Yesterday’s startling and detailed report in the New York Times on civilian casualties in Iraq was strangely not followed by discussion on television, either commercial or public. I hope the media remedy this nonresponse. One could imagine that they did not want to be attacked for making yet another attack on the Administration at this late date, particularly when any statistical study carried out in wartime is open to criticism. Perhaps they wanted to check out the data. I have made a preliminary check, and it seems to me that the study has to be taken seriously, even after all the caveats are weighed.

The reported Johns Hopkins study in the journal Lancet was prepublished on the web at this address. It estimates on the basis of a statistical survey that about 100,000 civilians have died as the result of the American-led invasion. (Many of the men may actually have been insurgents, but not soldiers in the usual sense.) Some of these were indirect casualties, caused, for example, by people less able to get timely medical assistance due to the fighting. But the study suggests that the great majority of the “excess deaths” were caused from the air by bombs, helicopter gunships etc. The study points out in an aside that may lead readers to have greater confidence in it, that only three deaths were reported by their interviewees as were attributable to mistakes on the ground by American soldiers In two of these cases the soldiers later apologized.

This study greatly increases the seriously of our undertaking. The highest non-propaganda estimates of civilian deaths I had seen previously were below 20,000. One method of counting based on newspaper accounts puts the figure at about 15,000 (600 in Falluja). This may be found at this site.

The study team took a sample survey of household clusters from January 2002 to date. They interviewed 33 clusters representing about 6000 people, being sure to make the sampling as representative of Iraq as a whole as possible. They looked at death rates from all causes before the America-led invasion and afterwards. Once the death rates were established, then the results were extrapolated to the country as a whole. They found it difficult to work in Falluja (study done in September of this year) and so left it out of their calculation. (They went there anyhow and have what data they could collect.) If Falluja were included, they believe the final figures would be much greater.

This suggests that we are still a long way from being able to use heavy firepower to overwhelm an opponent without causing a high level of casualties among civilian populations. This is not to say that greater precision in the use of firepower, particularly from the air, has not helped. Some European countries suffered mortalities over a period of five years in World War II as high as 10% of their pre-war population. We are speaking here of one and one-half years of war that killed (or caused to die) perhaps 0.35% of the population. Nevertheless, this cost is not at all trivial. We can certainly understand why many Iraqis and others see the war and what goes with it as unjustifiable and immoral.

This suggests once again that after Tuesday’s election, the American Administration must seriously rethink what the war is doing to its position in the world, as well as to the people directly affected. We must consider how we might be able to bring the war to a speedy conclusion. If it does not look as though we can with the forces on the ground bring it to an end, then we must either greatly increase those forces (hopefully with the assistance of other countries) or we must, in consultation with British, Kurdish, and Shiite leaders, together with the Allawi government, devise a means for a relatively quick and orderly exit. We must do all this remembering that if we handle the process poorly we may leave behind a society so torn apart by rivalries new and old that the fatalities discussed here will end up seeming trivial. Our invasion, no matter how idealistic its rationale might have been for many of those initiating it, has opened a Pandora's box. It will be hard to force the lid back on.

Perhaps we should wait until after the January elections. But regardless of the benefit or reality of these elections, we must begin planning now for how we end it, for even in the best case January is likely to bring to power a new government that will be just as unacceptable to many of the insurgents as the Allawi regime is today.

The International Institute for Strategic Studies in its latest “Comments” takes a position on the reform of American intelligence. Its conclusion is that the egregious errors in handling the situation leading up to 9/11 should not lead to the kind of changes that the 9/11 Commission, seconded by the U.S. Senate, are proposing. The difficulty that needs to be addressed is that the information gathered at lower levels is not getting up to those who could act on it at the top in a timely fashion, if at all. Placing another layer above the CIA may simply make the situation worse.

They point out that a pre 9/11 reorganization was an attempt to get the information to the NSC. This was useful but not enough. As they say: “Well before 9/11, there was a bureaucratic mechanism in place for gathering intelligence at the appropriate level in the form of the CSG, which had been enshrined by presidential decision directive as the government’s counter-terrorism crisis-management nerve centre at the NSC. As chairman of the CSG, Richard Clarke made breaking down inter-agency anxieties about sharing information a priority but had not been completely successful. The problem before 9/11, then, was not the absence of a top-level clearinghouse for pooling intelligence on terrorist threats from multiple agencies. Rather, the trouble was that key officials in the individual agencies themselves did not rate intelligence that turned out to be important as sufficiently probative to filter up to the NSC.”

The “Comments” also sum up the advice offered by Henry Kissinger with the support of others, which concluded (note that the NID is the new position being advocated by the 9/11 Commission and the Senate; DCI is the present Director of Central Intelligence):

“Shortly before the House version of the intelligence reform bill was introduced, Henry Kissinger, with the support of a bipartisan group of former high-ranking officials, in testimony before the Senate Appropriations Committee cautioned Congress against taking ‘irrevocable legislative action’ prompted by any false sense of urgency that the election cycle might have created. Kissinger was generally concerned with creating another layer - in the form of the NID - between the president and existing intelligence institutions. His specific worries included:

• weakening the relationship between intelligence analysts and operations officers;

• potentially compromising democratic principles by institutionally melding domestic intelligence with foreign intelligence;

• suppressing competing views;

• blurring lines of authority between the NID and the NSC;

• the questionable advisability of folding tactical and operational military intelligence into a predominantly civilian multi-agency structure; and

• the inclination of the 9/11 Commission to ignore more incremental and less disruptive means of achieving reform through existing institutions, such as the DCI.”

Good points, well made.

As suggested in previous postings, it seems to me that there should be an operational office alongside the NSC that has responsibility for action. Such an office would be more likely to demand needed intelligence and coordination than the advisory and fact-gathering groups that seem to be in the loop discussed above. One would office would be in Homeland Security. But this is not the way this agency is structured. It is more like the old Civil Defense or FEMA agencies that have to do with managing crises, with reaching out to everybody, mobilizing first responders etc. Perhaps a thorough redoing of Homeland Security would give us such a capability, but probably the complexion of that agency is already set (and I believe it might as well be dismantled). The FBI and the CIA are both very ineffective agencies (because of a combination of the quality of their personnel and their institutional culture). The first task is to remold their cultures and personnel (a long and perhaps impossible task). The FBI is set up to control internal crime by getting indictments in the court system. This is a task that must be done in the end in many terrorism cases, but it leads to different priorities and a different sense of time than the terrorism issue demands. Most of the CIA is concerned with fact gathering. A section send out small units on ad hoc military assignments in overseas situations. It does not, however, have the command function and field forces that would be demanded by serious security threats playing out in the United States. Somehow this lack has to be remedied without damaging civil freedoms in the country more than the terrorism scare already has.

As I have often emphasized, terrorism is many things and the war in Iraq is not simply another form of Islamic terrorism. Nevertheless, an excellent discussion of terrorism through analyzing the statements of Islamic terrorists was presented in the Op-Ed page Wednesday. The Islamists talk continually on the internet, and according to these reporters they are getting happier and happier about what is going on. After a downcast mood following the defeat of the Taliban, they now feel that our position in Iraq is about the same as that of the USSR before they were driven out of Afghanistan. They point out to one another our mistake of taking on two guerrilla wars at the same time, and also of fighting insurgents with unlimited access to arms and money. They see the fighting as leading to a religious revival among the Sunnis in Iraq and the whole Islamic world. They regard Iraq as a great recruiting ground for Muslims everywhere. Lashkar-e-Taiba, the leading Jihadist “army” in Pakistan is now shifting its sights from Kashmir to Iraq. They also point to a parallel development among the Shiites among which a leading divine preaches that events in Iraq are a harbinger of the return of the Mahdi. “A fire will come from the sky and swallow up Baghdad”, apparently a kind of Shiite Armageddon. The authors of the Op-Ed conclude by advising us to not be taken in by the Administration’s rosy picture. We are in a mess and will be lucky to get out. In this election season, many are saying this because of their visceral opposition to the President. But these analysts are particularly well informed.

The report in today’s paper from Ramadi, the capital of Anbar Province, underscores the difficulties. Apparently, while we have been worrying about Falluja, Ramadi has been going from bad to worse. The 400,000 people in the city are essentially out of either our control or that of the Allawi administration. Our forces can guard particular buildings and take convoys through the city. But around every corner there is another sniper. No one feels safe anywhere. And those Iraqis not with the resistance find it in their interest to pretend they are. Again we hear the refrain that the government troops and police are with few exceptions completely worthless, or even worse than worthless. They openly speak of the American soldiers as dogs and talk of fighting them one day. The Marine commanders know they can win any battle, but they seem quite hopeless when it comes to winning the war. The idea of using the Americans in the city to do something other than fight has essentially been abandoned. Reconstruction is at a standstill.

Recent days have seen recurrent attacks on our forces and on government forces in Iraq, some bloodier than others. But more alarming, reporters are continuing to report widespread hatred of American soldiers, even within Shi’a areas. Reporters who have recently talked to new recruits in the Iraq’s police and military units tell reporters they hate Americans and would gladly fight them. We should consider once again why this might to so.

President Bush believes that he is offering the Iraqi people freedom and democracy. He cannot understand why they will not accept these gifts because in his mind these are what all people want. However, while Bush speaks of democracy, the average Iraqi may see something else. First, he may see an occupation that threatens to take his homeland away from him. We say this is silly, but our judgement is not there’s. They have been occupied before, by the Ottomans, the Persians, and the British. It is not impossible to understand that we are just another power in this tradition. Second, they see us as Christians invading a Muslim land. We are in this sense desecrating holy land, putting down Islam while raising up Christianity as the more successful religion. (Certainly this is the way the ancient Israelites viewed their wars, their victories and defeats.) Third, when we say that we are bringing democracy and freedom this means little to a people who have never lived with these. It is easy for them to believe these are mere slogans. They know that we are bringing modernism, rationalism, and decadent ideas and behaviors from a sinful West. These changes may mean much more to them than the promise of democracy.

I have played with the idea of comparing what is happening in Iraq to our forces to what happened to Napoleon’s forces in Russia as reported in War and Peace. Napoleon easily conquered the most important parts of Russia and took Moscow in a walk. Yet his forces eventually had to leave and as they went home through the Russian winter they were destroyed. They were destroyed by a ragtag army that harried his forces all the way back. Much of their fighting might be called guerrilla war. It is important to realize that Napoleon also was bringing the modern world to Russia. Everywhere he went in Europe he established modern states with a new rule of law. It wasn’t democracy, but it was a new and superior political system. It guaranteed much more freedom to the average person than the systems it replaced. Yet the Russian peasants, ground down under the heel of oppressive tsars, resisted fiercely. They resisted because the invader threatened to destroy their way of life, to replace the Orthodox Church (or so they thought). The French were outsiders who did not belong in Russia, so they were attacked and attacked until the last one had left the country. The situation is different now (we have better supply routes and equipment for one thing). Yet there are some similarities that we should take to heart.

In an Op-Ed today, Zbigniew Brezezinski develops the outlines of a strategy that might help us escape from the traps that recent policy has allowed the United states to fall into in the Middle East. It is not too striking an effort, but nevertheless it offers many more useful ideas than either candidate has yet offered. He begins by expressing his fear that some elements of the Bush Administration are tempted by the idea of developing a “Holy Alliance” against Islam. This would include the Christians, Orthodox Russia under Putin, India with its Hindu-Muslim struggle, and Israel with its Jewish-Christian connection. They might even hope on other bases to entice China and Japan into the Alliance. He sees this as a dangerous approach that offers many dangers and few gains. He is happy that Kerry and his people would not follow this route, but feels they do not have enough ideas of their own to find a way out. Without more reason to do so than Kerry has put forward, he believes that our European allies will remain unwilling to help Kerry obtain his objectives in the Middle East and elsewhere.

Brezezinski would have a new administration get together with our European allies to develop a “Grand Alliance” that would embrace the Middle East and its problems by taking on in collaboration with moderate Middle Eastern countries the three major challenges that we face in the region: Israel-Palestine, Iraq, and a restless Iran. We should begin with a joint statement of the European Union and the United States on Israel-Palestine. It would outline a solution and include a commitment to international peacekeeping to help with the aftermath. Second, the European Union would make a major financial commitment to the recovery of Iraq and commit a significant military force so that the United States might be able to reduce the size of the American presence. It might be possible in this context to get some moderate Muslim states to also commit forces. Third, the United States and the European Union would open exploratory discussions with Iran on regional security, including questions of nuclear proliferation, Iraq, and Afghanistan. This should be combined with a carrot of normalizing relations with the West. He believes that our European allies would find it difficult to stay out of the projected Grand Alliance because of the dangers they see in allowing the United States to continue to go it alone. They fear as much as he does that we might just decide to unilaterally withdraw from Iraq, or lash out again by attacking Iran.

Today’s paper explains the methods by which a small faction in the Bush Administration was able after 9/11 to change military law in regard to the way in which persons were arrested, held in custody, and tried (actually not tried as it turned out in most cases) after 9/11. Rules of evidence were to be greatly modified and everything was to be done simply by the whim of the President no matter what the national or international law might be — so long as terrorists, a very hard category to define in the field, were said to be involved. This faction was so sure of its rectitude and so convinced that everyone else was a wimp that they excluded from their efforts the military lawyers (who before these events had been bringing military law and practice into conformity with civilian law and practice), the State Department who had the greatest number of experts on international law, and such supposed insiders as Colin Powell and Condoleezza Rice (both of whom were furious when they found out what was happening). The result has indirectly been the abuse of prisoners in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Guantanamo and, more directly, the inability of the government to try effectively those that it has imprisoned. The latter failure results from the fact that too many of the judges and bypassed military lawyers that have at some point to become part of the process are deeply opposed to what is going on.

I was recently asked what I thought of the threats to civil liberties that were inherent in aspects of the Patriot Act and the preemptory approach of the government to suspects. My reply that I was not happy, but that what I really worried about was what would happen if we had a succession of 9/11s, such as both Homeland Security and al-Qaida has assured us will occur. Then I would see a cowed American public willing to accept almost anything the government claimed was necessary, with the end result a fundamental and long-term loss of civil liberties.

A friend of mine, Patrick Gunkel, has pointed out that from a larger perspective the loss of 3000 lives on 9/11 is actually a rather small event. Over 40,000 people are killed in automobile accidents every year and 60,000 people die in New York City every year. Of course, the level of horror of 9/11 seems quite different, especially when the events are played up all around us by the media. But let us imagine a string of 9/11s, one every week for two months, occurring at scattered points around the country (although mostly in large cities). This is what we have been told might happen. But if it did, then how would we restrain those in government who would set aside our common rights to attack this danger? I am afraid that the majority of Americans would not be in a mood to restrain them.

This suggests that those who fear this outcome should come together as experts and civil libertarians to devise proposed changes in peacetime civil and military law that could and should be made for carefully delineated periods in the event of extreme emergency. If these changes were well publicized and decided on before the fact, then when such an emergency occurred, the rush to push aside liberties for safety might be controllable. One can hope that a new administration would make such a move to define before the event emergency law for crises of different intensities.

Today’s paper reports on the excellent reputation Dutch soldiers are developing in one of the less conflicted provinces between Baghdad and Kuwait. Their approach is decidedly low key. They do not wear armor on their persons or vehicles. They emphasis small public works projects. They are well respected by the local people and have friendly relations with them. The result is a marked contrast between the attitudes that the Iraqis have toward the Dutch and toward the Americans. The Americans come though town only in heavily armed convoys. They seem to feel that everyone in their path is an enemy. On occasion they have even killed local Iraqis that got in the way of their vehicles, and never slowed down. In reaction the Americans are seen simply as occupiers who have no interest in helping the Iraqis. The bristling Americans racing through the streets have had their experience in much tougher environments or have been indoctrinated by “old hands” who have had this experience. It is easy in this environment to develop the idea that every Iraqi is an enemy. Many American units had originally intended to take the Dutch approach. (I remember a discussion of the approach the Marines intended to take in some areas.) But their experience has taught them a different doctrine. Perhaps an effort could be made to avoid having people who have developed a fearful/brutal attitude toward Iraqis come in contact with the people. Units composed of such persons should either be shipped home or used only in the most dangerous areas. Otherwise, we are making enemies even where we do not need to have enemies.

American intelligence is developing what purports to be an improved picture of the enemy they are fighting. Intelligence officers believe they are facing 8000 to 12,000 insurgents backed up by another 20,000 active sympathizers (this figure seems low). They are divided into an estimated 50 cells. They believe that only a 1000 of the total are foreign fighters, although these are some of the most dedicated. The insurgents are supported by almost unlimited supplies of money brought in from Syria, but originating in many cases in Saudi Arabia (notice the absence of Iran in this account). The rest of the money is evidently parceled out by relatives of Saddam from a hoard that the family had managed to place under their control in Syria. It was noted that Iraqis are often fees decided on in advance for setting bombs or attacking Americans. The data reported in the article suggests that 80% of the attacks are criminal rather than insurgency in the accepted sense. This applies especially to kidnappings for ransom and hijackings. Four-fifths of the remaining 20% are carried out by domestic insurgents rather than outsiders. Major insurgent leaders in the Falluja area are more like gang leaders than guerrilla fighters. (The numbers may be wrong, but other accounts suggest that a large percentage of the incidents reported are not actually political. This includes large numbers of revenge killings within the Iraqi community.) The new intelligence suggests a lack of unified command. There are five leaders in the Falluja area alone. The new intelligence is based on an increase in intelligence due to increasing involvement of Iraqis in the anti-insurgent effort. Unfortunately, this gain is balanced in part by the fact that as more Iraqis become a part of the anti-insurgency, the insurgents are able to also improve their intelligence by placing some of their members in the new anti-insurgent units.

These figures should be considered in the context of theories of guerrilla war. The old “rule of thumb” going back at least to the war of the British to suppress the communist insurgency in Malaysia was that to defeat guerrillas the government (or analogous body) needs ten times as many soldiers as there are active guerrillas. This suggests that we are not in such a bad situation in Iraq. We have more than the 120,000 soldiers that this would imply are needed. Unfortunately, the 135,000 or so Americans are scattered over a large area while the guerrillas we are speaking of here are concentrated in a much smaller area. In this area, we do not have ten times their number. Bringing a few thousand British up from the South should help. But perhaps we could turn a much larger percentage of the country over to Iraqi security control, concentrating our forces only in the most difficult areas. We already have very few troops in the Kurdish area. We could also reduce our forces greatly in most of the South.

The Association of Muslim Scholars announced earlier this week that all Iraqis should boycott the elections unless attacks on Falluja or similar American offenses were stopped. The Association is said to represent 3000 Sunni mosques. This announcement came at the time that negotiations to avert the American attacks seemed to be on again, off again. The Association particularly attacked Allawi for insisting on “impossible conditions” for calling off the attack. They objected to the demand that the Fallujans turn over Zarqawi when (they claim) he is not in Falluja. I am sure that many Sunnis are upset by every bomb that falls on Falluja, but we are not really sure of the effect elsewhere.

This morning we had news that the United Nations (only 14 persons in country) has developed with the Iraqis what appears to be an excellent registration system, given the circumstances. They plan to use the country’s food distribution rolls as a basis for registration. The coverage of this system is nearly universal, and government food distribution continues even in Falluja. The electoral administration intends to use the occasion of people coming in for their November food ration for a creative form of registration. Each person with his or her food will be given a piece of paper giving the number of eligible voters in the family. That person is then to correct the list as necessary and hand it back. As I understand it, this will serve as a registration. The clever part of it is that it means that no one will be seen going into an office specifically to register, an action that could be dangerous in some areas. Relying on this method one can begin to understand how some Iraqis assert that they will be able to have a reasonable vote everywhere in the country in spite of the problems.

In all the discussion of the reform of the intelligence services, based in part on the 9/11 report, there is simply not enough realization that the agency has repeatedly failed the country. Today there is yet another report about how immediately before and in the early stages of the war in Iraq, the Central Intelligence Agency in its capacity as advisor to the government and as advisor to various commanders on the ground in Iraq, repeatedly “had it wrong”. They really did think that the people would welcome us with open arms. They really thought that insurgency after we had conquered the country would be a minor problem. They evidently had no idea of the state of Iraq’s infrastructure before the war. With this kind of advice coming in it is no wonder that the Bush Administration so badly judged the requirements of the commitment. The Agency has also been responsible in part for the egregious violations of the right of prisoners in a largely futile search for information.

