actor. But the United Nations as the shell within which others can act is probably the best hope we have, and we must start work as soon as possible on strengthening the usability of this framework. Much of the way in which we and the world are able to act together to meet the future will depend on how we exit Iraq.
In his front page editorial (actually it's on this Sunday's Week in Review front page and without being called an editorial it indubitably is), Roger Cohen suggests three exit strategies: (1) Announce an exit date in 2005, focusing Iraqi minds on taking over sexurity themselves, (2) make the United Nations the key player at an even earlier date, or (3) after making obeisance to the U.N., start a bitter campaign to crush the resistance. He finds all three solutions elusive. It appears to me that we will not make a decision, trying all three in turn.
The latest news is that Sadr has started a new campaign against the British in the South. We will have to see how this works out. But right now I get the impression things are better than I would have thought they would be by now. The escalating erosion of our position on the ground has not seemed to be occurring; we seem to be succeeding in Najaf and Kerbala without ruining our record with the Ayatollahs. There is a serious discussion developing on the exact form the Brahimi-UN government will have. (Regardless of the controversy, the seriousness with which it is being taken is encouraging.) If we can work out alternative (2) along with a little of (1) and (3), then we may be able to leave in 2005 with a sense of success that will make the Brooks' longer-term prediction a little less likely.
A couple of days ago, David Brooks suggested that the greatest danger of American incompetence in Iraq will be a parting resolution by this and successive American Administrations of "never again" (at least for a while). The resulting world-wide security gap will be one that will be hard to fill. For the world is going to have other crises, other issues that have to be forcibly solved — and the United States will not be there to carry the torch. North Korea and the Sudan come to mind for the agenda next month, but there will surely be many to follow. Brooks thinks the United Nations is not up to the task. This is surely the case if we mean the United Nations as a primary actor. But the United Nations as the shell within which others can act is probably the best hope we have, and we must start work as soon as possible on strengthening the usability of this framework. Much of the way in which we and the world are able to act together to meet the future will depend on how we exit Iraq.
In his front page editorial (actually it's on this Sunday's Week in Review front page and without being called an editorial it indubitably is), Roger Cohen suggests three exit strategies: (1) Announce an exit date in 2005, focusing Iraqi minds on taking over sexurity themselves, (2) make the United Nations the key player at an even earlier date, or (3) after making obeisance to the U.N., start a bitter campaign to crush the resistance. He finds all three solutions elusive. It appears to me that we will not make a decision, trying all three in turn.
The latest news is that Sadr has started a new campaign against the British in the South. We will have to see how this works out. But right now I get the impression things are better than I would have thought they would be by now. The escalating erosion of our position on the ground has not seemed to be occurring; we seem to be succeeding in Najaf and Kerbala without ruining our record with the Ayatollahs. There is a serious discussion developing on the exact form the Brahimi-UN government will have. (Regardless of the controversy, the seriousness with which it is being taken is encouraging.) If we can work out alternative (2) along with a little of (1) and (3), then we may be able to leave in 2005 with a sense of success that will make the Brooks' longer-term prediction a little less likely.
Torture in Iraq
The torture complementing our mistakes has received enough publicity. My feeling is that it was due to a combination of low morale, overwork, a culture of disrespect, ignorance, confusion as to who was in charge, and an attempt by the "culprits" to satisfy repeated orders to "soften them up". The culprits "on the front line" had apparently received little or no training in what they were to do, although at least one had already had experience in U.S. prisons and a previous record of brutality in his marriage. One woman claims to have not heard of the Geneva Conventions. In any event, they clearly were not seriously exposed to such information. We are told now the purpose of taking the pictures was to have something to show to new prisoners when they were brought in, to give them more of a reason to cooperate. Whether the pictures were used this way or not, I do not know. But if it was understood that this was the purpose, it would help explain some of the poses — and would certainly implicate people much higher in the chain of command than the actors.
One point that has not been made is the extreme gap between what young Americans today understand as proper sexual behavior and that accepted by conservative Iraqis. The culprits knew they were humiliating the Iraqis, indeed that is what they thought was wanted. But they did not understand that their behavior would be seen, or said to be seen, as depraved and evil. Exposed to a culture that regards sadistic sexual play, including tying up one another, as just another alternative way to enjoy life, it would have been difficult for some of them to see what they did as "so bad", especially when others suggested and abetted the practices. I certainly hope these front-line "culprits" are not the ones who receive the brunt of the punishment for their actions.
I also read by today's paper that many "experts" say that torture, including such measures as the above, "never pays", that the information that is obtained in this way is generally worthless because unreliable. To me, this is just too neat. It would imply that rigorously following the Geneva Conventions is a "no brainer" that benefits everyone. Instead, although I have no doubt that some people come to enjoy torturing their victims, torture has been used down through history because it often does "work". So instead of accepting the easy "scientific" out, we should instead decide that even if torture is effective, it will not be used in the absence of specific judicial decisions about single, closely defined questions asked of specific individuals. If it is ever used outside these limits, the United States should stand ready to bring those involved before international courts.
The torture complementing our mistakes has received enough publicity. My feeling is that it was due to a combination of low morale, overwork, a culture of disrespect, ignorance, confusion as to who was in charge, and an attempt by the "culprits" to satisfy repeated orders to "soften them up". The culprits "on the front line" had apparently received little or no training in what they were to do, although at least one had already had experience in U.S. prisons and a previous record of brutality in his marriage. One woman claims to have not heard of the Geneva Conventions. In any event, they clearly were not seriously exposed to such information. We are told now the purpose of taking the pictures was to have something to show to new prisoners when they were brought in, to give them more of a reason to cooperate. Whether the pictures were used this way or not, I do not know. But if it was understood that this was the purpose, it would help explain some of the poses — and would certainly implicate people much higher in the chain of command than the actors.
One point that has not been made is the extreme gap between what young Americans today understand as proper sexual behavior and that accepted by conservative Iraqis. The culprits knew they were humiliating the Iraqis, indeed that is what they thought was wanted. But they did not understand that their behavior would be seen, or said to be seen, as depraved and evil. Exposed to a culture that regards sadistic sexual play, including tying up one another, as just another alternative way to enjoy life, it would have been difficult for some of them to see what they did as "so bad", especially when others suggested and abetted the practices. I certainly hope these front-line "culprits" are not the ones who receive the brunt of the punishment for their actions.
I also read by today's paper that many "experts" say that torture, including such measures as the above, "never pays", that the information that is obtained in this way is generally worthless because unreliable. To me, this is just too neat. It would imply that rigorously following the Geneva Conventions is a "no brainer" that benefits everyone. Instead, although I have no doubt that some people come to enjoy torturing their victims, torture has been used down through history because it often does "work". So instead of accepting the easy "scientific" out, we should instead decide that even if torture is effective, it will not be used in the absence of specific judicial decisions about single, closely defined questions asked of specific individuals. If it is ever used outside these limits, the United States should stand ready to bring those involved before international courts.
