Thursday, May 06, 2004
If We Leave Before Our Time
In an otherwise excellent editorial on the need to radically reform and regroup in Iraq if we are not to be thrown out, Thomas Friedman (NYT Op-Ed, May 6) writes that if "we quit Iraq, it will then become Afghanistan-on-steroids, which will threaten everyone." Assuming that he means that Iraq would inevitably be transformed into a powerful al-Qaeda-Taliban base of operations, this is another example of that very American arrogance that Friedman so often deplores.
It is true that a truly democratic Iraq under our tutelage would be good for Iraqis and good for America. But this does not mean that without our presence Iraqis cannot transform their country into a functioning society with far more respect for human rights than there was under Hussein. In spite of the "evil elements" that confront us now, Iraq has a large, relatively well-educated secular middle class, powerful and moderate shi'a leaders, and a functioning Kurdish enclave in the north. Events in Falluja suggest that out exit might lead to a resurrection of Iraq's army and the establishment of a nationalistic military regime. It might lead to a religiously oriented regime, with considerable power in the hands of the Ayatollahs. The final result might be federalist or highly centralized. Whatever the final outcome, there is certainly no inevitability in its becoming a terrorist base threatening American and European interests.
In an otherwise excellent editorial on the need to radically reform and regroup in Iraq if we are not to be thrown out, Thomas Friedman (NYT Op-Ed, May 6) writes that if "we quit Iraq, it will then become Afghanistan-on-steroids, which will threaten everyone." Assuming that he means that Iraq would inevitably be transformed into a powerful al-Qaeda-Taliban base of operations, this is another example of that very American arrogance that Friedman so often deplores.
It is true that a truly democratic Iraq under our tutelage would be good for Iraqis and good for America. But this does not mean that without our presence Iraqis cannot transform their country into a functioning society with far more respect for human rights than there was under Hussein. In spite of the "evil elements" that confront us now, Iraq has a large, relatively well-educated secular middle class, powerful and moderate shi'a leaders, and a functioning Kurdish enclave in the north. Events in Falluja suggest that out exit might lead to a resurrection of Iraq's army and the establishment of a nationalistic military regime. It might lead to a religiously oriented regime, with considerable power in the hands of the Ayatollahs. The final result might be federalist or highly centralized. Whatever the final outcome, there is certainly no inevitability in its becoming a terrorist base threatening American and European interests.
Wednesday, May 05, 2004
Iran and the USA
Today's paper brings a discussion by Kristof of his current visit to Iran. He prefaces it by saying that he has never been in a country that is so pro-American, even pro-Bush. They believe everything good about the Americans because they have adapted the defense mechanism of assuming that truth is the opposite of everything they see on their television. This must be an exaggeration, yet I have heard similar things from others in the last few years. As one who spent over a year in Iran on three trips back in the pre-Khomeini days I can attest to the good feelings of my generation of Iranians. One must remember that for many years there were more foreign students studying in the United States from Iran than from any other country. (There were so many, in fact, that at some places such as Utah State an Iranian could go through four years and learn very little English.) In my own work I interviewed all the Ayatollahs then in Shiraz (a southern city). In one on one conversations they were quite friendly, even though they varied from Marxism to extreme orthodoxy to mysticism. In the last couple of years I have had occasion to see several Iranian movies. What is remarkable about them is that most have been propagandistic, some rather heavy-handedly so. But the propaganda has consisted largely of feminist ideas imported from the West. Today I read that the most popular current film in Iran is a comedy that makes fun of the religious mullahs.
It is past time that Americans, especially those in our establishment, come to realize the complexity of the Muslim world, and of countries such as Iran. We can oppose the most egregious anti-Western moves of the Iranian establishment, indeed such opposition is welcomed by many Iranians. But we should strive to develop more extensive relationships with Iranian people at every level. We should strive to take more seriously their culture, including its modern aspects, and become acquainted with its educational, social and economic needs.
Iran in the last few years has teetered on the brink of fundamental change. The majority appears to have turned against the theocratic system that has been imposed on the country. (Remember that when the shah was driven out, half his opponents thought they were fighting for a liberal, even radical Iran. The subsequent theocratic system was imposed through a revolution within the revolution.) Today's opposition includes many clerics, some of whose leaders were opposed to theocracy much as Ayatollah Sistani in Iraq is today. The Iranian opposition, horrified by the violence of the previous revolutionary period and the bloody 1980s war with Iraq, has until now opted for nonviolence. But this will not always be so. If the theocracy does not back down and allow a free society, they will sooner or later be forced to increase once again state repression. The resulting explosion could be quick and easy or prolonged and vicious.