This, we should remember not the first time that the Agency has failed us. I remember that when I was visiting Vietnam as an advisor to DOD, that the CIA had become something of a joke because in a recent election it had predicted the victory of a faction that in fact came in about eighth when the votes were counted.

The fact is the CIA is lost in a world of its own making. Its analysts believe what they want to believe, and hire secret agents that will feed their fantasies. It seems to me that we need a complete redo, not just a rearrangement at the top. We need an analytic agency that begins de novo, based on the best and most knowledgeable people our universities can provide. We will need to incorporate into the agency some of the truly secret investigative parts of the agency, while keeping the analysts in charge. The analytic agency will operate in the clear without secrecy. The investigative branch will operate in a classified manner. But we must develop a working relationship by which the analysts can both use the clandestine service as a source of information and direct this service in the kind of information that they try to obtain. In the end, the analysts with the broader picture should be the channel through which information from the Agency is provided to actors in government and the military.

In comments on the war, there is often little attention played to the number of Iraqis who are dying, particular as a result of insurgent action. The Times reports that in one recent week 208 Iraqis were killed compared to 23 American military. Perhaps half the 208 were killed by American military action (targeted insurgents and civilians combined). The other half are divided between casualties among the Iraqi security services targeted by the insurgents and civilians killed in the course of insurgent “cause havoc” actions (particularly suicide bombings). In addition there are the kidnappings, either for profit or ideology — sometimes both. The latest is that of the director of CARE in Iraq. What is important to the cause of peace and stability in Iraq is the reaction of the Iraqi people to all this. Some surely condemn many of our bombing attacks that inadvertently kill civilians. They also condemn both America and the Allawi government for our inability to stop the killing. But many civilians are also bound to condemn insurgent attacks that seem to have little purpose other than killing civilians. These may be targeted civilians or just persons in the wrong place at the wrong time. So it would seem to an outside observer that in many cases the insurgent attacks, particularly the suicide bombers are counterproductive. It is said that many Iraqis believe these are the work of outside Islamists, because they do not believe real Iraqis would kill so indiscriminately.

In a recent discussion with a person well acquainted with events in Iran, he suggested that the next successful democracy in the Middle East after Turkey will be Iran. His feeling is that the Iranian people are just waiting for this opportunity. He believes that the religious leaders have completely lost the support of the population. Since the opposition seems to have rejected the idea of mounting a violent revolution, the problem then becomes trying to understand the process by which the present system is replaced. His suggestion is that sooner or later a commander in the security forces (Revolutionary Guards in his scenario) realizes that he would be welcomed by the people if he simply set the religious leadership aside. The result in the first instance would be an authoritarian regime, but this would soon evolve into democracy.

Maybe so, but let us step back a little and examine the situation.

The government of Iran as it is now constituted consists of a Supreme Leader appointed for life by an Assembly of Experts (a small council of religious leaders), the Assembly of Experts (advises on many issues, particularly judicial), the President (popularly elected every four years), and a Consultative Assembly (elected every four years). The problems with the system from a democratic perspective include the nonelection of the Supreme leader who can override anything, the participation of the Supreme Leader in appointing the President’s cabinet, the ability of the Assembly or Experts or other religious bodies to veto the candidacy of anyone to an elected office, and the continual interference with the media by the religious bodies, the Revolutionary Guards, and other antisecular gangs that operate either with or without government support. As might be expected in a state viewing itself as Islamic, the judiciary is largely under the control of clerics (whose education is often primarily in Islamic law). The head of the judiciary is an Ayatollah. The regular court system is supplemented by a Revolutionary Court System that has been responsible for a good deal of the suppression of what modern societies consider personal rights.

In spite of all this, there is a large segment of the Iranian population, especially that centering around the universities, that is quite outspoken. While newspapers and other publications and artistic products (such as movies) are continually banned or closed, the flow of information and artistic expression continues. The movies that reach the West depict a remarkably westernized life in which women play effective and accepted leadership roles. The opposition scored important gains in electing and reelecting Khatami as President (a clergyman, but moderate). They also elected a competitive parliament willing to challenge the religious leaders in many respects. However, by the time of the most recent parliamentary election the inability or unwillingness of Khatami to stand up to the religious leaders and the failure of the parliament to get its measures past the religious hurdles set up by the system, combined with a stronger than previous effort by the clergy to veto the candidacies of many liberals, turned off the liberal leaders to such an extent that they told their followers to abstain from voting. The result was a predictable sweep by the conservatives — further isolating President Khatami.

We do not know what the Iranian people actually think. In the recent past, polls have shown majorities supporting liberal propositions, such closer relations with the United States. But one wonders why a liberal majority hasn’t been able to challenge the system more than it has. One suspects that in Tehran there would be a majority against the system. But, as in many countries, the modernized capital is not the country. It should be noted, however, that statistics suggest that Iran as a whole is a surprisingly modernized country for the region. Its total fertility rate is down below 2.0 births per woman, which means that the population is moving rapidly toward stabilization. By comparison, the rate in Iraq remains above 4.0. This achievement means that the people of Iran have been able with government encouragement under both previous and present political systems to control their fertility in a modern manner. The literacy rate is at 79%, with female literacy 74%. Comparative figures for Iraq are 40%, with female literacy at 24%. If these figures are anywhere near accurate, this means that Iran has without much of the world noticing been developing a modern society that is poised to demand a modern political system. What remains to determine is the path.

The implications of the discussion for American foreign policy are not clear. But it does suggest that instead of thinking of Iran as the next boulder in the path of universal democratization, we should think of it as a country well on its way toward joining our world through the efforts of its own citizens. It would be crazy to think of invading such a country, a step that would both discredit its growing liberal population and discredit liberal leaders. Instead, we must with the help of Iranians both within and without the country devise a strategy that will assist the democratic evolution of the country. In doing so, we must remember that Iranians, liberal and conservative, must be allowed to define their national interests in their own way. In particular, we should not assume that nuclear abstinence is a necessary part of the democratization process. Dictating the position of Iran on this or any other issue cannot be a part of a true democracy program.

The opponents of the Iraq War have many good arguments. It was “the wrong war at the wrong time in the wrong place”. Yet we are there, and all Americans and friends of what used to be called the “Free World” must realize that for both our country’s reputation and the good of the Iraqis we have to accomplish as much as we can while we are there and leave as early and as “successfully” as we can.

In today’s Times, Bob Herbert’s Op-Ed represents another example of the dark side of the liberal critique of the Bush Administration. Herbert tells us that “we find we can’t win this war we started”. Further down the page Herbert writes “As for the rebuilding of Iraq, forget about it.” These may appear to be brave words to Herbert’s admirers. They were words I might have written last April when it appeared our forces were entering the retreat phase of Napoleon’s invasion of Russia.

But today they no longer make sense. If we concentrate on the horror, on the repeated suicide bombings and mortar attacks, and mines along the roads, the picture can look black. But if we notice how these incidents have become more and more concentrated in the Sunni Arab areas, if we read reports detailing small gains here and there, of water systems reestablished, of electricity production which is now considerably above the level when we attacked, of schools that have been renovated, we will draw a different picture. If we note that the program of turning in weapons by the Mahdi Army is now being extended from Sadr City to other Shi’a areas in Iraq, we will see hope once more building. If we note the Shi’a majority in the South and the Kurdish enclaves in the North are expected to vote heavily in January, this will give another picture.

There is no doubt that the situation is still perilous, that the Sunni Arabs might be able to keep the insurgency up for months, or that relations with al-Sadr might break down once more. There is no doubt that the Administration’s plans for the aftermath of “victory” were poorly developed, that there were too few troops to carry out this phase, that the economic development effort, the arms available to American troops, the training of Iraqi security forces, and the incarceration and treatment of Iraqis captured in war or on the streets were so incompetently administered as to verge on criminality. Yet this does not mean that the probability of a reasonably successful outcome is below 50%. I suspect it is well above that. The hatred many of us have for the Administration should not be allowed to obscure the responsibility of observers to take careful and frequent readings of the course of events, and to adjust their judgments as new information comes in.

Today’s New York Times report on Guantanamo concludes that the mistreatment of prisoners there was (at least until this April) quite general and persistent. It assumes that much of the subsequent mistreatment in Afghanistan and Iraq was due, at least in part, to the habits developed and accepted at Guantanamo. An example of special treatment that their reporter repeatedly heard was the shackling of a prisoner to the floor while filling the room with extremely loud music and very bright strobe lights. This was combined with extremely high air conditioning for up to 14 hours.

Many confuse such treatment with the treatment of enemies on the battlefield where tensions are extreme and raw. But this is in a prison in which the power is completely in the hands of the guards and interrogators. There is little or no excuse for it. Experts do not believe that it leads to good intelligence not otherwise obtainable, particularly if, as was generally the case at Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib, the prisoners have little information to give.

Whatever administration is in power in the United States should take seriously the challenge such barbarity poses to the country, in the opinion of its citizens and the world community. The problem is one that transcends the military services and goes to the behavior of the whole corrections and intelligence community, whether in civilian life or in a so-called “time of war”. We cannot claim to be a defender of freedom and a purveyor of democracy while we are allowing people to act in this way at home and abroad.

I would propose a series of conferences on law enforcement and corrections that included the military services, intelligence agencies, and those responsible for these functions at state levels. We should review existing standards of behavior in these agencies, compare these with international standards, and consider the ways in which these are taught to people “on the front lines” in these agencies. If there are special conditions that require measures that go beyond this base line, these should be narrowly defined and the persons identified who can legally give orders to go beyond this line. Such exceptional treatment should be allowed only for named persons and only for specified periods. The conferences should develop high and relevant psychological standards for persons allowed onto the front lines of corrections and interrogation. The conference should consider methods of improving the existing professional cultures among those charged with interrogation and corrections responsibilities.

In addition to this, the United States needs to rethink its identification of persons it picks up in what it refers to as a “war on terrorism”. Most of the people we picked up in Afghanistan were actually members of the Taliban militia. As such, they deserved to be treated as prisoners of war, with a classification identical to that of persons picked up in the course of military operations in Iraq. There has been a much too quick and vague identification of persons as members of al-Qaida or as terrorist enemies of the United States. I agree that there is such a category. But it should be much smaller than we have made it in this instance. For those so categorized, the answer is to bring them back to the United States and try them for their crimes against the United States on a basis that accords with international rather than national standards. We must remember at all times that by our actions we are being judged by peoples everywhere, those well intentioned toward the United States and those not well intentioned. But we are never going to win the long-term struggle to maintain the reputation of states dedicated to freedom and democracy unless we accept the right of our audiences to judge our actions by their standards as well as ours.

Today’s paper discusses a British approach to fighting the insurgency that the American forces might profit from adopting. I say “might” because the British approach has not been 100% successful and the British in the South are in a largely Shi’a area in which the foreign intervention has been welcomed more than in the areas of or worst problems.

First, although they are working on setting up local councils, they are less intent on establishing democracy because they simply do not believe it will have much staying power. Second when the al-Sadr revolt reached them, their response was to hold their bases and outlast the mortar rounds. They killed many of the Mahdi Army in the process, but they launched no counterattacks and so spared the civilians. They make a deliberate effort to see the point of view of the local people, including the Mahdi Army. they try to avoid armor and even helmets as much as possible. They have developed a program to aid local businesses with small loans. The effort to involve the leaders even of hostile groups in these programs seems to have paid off — at least for now.

It is worth reading today’s discussion in the Week in Review of the difficulty of identifying the enemy in Iraq and the problem that this poses for the American command. An American general is quoted as calling this a “negative insurgency” because the groups involved are not offering the Iraqi people any tangible benefits. Unlike other insurgencies, the insurgents have not established a political wing with a communicable political program. Some observers reason that a major reason for their negativity is that the insurgents are loosely organized into many separate groups, often with quite different and even clashing objectives. In this situation, the leaders of these groups may believe that it is better for now to abjure definite positions beyond anti-Americanism. It is, after all, a simple message, and simple messages are those most likely to mobilize large numbers of people. One can only assume that if insurgent success were imminent, the many groups of which they are composed might then shift their attention to their so far suppressed political agendas.

This suggests that if anti-Americanism is the major glue that holds most of these groups together, if we left violence would simply shift its focus. To some degree, it would. However, for the Coalition troops to leave might not be enough to change the focus in the short term. For there would still be in place the Iraqi political and security structure headed by Allawi. Would this continue to be viewed as no more than an American puppet, with a consequent intensification of efforts to drive it from power? If so, we should realize that defeating such a puppet could take longer than many suppose. We must remember that the South Vietnamese government held the country together for a year against one of the largest armies in the world after the Americans left.

We also must remember that the Shi’a hierarchy, the major Shi’a parties, and the major Kurdish parties stand to gain from the success of the political process headed by Allawi. Right now the Shi’as and Allawi are having difficulties because some Shi’a see Allawi as attempting to reestablish a Baathist and secular government. Yet if the Americans left, Allawi and the Shi’a would be forced to come to an understanding to resist the Sunni Arab insurgency. They might even be able to get al-Sadr on their side in this event. After initial losses in the aftermath of an American withdrawal, this new “coalition” might be able to consolidate control over most of the country. One can assume that eventually the Kurds and the rest of the country will have a falling out. But I place this after the democratic process has moved to at least the constitution writing stage. How a subsequent Kurdish challenge plays out will depend on the degree to which the Kurds will want to continue to play a role economically and politically in Baghdad.

The news from Haiti this morning reports on the continuing sad story of inadequate and irresponsible government combined with inadequate foreign assistance. The drama is playing out among a people who have been suffering through countless years of inadequate nutrition, resource depletion, and an everlasting internal war of all against all. While we worry about the problems of Darfur, it is not clear that we should not be concentrating on those closer to home.

More generally, as we look around the world we note that Somalia has been without government for years, making it a haven for criminals and terrorists, local and international. A new Somali government has been established in Kenya across the border, but it is doubtful that it will be more successful than the last attempt of this kind to actually govern. In Palestine-Israel we see another running sore that the political institutions directly involved have proved manifestly unable to heal.

Along with the multiple problems of Sudan, these crises suggest once again the need for the resuscitation of something like the trusteeship system that was set up for former colonies after World War I. In the form that was adopted then (having one Western state responsible for each trusteeship) it was too much like another form of colonialism. If a new attempt were made today, it would have to be more broadly based. In any event the international community should establish on more than an ad hoc basis an international governance agency that can be called upon to take over and govern parts of the world that are either unable to govern themselves or unable to govern in a responsible manner. Once established, the agency would develop its own management and civil service structure that would be able to handle crisis and development problems anywhere in the world.

Such an agency would need to begin in desperate situations where a society is so broken that the local people and the international community would be likely to accept massive outside intervention. Only after the agency develops a track record in such situations, would it be asked to expand its activities into a wider variety of situations. The development process might begin with the Security Council granting the agency the rights and the resources necessary for governing Haiti for a period of ten years, to be extended as necessary. During this period the agency would establish comprehensive educational and medical services for all. It would establish an effective, modern police force, disarming all others. There would be no army under such a dispensation (compare Costa Rica). It would undertake economic development and land reclamation projects that would make possible a sustainable future. Since agriculture resources will never adequately support Haiti, other forms of economic development would also be undertaken. As national and municipal services and jobs begin to be provided, the international agency would develop a modest level of taxation so that Haitians would not come to see themselves as little more than the uninvolved recipients of an endless stream of foreign goods and services.

To work, a major international commitment of resources and attention must be made. Recent experience suggests that the international community, and especially its lead countries, will be reluctant to make the kind of commitment that the establishment of this agency would entail. Yet the case could be made that in the long run it is more costly to the international community to confront on an ad hoc basis repeated crises in situations such as Haiti than it would be to address them in a more organized and long-term manner.

The last week has brought more information confirming the basic direction of the Iraq insurgency and our chances to overcome it. On both sides, the battle seems more than ever to have settled down to be one between the government and the Americans, assisted by the Shi’a establishment and the Kurds on the one side, and the nationalists, Baathists, and Muslim extremists within the Sunni Arab population on the other.

The Shi’a establishment has long been pushing for the January vote. Now it is starting a campaign to get persons in all communities to vote in large numbers to ensure the legitimacy of the vote. Muqtada al-Sadr’s followers are continuing to hand over their heavier weapons (for a fee) and there is more and more talk of their leader joining the political process. Of course, terrorism continues and the American bombing and clearing operations continue, but these are more and more directed at the Sunni Arab community whose ostensible leaders seem unable to rein in the attacks. Current estimates are that about half of the Sunni Arabs would vote is they had a peaceful opportunity. But whether they will get this level of security by voting day in January is still unclear.

The picture is muddled by the fact that the Allawi government has interfered in the process of vetting former Baath party members to the extent that some Shi’a are saying that he is intent on establishing a new Baath government that will once again dominate the country. This is ominous since to do it he will have to short-circuit the election process and establish another authoritarian state. However, a more favorable view of what he is doing is that he is trying to improve his relation to the insurgent Sunni Arab community by bringing more of their real and potential leaders back into the mainstream.

Today’s paper includes a long op-ed arguing that the United States and the Iraqi government is making a mistake by continuing to try to isolate al-Sadr and Ahmad Chalabi. (It is a Chalabi commission whose function it was to carefully screen former Baathist officials that the government is now by-passing by adopting a faster inclusion process.) The writer points out that Chalabi has managed in a few months to transform his role from that of a leader of an exile organization heavily supported by the United States to a leader of a federation of Shi’a organizations whose members see him both as the man responsible for eliminating Saddam (whether he brought on the American attack with lies is immaterial to them) and the defender of populist Shi’as, such as al-Sadr, and an intermediary with al-Sistani and Iran (where he now has a home). The fact that the Americans and Allawi and many Sunni Arabs hate him is seen as a plus by his supporters. The op-ed writer argues that it is with this Chalabi, not the one who may have misused funds in Jordan and Iraq, or misled the Pentagon, that we must learn to cooperate if we are to be seen as an impartial and supportive party in bringing democracy to Iraq.

This is correct. The United States must get out of the habit of picking favorites and supporting them to the detriment of others if we are to play a positive role in democratization in Iraq or elsewhere. The faster we are able to overcome our prejudices and learn to see situations through local eyes the better.

The front page of today’s Times tells us that there is worry that most Sunni Arabs will not be willing to vote in the January election. Apparently several Sunni Arab political parties want to take part. But their members are too fearful of the insurgency in their area to allow themselves to be seen as supporting the election, standing for election, registering, or even voting. There is also reluctance to vote because of distrust and hatred of the Americans and the new system. But Sunni Arab leaders are quite aware that a boycott will not be to their sectarian advantage. The main issue seems to me to be simply fear, since most Sunni Arabs live in the high violence areas.

This same discussion reports that the Shi’as and Kurds, making up about 80% of the country are expected to vote in large numbers. This encouraging piece of information is combined with the fact that the agreement with the Mahdi Army in Sadr City seems to have held for at least two days. Today, the report is that in Sadr City the Mahdi Army is beginning to hand in its heavy weapons as promised in the agreement. Again there is talk of al-Sadr entering the political arena. These developments and estimates bring us back to the fundamental fact about the insurgency: it is overwhelmingly a reaction of the Sunni Arab population of the Sunni Triangle to the humiliation of having their leader and their system dispossessed. The promised move toward elections, a new constitution and finally parliamentary government will give the other majority sections of the population a weight in the society that they have never had before. As their leaders accept this fact, the insurgency should be even more confined to the triangle than it is today.

But what can be done for the Sunnis who want to vote? Some are said to be encouraged by the recent policy of suppressing the insurgency in Sunni Arab centers of resistance. But for each person encouraged another may be further enraged by the attacks, even more inclined to kill those of his neighbors who would cooperate. Ideally, there should be a formula by which 15% of the country could be temporarily left out of the voting, thereby satisfying the Ayatollah Sistani who demands an early vote and leaving the door open for the Sunni Arabs to come in later. Unfortunately, no one seems to be considering this option.

Today’s paper offers an Op-Ed with a careful look at the training of the new police force in Iraq. It points out that in spite of a great deal of advice, our government has consistently short-changed the effort. because of insufficient funds the final decision was to offer an eight-week training program for new police officers (compared to six months in the United States). This period is further shortened by the need to translate everything that is said into Arabic and then back into English. Even then only 8000 men have completed the course. Most of the new recruits were simply handed a badge. The advisory group sent to Iraq over a year ago to estimate needs suggested that the United States bring in 6000 international police advisors for a population of 25,000,000. Yet one year later, there are only 500 in the country.

The problem is compounded by the fact that the recruits start the training with no idea of how a modern police force should operate. What astounded the recruits most was the concept of “human rights”. In their experience, police are little more than a rag-tag gang of extortionists. ( For this reason, 32,000 of the old police have been “reprogrammed” to meet new requirements.) Another anomaly is that the police are trained for ordinary police duty American style (with, for example, seminars on domestic violence) and then sent out to guard the new government’s offices.

The seriousness of this failure is suggested by the fact that this police force will for many Iraqis be the new face of the government. Its first task should be to change the attitudes of people who see lack of security as the main failing of the new system. The country is beset by what is reported to be a very serious crime problem that goes far beyond that associated with the insurgency (especially revenge killings, kidnapping, and robbery). The force described by this reporter will do nothing to change the popular impression that the Americans and the new government have done nothing for the country.

One of the most discouraging reports I have seen lately comes from a New York Times reporter in Baghdad discussing the problems that reporters have of getting out and seeing what is going on. Most reporters have simply left. Those who remain go out very seldom and then to the few areas that seem relatively safe. Even then they are finding it increasingly difficult to get Iraqis to talk with them. Even those who they had formerly developed relations with now avoid being seen with an American. Until this trend of reporter access reverses, it will be hard for our optimism to brighten very much.

Another report discusses the problem of finding out just who Zarqawi is. Apparently it is not at all clear that he is or ever was a follower of Ussama bin Ladin. His objectives seem to be the same as bin Ladin, but his methods are quite different. Ussama would never be seen cutting off someone's head. Many doubt that Zarqawi was ever a backer or tool of Saddam. Another group of authorities are convinced that Zarqawi is actually a competitor of bin Ladin's. The two are thought to be competing for the same pool of "soldiers".

Friedman in today's Op-Ed makes a further a different attempt to approach the "enemy definition" problem. He points out that the Iraqi insurgency seems to be able to recruit an unending stream of people willing to become suicide bombers. He relates this to the development of extremist Islamic thinking, believing that the secular tendencies of the earlier Saddam regime had begun to change toward the end for tactical reasons and that now what we are facing is a revitalized and fanatical Islam. However, Friedman should be reminded that for many years the most successful recruiters for suicide missions were the Tamil Tigers of Sri Lanka, and they were not religious at all. Nationalism and hatred of "the other" can evidently produce enough fanaticism for suicide. Still, Friedman's broader concern is a good one. The Palestinian suicide bombers are different. They are better known, the names often being released, and their objectives are clearer. Their reasons seem to involve a strong mixture of religion and nationalism. In Iraq, who the bombers are is much more secret and their goals cloudier. It is encouraging to realize that unlike the Israeli-Palestine problem, which for Americans is unsolvable because of internal American politics, it should be possible over time to reduce nationalist reasons for taking part in suicide bombings in Iraq. When the Americans leave, the queue should shorten.

The election in Afghanistan seems to have been a resounding success. The promised attacks by the Taliban were few and far between. This would indicate that they are weaker than we would have thought and/or that the security forces (American, NATO, and Afghan) are more effective than observers would have expected. All this is promising. The opposition claims that they were cheated, that the ink did not work and so on. In nearly every “third-world” election I have been involved in these claims have been made. There is usually something in them, but not much. The counting will take a long time. If the combined opposition gets near to 50%, then the criticisms should be looked at carefully. But if not, probably not. One must understand that in a society such as the Afghan people generally do what they are told. Even if the election is ostensibly free and secret, voters will fear that they will be found out if they go against the local consensus. For most local leaders, on the other hand, power relations and the possibility of future favors reach back to Kabul and Karzai. He has the power now; he will probably have it in the future; it is safer to have one’s people vote for him. It is also true that most of the other candidates had a very difficult time getting known. Some voters evidently did not even know what Karzai looked, let alone any other candidate (they voted by picture as well as written name). One can assume that in Kabul itself the more educated and individualized population will have voted with more understanding.

Many Afghans appear to have voted for Karzai because of the relative peace they have enjoyed since he came to power. Beyond security, they see real improvement in a number of areas (education, transportation etc.) It is nothing like what they want and expect, but compared with what they had before they welcome it. This again leaves a positive feeling for what has been accomplished there — and contrasts rather dramatically with the reactions reported in Iraq to the Americans and the interim government.

As to the future, it is well to remember that in spite of repeated assurances in the papers that this was the first election in Afghanistan, there were earlier elections in the 1960s. Over two million voters participated in one; not too bad a turnout in a country with less than half its present population. That “democratic system” and its king (Zahir Shah, now back in Kabul in an anomalous role) were soon overthrown, leading to a spiral down into violence, local communism and then Soviet invasion. I also remember going to two elections in Zimbabwe. Both led to large turnouts. In the first the people overwhelmingly voted in an anti-insurgency leader. The second had an even larger turnout and voted in the insurgent leader, Mugabe, with an even larger majority. Over the next twenty years Mugabe succeeded in eroding democratic rights of all kinds to the point that it would be hard to imagine a fair election that would reverse the process. One Swallow does not make a spring.

The American Ambassador to Afghanistan, Zalmay Khalilzad, has a long an interesting career for such a young man. He is a Pashtun from Mazar-e-Sharif in Northern Afghanistan. After high school he studied at the American University in Beirut and then on to the University of Chicago. He began his academic career working with Zbigniew Brezezinski at Columbia. He then started working off and on in the State Department and the Rand Institute. He was a player in the government’s involvement in the Afghan resistance against the Soviets in the 1980s. Apparently his ideology became increasing military oriented and he became affiliated with neocons such as Wolfowitz. He began this President’s term in the National Security Council, but soon was a special representative concerned with Afghan affairs. Along the way he is said to have supported the idea of working more closely with the Taliban, perhaps because of his work for a pipeline company that was contemplating a route from Turkistan through Afghanistan to the Indian Ocean. After our later victory in Afghanistan, he oversaw putting together the conference of Afghan leaders in Berlin and later the Loya Jirga that appointed Karzai to lead the new government. As Ambassador he is extremely active. He is said to have been working to get other candidates to withdraw in favor of Karzai, and to be the main person responsible for the retirement of Ismael Khan as the governor of Herat. Many Afghans refer to him as their new Viceroy.

Having invited Khalilzad to a conference once, I remember him as a gracious, polite, and engaging person well suited to the kind of job he has now. Certainly, if he is a viceroy, he is a most Afghani viceroy (although in our brief acquaintance he wanted to be referred to as an American and not an Afghanistani). But what is not so good is the fact that as he throws his new weight around, it is the weight of the United States. It makes sense from the American point of view that he would want to get rid of Ismael Khan, a person known for his anti-American and anti-UN sympathies and his Iranian support. However, Ismael Khan was also known as one of the best liked and most courageous of the “warlords”. Herat was considered to be the best run and most reconstructed of the regional cities. Unfortunately, American troops were both directly and indirectly involved in his “retirement”. This does not seem in the long run to be the way to make friends for either Americans or the Karzai government. It would also appear that retiring governors that have been able to administer their areas with some effectiveness before there is an Afghan army and administrative corps that can take their place is a foolish undertaking.

Today’s paper lays out the outline of a new strategy for putting down the resistance. Apparently it all started with the actions at Tal Afar near the Syrian border. Then it moved to the clearing of Samarra. Now the action is in the Balil Province south of Baghdad. The plan is to bring the twenty or thirty most serious problem areas (towns or cities) under Iraqi-Coalition control before the elections in January. What they hope to do in the process, beyond the obvious, is to change who directs the action, to take the initiative away from the insurgents. They have developed a set of measurements to monitor the rate at which the Iraqi government is able to take over and control these problem areas.

The thinking is that this activity and this plan have been devised at least in part to counter the Kerry claim that Bush does not “have a plan” for Iraq. One hopes that the war is not being planned and fought on the basis of what will play best back home. Nevertheless, if it took Kerry to get things turned around a little, one should not complain. One particular problem that the new approach hopes to address is making possible the security of those Iraqis who want to cooperate with Allawi and the Americans. Because of the job situation, there have been many people seeking work, even under desperate conditions. But without security the well could dry up — the people could just stay home.

Meanwhile, the insurgent attacks go on, particularly in Baghdad. The latest attacks near and even within the “Green Zone” are apparently meant to prove to the citizens and the foreigners working in the country that there is and can be no “safe area”. Ayatollah Sistani wants the United Nations to take a larger part in the election process. Yet it is not going to do it as long as the security situation remains as it is, particularly in Baghdad. This leads one to wonder why the concentration in the new security effort is not on Baghdad itself, an area with about a fourth of the country’s population. If this city were as safe as say Kabul, the international community, investors, experts, and regular Iraqis would take heart and be a great deal more cooperative. One of the points often missed when Iraqis say “the Americans must leave” is that many Iraqis argue that the Americans have failed in their primary task, bringing security to Iraqis. As one articulate and well-educated Iraqi women told interviewers recently, “If they cannot do even this, let them leave and let us work out our problems among ourselves.”

It now appears that the insurgency in Iraq was actually planned before the war with some care by a division of Hussein’s intelligence service. Before the war started they had positioned weapons and munitions in hidden locations, in farms and so forth. At the beginning of the war Saddam told his people that if they held the Americans for a week he would carry on from there. His confidence was based on the idea that whatever happened, the Iraqis would never submit to an occupation force (there had been some evidence for this in Iraqi history). Apparently, Saddam was both confused and clever in his war preparations. he had convinced some of his officers and the Americans that if the attackers went beyond a certain line in their approach top Baghdad, that he would use chemical weapons. But he had also admitted to others before the war that he did not have any chemical weapons.

In any event, the insurgency has been surprisingly persistent and innovative. Although Saddam and the Baath had a plan, the insurgents actually represent at least four types of fighters. The first are simply the disaffected and the revenge seeking (“They killed my relative, I must get back at them”. ) The second is the Shi’a resistance, based on the idea of resisting the infidels OR on the idea of improving the position of a particular group of Shi’as after the Americans leave (Mahdi Army and al-Sadr). The third is the Jihadist or Mujahedin element, fighting the “crusaders” in the name of Islam. Some of these are outsiders such as Zarqawi, but remember the Ansar, routed in Kurdistan but settled elsewhere now, are extremist Kurds, not foreigners. Many Jihadists see themselves as linked to al-Qaida, at least spiritually. Whether there is more than that we do not know. They probably represent many groups large and small, with varying degrees of linkage to one another. Finally, there are the Saddam or Baath loyalists. Initially they had the most money and access to the most arms. They were certainly the best trained element. One can assume that they have tried to direct the effort. They may have coordinated their efforts to give the impression of a more united national movement. But actually, the insurgents are harder to defeat if they work separately, for with so many diverse groups the gathering of intelligence from captured individuals is much less fruitful than it would otherwise be. We think of this group as Sunni and most of their activity has been in the Sunni triangle (although one suspects they are also in Basra and other urban centers outside the triangle). We must remember that some Baath leaders were actually Shi’as, such as Allawi himself before he fell out with Saddam. These were secular people for whom sectarian allegiances were useful but not essential.

Kristof is on a campaign in the Times to bring the attention of the world to the serious oppression of women in Afghanistan, Pakistan and elsewhere. This is a serious problem, although my judgment and experience suggests that it is hardly confined to the Muslim world. (I found some of the most oppressed seeming women in Nepal.) However, the fact that Afghanistan has not turned quickly into an arena of freedom for women should surprise no one. King Amanullah tried to improve their lot in the twenties and he was ejected. Movement in this direction started again during the democratic opening in the 1960s. It was revived by the communists both before and after Soviet intervention. It is my suggestion that democratizing Afghanistan at this point has to be done without putting on the agenda a major change in the position of women. The position of women is already much better in Iran and across the border in the Soviet successor states. Many Afghans are aware of how women live in these countries and in the West. The more contact there is of East and West in Afghanistan, the more the position of women will improve.

Women tend to be relatively free in the Islamic world after or during the time of authoritarian, modernizing, westernizing leadership. It was Ataturk in Turkey and Reza Shah in Iran that made critical improvements in the position of women. In Iraq, women under the Baathist regime of Saddam Hussein achieved a degree of freedom rare in Arab countries. We can still see the remnants of modernized class in which this occurred in the better off parts of Baghdad and in the emigré community. But if and when true democracy is restored in Iraq, we will see the position of women decline once again — at least for a while. The task of western-sponsored democratization should be to lay the groundwork for popular rule, establish the principles of free media and free discussion. We should also help privately in the organization of women's groups, and should, of course, support female education at all ages. But we will defeat our purpose if we push too hard, if we seem intent on invalidating local customs, replacing their way of life with ours. Democracy should be seen as laying the basis for freedom, not an initial guarantor of freedom and equality for all. (Much the same should be our approach to economic reform. Democracy is a means by which a people can decide on what economic policies and forms they wish to have. It is not a precut formula that necessarily demands a particular economic system.)

Progress in the reconstruction of society, leave alone democratization, in Afghanistan suffers from the same indeterminacy as in Iraq. The primary difference is that both the Afghans and outside observers have more confidence that the Afghan leaders are calling most of the shots in Afghanistan than they do in Iraq. Most Afghans cannot view American an foreign forces as constituting an "occupation" in the same sense as Iraqis view our forces there to be an occupation. The fact that Kabul appears to be a much safer and more livable city today than Baghdad also gives a different complexion to the situation. However, it is still true that in much of the countryside the government is not in complete control, that the insurgency still has its safe areas and manages to infiltrate its operatives throughout the country. There is evidence that it has staying power. But evidently the government has staying power as well. Certain areas, such as the Uzbek fiefdom of General Dostum in the North, are out of control of Kabul, but are most unlikely to fall to the Taliban. These areas may be compared to the Kurdish areas of Iraq.

Judgments of success depend on who you believe and what seems important to you. If your measure is the extent to which women have gained freedom, the situation is not encouraging. In the major cities they are better off than they were. Certainly more girls are getting an education in much of the country than they did under the Taliban. But the extremely restrictive "tribal" way of life still dominates the countryside. The number of people who have registered to vote is astounding, and sometimes more than that (many people have managed to get several registration cards). But the hope for uncoerced voting in rural areas is fading. (Uncoerced voting generally comes at a later stage of democratic evolution in any event. We should never expect ideal Icelandic standards to a country such as Afghanistan.)

One of the best signs that the evolution of a stable system is proceeding is that the second presidential candidate, Yunis Qanooni, is attempting to get all the other opposition candidates to work together to force a runoff. It is also encouraging that while his message is anti-American and pro-Islamic, it is all very moderate. Essentially, his pitch is that the government has forgotten the Mojahedin, that it is labeling their leaders "warlords". His message "lets have more respect". Qanooni's movement has also been able to enlist support from a broad spectrum of ethnic groups, including the majority Pashtun (most of whom support their fellow ethnic Karzai).The moderation of both the government and the opposition bodes well for democracy and for American policy.

The attack on Samarra seems to have succeeded with very little loss (on our side anyhow). We are now engaged in a similar major clearing operation south of Baghdad in Balil Province. This reduction of enemy redoubts was supposed to be delayed for at least another month. But for some reason it has been speeded up. The suspicion is that in Samarra the defenders just faded away to fight another day. Some did I am sure. But the important question is whether the insurgents will be able to reconquer the city once the Americans leave. Perhaps there is a middle ground between “leave it to the Iraqis” and maintaining an American occupation that has not yet been found.

Oddly, at about the time that the latest attack was underway Prime Minister Allawi made a somber speech to Iraq’s National Assembly telling how bad the security situation actually was. He lamented the fact that the Iraqi security forces were not yet up to the challenge, being underequipped and undertrained. He added that they do not yet have the respect of the Iraqi people that they require. I guess that he thought it would be an error to paint the rosy picture at home that he did in Washington. After all, his audience experienced the violence on the streets every day.

The paper also reports statements by Paul Bremer, now safely back in the country and apparently anxious to argue that his failure to accomplish more in Iraq was due to the mistakes of the administration and not his mistakes. He claims, and it appears confirmed, that from the very first he argued for more troops, but that the administration insisted they had enough. The fact he is making this case now is not a hopeful sign for what he believes the situation is now.

Another Times report today focuses on the Japanese contingent, one of the coalition partners that are helping us according to the President. It seems that their contingent of 550 soldiers in the town of Samawa has not yet fired a shot. They were evidently put into the safest place that could be found to keep the folks back home happy. Meanwhile the local Iraqis are running out of patience. They had such inflated ideas of what the Japanese would do that the schools they did rehabilitate seem to count for nothing. The locals threaten that if the Japanese don’t do more they will turn against them.

In all this confusion of action and inaction, of ridiculous expectations and dashed hopes, the general impression is that no one knows what is really happening or will happen. On the one hand, the claim of looming and unavoidable disaster is overblown. But so is the claim that “we have it under control”. My hope remains that the size of the group that will benefit from the current attempt to establish “democracy” is so large that the insurgency will eventually fail. It seems likely that if the coalition forces left now, all hell would break lose. It also seems clear that the Iraqi replacement forces have a long way to go in spite of Allawi’s on again, off again bluster. Yet with every day we stay, the sense that we are simply an occupying force that does nothing for the country grows stronger.

Sunday’s paper brought yet another discussion of the intention of al-Sadr to renounce force, disarm his militia, endorse the election, and enter politics. Once again he has been making overtures on a number of fronts. Our friend Ahmad Chalabi is said to be encouraging the move. al-Sadr’s representative has been meeting with the Sunni Association of Muslim Scholars, Kurdish and Christian leaders. He wants to bring into his camp the smaller, disaffected, anti-American parties to form a new bloc. His conditions include the involvement of the United Nations and the absence of American or British interference in the elections. Supposedly, this initiative is again approved by Ayatollah Sistani. Many political leaders endorse the attempt, but are also skeptical.

Meanwhile, the Mahdi Army continues to operate effectively, at least in Baghdad. The degree of his control over the army has always been a question, although I suspect that this is a question that has been promoted by al-Sadr to improve his bargaining position. More serious may be the attitudes of the Mahdi Army individuals if asked to give up their weapons in an authenticate move. Reporters speaking to them on the street find they are as dedicated to killing Americans as ever. Even though they have lost untold numbers in Najaf and Baghdad in recent offensives, their morale appears to remain high.

It is very difficult for a challenger in a war situation to express simultaneously support for the troops and promote the idea that this was “the wrong war at the wrong time”. Bush is right about that. But Kerry must do both to win and he is right to do both.

It is in the area of developing a new strategy for Iraq that Kerry faces the most serious challenge. He is absolutely right that if one were going to fight this war, the war should have been better planned and the aftermath should have been better planned. This is both a matter of inadequate resources and inadequate planning for the use of those resources. But Kerry must be careful. He knows that he will not really know what to do until after his election (if it occurs) and he is able to sit down with the principals and see what is possible.

Kerry accuses Bush of having a policy of “more of the same” in Iraq. Yet if we look at the Kerry plans, outlined here, we find that they too are made up of items that could be labeled “more of the same”. He is going to: * Internationalize, because others must share the burden; * Train Iraqis, because they must be responsible for their own security; * Move forward with reconstruction because that's an important way to stop the spread of terror; and * Help Iraqis achieve a viable government, because it is up to them to run their own country.

All of these items are, of course, what Bush claims to be doing. But under these headings Kerry does spell out some new directions or at least emphases that would help. Probably the most useful (found under several headings) is the shifting of more of the development process at small and major levels, in gas fields and in election preparations, to a broader set of international actors as well as to the Iraqis themselves. There has been too much reliance on Americans, particularly in the major oil and construction projects. It is also interesting to note that while Kerry has had his doubts about making the democratic transformation of Iraq (or other states) a major aspect of American policy, in his Iraq program he suggests strengthening the democracy program by such actions as increased protection of the voting process, more training in civil society and the operation of political parties, and more support for judicial training.

On September 29 the NY Times published one of the most informative pieces on the Iraq war yet. The article was written around an incident map compiled by a private security company working in Iraq. They report that in the last 30 days there have been 2300 attacks, which is about average for this period of time. The point of the piece emphasized by the Times is that the insurgency is everywhere.