As these events threaten to unfold, the United States and its allies could choose to play the part of careful and concerned observers. Our primary effort should be to help a peaceful transition. If this is not to be, then if we were to consider playing a greater role in bringing about a crisis, or in meddling in it once it occurs, this consideration should involve consultation with the best experts on the country and its evolution, with our allies, and with a representative and diverse sample of Iranians within and without the United States. Recent experience in Iraq should be taken to heart. If the end result turns out to be bloody, we should at least have developed plans well ahead of time for helping to rebuild the country after its convulsion.
Today's paper brings a discussion by Kristof of his current visit to Iran. He prefaces it by saying that he has never been in a country that is so pro-American, even pro-Bush. They believe everything good about the Americans because they have adapted the defense mechanism of assuming that truth is the opposite of everything they see on their television. This must be an exaggeration, yet I have heard similar things from others in the last few years. As one who spent over a year in Iran on three trips back in the pre-Khomeini days I can attest to the good feelings of my generation of Iranians. One must remember that for many years there were more foreign students studying in the United States from Iran than from any other country. (There were so many, in fact, that at some places such as Utah State an Iranian could go through four years and learn very little English.) In my own work I interviewed all the Ayatollahs then in Shiraz (a southern city). In one on one conversations they were quite friendly, even though they varied from Marxism to extreme orthodoxy to mysticism. In the last couple of years I have had occasion to see several Iranian movies. What is remarkable about them is that most have been propagandistic, some rather heavy-handedly so. But the propaganda has consisted largely of feminist ideas imported from the West. Today I read that the most popular current film in Iran is a comedy that makes fun of the religious mullahs.
It is past time that Americans, especially those in our establishment, come to realize the complexity of the Muslim world, and of countries such as Iran. We can oppose the most egregious anti-Western moves of the Iranian establishment, indeed such opposition is welcomed by many Iranians. But we should strive to develop more extensive relationships with Iranian people at every level. We should strive to take more seriously their culture, including its modern aspects, and become acquainted with its educational, social and economic needs.
Iran in the last few years has teetered on the brink of fundamental change. The majority appears to have turned against the theocratic system that has been imposed on the country. (Remember that when the shah was driven out, half his opponents thought they were fighting for a liberal, even radical Iran. The subsequent theocratic system was imposed through a revolution within the revolution.) Today's opposition includes many clerics, some of whose leaders were opposed to theocracy much as Ayatollah Sistani in Iraq is today. The Iranian opposition, horrified by the violence of the previous revolutionary period and the bloody 1980s war with Iraq, has until now opted for nonviolence. But this will not always be so. If the theocracy does not back down and allow a free society, they will sooner or later be forced to increase once again state repression. The resulting explosion could be quick and easy or prolonged and vicious.
As these events threaten to unfold, the United States and its allies could choose to play the part of careful and concerned observers. Our primary effort should be to help a peaceful transition. If this is not to be, then if we were to consider playing a greater role in bringing about a crisis, or in meddling in it once it occurs, this consideration should involve consultation with the best experts on the country and its evolution, with our allies, and with a representative and diverse sample of Iranians within and without the United States. Recent experience in Iraq should be taken to heart. If the end result turns out to be bloody, we should at least have developed plans well ahead of time for helping to rebuild the country after its convulsion.
Tuesday, May 04, 2004
Inside Terrorism
Just finished Bruce Hoffman's Inside Terrorism. Since this review of the subject was completed a year or more before 9/11, it reminds us that in some circles terrorism was taken very seriously before the New York skyline was altered. Terrorists have been very active for a long time, and their efforts had been escalating since World War II.
He makes some critical points about the approach of the terrorists and how this approach has been changing. Most important is the fact that terrorists have been primarily interested in the "press" that they get for their actions. They are playing to an audience, generally in one nation or area, but increasingly worldwide. They seldom kill just to be killing. They kill to make an impression. He argues that the more secular and nationalist the terrorists the more careful and directed their efforts are. Only religious (or "spiritual") terrorists single out large sections of humanity for destruction as enemies, for their objectives are not "practical" in the normal sense. Qaddafi's action against the Pan Am flight would seem to not fit this too accurately. As a state actor rather than a private group, Qaddafi was apparently more interested in deterring and avenging attacks rather than the publicity value of his actions. Hoffman also must resolve the difficulty of deciding whether something is actually religious or not. Many so-called religious disputes are more ethnic and nationalist than religious. A person's religion is used by most people as primarily a label. People seldom die for theology. An exception might be al-Qaeda and related groups. For them religion matters, at least in so far as life styles are religious. Al-Qaeda's use of means strictly prohibited in Islam, such as suicide and attacks on women and children, would seem to indicate that it is more interested in results than theological niceties (remembering that in Islam traditional legal rules on such matters are more central than what we might call theology in Christianity).