Yet studying the map rebuts this assumption and leads to very different conclusions. The number of incidents in the three southwestern provinces are 1, 2, and 7 respectively. For the provinces east of that, the figures are 1 and 6. Beyond that, on the Iranian border, they are 12 and 13. In the three Kurdish provinces in the northeast the figures are 1, 4, and 1. So out of the 18 provinces in the country 10 are essentially quiet. At the other extreme we have Baghdad with 997, Anbar (Falluja) with 332 and six others with 325, 283, 83, 123, 87, and 76 respectively. This certainly refutes Dr. Allawi’s recent claim in Washington that “14 to 15 of the provinces are completely safe”.

An overlay map of where the Sunni Arabs live shows that nearly all the incidents have been in Sunni Arab majority areas: Shi’a areas are remarkably free. The only Shi’a area with significant incidents is Basra with 87, and I believe there is a considerable Sunni Arab population there. It should be noted that in the Najaf and Karbala, areas where there has been heavy fighting recently, there were very few violent incidents in September. The kind of war that we had in Najaf is not a war against terrorists. It is essentially conventional and much easier to fight and win in a meaningful sense.

So the Coalition and the Interim Government are fighting the Sunni Arabs and not the Shi’a. As I have said many times, this fits the rational assumptions about why Iraqis might fight to fight “the invader”. The Sunni Arabs are the ones who will be left out in the cold in a democracy — or feel they will. The map also suggests that the Iranians are not playing a major role in anything that is going on. The map is remarkably free of incidents near the Iranian border, which, incidentally, is where the Shi’a and the Kurds live.

David Brooks gives a reasoned argument in Tuesday’s paper for the Administration’s thesis (supported in other days by many academics) that elections (as a road to democracy) are the best solution for terrorism. His example is the election of Napoleon Duarte in El Salvador in the 1980s. There is no doubt that this did play a part in moving social conflict in the state from the jungle to the election booth. Brook’s message is that as soon as we bring democracy, the “insurgency buster” to Iraq and Afghanistan, there will be an end to violence and insurgency.

There are several reasons to doubt the analogy. First, El Salvador, like all Latin American countries had been working on making democracy work since the 1820s. The people were used to elections, parties, and freedom of expression. The fact that these features of their systems were often set aside by recurrent times of trouble and dictatorships does not vitiate this experience. So when the elections were held in the 1980s, most Salvadorans were ready for them in a sense that Iraqis are not. Second, although they have had much less experience with democracy than Latin Americans, the peoples surrounding Iraq and Afghanistan have had brief episodes of democracy. The Syrians and Iranians have both had short bouts with democracy. Afghanistan had a democratic opening in the 1920s and more serious experience with democracy in the 1960s. Pakistan has been an off and on again democracy since its creation. Unfortunately, violence and repression followed these experiments. Third, we should also remember the experience in Yugoslavia. For forty years Tito ruled the many peoples of the land with an iron hand. When this was removed, the successor states all intended and tried to be democracies. But except for relatively homogeneous Slovenia, the result was a bloodletting that has still not worked itself completely out. Several successor states remain relatively peaceful only with the help of the international community.

In Post-USSR and post-colonial lands, the institutions of democracy were established and elections held immediately after the attainment of independence. Yet the end result for most of the “successor states” was dictatorship in a new form, this time covered with the fig leaf of democratic forms. India, and Caribbean Islands largely escaped this experience, and today in some of these states democracy is having a rebirth. But the record hardly suggests that elections are a sovereign solution for violence in emerging societies.

Yes, elections might help to calm things down, especially in Afghanistan. But they could also be no more than a starting point for a new cycle of violence, an experience only too common in the modern world.

There is a growing feeling that we are trapped in a cycle of violence in Iraq. Today, let us see some arguments on both sides of this judgment. On the one side are experts such as Juan Cole who continues to report in greater detail than the media the litany of deaths and destruction. By his estimate the level of violence has been steadily rising since June. He apologizes today for having reported too large a safe area previously (see our earlier posting). He now thinks only the three Kurdish provinces are relatively safe. On Sunday, Maureen Dowd led yet another Times Op-Ed charge against the mendacity or delusion of an administration that cannot admit such an obvious fact.

On the other side, I read a fabulous Times account in Monday’s paper by a reporter who accompanied a truck convoy from Kuwait to Baghdad. He reports that at any one time there are about 700 large trucks hauling goods in Iraq. The drivers include many Americans as well as Pakistanis, Bangladeshis, Somalis and others. They realize it is dangerous, but continue for the money and apparently the thrill and camaraderie “of the road”. The trucks largely move in large convoys, with accompanying humvees. Yet the impression is that they are very lightly protected. The long line of closely packed fuel trucks pictured in the article must present an enticing target for terrorists with rockets (Cole reports a recent attack on just such a line). Nearly all the drivers have had their trucks attacked at one time or another. But the trucks are getting through both for the military and the civilian economy. As far as the extent to which the violence is concentrated, the general consensus of the drivers was that danger increased with every mile from Kuwait to Baghdad. The reporter’s convoy stopped for a while before making a night run into the city.

This made me stop and think a little. The willingness of these drivers to take these risks suggests that there is more of a chance than we might think. If we imagine that a truck is stopped or highjacked every week, that is only 52 a year out of 700 plus large carriers. When we think of the civilian deaths at the hand of terrorists, we must remember this is a country of 26 million. I suspect that if we did the calculation, the danger for Israeli and Palestinian civilians over the last several years has probably been a good deal greater than for Iraqi civilians once the early stages of the war were behind them. I saw a report the other day on homicides dealt with in Baghdad hospitals. The doctors said that they were mostly domestic homicides, often revenge killings or other killings for honor.

I am not willing to go the Administration route and put on rose-colored glasses. But it is well to remember once again that the media do report what happens, not what does not happen. This can give a warped view. (For example, killings in American schools have been going down for many years; this would never be understood through watching or reading the media.)

Noah Feldman, a noted authority on the current situation in Iraq, writes in Friday’s Op-Ed that elections in Iraq would be worse than useless if they take place without the Sunni Triangle’s full participation. His argument is several fold.

Feldman regards Sistani’s latest demand that the elections be held in January and that the government parties abandon the single list approach to be actually a bargaining ploy to strengthen the hand of his supporters in making election arrangements. Sistani believes that instead of the 55% Shi’a population that the list is being based on the real number is more like 70%. He wants the list to be based on 70%. Feldman points out that the January election is important because those elected will rewrite the constitution. Sistani intervenes because he wants the Shi’as to dominate that process. Turning to the Sunni, Feldman notes that they are used to running the country. They are also clearly able at this juncture to mount an effective insurgency. Were they to be left out of the election process, they would turn decisively against the democracy project and persist as an uncontrollable population in the heart of the country. Therefore, unifying the country will require both the suppression of the insurgency, proving the insurgents cannot win and “the carrot” of being offered an effective role in the political process. He believes this offer will be enough to get the Sunni clerics who have told their followers to sit out the election to change their minds. He realizes this will take some time, but believes it would be a disaster to not postpone the election until such time as the Sunnis are ready.

Whether Feldman is right or wrong depends in large part on what the country really looks like. If as Allawi and the American Administration claim, there are really only three provinces where elections could not be held today, that is one thing. But there is considerable dispute over where control is adequate and where it is not. Juan Cole’s position is that the elections now could only be held in only nine provinces: the three Kurdish provinces, Baghdad, and five provinces in the south (including Karbala and Basra). Cole’s position on Baghdad is unclear because he says that Allawi included Baghdad in the three no-goes where elections could still not be held, and Cole certainly is aware of lack of control in much of Baghdad. Perhaps Cole’s map where he shows Baghdad white is simply a mistake. One thing to remember is that out of a population of about 25 million, 6 million live in the Baghdad region. So if that is in the pacified area, great, but if it remains out in the cold as Allawi and others say now (and as I would guess from the news), then it is hard to see how a “national election” could be out.

Perhaps the greatest objection to the Feldman approach is that it is unclear why the Sunnis would ever “come in out of the cold”. They will lose control no matter how the constitution is written, if it is at all democratic. Moreover, for whatever reasons, they hate Americans and those who cooperate with them. This unfortunate hatred cannot be wished away. The longer the war goes on in the Sunni Triangle, the more Sunnis are killed, and the more individual Sunnis come to feel the need for revenge against the Americans and their allies. I do not see how “suppression” under these conditions will produce a country ready for a democratic vote.

Today’s paper reports that the Ayatollah Sistani is again expressing his concerns about the planned elections. He seems to have two fears. First, he objects to the fact that the major political parties, all groups that had an existence outside the country during Saddam’s day (but not only outside), are meeting together to decide on a common ticket that will be presented to the people without offering the chance for others, particularly local leaders, to run effectively for office. Their argument is that this will mean a more unified country after the elections. His argument is that it will mean a less legitimate process. Second, he is worried that all the talk about security being too poor for the elections to occur is just a pretext to put them off. He thinks they should go ahead where there is enough peace, and that means most of the country in his view. (This is a view I share.)

One never knows why the Ayatollah injects himself into the process in this way. But leaving aside the obviously important “real concerns”, he probably also feels a need to counter the thought that al-Sadr is the only Shi’a leader that stands up for the masses. He wants to show that he is there for them, that he will not allow the shenanigans of the foreigners and the Sunnis to deny the Shi’a masses their right to rule Iraq.

Regardless of his reasoning, one can draw a positive conclusion from his statements (as usual cloudily expressed through a representative). This is that he is taking the process seriously. He still wants, as he has said in the past, for a legitimate vote to take place. He still believes it can. He wants to have a Shi’a run Iraq and believes that if the present process is carried through on schedule, this will result. He is suspicious, or wants to show that he is suspicious, of the Allawi government and the Americans. But if he holds their feet to the fire, all will be well. (He must see more bright lights than many commentators do.)

Wouldn’t it be nice to have an old-fashioned war where we could judge success or lack of success by the movement of front lines? Iraq and Afghanistan, indeed the whole so-called “War on Terrorism”, confuses everyone, even those who do not have a pre-determined wish to see events turn out poorly or well.

President Bush tells the United Nations that we are building democracy in Iraq, never mind a few stumbles along the way. Prime Minister Allawi assures us that what we are seeing in Iraq is the last gasp of the insurgents, made desperate by their inability to derail progress toward democracy. Meantime the killing goes on in Iraq. I am particularly discouraged by the thought that for many Iraqis the issue is not so much deciding on which side would be best for the country but rather the inescapable rules of revenge. With every person killed in Iraq, no matter whether we were the direct killers or not, there is likely to be group of persons united by family or other ties that feel that they are duty bound to exact revenge on the Americans (or other foreigners, they are not always that discriminating). I am not sure we can get over this hurdle. Yet Allawi’s words also remind me of the Tet Offensive in Vietnam. Many observers saw that as a defeat for the communists (their losses were tremendous, they failed to hold any cities — they never had any Fallujas). Yet it was at this point that many Americans decided they had had enough. There may or may not be any moral in this.

Afghanistan looks a little better. Today’s NYT Op-Ed page had two pieces. One said that bad planning and unwillingness to put adequate forces and resources into the country has resulted in a smoldering disaster. The presidential election in going ahead in spite of a lack of control over much of the country. The economy has come to depend largely on the opium crop. Yet even this critic sees some positive gains, particularly in the education of girls and the number registering to vote. The other piece paints a much more optimistic view of what is happening, what we have come to know as a Bush-eye view. I believe that one of the best parts of the Afghan situation, one that ironically may be due to the fact we have not invested very much in the effort, is that Hamid Karzai and the Kabul government is taken much more seriously than Allawi’s government in Iraq. Hatred of the foreigner does not seem to be the most salient fact in the violence in much of the country. This is due, in another part, to the fact that the structure of the country was not torn apart by an invasion as it was in Iraq. The old ethnic and tribal groups, often led by what we call “warlords” were never driven out. They either never left or easily returned (as did Karzai). In fact, some of their units played a major role in bringing down the Taliban. The Karzai government also benefits from its authentication by the Grand Assembly or loya jirga that was carefully planned out of the country and then convened with comprehensive participation within the country. Along with the involvement of the former King, this gave Karzai a credibility that similar efforts carried through in the more hostile redoubts of Baghdad simply did not obtain. Would that it would have been possible to approach Iraq in the same fashion.

If we are to escape from the trap recent policies have led us into, we must take urgent and dramatic steps to reestablish our credibility and thereby reestablish our leadership. Only then can we pursue the essential goals of any American administration: the protection of American interests at home and abroad and progress toward the achievement of a better life for all people.

At a minimum, the following steps are necessary:

1. Make careful and judicious use of our resources. This means avoiding spending beyond our means except in clearly exceptional times. In military terms, it means undertaking actions only when we have clear objectives and when we can apply overwhelming force. It means ending actions only after our objectives have been attained. Following this path, we will reduce casualties on all sides and preserve the ability of the country to respond in a timely fashion to other crises as they arise.

2. Establish and maintain friendly working relationships with all responsible governments, even those with which we have important policy differences. In the case of Iraq specifically, this means working with the governments of all adjoining states to help contain the movement of supplies to the insurgents and to assist in the development of the country. In the case of Russia, it means avoiding unnecessary criticisms of their internal policies and offering assistance in their struggle against terrorism and ethnic unrest. It also means taking a more even-handed approach to Russia’s relations with its former socialist republics.

3. Play a more supportive and cooperative part in international organizations or conferences, whether the subject be environmental policy, trade policy, nuclear proliferation, or international courts. We must be seen as playing a positive rather than disruptive role in creating a new international order, as well as in the creation of new regional organizations or systems.

4. Work for the extension of freedom (democracy and human rights) in the world through peaceful means. We can do this through offering democratic assistance to countries that ask for it. Many countries desire our assistance in improving their security, judicial, or electoral systems - or in the building of a civil society. We should remain a haven for exiles working for freedom in countries still without freedom. We should publicize our impression of the degree to which the performance of some states falls below international standards. Official condemnations of the behavior of other governments should, however, only be made in exceptional circumstances. Finally, we should support freedom through our example, through inviting people throughout the world to become acquainted with the better aspects of our way of life. We should, of course, be sure to continue working on improving the level of freedom and democracy in the United States.

5. Assist in the creation and maintenance of chains of nonaggression agreements throughout the world. We might, for example, help to create and ensure a nonaggression agreement running from Lebanon and Turkey to India and Bangladesh. This would include specific guarantees to the countries involved that we will not threaten them and will come to their assistance if threatened, thereby strengthening their ability to develop nonthreatening relations with the countries around them.

6. Strive to develop along with other existing nuclear weapon powers a more responsible and equitable nuclear nonproliferation program. As it is, rising states with nuclear ambitions have no reason not to use the same logic that we do in imagining that nuclear weapons makes a country invulnerable through deterrence. We can say little that is convincing to the Iranians as long as we have allowed Israel, Pakistan, and India to possess these weapons and as long as we show little sign of actually dismantling the overwhelming nuclear deterrent capacity that we maintain. In the end, an effective nonproliferation program will be one in which all nuclear weapon countries move together toward a radical reduction in their stockpiles and radical change in their nuclear weapon doctrines. It is past time that the United States take a lead in an effort to develop such a program.

With an approach along these lines, we will begin to look more like a leader than a bully, and we may find it easier to induce other states and peoples to help us extricate ourselves from those projects in which we have floundered.

Yesterday’s paper bought us the news that “the cause of regime change in Iran is expected to be revived if President Bush is reelected.” It reports that Rick Santorum of Pennsylvania has submitted a bill that would give congressional support to “regime change” in Iran. The report suggests that the first step administration conservatives contemplate would be to try to start a revolution. But I imagine that when that doesn't work, perhaps the “imminent threat” of Iran developing a nuclear weapon (such as Pakistan, India, and Israel already have) will be enough to launch another invasion.

The idea of invading Iran is foolish on many counts. First, Iran is a much larger country than Iraq and its people are much more united. Second, while it is to some degree a theocracy, Iran is also to some extent a democracy. Iran’s media are controlled to an extent, but also remarkably vibrant. Iran’s women are in chadors, but light years ahead of much of the Middle East in the extent to which they participate in public life. Both through the efforts of the shah and the clergy, the country is now quite well educated, with millions of Iranians ready and willing to participate in the modern world.

Yes, we should support greater freedom in Iran and work with the world to contain its nuclear ambitions (which are supported by many Iranian liberals as well as conservatives), but no one should contemplate the United States plunging Iran into the kind of turmoil we see in Iraq because Washington has policy disputes with Tehran.

Let us understand the Iraq War at its most idealistic. Most liberals who supported the war never believed that America was in imminent danger if we did not "take out Saddam" in March of 2003. It is true that they believed there were more WMDs in Iraq than we actually found. They feared, and especially the military feared, that chemical and biological weapons would be used against American forces. However, they still felt we should invade Iraq to get rid of one of the world's most oppressive and bloody tyrants. They also believed that if we did invade we would be able to reconstruct Iraq as a democratic country. After all, in Iraq we were not dealing with a country sunk under the weight of illiteracy and poverty, but rather with one of the more developed and modern states in the developing world.

Fern Holland, grew up in poverty in a small Oklahoma town , but from an early age was able to achieve high grades in school at the same time as she helped those less fortunate than she. Wherever she went and whatever she did, she did it in an American "can do" spirit. She obtained a law degree, but even before it was obtained, she had embarked on a worldwide effort to make the world a better place. She helped dying children in Russia and assisted in a squatter camp in South Africa; she joined the Peace Corps and was off to Namibia. She moved to Washington and quickly became involved in the legal problems of African women and children. She tried to set up an African Institute for Democracy. When Iraq came along, she decided that she wanted to be a part of the democratization effort. In Iraq, Shi'a women told her of the struggle against Saddam and the thousands who had died after the Gulf War because of the betrayal of the Americans. She became convinced that whatever the flaws in the reasons for the war, these graves were a sufficient reason. She went to work for the American representative of the Provisional Authority in a province south of Baghdad. They worked together on setting up Human Rights Centers and soon she was focusing on democracy education and liberating Iraqi women. The Provisional Authority didn't seem to have very clear ideas of what to do, so she just went ahead, setting up provincial women's centers.

She developed many friends, men and women, who gladly worked with her. Sometimes she worked with an idealistic former marine who had come back after his tour of duty to help the Iraqis. But along the way in the local bazaars, she also came to be seen as a threat to men of authority and local customs. Rumors spread that she was handing out pornography, was conducting abortions, or was a Jewish spy. On one occasion, she took women to Washington so they might better understand the United States. Bremer and colleagues were impressed. They flew in occasionally to see her projects and heaped praise on her work. But on March 9, on the way back from one of her projects, a jeep pulled alongside her car and killed Fern and the Marine at close range with AK-47s. They were the first civilian employees of the Provisional Authority to be killed in Iraq.

Since then, security in much of the country has crumbled; there are now fewer Ferns in the field; the women who worked with her have mostly given up on the movement; her women's centers are largely abandoned.

There are many reasons that Iraqis have for hating Americans: some are crazy, some are reasonable. But two reasons are most important. First, like many peoples in the world Iraqis simply do not understand the impetus to help others that moved Fern. Many loved or respected her. But too many could not help feeling that she must have ulterior motives, that she wanted to destroy their culture, to make them all Christians, to lay the basis for a permanent occupation, or to gain personally in some as yet unfathomable manner. For them, she was "too good to be true". Second, "nobody asked you". That is, they did not feel that anyone had a right to come into their country and try to impose their beliefs and practices on it, no matter how ideal these might seem in theory.

What can we learn? We should learn that the more intense our effort to transform a society, the more resistance will be encountered. This should teach us that if we are going to go out to a people with organizers and educators whose mission is to fundamentally change their way of life. then we must also have a large number of people in the field willing and able to protect those agents of change that we employ to carry out such a policy. It was foolish to have people like Fern out in the field day after day without protection. (I think we know that now, but I believe we have very few Ferns still in the field.)