Perhaps Hoffman's best-known contribution is his emphasis on the use of new technologies and the probable extension of this use by terrorists in the 21st century. I had forgotten how really dangerous the Aum Shinrikyo became in the eighties and nineties. At one time they had amassed as much as a billion dollars, had several research laboratories and thousands of members worldwide, including many Russians (and nuclear scientists). They carried out experimental incidents with bacteriological weapons. Nuclear weapons were being developed on a large acreage in Australia. They accumulated enough sarin gas to kill millions. They appear to botched both biological and nerve gas attacks, although the main subway sarin attack killed hundreds and could easily have killed many more. Hoffman believes that other groups will go much further than this in the future. Clearly al-Qaeda has tried but appears still far from success.
The story of Aum Shinrikyo and their enigmatic leader also tends to support the idea that we are not in the midst of a religious war. Rather, outside of particular disputes (Basques, Tamils etc.), we seem to be facing a diffuse tendency of people aggrieved by what they feel is a loss of status (Japanese, Muslims) to strike out against those with more status (which means Western Civilization and particularly the United States). Aum was built on an odd mixture of modern ideas with Hinduism and Buddhism. It was virulently anti-American, accusing the United States of being intent on destroying Japan. It was also anti-humanitarian, envisaging loss of life in the hundreds of millions in the struggle against the sect's enemies.
Just finished Bruce Hoffman's Inside Terrorism. Since this review of the subject was completed a year or more before 9/11, it reminds us that in some circles terrorism was taken very seriously before the New York skyline was altered. Terrorists have been very active for a long time, and their efforts had been escalating since World War II.
He makes some critical points about the approach of the terrorists and how this approach has been changing. Most important is the fact that terrorists have been primarily interested in the "press" that they get for their actions. They are playing to an audience, generally in one nation or area, but increasingly worldwide. They seldom kill just to be killing. They kill to make an impression. He argues that the more secular and nationalist the terrorists the more careful and directed their efforts are. Only religious (or "spiritual") terrorists single out large sections of humanity for destruction as enemies, for their objectives are not "practical" in the normal sense. Qaddafi's action against the Pan Am flight would seem to not fit this too accurately. As a state actor rather than a private group, Qaddafi was apparently more interested in deterring and avenging attacks rather than the publicity value of his actions. Hoffman also must resolve the difficulty of deciding whether something is actually religious or not. Many so-called religious disputes are more ethnic and nationalist than religious. A person's religion is used by most people as primarily a label. People seldom die for theology. An exception might be al-Qaeda and related groups. For them religion matters, at least in so far as life styles are religious. Al-Qaeda's use of means strictly prohibited in Islam, such as suicide and attacks on women and children, would seem to indicate that it is more interested in results than theological niceties (remembering that in Islam traditional legal rules on such matters are more central than what we might call theology in Christianity).
Perhaps Hoffman's best-known contribution is his emphasis on the use of new technologies and the probable extension of this use by terrorists in the 21st century. I had forgotten how really dangerous the Aum Shinrikyo became in the eighties and nineties. At one time they had amassed as much as a billion dollars, had several research laboratories and thousands of members worldwide, including many Russians (and nuclear scientists). They carried out experimental incidents with bacteriological weapons. Nuclear weapons were being developed on a large acreage in Australia. They accumulated enough sarin gas to kill millions. They appear to botched both biological and nerve gas attacks, although the main subway sarin attack killed hundreds and could easily have killed many more. Hoffman believes that other groups will go much further than this in the future. Clearly al-Qaeda has tried but appears still far from success.
The story of Aum Shinrikyo and their enigmatic leader also tends to support the idea that we are not in the midst of a religious war. Rather, outside of particular disputes (Basques, Tamils etc.), we seem to be facing a diffuse tendency of people aggrieved by what they feel is a loss of status (Japanese, Muslims) to strike out against those with more status (which means Western Civilization and particularly the United States). Aum was built on an odd mixture of modern ideas with Hinduism and Buddhism. It was virulently anti-American, accusing the United States of being intent on destroying Japan. It was also anti-humanitarian, envisaging loss of life in the hundreds of millions in the struggle against the sect's enemies.