We should also learn to moderate our aspirations and goals as we attempt to instill democracy. We need to remember that the relatively open and egalitarian society we have today evolved over centuries from a society with beliefs and attitudes not too different from those in modern Iraq. We must remember that even after a civil war, Americans in the South continued to treat African Americans as inferiors for a hundred years in spite of the efforts of northern educators, some of whom lived and worked in the South. Often they fought back violently against the idea of equality. Only after several generations of racists had come and gone and after communications North and South had greatly increased, was there a widespread acceptance of equality in the South. Why then should we expect the men of Iraq to suddenly accept the idea that women have the same rights as they do? People in countries such as Iraq are often ready to adopt the forms of Western democracies along with some of the reality. But we are not likely to be able to force down their throats the latest ideas of a liberalized West.

Sunday’s NYT Week in Review offers through two maps and accompanying discussions why Russia faces extreme difficulty in holding the country together at the same time as it is expected to adhere to those international human rights standards, particularly self-determination, that the advanced world has adopted. This material can be see by going to herel (at least this week. Later I suppose they can be found by going to nytimes.com and looking for archived pages under the titles Map: Russia’s Ethnic Jigsaw Puzzle, and Map: Piecing Together the Caucasus). The discussion accompanying the maps points out that more than half of Russia consists of ethnic republics and autonomous regions (this is, of course, after all the old SSRs were subtracted from the state). Many of these political units now have majority Russian populations. Yet many do not, and the complexity of holding them all together is daunting. The map of the Caucasus shows an overlapping of peoples and borders, international and otherwise, that make the complexities of the Balkans look relatively trivial. Today’s NYT points out that many of these groups hate and despise one another, often more so than they do their Russian overlords. It is expected, for example, that 40 days after the Beslan tragedy there will be another tragedy when Ossetians take revenge on nearby Ingush (even though the Chechens were probably the real sponsors).

All this should be remembered when we too easily criticize the Russian for trying to hold on to Chechnya, in part because their independence would enflame their neighbors. We should also more easily sympathize with Putin and his people when they propose or accept changes in the system that would give greater power to the center and reduce the power of local political leaders. We may not like it, but Russians do crave stability above other goods in the political arena — and perhaps with good reason.

In Sunday’s paper we read that the Administration plans to make a major military effort to take control of Falluja, Ramadi, Baquba, and Samarra toward the end of the year. The reason cited for delay is that they want Iraqi forces to spearhead the drive and these forces will not be adequately trained or equipped before then. In today’s paper we read that the effort to train the Iraqis has been lagging. The reason given is that, among other things, “only 230 of the nearly 600 military personnel required by the headquarters have been assigned. . .” Authorities say that “It takes time to build these new organizations. . .” One commentator notes that there doesn't seem to have been much urgency about the effort.

Let us think for a moment. We invaded the country on March 19, 2003. The war was “over” in about a month. Soon after that we announced the dissolution of the Iraqi army. Being told by many military experts before the war that the forces we were planning to use for the invasion were not adequate to police the country, are we to believe that it did not occur to the Administration that we would need a substantial new Iraqi army to take over security tasks after we left? Yet here we are in September, 2004 and we are told that the headquarters for the effort is not yet half manned! Not quite right. There was an earlier Iraqi security force put together by some other part of our occupation structure. When it collapsed in battle, we were told that these forces had not been sufficiently trained and that they had not been provided with enough weapons or body protection. Apparently, the “lagging program” that we are talking about now is a new training program that replaces rather than develops the failed earlier program.

Was our Administration this incompetent, or are we simply seeing the development of excuses for not taking back out of control areas until later. Could it be that the real reason for the United States delaying its offensive is not lack of a poorly staffed training headquarters but a desire to avoid American casualties in Iraq in the weeks before the election?

We can conclude that the Administration is either impossibly incompetent or crassly playing politics with its war. Meanwhile, Americans and Iraqis die every day.

Front page news today is a report on what is purported to be the gist of a National Intelligence Estimate prepared for the White House in July. The White House appears to have ignored it, for the Estimate paints a pessimistic picture of Iraq that is described as consisting of three pessimistic scenarios. The most positive scenario is that a democratic system is established after a long and difficult process, accompanied by a great deal of violence. The most pessimistic is that the country will lapse into civil war. What readers of this blog will find interesting is that this intelligence estimate strangely echoes the report by the Royal Institute of International Affairs (see blog for September 3) that also lays out three pessimistic scenarios, with the most pessimistic civil war etc. Was the CIA reading the work of the Royal Institute or do great minds simply think alike?

The news from Iraq seems now to be steadily worsening, especially for the Iraqis and their infrastructure. Neither the new Iraqi security services nor the Coalition forces seem to be able to prevent an escalation of daily tragedies. The pipeline system is in tatters, the power grid is easily taken down. Often the Americans come in with high firepower to and achieve yet another pyrrhic victory. More Iraqis are killed or wounded. Some times the civilians believe that the Americans were the real attackers; some times we or the Iraqi government are accused instead of not doing enough to protect the people. Clearly we are not doing enough. Clearly we do not have the forces to do enough. Clearly the Iraqi defense forces are not well enough trained or led to make enough difference.

Meanwhile back in Washington the administration appears to live in a magical world in which saying “democracy” creates “democracy”, and saying “we are winning” is the same as winning. I hope the administration is simply playing this word game until it gets reelected. On the other hand, I hate the thought that the Iraqi insurgents may be the only group that can actually defeat Bush. If this is their objective, they are certainly making a good run at it.

The United States is engaged in a struggle for the extension of freedom in the world at the same time as it tries to rally the responsible states of the world against the threat of al-Qaida. This requires a delicate balancing act, one that appears to be misunderstood in Washington. The first requirement of a free world is respect for basic human rights, not the adoption or maintenance of a political system similar to our own. From this perspective, the Op-Ed by Paul Wolfowitz in today’s paper criticizing the imprisonment of a journalist in Indonesia is praiseworthy. We should stand up for freedom in this context. On the other hand, recent remarks by American leaders about the need for Russia to grant independence to Chechnya or more recently the remarks of Powell, Kerry and other American politicians criticizing Putin’s proposals to change certain aspects of the Russian governmental system are not helpful. Yes, Putin wants to create a more centralized system. But Russia has often been highly centralized. At this juncture what Putin wants to do may be necessary for the health of the state. It ill becomes highly placed Americans who appear to have little concept of how Russia is or should be governed to denounce the suggested changes.

If American leaders want to criticize aspects of Russia’s human rights record, fine. Just as we should accept the criticisms of others of our human rights record. But within very broad limits, their government structure is largely their business, just as the political structure of much more repressive China is the business of the Chinese — and the 2000 voting results in Florida was our business. If American academics want to criticize Putin’s announced changes in order to show solidarity with Russian liberals, fine. But for the foreseeable future we will need to work with the leaders of Russia. What sounds too much like Cold War sniping erodes the basis for future cooperation, whether in intelligence on al-Qaida, in support for adventures such as that in Iraq, or in reaching agreement on economic or environmental issues.

I have recently been looking back over a book that I enjoyed in the past: Theodore H. Van Laue, The World Revolution of Westernization (1987). It is a review of the history of the last few centuries from the standpoint of the effect of Western Civilization on the rest of the world. One of the author’s most interesting theses is the idea that all peoples and cultures and religions try to expand over as much of the world as possible. From this standpoint, he argues that Western imperialism was inevitable. It helped millions and hurt millions. But once it got going no one, neither the imperialists nor those they conquered, could resist it.

His second thesis is that ideological movements such as Fascism and Communism and Maoism and third-world nationalisms of all kinds were essentially reactions against this all-consuming “revolution”.

What makes Van Laue’s work germane to our discussion is the evidence that he brings forth that the greatest harm that this revolution did to the rest of the world was to humiliate its peoples. The Chinese even celebrated a “day of humiliation”. He points out that the United Nations and the humanitarian efforts of the West are seen by other peoples as all part of the process of devaluing their abilities and contributions. They are ashamed of their poverty and ineffectiveness and poor leadership, but still do not appreciate saviors from the West that would save them from all this. The United States has been particularly enamored of its role in the world as the leader of the West, and has gone beyond this to see its version of Western Civilization as inevitably superior, its democracy the goal of all peoples. In the long run, the Americans may be right. They may only want to help, to bring freedom to enslaved peoples, but too many of these peoples inevitably see this as condescending, devaluing their traditions. This is the essential reason that the cheering in Iraq was so short-lived — and for many never began.

Under his pen the many isms that have bedeviled the world in this century come to be seen as part of the same reactive phenomenon. In the face of the onslaught, a small number in many countries essentially became Westerners, wherever they might live. Small in numbers, these often play a large role in emigré communities (and were the majority of the people the government talked with before the invasion of Iraq). (In some countries such as India this group may become so large and powerful that it can continue to play a major role in the evolving society.) A larger group consist of persons who live their lives caught between the new world opened up by the West and the traditional world with which they still identify. Many of these develop or gravitate to doctrines that mix their own tradition with the imported or imposed tradition. They tend, for example, to accept the ideas of material progress and equality. But they also see the need for rapid change, to “catch up” so that their people can hold up their heads again. Their impatience leads them to understand “democracy” in a Rousseauian sense of the “General Will”, discovered in their case by a vanguard class that will unite and lead the society in spite of itself. A “true democracy” is defined as a society in which the people are expected to unanimously acclaim a savior that will lead them out of the wilderness. In this “democracy”, political rights and civil liberties as we understand them have little place. People in this group can take this position because the third group in their societies, the great “mass” (which is often a maze of people with local traditions without a concept of a national community or freedom as we understand it) are without the knowledge, experience, or organization that would make possible resistance to the “new order”, whether explained in terms of Nazism, Maoism, Stalinism, Nasserism, or Baathism.

Van Laue’s treatment helps to explain why two groups so different in apparent ideology, the Baath and the Jihadist Muslims, can cooperate together on the task of “expelling the foreigner”, or perhaps in another sense, simply “taking down the Americans a notch”. The more they seem to succeed, even temporarily, the more they can see themselves as defenders of the honor of the Iraqi people. One could only wish our government planners of the Iraq invasion had spent a little time with this book.

Everyday life continues to go on for a remarkable number of people in Iraq. Today’s paper tells about the government’s distribution of food packets to everyone on the country, a process that has been going on with little or no interruption since 1991. At a cost of about $3.5 billion a year, the bureaucracy manages to continue this practice even in the most war torn areas, such as Falluja. The insurgents no doubt get their packets along with everyone else. Wealthier folk may sell what they do not need, but they are would also resist any attempt to stop the practice. Western economists chafe at the continuation of a practice that promotes continuing dependency and also reduces the motivation for local suppliers, including farmers, to increase production (because following pre-invasion practice, most of the food is imported). The government knows that it is in a bind, but it also knows that its support would be eroded even further were it to tinker with the practice.

Yesterday we read a newspaper account of the continuing desire of many Iraqi merchants to operate in the Iraq market. They often have their shipments stopped or stolen. But as one said, if it is just ordinary highwaymen, they can be bought off with a small sum. If the attackers are extremists, on the other hand, that is more complicated. It means going through the tribal chiefs and requires a larger payment. There was another account of a clothes dealer who was just about to make his annual trip to Italy to purchase the latest fashions for the Iraq market. Many of these people have lost family members, some have had to ransom relatives, some have sent their families to Syria. But they carry on. Apparently property values in downtown Baghdad rose rapidly after the invasion. They have cooled off somewhat now, but are still above pre-attack levels.

An ABC report the other night on the vulnerability of American trains to terrorists reminded me once again of the missed opportunities for enhancing American security that have been occasioned by the ill-timed and ill-planned invasion of Iraq. ABC found that an explosive package could easily be placed in an upper bin on a train car and stay there without being noticed for hundreds of miles (for example, from New York to D.C.) No one was sent down the aisles during the course of most journeys across the country to even make a cursory search for such packages. The train administrator and others interviewed said "they simply did not have enough resources to do more".

Let us then do a little back of the envelope calculation. We have had and have about 140,000 military in Iraq. Let us imagine a situation without Iraq where government resources had instead been focused on homeland security and defeating al-Qaida. I would imagine that we would still have dispatched and kept a considerable force in the Persian Gulf, say 20,000. I think we would place in Afghanistan about 40,000 of this number (in addition to the sometimes 20,000 we have there now). Such a force would have a much better chance of capturing Osama and his chief lieutenants. It could better protect development projects throughout the country, and reduce the fears of voters in upcoming elections.

This leaves 80,000. Let us first set aside a fast reaction force of 20,000 for international emergencies as these come to be identified by the United Nations. This might include providing forces in Haitian crises or now perhaps in Darfur. Having such a force to help in international projects when needed would improve the global reputation of the United States, thereby improving access to intelligence developed by others. Then we might retrain and redeploy the remaining 60,000 for internal protection. This would allow us to greatly augment investigative forces on docks for baggage checking and at critical entry points into the United States. To return to our previous example, we could assign two men or women to major Amtrak or commuter trains, to make occasional walks up and down the aisles looking for anything suspicious. If we assume that half of the 60,000 could be assigned at any one time to such duty, this would mean that 15,000 trains that are now unprotected in any way could be covered in this manner every day. (This overkill. There are only 1400 amtrak and commuter trains in the Northeast running on any weekday.) This might not be the best way to use such a home security force. But the reader can easily see how it might reduce the pleas that no more can be done for protection because of "insufficient resources".

The tragedy in the Caucasus has caused a great deal of discussion of Russia’s role in Chechnya. Putin has tried to say it is simply "international terrorism" as a means of identifying his cause with ours. U. S. Government officials have apparently said that perhaps an accommodation with Chechnya should be made. An Op-Ed by Daniel Pipes carries this a step further saying the problem would be solved by granting independence to Chechnya, a people the Russians have not treated too kindly in the past. (It occurred to me that we should tell the Israelis that their problems might also cease were they to grant the Palestinians what they want!) Today another Op-Ed says the opposite, that is that Putin has tried hard to reach an accommodation short of independence and that for him independence is not an option. My opinion is that we should not unnecessarily make enemies in Russia by using our cold war animosities as a crutch for reducing Moscow's power still further.

This is all part of a difficult and many-sided discussion that will not end soon. The questions are: "What is terrorism", "What is international terrorism?" and "What is the proper or most useful relationship of the United States to terrorisms of different kinds?"

It is clear that as a nation we have one clear terrorist enemy, an enemy that we can loosely label "al-Qaida". It is not a unified, closely integrated movement. It plays a hand in the insurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq, in the terrorism in Indonesia and Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, as well as most of terrorist events in Europe and Russia. Al-Qaida is not, in my judgment, a major player in the Israel-Palestine conflict. Neither is it the only or even a major player in the insurgencies in Chechnya. But in this and other cases we can see that terrorists and insurgents are being assisted by and copying methods associated with al-Qaida. My position is that in so far as al-Qaida is involved, we should assist any country affected by their activities, whether or not we agree entirely with the politics involved. One reason is to improve our intelligence and knowledge base for our struggle against our primary "terrorist" enemy. On the other hand, where this link is not clear, we should not automatically be supportive just because someone has labeled the violence "terrorism".

Partly with Israeli urging, many is Washington want to emphasis the "terrorist" activity of the Iranians, directly and through Hezbollah, a sometimes violent political grouping headquartered in Lebanon. But directly or indirectly, Iran's terrorism has not been transferred in any major way to the United States and Europe, although there was apparently some actions against Israelis in Argentina. In Iraq and Afghanistan Iran has played a hand in assisting military and political groupings (in fact they aided us in the early stages of our latest Afghanistan adventure). They may be sending in weapons to Iraq, probably to the Mahdi Army, but I have seen little proof. In fact I saw a reference that they were actually assisting a variety of Shi'a groups, as a means of maintaining support for the future. In my mind this hardly makes them a terrorist state.

Today for the first time, Rumsfeld and company admitted that things were not all they should be in Iraq. They are worried about not meeting the political timetable. This was strongly reinforced by a segment of the Lehrer show in which two military authorities (retired generals) discussed what is happening. They were both very negative. They do not see the new Iraqi forces being able to do anything any time soon. They note that a number of cities are out of control and they do not see how they will be brought under control in time for the elections. They noted the steady increase in attacks on Americans and the destruction of pipelines. They noted the improvement in both the arms and the tactics of the insurgents. These men (and other experts, I am summarizing from both news and TV here) did not feel that there was widespread cooperation between Shi’a and Sunni, but they did say that many now see Baathist seculars and the religious extremists cooperating in their attacks on Americans. One sign of this is that the extremists have pulled away from the imposition of Taliban-style Islamic rules in the cities under insurgent control (apparently to satisfy the Baathists).

The experts were asked what is to be done. Their answer was essentially that there was nothing to be done. We could do marginal things, but the implication was that the flow of events was against us. They agreed that the enemy for too many Iraqis has become the existence of American forces in their country. They did not see any change in the situation unless these forces left. Yet they also implied that if they left, “our Iraqis” could not handle the situation on their own.

This suggests that we are back in April 2004 where the name of the game again becomes finding an exit strategy. I suggest the reader review the posts during that period, particularly here. Of course, I overreacted then. Maybe I have again.

If there is a way out, it would seem to me to be a concentration on our strengths. We still have a significant portion of modernized Iraqis in Baghdad and other cities wanting to see the Interim Government and the Americans succeed. We still have the Kurds in the north. Most of the Shiites in the south are potentially on our side. They really do not want to cede the country to the Sunnis and Muqtada. Given this situation, two steps must be taken now. First, enlist the active help of the Kurdish forces outside their homeland. Second, arm the anti-Sadrist Shiite militias that existed in embryonic form formerly in the south. Given leadership and weapons and confidence they might turn the tide in the areas in which Shiites are in the majority, especially outside Baghdad. The great Shi’a divines do not want to see their chance for a successful Shiite state dribble away. But right now they and their followers do not have the confidence or weapons to act effectively. This approach must be buttressed by an American promise to stay only until (some benchmark here), thereby removing the accusation of treason that can be hurled against anyone who helps the Americans as long as they stay.

The fatalities count for American and coalition forces for August was again up. It was up to 2.42 a day on average. To give some perspective on this, the figure is considerably more than June and July, about the same as May, but still much less than the two high points of fatalities during the occupation (last November and April). However, during the first 7 days of September, the average was up to 3.29, a figure that will be raised by today’s loss of at least five more soldiers. This should be understood in the context of several other statistical observations (rather than facts). It is reported, for example, on tonight’s news and in today’s paper that the number of attacks on Americans has increased dramatically in recent weeks. Since these seem to have resulted in a relatively low increase in fatalities, apparently the military has adopted at least safer strategies if not more effective. It also appears that Iraqi losses have been very heavy in recent weeks. First and foremost these are losses among the insurgents. The Mahdi Army has lost heavily. This attrition has started up again in Sadr City where after a lull of several days major attacks were made on American forces. Losses are also frequently heavy in the government’s security forces. Losses must also be heavy among “neutral” civilians, particularly in those areas such as Falluja where the Americans are bombing heavily rather than trying to retake urban areas. I am sure these attacks sometimes kill many insurgents, and the Americans feel they must do something in these areas. But such attacks in urban areas unavoidably kill civilians.

The Administration still talks as though they do not understand what is going on. I hope they have reports that support their conclusions. What I look forward is new evidence that the Interim Government is increasing its presence and control beyond the narrow confines patrolled by Coalition forces. The decimation of its leadership continues. They almost got the Governor of Baghdad today. The hoped for calming down of the Mahdi Army has obviously collapsed once again in Baghdad. Once again there is dancing in the streets at the deaths of Americans. We may not have to face an unraveling of our position just yet if ever, but some day we may have to, and I hope for the sake of both Iraqis and Americans that there is more to our leaving than cut and run. Unfortunately, we are now in an election season in which any admission that things are not going well seems to be unthinkable, thereby creating a dreamworld in which wishing for democracy is the same as creating democracy.

A great deal of nonsense is written about bargaining with terrorists. Cheney tells us as so many do that there is no point in bargaining — "just kill them". In Iraq we have seen that bargaining is sometimes fruitful, sometimes not. The question, of course, is not the value of bargaining with an abstraction like terrorism or a generic class of people called "terrorists". We must be more specific. Before making too many generalizations we need to ask about which class of terrorists we are dealing with. Clearly in some cases bargaining with terrorists is not fruitful; also clearly in some cases, not bargaining with terrorists is equally unfruitful. Israel has had many years to bypass "bargaining" with its terrorists by "just killing them". It doesn't seem to work very well because there are too many Palestinians.

As a first cut at the problem, we must distinguish from all other terrorist groups those small cells, such as the "Red Brigades", that can actually be eliminated or reduced to ineffectiveness by police or military action. Groups that are based on a widespread disaffection within a population, such as that of Palestine, Chechnya, Iraq, or Ulster cannot in any simple sense be eliminated by force, except perhaps by actions bordering on a holocaust. Toughness in these situations can be counterproductive, can manufacture new terrorists as fast as they are eliminated. The people of a disaffected area (and this seldom means all or even most of the population of the area) may be remarkably resilient under pressure. The people who caused the recent Beslan school tragedy in the Caucasus apparently intended to be killed. No matter how tough the Russians might have been they could not have convinced these people. Very often, as we have seen, an accommodation occurs. This has happened in Algeria, in the Basque area of Spain, and in Ulster. The accommodation often does not end the story. Many remain dissatisfied. But it helps the society to carry on more peacefully than before. Even if the central government loses some of its values, as in Algeria, it is a useful way to cut its losses.

This suggests that in many situations the issue is not whether one can bargain with the terrorists but rather whether there is a terrorist support and recruiting community that can be affected by actions that a government can take. For example, al-Qaida exists against a background of consistent (from their perspective at least) American support of Israel in Palestine and of support by the United States of dictatorial regimes whose leaders live most unislamic lives (such as those of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Emirates). If we were perceived to change these policies, over time the community of Muslims willing to support al-Qaida would wither. People now in al-Qaida might remain as fanatic as ever, but the level of recruitment and the funds available would decline. If a democratic government with minimal American influence were established in Iraq, then the support community would also decline. If we played a more positive role in the development and education of the Pakistani people, this would also reduce the number of people that became involved in terrorism.

To take an even more indirect tact, if we were able to help in the development of Muslim countries, so that their young people had greater hope for success in their lives, then the pool of potential terrorists would decline. All of these effects would be hard to trace and would occur over many years, but this does not affect the likelihood that they would "work".

Turning to more immediate, face-to-face, situations, we must again note differences. The Mahdi Army is an army of Shiites whose stated goal is the expulsion of Americans from Iraq. However, their goals are also more complicated. They include the increase of the power of their leader and increase of the power of the Shi'a in Iraq. Negotiators could (and I expect have) show them how these goals might be attained by easier means than blowing up people — and this might be done at the same time that American and Iraqi forces have shown them how hard success through arms alone will be. Many of the tribal and Sunni religious leaders can similarly be bargained with. However, terrorists who will only be satisfied by an extremist religious revolution in Iraq (a growing group) or an extremist nationalist revolution (probably a declining group) have goals so far from ours that there is little to bargain strategically about, although tactically in a situation such as Falluja we can of course bargain. For extremists the goal is to bring down the whole recovery enterprise by engendering as much violence and confusion as possible. But even here, by showing in the field that this goal is ultimately hopeless, we can dry up support and recruitment. This is not what is usually called "bargaining", but perhaps it should be included in the discussion.

As was reported in an earlier posting, the theologian who has given a green light in the past to Muqtada was the Ayatollah al-Haeri, now resident in Qom, Iran. Apparently this is new news only to me. For the last year al-Haeri has been distancing himself from al-Sadr. He has stripped al-Sadr of his position as his representative in Iraq and announced that he did not support the idea of the Mahdi Army in the first place. This is quite important since Muqtada does not have the theological credentials for leadership in the Shi’a world and had been relying on al-Haeri to provide them. One of the reasons for al-Haeri’s change of heart was a message earlier from al-Sistani and his group telling al-Haeri that holes in the Najaf shrine roof had come from the guns of the Mahdi Army. During the Saddam years al-Haeri escaped from Iraq and published a book giving the case for armed resistance. His office no longer gives out the book, saying that since Hussein is gone the book is irrelevant. Al-Haeri remains an advocate of Iranian-style theocracy, something rejected by most mainline theologians in Iraq, but he apparently feels his objectives can now be attained through the political process.

Bob Herbert reports in today’s paper the statement of John McCain that our troops are likely to remain in Iraq for 10 to 20 years. Yet, sadly, no one else is telling the people the truth. He backs up his case by pointing to a “Briefing Paper” just released by the Royal Institute of International Affairs. (Click here to look at the study). Let us briefly summarize the three scenarios the Paper suggests.

(1) The “fragmentation scenario” which it considers the “default scenario”. The assumption is that the Shi’a, Sunni, and Kurdish elements of the population will work against one another’s interests to such an extent that the nation will slowly dissolve before the present political process comes to fruition. In this scenario opposition to American forces continues and grows, but not in a way that unites the disparate factions. The Kurds are scared of losing independence; the Sunnis are afraid of being overrun, the Shi’as are afraid that there is a Sunni-Baathist plot that will not allow their promised control of the country to be realized.

(2) The “Holding Together” scenario. Enough people will choose to work together to make it possible to establish a government on the projected model. This will occur only if the interim government and the Americans work effectively to block the fragmentation scenario.

(3) The “Regional Remake” scenario. The way I understand it, this could occur during or after the playing out of either of the first two. The Paper then goes on to detail the ways in which Iraq might become a fulcrum for re-forming the Middle East. If the Kurds end up essentially autonomous, his will reverberate through Iran, Turkey, and Syria. This may incite the Turks to invade, ostensibly to help their Turkoman relations in the Kirkuk area, but actually to block the spread of Kurdish nationalism by suppressing any quasi-independent Kurdistan. (However, elsewhere the Paper suggests that Turkey might be willing to accept an independent Kurdistan within Iraq if the alternative seemed to be a revived Shi’a or Sunni world pressing on its borders, as described below.) In this scenario, Najaf becomes the focus of a suddenly expansionist Shi’a world, in which the Shi’as of eastern Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Lebanon and elsewhere change the directions of their loyalties. One interesting aspect of this scenario is that the Shi’a Ulema of Iran might fear a world in which Iranians could change the direction of their loyalties to the theologically higher ranked Najaf clergy. This might undermine the present Iranian regime, based as it is on a politically activist Shi’a doctrine that Sistani rejects. On the other hand, the Sunnis in the triangle in this scenario become the focus of an extremist salafist Islam that shakes the present boundaries of Sunnite states such as Saudi Arabia.

The Paper’s more general thesis is that Iraq threatens to fly apart. Even with the most careful military and diplomatic efforts, the best the Interim Government and the United States can hope for is a fragile state in which the parts are only held together with continuing difficulty. The Paper implies that there is a good chance the result will be much worse. However, Herbert’s belief that the Paper calls “full-fledged democracy” in Iraq “beyond belief” is not supported by the Briefing Paper. Of course, it will not be perfect Swiss or Icelandic democracy. Brazil and India, Taiwan and Argentina are also not that “full-fledged”. Countering pessimism about democracy is the strange fact that something like a European model of democracy might become the least common denominator for the groups that would participate in the “holding together” scenario. Personally, I think we should be happy enough if we could leave behind something like Putin’s Russia with a Kurdish Albania or Montenegro.

But let us return again to McCain and his ten to twenty years. Given these scenarios, with the least common denominator for the participants in all of them a desire to get the Americans out—except for the Kurds for whom we might end up a permanent protector (they wish!)—it seems to me McCain’s time schedule is a counsel of despair. If things do begin dragging out as he suggests, then some American President is going to simply take the troops out. Or if he does not, then he will be remaking America into a truly Imperialist state such as the American people are unlikely to understand or support. We might leave a small mission in there as a fire break for the Kurds, but beyond that I do not see a long mission.

The Mujahedin-e-Khalq is a left-over Iranian leftist organization with a most chequered history. In the 1960s and 70s, the Mujahedin staged several small terrorist attacks within Iran. When the Shah was expelled from Iran, many observers imagined that the end of the Shah would mean a leftish Iran (we feared a communist). Certainly most of the middle class opposed to the Shah also thought so. However, soon, even the liberals were on the run and theocracy was established. The Mujahedin-e-Khalq were the last group to go under completely, after one last blood-letting in 1981 that left many of Khomeini’s men dead or injured. The remnants of the organization ended up, along with many real liberals, in the West, lobbying Americans, even Congress, for support against Tehran. Over the course of the next twenty years, two things happened. First, they evolved into a rather cultist organization that looked to its female leader as a kind of goddess (the leading “brother” and leading “sister” married in grand ceremony, but she seemed to come out on top). Second, their activity came to be centered on a military wing supplied and supported by Saddam in Iraq. Toward the end of the Iran-Iraq War they were armed by Saddam and sent into battle. They later helped Saddam put down the Shi’a and Kurdish revolts after the first Gulf War. This record probably destroyed most of the lingering support of Iranians outside their own ranks, but helped them with some Americans who wanted to be sure that Iran was held in check.

Nevertheless, when after the war the United States came to listing groups throughout the world as terrorist, the Mujahedin ended up on the list. They did, in fact, continue to sporadically engage in terrorist activities in Iran and around the world (especially against Iranian missions). Whether they should be listed as a terrorist organization has, however, remained a contentious issue, even within Congress. But they stayed on the list. So at the beginning of the latest Iraq war we bombed their camps and our intention was to arrest them. However, apparently because they appeared to have some possible value to us in the future, we made an agreement to simply disarm them, leaving them in their camps.

Now we would like the Iranian government to turn over a number of top al-Qaida people that they hold. Iran says “Fine, as long as you give us the Mujahedin leaders” (I do not know how many they want.) Here there is a standoff. There is a group within the United States government, the neocons, which Juan Cole says are closely connected to the Israeli lobby, that wants to maintain the Mujahedin as a threat to Iran, and as a possible source of support in some future invasion or sponsored revolution. (If this is the reason, it seems foolish, because I suspect they would discredit any revolution or invasion more than they would help.) So far, this group has successfully argued against handing them over. This also points to the obvious: ours is not a “war on terror” as much as a “war on whomever it seems in our interest right now to label a terrorist”.

Although it seems foolish to not take the opportunity to get our hands on the al-Qaida leaders just because we are reluctant to hand over Mujahedin who are ideologically as far from us as Tehran, there is a dilemma here for any government attempting to stick to principles (either out of moral scruples or a desire for a better reputation). Should we be seen as handing over a group with whom we have worked out a deal to live in Iraq to a government that might well execute them for crimes against the state? Whatever else they may be, the Mujahedin are certainly now in the class “political refugees”, the kind of people that we often admit into the United States because of the danger they would be killed if they went home. Whether we will be able to protect them when and if a new Iraqi government gets around to considering their case remains unclear.

One of the best discussions of what is possible and what is not in the fight against terrorism is found in a book review of the 9/11 report by Richard Posner in last Sunday's NYT. He thinks it is surprisingly well written, with "riveting" narratives. However, he finds the analysis less than impressive and the recommendations largely mistaken. Indeed, he thinks the fact that the report emphasizes its recommendations vitiates the whole enterprise, for the analysis in a report so focused on recommendations is inevitably going to be recast to support the recommendations. "Combining an investigation of the attacks with proposals for preventing future attacks is the same mistake as combining intelligence with policy. The way a problem is described is bound to influence the choice of how to solve it". (I think he got the last sentence backwards, but never mind it goes both ways.)

His main propositions are that (1) there is little reason to believe that we could have prevented 9/11 with a better intelligence system, and (2) There is certainly little reason to believe that combining all intelligence agencies into one would help anything. In fact, he thinks it will lead to herd thinking that makes dissenters even more likely to be ignored than is true today. He believes that the desire for unanimity of Republicans and Democrats drove the Commission to end up blaming everyone in both administrations. It was forced to blame both Clinton and Bush administrations equally (an especially good point).

He sees nothing in the Report supporting the conclusion that 9/11 could have been prevented if we had had a better system. No intelligence system would have been able to put the bits and pieces of information together in time to prevent the attack, although it is easy enough to see how this might be done in retrospect. He argues that no novel attack of this type can ever be prevented. We are always protecting ourselves against the last attack and it cannot be otherwise. "No terrorist had hijacked an American commercial aircraft anywhere in the world since 1986." He points out that both the Clinton and Bush administrations had considered and to some degree acted on a variety of ways to control bin Ladin. In fact by the time the Bush people came in, "bin Ladin fatigue" had set in. He does not blame the Bush people, because he finds it only natural that a new administration should not adopt the same priorities in any area as the previous.

Posner points to a short list of actions that we could take to improve our defenses against Jihadist groups. They include better evacuation plans for major buildings, the more careful inspection of the papers of Muslims entering the country, more careful screening of airline passengers and baggage, stronger cockpit doors, ground control overrides for controlling airliners in emergencies, elimination go legal barriers to sharing information between the FBI and CIA, more training in relevant languages, and reassignment of federal agents assigned to the war on drugs to some aspect of the war on terrorism.

He also argues by implication that the FBI should be taken off the case. It is institutionally simply unable to operate against this kind of threat. It is a police department working for arrests and prosecutions and this culture appears unlikely to change. Information sharing within the FBI is at least as bad as that between agencies. Its antiquated equipment and the independence of its offices work against what is needed for the counterterrorist enterprise. He concludes that we need either to appoint a tough new manager that would really be able to change the way the Bureau operates or create a new agency analogous to the British Secret Service (MI5). The British MI5 and MI6 seem to work well together, have the same culture, and neither is involved in arrests. In any event, we clearly need an effective domestic intelligence agency.

Posner is particularly incensed by the argument that the reason the bits and pieces of intelligence were not put together in a timely fashion was that there was no one person in charge. There is simply too much information for any single or interconnected data base arrangement to handle it. There will always be some information that will not be shared for quite legitimate reasons. Because information is power, there will always be some hoarding of information within subunits no matter how centralized the system is in theory. In his view, efforts to centralize will lengthen the time that information takes to get to the President and will reduce the number of alternatives that he is presented with. He sees the "National Intelligence Director in continuous conflict with the Attorney General, the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the National Security Advisor."

Posner is an opponent of proposals for centralization throughout his critique. One more arrow is shot at the idea that the paramilitary operations of the CIA should be folded into the Department of Defense. He thinks that the CIA has a more flexible structure and can do things that the DoD cannot. We now have multiple forces in addition to the CIA's Special Activities Division. They are all useful, giving administrations more flexibility in confronting crises.

The author frequently returns to the proposition that even if all the right steps are taken, we will only reduce slightly the probability of another 9/11 type event. The Report does not demonstrate that the system did not respond well before 9/11. The problem was in the nature of the threat, not the system it confronted.

As the campaign season grinds along we are treated to the spectacle of the leadership of two warring political parties fixated on slogans and postures rather than positions and choices. It was alarming enough that John Kerry and his handlers chose to make their convention message one of military experience and leadership (based on Vietnam!) and that the Republicans responded with an all-too-successful campaign to smear his Vietnam record. Most recently, it was alarming that after George W was caught making an all-too-true admission that a war against terrorism cannot really be won, Edwards could not resist mounting a platform to say that unlike Bush, he and Kerry planned to "win the war on terrorism". Bush's handlers quickly tried to repair the "damage" by saying that he had been misunderstood. I can only thank the stars that for one golden moment Bush told the truth. (Of course, a better truth would be to abandon the "war on terrorism" phrase.)

David Brooks, my favorite Conservative (his smile and unpredictability I guess) writes in a long piece in the NYT magazine that the Republicans must get back to their conservative roots and give up pandering to the crowd. Among other points, he suggests that in the third world the first goal of assistance should not be the institution of a new capitalist order or (by implication) a new democratic order. Our first goal should rather be the establishment and securing of law and order, because without these nothing else works. This does return us to a legitimate and truly conservative doctrine. In a more doctrinaire mode, Pat Buchanan has a full page add in Section A of the NYT pushing his new book "Where the Right Went Wrong". He decries the invasion of Iraq, a country not threatening us. He sees the invasion as igniting a war of civilizations that we certainly did not need. Of course he also accuses Bush of a reckless fiscal record and the gutting of our economy through a false doctrine of free trade. It is certainly true that the attempt to reform the world (by force or otherwise) and to spend money we do not have has historically been associated with liberals rather than conservatives. But, of course, these are voices in the wilderness.

Kerry and his handlers have failed to offer anything more than "not Bush". I like "not Bush", but it is evidently not enough for the swing voter. In particular, Kerry has offered us very little to go on in regard to the wars in Iraq or Afghanistan or the so-called war against terror. It is mostly "me too" and "I'll do more than George W." It seems he will get our allies more involved, that he will spend more on training Iraqi forces. These are all moves the administration is already taking. He wants to bring our troops home as soon as we can. (I would imagine that Bush could go along with that.) Looking back he has made the error of saying he would have endorsed the invasion even if he knew that there were no WMD. So his position comes down to little more than: "I would have implemented the Bush policy more effectively than Bush did." That does not have much of a ring to it.

What the American public should hear is something like the following:

(1) The United States made an error in attacking Iraq when it did and for the reasons stated at the time. While the United States should reserve the right to make a preemptive attack, this option should be reserved exclusively for situations in which an attack on the United States is judged to be imminent on the basis of a variety of trustworthy intelligence sources. Only in such situations would we have the right to short-circuit the process of building international consensus necessary for any international policy's long-term success.

(2) Except in the direst of emergencies, the United States should never commit its forces to the field of battle without careful planning for the campaign and for its aftermath. In any major endeavor the country's leaders should make it clear that the undertaking will be costly and that military forces and foreign assistance will need to be increased for the duration. To that end, a full and reasonable budget should be established and taxes increased to meet the increased national obligations. Such a "war tax" should be acknowledged as the unavoidable duty of all Americans; paying it is the least that civilians can do to help the effort.

(3) In the present situation, after taking office in the beginning of next year, I, John Kerry, will strive to reduce significantly the tax cuts that have been foolishly instituted and maintained during this war. I will increase the defense budget pursuant to an increase in the size of our military budget and will increase foreign assistance to the governments of the countries directly involved in the struggle against Islamic extremism, particularly Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. I will, in consultation with the government of Iraq, develop a plan for the reduction of American troops in Iraq, looking toward the earliest possible ending of the occupation. We will also strive to increase the participation of NATO and other foreign troops and police in longer-term peacekeeping in Iraq. In Afghanistan we will stand ready to take similar measures. However, should the Government of Afghanistan desire it, we should be prepared to increase significantly the number of troops we have in the country, particularly for the purpose of sharply reducing the activities of the Taliban and eliminating the remnants of al-Qaida. Our material assistance to Pakistan should be economic, educational, and military, with a particular goal increasing Pakistan's contribution to the elimination of al-Qaida. (Portions of this paragraph are based on general statements John Kerry has already made.)

In my recent discussion of the situation of Ismail Khan in Herat, I spoke too soon. It seems that the recent attacks on Ismail Khan's in Herat have come from Amanullah Khan a Pashtun leader who controls an area nearby. Although Kabul sent in national and American forces to assist Ismail Khan, Amanullah's attacks may have actually been encouraged by a government minister as the beginning of a campaign to get rid of Ismail. Kabul is said to be fearing a general breakdown of order in the area because Ismail Khan's control is slipping. Apparently his problem is also that he is too anti-American. Both Khans may end up as permanent guests in Kabul and be rewarded with positions in the new government when it is formed (an old Afghan way of dealing with troublesome Khans). I do not see why the Kabul government would prefer a Pashtun tribal leader over a Tajik leader like Ismail. After all, the base of the Taliban has always been the Pashtuns.

Meanwhile, back in Kabul as the elections near, explosions and assassinations have become more common. The Taliban vows to block the elections, and suggests that they have slipped many supporters into Kabul to increase the violence. It would seem to me that the national army has enough to do in Kabul and in engaging the Taliban without worrying about order in the West. All this danger is, of course, another cost of going into Iraq before we had really brought the country under the control of Kabul (or at least established a peaceful order of some kind) and effectively reduced the sway of the Taliban (and al-Qaida) everywhere. Remember that after the first defeat of the Taliban, Karzai pleaded with the Americans and the West to bring in more troops to stabilize the situation. We should have accepted this request with alacrity. But we did not. Now we do not have the forces to make a difference.

Today's paper suggests once again that there are really two quite dissimilar Iraqs. What the Americans do to assist the government in the one may do little to solve the problems of the other.