Incompetence and Frivolity
The latest news from Iraq reminds me again of the remarkable incompetency of many of our leaders. The Iraq intervention was planned with the deliberate exclusion of those most knowledgeable about Iraq in the State department and academia. Military officers who predicted a need for a much larger force were ignored or dismissed. The first civilian brought in to oversee the transformation of the country to a developed democracy was dismissed after a few months to be replaced by Paul Bremer. Bremer soon issued commands to exclude all Baath party members from the development process and to disband Iraq's army. Falling later into difficulty, Bremer backtracked, now allowing the use of Baathists as long as they were not "too bad". Soon we were asking an Iraqi general to reorganize a segment of the old army to help us in Falluja. Yet the Marine officers who brought this man in to solve their problem were then told the general they had selected was not acceptable after all. Now we are told he will be replaced by another Iraqi officer the top American command likes more. We don't yet know the reaction of General Saleh and his forces in Falluja. But it can be imagined.
Meanwhile, the overall reconstruction and security effort is being bungled by an overreliance on inexperienced and untrained reservists and foreign contingents brought in from many countries to show how much support our President has. Soldiers who were told they were to be sent home on a certain day were then told they would have to spend several more months. With this confusion and the low-scale but continual attacks on civilian and military targets throughout the country, morale has apparently fallen to a new low. Part of out security responsibility, including intelligence and interrogation, has been handed over to "private" American concerns who are less answerable to the officers who we thought were in charge. The latest scandal involving the egregious mistreatment of Iraqis has been the result of command confusion, dereliction of duty, and low standards of training and behavior on the bottom rungs. Low morale problem played a part in the disgusting American behavior as well.
It is hard to say it, probably irresponsible, but recent news suggests that maybe we should just go home! While tragedy stalks the battlefield, our President rides joyfully from campaign stop to campaign stop. The administration has never taken this war seriously in terms of planning, allocation of sufficient troops and funds, or bringing the American people into the effort in a serious manner. They need to be told that tax cuts must be put on hold to support the forces we need. Today I read a serious call for a return of the draft as a means of nationalizing the effort. I do not like the draft, but the author is right that it would be a way need to get the country seriously involved. If the people thinks the cause is worth it, perhaps this is the way to go. If the people, following the lead of their President, do not, then let's admit it, and negotiate a withdrawal.
The latest news from Iraq reminds me again of the remarkable incompetency of many of our leaders. The Iraq intervention was planned with the deliberate exclusion of those most knowledgeable about Iraq in the State department and academia. Military officers who predicted a need for a much larger force were ignored or dismissed. The first civilian brought in to oversee the transformation of the country to a developed democracy was dismissed after a few months to be replaced by Paul Bremer. Bremer soon issued commands to exclude all Baath party members from the development process and to disband Iraq's army. Falling later into difficulty, Bremer backtracked, now allowing the use of Baathists as long as they were not "too bad". Soon we were asking an Iraqi general to reorganize a segment of the old army to help us in Falluja. Yet the Marine officers who brought this man in to solve their problem were then told the general they had selected was not acceptable after all. Now we are told he will be replaced by another Iraqi officer the top American command likes more. We don't yet know the reaction of General Saleh and his forces in Falluja. But it can be imagined.
Meanwhile, the overall reconstruction and security effort is being bungled by an overreliance on inexperienced and untrained reservists and foreign contingents brought in from many countries to show how much support our President has. Soldiers who were told they were to be sent home on a certain day were then told they would have to spend several more months. With this confusion and the low-scale but continual attacks on civilian and military targets throughout the country, morale has apparently fallen to a new low. Part of out security responsibility, including intelligence and interrogation, has been handed over to "private" American concerns who are less answerable to the officers who we thought were in charge. The latest scandal involving the egregious mistreatment of Iraqis has been the result of command confusion, dereliction of duty, and low standards of training and behavior on the bottom rungs. Low morale problem played a part in the disgusting American behavior as well.
It is hard to say it, probably irresponsible, but recent news suggests that maybe we should just go home! While tragedy stalks the battlefield, our President rides joyfully from campaign stop to campaign stop. The administration has never taken this war seriously in terms of planning, allocation of sufficient troops and funds, or bringing the American people into the effort in a serious manner. They need to be told that tax cuts must be put on hold to support the forces we need. Today I read a serious call for a return of the draft as a means of nationalizing the effort. I do not like the draft, but the author is right that it would be a way need to get the country seriously involved. If the people thinks the cause is worth it, perhaps this is the way to go. If the people, following the lead of their President, do not, then let's admit it, and negotiate a withdrawal.