The first is the larger part of the country in which the "Coalition forces" and the government seem to be able to govern and operate with some effectiveness most of the time. This includes most of the Shi'a areas, the Kurdish area, and most of Baghdad (at least outside Sadr City). This is the area that made possible the recent "elections". I note in the NYT letter column recently that a Kurdish representative highly praised this process, so presumably they are on board (at least for now). The peace agreement, however doubtful, in Najaf has for the moment removed a great burden from the shoulders of the government and the Americans. No longer do the Americans risk being involved in the destruction of the most holy of Shiite shrines. If Sadr removes his troops from Najaf (which he seems to have done) and Kufa (part of the agreement, but we are not sure), it will be a victory for the government. If he still maintains his forces in Sadr City and elsewhere, it will be unfortunate. Yet the events of the past few days show that he can be talked to. He certainly does not have the Shiites uniformly behind him. Again we must remember that for the recent Conference 1100 (the Kurds says 1300) delegates from all over the country were able to convene in Baghdad for a few days (and therefore get in and out of the city and the meeting hall). It was a heavily protected area, but still it happened.

Unfortunately in a large part of the Sunni triangle, in Falluja, Ramadi and elsewhere (mostly in what is called Anbar Province) the Jihadists seem to have won out, driving out both former Baathist leaders or killing them, and doing the same to government appointees (in so far as these were not the same). Executions have become a regular event, often videotaped. The Governor's sons were kidnapped in Ramadi and the Governor was made to confess on video that he had been a traitor to Islam. The so-called Falluja Brigade that was supposed to secure order in Falluja has disintegrated. The situation is so bad that a new governor of Anbar has not been appointed. The leader in Falluja is supposedly a Sunni divine named Janabi, but the hand of Zarqawi seems to be behind much of it. From the government perspective, the only potentially bright side is that these fanatics are also devoted anti-Shiites.

Allawi and the Americans continue to temporize, protecting in this area little more than their stationed forces. Right now they are relying on Janabi's promise to the area's sheikhs not to make more attacks on the Americans. In addition, the Americans are concentrating on reducing the movement of people into and out of the area, particularly to Baghdad. I do not, incidentally, see how supplies could still be coming in from Jordan unless these fanatics are open to a good deal of bribery themselves. (One must never be sure that the reporters of this situation have not overshot the mark a little in trying to make Americans understand the situation is not as Rumsfeld paints it.)

What to do? Because of the lack of sufficient men and materiel, the Coalition and the government simply cannot control the whole country at this point. So they must try quarantines. They should try to define and defend with local and national help perhaps three-quarters of the country, including most of Baghdad. In heavily disputed areas, they should continue aggressive patrolling to establish or maintain a presence (thereby not abandoning people in these areas still on the government's side). If they can establish a semi-reliable peace in this "Iraq", and this peace must include satisfying the Kurds for now (we could use their Sunni Pesh-Murga in the rest of Iraq if they were satisfied there was little threat at home), then Iraq can pursue its political calendar, possibly leaving at voting time a few empty seats for areas out of control and therefore not able to vote. After some success in this "Iraq", the government could proceed to bargain/force the areas outside of control into the system, taking them on one by one. Of course, some of their leaders would be considered incorrigibles and would need eventually to be arrested. We could also expect some continued violence long after "victory" in this new campaign is declared, just as the Taliban (which they model themselves after) has continued its attacks in Afghanistan.

Today's NYT has an analysis of the use of tanks in Najaf. It seems that contrary to the assumption of the planners, and specifically Rumsfeld, army tanks turned out to be the key element in the "victory" of American forces in the city. The Mahdi Army could compete with the Marines to some extent, but they found the tanks unstoppable. The article suggests there is going to be some rethinking in a Washington that had envisioned a future dominated by light units backed up by highly accurate airpower.

This revives an old argument going back at least to the years after World War II. It was clear that in the two world wars, tanks were indispensable for major battles on open battlefields. One thing was clear: the only effective way to oppose tanks was with an effective tank force. Doubts have long been expressed about how effective tanks are in confined spaces, such as dense urban areas. Later tanks were seen as obsolete when facing powerful, small, often shoulder-fired weapons able to penetrate armor. The value of the tank seemed further diminished by the use of increasingly accurate air power. Yet, when the North Vietnamese overwhelmed South Vietnam, it was with a tank attack.

The issue is partly psychological. I am told by those who have experienced it, that soldiers in battle who see a tank coming at them tend to run for cover. However, some soldiers or guerillas have gotten sufficiently used to tanks that they are able to dart out with bombs etc. at the last minute in a confined environment (city or dense forest) and disable a tank. This does not see to have been the case for the Mahdi Army.

In judging this issue, three points should be remembered. First, new theories of ways to fight battles with fewer troops and weapons should always be looked carefully. Second, if a projected opponent does not have tanks, one of the critical reasons for needing a large force evaporates. Third, tanks that do not have to operate in an area where there is danger of aerial attack have an advantage which they would not have if they faced a force as modernized as themselves. This has certainly been true of our tanks in Iraq.

I have just finished an excellent book by Brezezinski entitled The Choice: Global Domination or Global Leadership. His primary thesis is that to maintain its position and to smooth the transition to an inevitable future in which the United States will no longer be an unchallenged superpower, the country needs to begin now to establish stronger working relationships with like-minded states. In particular, and in the short term, it needs to work in partnership with an expanded European community. The way he puts it is that while the power of Europe is insufficiently organized for it to be a superpower on its own and an isolated American superpower will not be able to meet the challenges of the world (which are more than military), in combination they will form a truly unchallengeable and effective superpower. He goes on to envisage a future in which this community is gradually expanded to eventually include Russia, India, China, and Japan.

The book should be read, of course, as an extended critique of the unilateralism of the Bush administration based on the proposition that the United States is so strong it can do anything with or without allies. Brezezinski offers a number of reasons why this just is not so. In particular, he sees our Middle Eastern policy as unavoidably limited by the pro-Israel lobby. Only in tandem with Europe, and thus with both believable pro-Palestinian and pro-Israeli policies side by side can we work effectively with the Islamic world. If we accept the proposition that our policy should be Euro-American, it will be much less beholden to the pro-Israeli lobby. For unless the reality and the perception of our identification with Israel is changed, we can never have a satisfactory relation with the Islamic world. We cannot obtain our energy or anti-terrorist objectives in the long run unless our identification with the Israelis is moderated.

In passing, Brezezinski makes many other useful points. He distinguishes, for example, between preemption and prevention. The first is an action that must be taken now, because the crisis is upon us. The second is an action that has a considerably longer lead time, because the crisis is judged to be building but not yet upon us. Thus, we had no evidence that justified a preemptive strike against Iraq. We did have evidence that Iraq was a dangerous power that might try to develop WMD in the future. But a preventive war against Iraq could have been undertaken later after a great deal more diplomatic preparation of the ground. Another point is that globalization has naturally developed opposing forces against it. The only way to successfully confront these opponents is to develop more fully the moral dimension of globalization. We must give all of those involved more of a say in the process. We must "[tone] down [our] doctrinaire impulses, practicing what [we] preach, and [focus] more on the global good." Finally, he agrees with the policy of promoting democracy for all. But he cautions that "any just cause, in the hands of fanatics, will degenerate into its antithesis." If we try, for example, to fanatically force democracy down the throats of Islamic countries without regard to their history and culture we will produce the negation of democracy.

Since intelligence services are meant to "serve" other parts of the government, and in particular its defense commands, the first step in reorganizing our response to terrorist threats such as what we loosely refer to as al-Qaida is to establish a organizing point within the command structure that will be able to more effectively use and discipline the intelligence services to assist the carrying out of their (new) responsibilities. Let us first note the command structure that exists at present.

The United States has nine "Unified Combatant Commands". The commanders in chief of these commands are expected to be the leaders in military actions that occur in their areas of responsibility. The commands (with their area of responsibility briefly noted in parenthesis) are: European (West Africa, Europe, Russia), Pacific (Pacific Ocean, Japan, East and South Asia, Indonesia), Southern (Caribbean and South America), Northern (North America), Central (East Africa, Middle East, Central Asia, Pakistan), Strategic (Strategic Nuclear War, Space), Joint Forces (training, force structuring, and force provision ), Transportation (transportation ), and Special Operations (training and deployment of special operations forces). The first five are "action commands". The next four are "support commands". Special Operations might also be considered an action command, yet its responsibilities are primarily the training and provision of forces for missions as determined and overseen by one or another of the action commands.

This leads us to wondering who in the military structure is responsible for countering the al-Qaida or Jihadist threat? In so far as al-Qaida exists only in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the responsibility is that of the Central Command, assisted by Special Forces in particular areas. Elsewhere, the military commands are on the sidelines, with the lead taken presumably by the intelligence services. The fight is also the responsibility of the FBI (a quasi-police service operating mainly but not exclusively in the United States) and the CIA (an intelligence service with an "enforcement" branch operating mainly but not exclusively outside the United States). One might think this is also the responsibility of Homeland Security. But this is a civilian agency concerned primarily with organization and training. Homeland Security is certainly not prepared to be the leader in the fight against al-Qaida or similar groups. The conclusion might be drawn that the lack of a responsible military command to meet this new threat is a major reason for the irresponsibility and confusion in the availability, analysis, and usefulness of intelligence in this struggle.

If we are to take the terrorist threat as seriously as we took the threat of major nuclear attack in the past, it is time that we created a command analogous to the Strategic Command that takes on itself the unique responsibility of defending the country against the new threat. Let us note the responsibilities of the Strategic Command as described on their web site:

"USSTRATCOM is the command and control center for U.S. strategic forces and controls military space operations, computer network operations, information operations, strategic warning and intelligence assessments as well as global strategic planning.

The command is responsible for both early warning of and defense against missile attack and long-range conventional attacks. The command is charged with deterring and defending against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction."

Thus, this command coordinates and assesses intelligence, prepares the plans, and executes the plans where necessary to meet the threat. If we are to take the Jihadist or al-Qaida threat with equal seriousness, we must develop a command structure that reflects this seriousness. This new command would then be in a position to demand from all intelligence services coordinated and actionable intelligence that would make possible the accomplishment of its mission to assess and respond to danger of terrorist attack in a timely fashion. This command should be in direct communication with the President at all times. And when intelligence is not up to its responsibility to serve this command, the command will be in a position to change that equation.

Reports out of Iraq continue to appear to be emanating from two different worlds occupying the same space. One reads and hears accounts from outstanding and well-thought of American and British reporters whose message is essentially that we have already lost the war. The people are all against us. They regard the new Iraqi government and its forces as completely illegitimate tools of the Americans. The ranks of the insurgents are growing every day while the areas under American or governmental control are steadily shrinking. Some former supporters of the war, even those directly involved in the American effort at an earlier point now accept this picture. This Sunday the paper included a discussion among neocons that pointed to a minority that have now moved into this camp.

One also reads and hears accounts from a different cast of persons, representing generally a more conservative viewpoint, and in many cases a military viewpoint, that says that what the papers are reporting is nonsense. Reporters are concentrating on problem areas while ignoring the much larger area of the country where American control is unchallenged and the new government is taking over. These analysts believe in polls that show that while Americans are not liked and are wanted out, most people continue to want the new government to succeed. The fact that a few days ago the government could bring together 1100 leaders (and many were local leaders) to a conference in Baghdad to choose the new assembly certainly supports this second picture. Why would so many Iraqis of standing be willing to identify themselves with this process if the country were already "going down the tube". They should be home taking care of their families and plotting ways to get out of the country.

Why would reporters like John Burns of the Times believe the first position that nothing is working if it is? One can understand why people who are emotionally invested in our success in Iraq would hold the second position. But if the first position is untrue, what mind-set would cause otherwise reliable observers to report so negatively? Do they hate the Bush administration so much, because of its half-truths that led us into war, that they want to see us lose, in spite of all that means to America's world position — yes, and even to the future of Iraq? I can think that of Moore, but I find it harder to think that of mainstream reporters.

The fact is that if we decide to leave without victory, we may as a nation never know what the truth was. We will want the first picture to be correct, for this will justify our actions to ourselves. We left Vietnam essentially because we were tired of the losses and fact that there was no light at the end of the tunnel. This led many reporters at the time to write as though the people of South Vietnam had rejected us as well as the South Vietnamese government in favor of the communists of the North. My belief as a sometime student of that war is that most of the people in the south remained anti-communist throughout the war. The famous Tet Offensive in 1968(?) was a propaganda victory for the communists but also a serious military defeat for them. Nearly the entire Viet Cong force in the South was wiped out. From this point on, the war was essentially a conventional war between a well organized and equipped conventional North Vietnamese Army and, as the American forces were phased out, the South Vietnamese Army. Remember that it was at least a year after the Americans had essentially left the country that the North Vietnamese staged a major tank attack down through the center of the country that broke through the government's lines, leading to an ultimate route.

Yet also in the end, what the situation actually was made little difference. The American public was tired. Why should we go on losing lives as long as we had no plans to invade the North and thus end the conflict. We had to leave.

Fortunately, the Iraqi insurgents have no outside power to rely on. Yet, the United States is much more worried about casualties today, and rightly so, than we were in Vietnam. It will take much less this time to make us tired. If we cannot bring down the scale of the insurgency within six months, and the government fails to extend its writ over all the country, perhaps we will again feel we have to leave, regardless of how many children wave at our soldiers or how many new schools have been opened.

Today's Times has an interview with Amatzia Baram, an expert on Shiism at the Institute of Peace. He pointed out facts about Muqtada's appeal and situation that I was only vaguely aware of. I was aware that he was the son of a leading Iraqi Ayatollah who was executed by Saddam. He has not, however, taken religious training seriously, and until recently was not regarded as having religious credentials. However, after leading the recent uprising his followers have begun calling him a "hojatolislam", the next rung below ayatollah.

More ominously, he has announced that the Shiite Messiah, the Mahdi, is about to return from occlusion. His claim has been that the Americans knew this and invaded in order to grab him and kill him. He has labeled his army the "Mahdi Army", thus putting it at the service of the returning Mahdi. Therefore he says that he could not disband it even if he wanted to. He is also coming to be referred to by his followers in a manner that suggests they may think he is actually the returned Mahdi. (I noted that when Khomeini returned to Iran, supporters started calling him the "Imam" in a similarly ambiguous manner. For Shi'as "Imam" has a double meaning. It means the leader of the congregation, for example the leader of the Friday Prayers. But it also means the leader of all Muslims. The twelver Shi'as (which is the group we are concerned with here) consider there have been only 12 leaders of Islam. If he returned, the last imam who disappeared would be the Mahdi.

All four grand ayatollahs in Iraq today are quietists who see Muqtada as an upstart. But they are also very attuned to public opinion. It is true that for Muqtada to rise higher religiously he would need a mentor, which would be Ayatollah Haeri, now in Qom. Haeri is an activist and bitter anti-American. If he returns and endorses Muqtada, the other Iraqi Ayatollahs may become politically irrelevant in spite of their theoretical standing.

The most encouraging news today is the relative opening up of North Korea, at least to countries other than the United States. While the government has continued its oppressive ways, it has also been changing its philosophy. Since 2000, it has established diplomatic relations with 19 new countries, especially in Europe. Germany has been the leader in the attempt to open up the country, establishing a Goethe Information Center in Pyongyang. It offers scientific and popular media open to all (some North Koreans understand German because of the relationship with East Germany; however one wonders how many people actually are able to use this resource). Germany is now giving a course on libraries and librarians, as well as use of the Internet.

North Korea is also initiating limited capitalist reforms (not that capitalism in itself means freedom). Three hundred markets have been established, private trade with China is increasing, and private cars are beginning to appear on the streets. South Korea is helping to establish an industrial park, connected through a new highway and railroad to the South. Bilateral talks are occurring with its neighbors, even among military leaders. While the United States continues to demonize the country for its human rights record, the other countries are taking a much more relaxed attitude. On the one hand, the United States is quite right. The government is demonic and should be treated as such. On the other hand, maybe there is little to gain with this approach at this juncture. The USSR and its satellites were in part brought down by the Helsinki Accord focusing on human rights. By stressing the importance of adhering to its provisions, the United States helped to edge the USSR and the satellite world into a transformation. Yet perhaps this was possible only because it occurred at a certain point in the evolution of the USSR and Eastern Europe. If the treaty and our pressure had occurred earlier it might well have been counterproductive. Perhaps the Europeans and the South Koreans have it right this time. Or perhaps we can proceed forward using the good cop - bad cop approach.

In any event, whatever it portends, this opening lays a more useful basis for talks on nuclear, humanitarian, and other issues than we have had in the past.

Today the leading Times Op-Ed is a plea for making a greater effort to divide humanitarian assistance from the use of military force. This is a recurrent theme lately, often with references to the decision of Doctors without Borders to leave Afghanistan because several of its people were killed (and the organization felt that there had been too little attempt to punish the killers) and the destruction of the UN headquarters in Baghdad about a year ago.

Before we analyze these issues, we must make some distinctions. The work of the United Nations should not be conflated with that of USAID or other governmental aid organizations on the one hand, nor with that of independent nonprofits such as Doctors with Borders on the other. First, as to governmental assistance, we should not accept even provisionally the idea that American or West European assistance organizations, such as the Peace Corps or most economic, educational, or medical assistance programs, have nefarious objectives such as undermining local religion or society. We should understand that many think so, just as we understand that many believe that medical missionaries are actually there to infect rather than treat the people. Second, we must not forget that the United Nations serves the countries of the world, particularly those that supply its budget. As such, whatever it does cannot be "apolitical", even though the politics may be different than that of any particular member of the United Nations. It was not so much because the insurgents in Iraq thought that the United Nations was a tool of the United States that they blew up its headquarters. It was because they had become convinced by propaganda and otherwise that the country had suffered for years primarily because of United Nations sanctions. Only after understanding these distinctions should we approach the issues and suggestions that the Op-Ed raises.

First, it makes the suggestion, already forcibly made by others, that military forces should never become involved in humanitarian assistance because this blurs the distinction between the use of force and humanitarianism. This is a proposition that we cannot endorse. In many cases, assistance must be given in extremely violent environments into which it would be foolish to send unarmed civilians. Secondly, in many cases it is the military that is willing and able to act now while the civilian agencies are just gearing up. This is true of building schools, refurbishing hospitals etc. Moreover, an occupation army not under great pressure has a great deal of spare energy that can be used in assistance activities during lulls in the fighting. Moreover, many soldiers come back from overseas activities seeing their assistance activities as the best part of their experience. Taking part in assistance programs makes them come to view the local people as more than just enemies, just as it helps the locals to see them as more than just enemies. Later, in battle, this combined experience should have a positive influence on the way in which each side fights.

One can certainly second the Op-Ed's suggestion that more should be done to acquaint the local people with the special missions of humanitarian organizations. Often they do not know. Often their leaders do not want them to know. Such education should not be a primary task for the United States or other Western governments. It should in the first instance be a task for the nonprofits. Secondly, it would seem to be a useful function of the United Nations itself. For it has responsibilities both to these groups and to the governments behind it.

I take this occasion to go back a little and consider the Op-Ed of Daniel Pletka ("Arabs on the Verge of democracy", August 9). Pletka criticizes John Kerry for valuing "stability" above "democracy" in the Middle East and President Bush for not more aggressively pursuing his announced goal of democratizing the region. What Pletka does not seem to understand and what the Bush White House has come belatedly to understand is the cost to the United States and the region of pursuing an effective democratization policy. It would be possible to democratize the region in a generation. But it would require several times the expenditure in dollars and lives that we have so far incurred. It would require the imposition of a peace settlement on Israelis and Arabs. It would require the conquest of several major countries in the area with attendant casualties. It would require the training of a new political class in the standards and procedures of democracy. And it would require maintaining a massive and effective occupation force able to maintain order in the face of the inevitable opposition of the religious and political classes that now rule the area.

Where people have generations of experience with democracy and identify with liberal society, as in Eastern Europe, a minimal level of democratic assistance can transform an area. But where, as in Afghanistan, Iraq, Russia, or Pakistan, this background and identification is absent, we should not imagine that we can democratize on the cheap.

We return today to the dark subject of whether it is "Time to Quit" (Op-Ed, August 18). This has been addressed in several earlier posts (particularly April 7, 9, and 25). It is occasioned by an excellent Op-Ed under this heading by Edward Luttwak, a sometimes conservative expert on military affairs. After discussing the feeling of many commentators that we should just leave, he reviews the reasons most Americans still feel we should not, such as the resulting collapse of the government, invasion by neighbors, encouragement to Islamic extremists everywhere, and loss of America's global credibility.