Monday, May 03, 2004
The "War on Terror" Revisited
Michael Ignatieff warns us in Sunday's NY Times magazine that we may have to renounce some civil liberties and restraints on our intelligence services if we are to win "the war on terror". His argument is enlightening, but suffers from two grave and interconnected errors. He tacitly assumes (1) that we are waging a war against an ill-defined enemy named "terrorism" and (2) confuses the issue even further by considering the war in Iraq as though it were simply another encounter with our terrorist enemy.
Admittedly, it is not always easy to keep straight where "we" and "they" are. But we must begin by identifying an enemy against which it is possible to fight a "war". Let me call this enemy "al-Qaeda". Although not a highly organized group consisting of "card-carrying" members, "al-Qaeda" can be used to refer to an organization with numerous branches and supporters throughout the world that has as its mission doing harm to the United States and its allies, and to their citizens wherever they are. Few if any of the members of the Basque ETA, the Chechnya rebels, or Sri Lanka's Tamils insurgent movement are members of al-Qaeda. Neither are the vast majority of the guerrilla warriors in Iraq who would not be killing Americans if we had stayed at home. (This last comment does not in itself mean we should not be in Iraq, but it does mean that we must not confuse the vast majority of the opponents we face there with either "international terrorism" or the al-Qaeda organization.)
Drawing these distinctions is critical to our country's future. Ignatieff and others are suggesting that we must set aside some civil liberties and some constraints on torture and assassination for the duration of "our war against terrorism". To me, this means we are being asked to consider surrendering these rights and standards for all time, since "terrorism" is a concept, a class of action, that cannot be defeated no matter what we do. The enemy that I lump together loosely under the term "al-Qaeda", however, has a real if often indeterminate existence. As such, it can be attacked, its leaders tracked down, and its operatives dispersed or even induced to "retire" as the members of other terrorist organizations have in the past. For the period of the campaign against this "enemy", I could justify relaxing some liberal prohibitions within stated limits. Beyond this, in a "war" against a category, Ignatieff's approach would simply mean the permanent loss of freedoms and of the standards of behavior against opponents that we have tried (with notable failures) to uphold in the past.
Michael Ignatieff warns us in Sunday's NY Times magazine that we may have to renounce some civil liberties and restraints on our intelligence services if we are to win "the war on terror". His argument is enlightening, but suffers from two grave and interconnected errors. He tacitly assumes (1) that we are waging a war against an ill-defined enemy named "terrorism" and (2) confuses the issue even further by considering the war in Iraq as though it were simply another encounter with our terrorist enemy.
Admittedly, it is not always easy to keep straight where "we" and "they" are. But we must begin by identifying an enemy against which it is possible to fight a "war". Let me call this enemy "al-Qaeda". Although not a highly organized group consisting of "card-carrying" members, "al-Qaeda" can be used to refer to an organization with numerous branches and supporters throughout the world that has as its mission doing harm to the United States and its allies, and to their citizens wherever they are. Few if any of the members of the Basque ETA, the Chechnya rebels, or Sri Lanka's Tamils insurgent movement are members of al-Qaeda. Neither are the vast majority of the guerrilla warriors in Iraq who would not be killing Americans if we had stayed at home. (This last comment does not in itself mean we should not be in Iraq, but it does mean that we must not confuse the vast majority of the opponents we face there with either "international terrorism" or the al-Qaeda organization.)
Drawing these distinctions is critical to our country's future. Ignatieff and others are suggesting that we must set aside some civil liberties and some constraints on torture and assassination for the duration of "our war against terrorism". To me, this means we are being asked to consider surrendering these rights and standards for all time, since "terrorism" is a concept, a class of action, that cannot be defeated no matter what we do. The enemy that I lump together loosely under the term "al-Qaeda", however, has a real if often indeterminate existence. As such, it can be attacked, its leaders tracked down, and its operatives dispersed or even induced to "retire" as the members of other terrorist organizations have in the past. For the period of the campaign against this "enemy", I could justify relaxing some liberal prohibitions within stated limits. Beyond this, in a "war" against a category, Ignatieff's approach would simply mean the permanent loss of freedoms and of the standards of behavior against opponents that we have tried (with notable failures) to uphold in the past.