Luttwak then proceeds to stand this argument on its head by arguing that it is precisely this list of dangers that makes it possible for United States to "disengage" at little cost. He feels that the Sadrists are able to get away with mayhem and our regional and international allies are able to carp on the sidelines, remain unhelpful, and pursue their own agendas precisely because they feel they can count on the United States "staying the course". If we were to cast doubt on this assumption, we would see a change in their willingness to help. He concludes from this analysis that we should begin making preparations for a departure now - and we have to mean it! If this doesn't change attitudes in the main players, then we should complete our withdrawal.

The basic argument is that other regional and international players have more to lose than we do in Iraq. We must use this advantage now while there is still time. If we do not, we may end up with worse choices, such as an evacuation under fire. Luttwak makes this rather extreme suggestion because he believes that if our reformation of the country continues to stumble, we will be throwing men and material goods away for nought. Sooner or later Americans will wake up to this fact and demand that we just leave, even if Saigon-style.

I would like to believe Luttwak. Unfortunately, like most strategists, he overestimates the role of logic and calculation in human affairs. As I have argued before, the Shiites should be supporting a process that is bound to lead to their domination of the country. Yet the violent young men in the street are moved more by nationalist hatred of the foreigner than such calculations, and it is increasingly unclear that their more moderate religious and political leaders can effectively stem this hatred. Too many Iraqis now see the Sadrists and other extremists as they would view combatants in a great drama between we and them. The more insurgents persist, the more they appear able to thumb their noses at the Americans, the more they become national heroes and the more are recruited to their cause. This may develop into an inexorable trend that Americans and the newly minted Iraqi government will find impossible to turn around.

At the end of a tumultuous four days, the National Conference managed to appoint a 100 member Congress to oversee the operation of the interim government until elections next January. The process was hectic; many threatened to walk out. But in the end they all stayed and acquiesced in the result. It was a compromise list agreed on by the leading parties and factions in the country. The chief negotiators included the Shiite Dawa Party (actually there are several such parties, but at the time of the defeat of Saddam's forces, they were thought to represent most of the country's Shiites), and the Shiite Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, the Sunni Islamic Party, the two Kurdish parties, the former exiles of the Iraqi National Congress and Allawi's Iraqi National Accord. The smaller groups felt they were ignored. The final result did not have the promised 25% female membership because the tribal sheikhs would not appoint women in their slots. Yet, by and large, it appears to be a fairly representative group.

I assume now that it has done its job, the National Conference will go out of existence, or at least become inactive. Its one other action was to try to solve the Najaf problem. After an initial rejection, it appeared as though they had a deal, but then within hours this too fell apart. Shells are again bursting in Najaf and the Americans are bombing both Najaf and Falluja. The breakdown may have been partly due to the Interim Government's stiffening of its demands on al-Sadr. They demanded an immediate disbanding of the Mahdi Army throughout the country. Again, intransigence seems to mark the approach of Allawi and his friends — and the American forces are expected to back up this policy. Suggesting that a less extreme, more temporizing policy would work better is, of course, easy to do at a distance. In any event, we are obviously not out of the woods in many areas of the country, particularly those heavily influenced by the Mahdi Army.

Yet, the Conference was held. A Congress was "elected" by acclamation (actually an appointive process). These steps had to be accomplished. Whether they are enough remains at issue.

The delayed National Conference did open in Baghdad, although under siege conditions with mortars bursting outside. Open 1100 delegates chosen in communities throughout Iraq showed up. The first session was thrown into disarray by angry protests against the fighting in Najaf. One hundred members stormed out; however they later returned. Today's report suggests that the Conference has drafted a request to Muqtada al-Sadr asking him to leave the shrine and join the political process. It was drafted by a distant relative of Muqtada and will be delivered today by a delegation of sixty traveling to Najaf. Whether this will be seen as anything different than another attempt by Allawi to stop the fighting is unclear. But the fact that the Conference took place and that it did get large number of delegates that were desired are encouraging signs, at least for the moment.

There have been a number of items in the news recently that remind us of the importance of maintaining good relations with Iran. Dilip Hiro in an Op-Ed on Monday pointed to the variation of opinion that he found within Iran. Interestingly, he found that those most supportive of what we have done in Iraq are those living closest to the Iraq border (because of what happened to them in the Iran-Iraq war). Further away he found many young people who looked to the possibility of democracy in Iraq as a future model for Iran. (One should be cautious about this and the reports from other recent trips by Westerners to the country. Even with one's best efforts, one tends in a foreign country to spend more time with those like oneself in ideas, culture, and age than with those less interested in you and less able to contact you.) He also found, especially in the holy city of Qom, some virulent anti-Americans, a segment dating back to the Mossadeq era and the later satanization of Americans by Khomeini. This group often regards recent events in Iraq as a deliberate attack on Islam. It is interesting to reflect that the nationalist movement in Iran began about 1890 with a boycott of tobacco (being imported by the British) led by the religious leaders.

The United States should develop better relations with Iran for many reasons.

First, outside of Turkey, it is most democratic significant democratic state in the region. We make a lot of it being a "theocracy". But it has in fact held a series of elections over the past twenty years that have been more "free and fair" than most elections in the area. The position of women in Iran is far better than that in neighboring states (always with the exception of Turkey). Freedom in the arts and in the expression of opinion is significant if by no means complete. Iran has a relatively well-educated population as the result of the efforts of both the preceding monarchy and the present "theocracy".

Second, whatever we may think of it, Iran is situated between Iraq and Afghanistan. It is understandably interested in what goes on in both states. That it interferes in their affairs from time to time should not be condemned as much as modified or redirected. As the most powerful Shi'a state in the world (a role it also played from the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries), Iran is also directly involved in the affairs of the Shi'as of Iraq, as well as those of Afghanistan, Lebanon, Pakistan, and elsewhere. Khomeini fled to Iraq to escape the Shah. Under Saddam, high religious leaders fled from Iraq to Iran (Qom). Many of these are still revered in Iraq, and some have returned or intend to. The holy cities of Kerbala and Najaf are equally holy cities for Iranians.

Long before the religious leaders came to power in modern Iran, Iran has longed for a decisive role in the world. After all, they see themselves as the descendants of a people that once ruled from Cairo to Delhi. The support of Palestinian groups opposing the Israelis as well as their interest in nuclear energy, the development of new missiles and maintenance of the possibility of a bomb are not unrelated to their view of their "international responsibility". These objectives clash with our own objectives and must be countered. But they should be countered in the framework of an understanding of, and accommodation where possible with, the Iranian understanding of themselves.

The area we now refer to as Afghanistan has seldom in its history been ruled as a unitary country. The people are diverse, transportation is difficult, and expectations of unity are weak. This has been illustrated once again by fighting around the city of Herat in the west, probably the most civilized and developed urban area in the country outside Kabul. This Tajik city has been ruled for many years, off and on, by Ismail Khan, one of the less deplorable of the country's war lords. As readers may remember, last March his son (who had the title of Minister for Civil Aviation in the central government) was killed by supporters of a neighboring warlord, with Khan's resulting counterattack condemned vigorously by Kabul. Now the warlords of three neighboring provinces, including the aforementioned, have made a coordinated attack on Khan's positions with artillery and tanks south of Herat. The attack was heavy enough to kill two "defense ministry commanders" (who, given the way titles are given here, were evidently actually commanders for Ismail Khan). The government has responded vigorously with a statement that such attacks are "illegal and a threat to public security". It was noted at the end of the Times article that the defense ministry said that "a battalion of the newly trained Afghan National Army is based in Herat and was on alert but for now remained in their barracks".

Such fighting back and forth happens periodically in the north between General Dostum and other warlords, and they among themselves. This is in addition to fights in the areas of the country that were former centers of Taliban power and are in a state of low level rebellion against much of the time. The country is gearing up for an election, but we should not expect that magically anything more than a semblance of a country will emerge. In the jockeying for power before the vote (which probably means ability to determine the vote) Karzai and other commanders (incidentally, mostly members of Karzai's cabinet) have developed new and cross-cutting alliances that seem to imply that whoever wins, the elected president's mandate will be less than overwhelming.

For the United States, the instability and weakness of Kabul is not nearly as serious as our troubles in Iraq. The difference is that without saying so our expectations in Afghanistan have always been at a lower level, as have those of Karzai. The forces that we have operating in the country have never been so large that leaving Afghanistan without the accomplishments that we had hoped will be seen as a disaster. If we can leave behind a responsible, fairly modern government in Kabul with some development and at least intermittent control over most of the rest of the country, we will have to be content. Unfortunately, accepting this reduced goal will not help control al-Qaida.

It has been a while since I issued my most pessimistic blogs in April; unfortunately, it appears to be time to put on my pessimist hat again.

For a long while, it has been assumed that our basic problem is the Sunni Triangle, the Jihadists and the Baathists. But concern about the threat they represent needs now to be set on a back burner. Muqtada al-Sadr can no longer be dismissed as a hot-headed leader of a bunch of unorganized thugs from the Shi'a underclass. No longer should we imagine that the more conservative Shi'a hierarchy will rein him in. They would like to, but appear unable to even if they continued to want to. Muqtada has managed to oppose the Americans and the new government cleverly and effectively, apparently building as he does so a reservoir of support throughout the country. It would appear now that he does have a less than laughable objective, which is to run the country.

These comments reflect the last few days' fighting in Najaf, Cole's latest comments, and a NYT report on the role of the Mahdi Army in Baghdad. The Americans and Iraqis are at a loss as to what to do in Najaf. They do not want to destroy the holiest of Shi'a shrines and yet the Mahdi Army continues to use it as their main base in the city. If they do go in with all guns blazing as they have threatened, they will be alienating both the Shi'as of Iraq and those far beyond. If they do not, then the reputation of Muqtada is enhanced. A major Ayatollah of Iraq (encamped in Qom until the Americans leave) has issued a fatwa saying that no Iraqi Muslim may fight on behalf of the government or the Americans. Shi'as are said to be streaming to Najaf from every direction to join up with the Army. Another report has most of the country below Najaf out of control of the government (this seems unlikely but could soon be so). The Shi'a continue to attack in a dozen other cities, the Americans responding with bombing that wins the day but does not help in the longer term. The latest reports suggest that the Americans and the Interim Government have effectively ceded the Sadr City area of Baghdad to the Mahdi Army whose administration is becoming more and more entrenched. More ominously, the Army is increasingly be able to exert its power throughout the city. Their forces appear able to raid almost at will even in the center. In a recent symbolic victory, an Iraqi-American attempt to set up a curfew in Sadr City was answered by a Sadrist announcement of a curfew for the entire city, one that was respected almost everywhere.

What are we left with? Within the well-protected area reserved for American and Iraqi administrations in Baghdad and in military camps throughout the country, as well as in Kurdish areas, there is the reality of a state progressing toward democracy under our auspices. But the bulk of the country appears to be sliding away from us and Allawi's administration. I can only hope that this pessimistic assessment is wrong.

The United States is faced with a series of policy conundrums stretching from the Mediterranean to India. The area is unstable, several countries have nuclear weapons, and there is widespread hatred of the United States. In addition, the countries in this swath of territory have serious material and spiritual disagreements with their neighbors that periodically threaten renewed conflict. We do not like or distrust many of the regimes in the area, but we neither have a home front nor an international consensus that will reliably support the maintenance of peace nor our national interests through the repeated application of American military force. In theory, the United Nations should take the lead in controlling aggression and danger in the region. But it does not have either the will nor the ability to act effectively to tamp down contending forces. What to do?

Let me suggest that the United States should begin now to develop a series of overlapping guarantees to the governments of the region. We would guarantee that we would come to their assistance should they be attacked, and especially to punish any aggressor that should use WMD against them. These guarantees would start with Israel in the West, but also include the Palestine State, Lebanon, Syria, Turkey (we already have that through NATO), Saudi Arabia, the Gulf Sheikdoms, Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India. At first glance, this attempt at guaranteeing such countries would be viewed as uncalled for, imperialistic, and unbelievable. However, through patient diplomacy, carrots and sticks, we might be able eventually to make our initiative believable enough that we could develop this series of relationships. Of course, to not seem foolish to ourselves and the region's leaders, we must be quite clear about what we are guaranteeing and how we would respond in a variety of possible situations.

The primary advantage to this approach is that we would make full use of our capabilities without initiating any new military actions. We would be able to define through treaty a new America whose regional policy is based on the maintenance of peace rather than differential support of "friends or foes". Through this policy we would lay a basis for the prevention of proliferation of WMD or the maintenance of such weapons within the region that we simply do not have now.

The United States, the Iraqi government, and the Mahdi Army of al-Sadr are locked in a major battle taking place in many communities, from the "Sadr City" section of Baghdad down through a number of major cities to Basra in the south. Some sketchy details include fighting between American, Iraqi, and Mahdi Army insurgents that has resulted in high casualties for the Mahdi Army. So far the Army seems to have unlimited men and materiel. In addition to fighting there have been marches in these cities against the Americans. They are protesting fighting so close to the Shrine of Imam Ali in Najaf as well as the killing of so many Iraqis. The key situation is the standoff in Najaf where the Mahdi Army is trapped and surrounded in the immediate area of the Shrine, as well as in a nearby cemetery. (Cole believes they have underground passages that make "trapped" indeterminate.) At last report, still another truce was being discussed.

With his extensive information base (background plus informants) Juan Cole emphasizes the degree to which this whole affair is turning more and more of the Shiite population against the government and the Americans. He reports that the vice-governor of Najaf, a government appointee, has resigned his post in protest against the attacks on Najaf by the government and their American allies. Others have resigned elsewhere, while top Shi'a leaders have been identifying more and more with Muqtada. Cole reports that while it may be true that many of the people of Najaf itself are disgusted with the Mahdi Army, in the wider Shiite community Muqtada al-Sadr is becoming a more and more respected leader. Soon he, or his followers if he is killed or imprisoned, will be in a position to maintain indefinitely an insurgency throughout the south, similar to that the Baath and Jihadists have been able to maintain within the Sunni triangle.

This is not an encouraging picture. The problem is that with his family background within the Shi'a movement, Muqtada has been able to appeal to that broad segment of the Shi'a community that had welcomed the bringing down of Saddam, but were more and more disaffected by the continuing American presence. The more conservative Shi'a leaders have understood that the process initiated by the Americans would work eventually in their favor. But the masses could not see this and could not wait for this "eventually". (Incidentally, this willingness of the masses to violently support irrational objectives does not bode too well for democracy, if and when it emerges.) We can only hope that Cole is wrong and that the government will come out of this crisis with enough credibility and effectiveness on the ground to continue to meet the goals of the democratization calendar.

Back in the old days when I concentrated on nuclear threats, there was considerable discussion of nontraditional means of delivery, such as cargo vessels coming into port with a bomb aboard or so-called "suitcase bombs". Now in the age of al-Qaida terrorists I suppose the greater fear might be of small planes with a nuclear weapon aboard, or even more likely a truck with such a device. (The suicide bomb threat was probably more likely when we thought of a highly technical society such as the USSR building the device. Something highly effective of this size is probably beyond the capabilities of Pathan weapons factories.)

I hark back to this time because Kristof's Op-Ed today is based on the conclusions of a recent meeting of the Aspen Strategy Group that came to the conclusion that the likelihood of a 10 kiloton nuclear weapon being smuggled into New York and detonated at Times Square was much greater than is usually believed. Apparently such a threat by al-Qaida was taken so seriously in October of 2001 that Cheney was sent out of town (in case they had the city wrong) and Bush dispatched nuclear experts to New York. This was all done without telling anyone in New York, including the mayor (which makes us ponder again the previous posting on this blog: what should have been done with this information?)

Graham Allison, a Harvard Professor whose new book "Nuclear Terrorism" includes this story, believes that the odds are that a nuclear terrorist attack will occur somewhere in the world in the next ten years. It is known that the Russians and their satellites have not had thorough control over the remains of their nuclear programs. The al-Qaida leaders have boasted of their purchases in this area. Allison and his colleagues in the Aspen Strategy Group believe that we should be making much more strenuous efforts than we are in combating nuclear proliferation. Certainly, our accomplishments in Libya were a step forward, and, whatever we may think of the priority of the effort, our achievements in Iraq certainly took that country off the list of worries for a while. But the essential problem is that as long as we allow the Israelis to maintain an unchallenged nuclear capability and as long as the United States and other leading states rely (at least in public pronouncements) on nuclear weapons as an essential "deterrent", eliminating the efforts of others to obtain and maintain nuclear weapons remains extremely difficult.

In today's Times, an Op-Ed by Philip Bobbitt, author of a forthcoming book entitled "The War on Terror", offers informed and commonsense definitions that should replace the ambiguous color coded alerts during these times of terror threats. Informing means putting out as much nonsensitive information on terrorist threats whenever it becomes available. If the government has general information on a possible threat, it should share this information with the public. Alerting refers to communications with public officials or others that might be directly affected in those cases where the government has concrete information about a threat to specific targets or classes of targets, but does not have information as to when such attacks might occur. Warning means telling both those mentioned under the alerting category and the general public about a threat that officials believe is real and imminent. Ideally, warnings should be coupled with advice or directions as to how the danger might be reduced. This is the only situation where Bobbitt thinks press conferences or other special events should be used as a means of communication.

Bobbitt offers these distinctions in the belief that too often Homeland Security or top political leaders have issued what appeared to be warnings when in fact the information they had should only have been communicated as general information or alerts to responsible parties. He feels that unless the government sticks to such limitations in its communications policy, it will exact a large and unnecessary tax on the economy. Ignoring his categorization will increase the return to terrorist groups of making threats and will eventually lead to a desensitized general public and security services that have been warned too often without the materialization of the threats.

Today's Times offers as an Op-Ed an assessment of the current situation in Iraq. It is compiled by two Brookings researchers. More complete information and the authors' sources are available as the Iraq Index. This Index is regularly updated. There seem to me some anomalies in this material, ones not completely removed in my mind by looking at the Index. For example, their estimate of Iraqi civilian casualties is far below what one normally sees. (They estimate about 2500; their notes point to other estimates more than twice that). I also wonder about the accuracy of polling data when it must be dangerous for even Iraqi pollsters to get into many areas. Nevertheless, Brookings is an earnest organization certainly without an Administration bias. So their statistics are probably as good as are available.

The authors point to definite improvement economically and in infrastructure. For example, the number of schools and hospitals in need of repair has steadily fallen. The availability of electricity and telephone service has increased. Perhaps most promising is the extent to which surveys show that Iraqis believe in and support their police and security forces. This is a much higher figure than that for support of the interim government, but that is not too bad either. Iraqis overwhelmingly expect their life to improve under the new government. The security forces are also growing rapidly since the debacle in April. The indicators for violence, including kidnapping, have not shown an improvement. Insurgent attacks on oil and gas facilities have rapidly escalated. (The al-Sadr threat to oil facilities in recent days has apparently shut down, at least temporarily, oil exports from the South.) This is at the same time that approval of foreign troops remaining in the country has fallen drastically, while approval of Muqtada al-Sadr has, at least up until recently, remained at a high level.

The picture is confusing, even more so if one looks at the back-up material. One can conclude that most Iraqis trust Iraqis, hate foreigners, hate violence, and like the promised democracy, and like Moqtada al-Sadr (apparently because of his anti-American diatribes). They are scared of the possibility of sectarian fighting. They want to run their own country, but do not seem too realistic as to how this might be achieved. They give little or no credit to the Americans, even for the good they have done. Very few want Saddam or the Baath back. When asked, most would say that the Americans should leave tomorrow, banking on a hope that violence sparked by their presence would decline and that Iraqi security forces would be able to handle remaining security problems. Many like the new leaders of the interim government; many do not. But they appear to prefer it to any alternative.

This morning's Times gives us a detailed account of the problems of trucking on the main artery between Jordan and Baghdad, one of the most important routes for the movement of both civilian and military supplies. While the account relies heavily on anecdotal evidence, it strikes the reader as only too believable. Jordanians make up the bulk of the drivers and their organizations are now advising their drivers that the trips are too dangerous. Many drivers have been stopped more than once before they decided to quit. Those who intercept the trucks roughly fall into three groups. The first includes insurgents intent on stopping all traffic. The second includes insurgents intent on stopping the carrying of supplies only to the Americans. (They frequently ask to see evidence of where the goods are being taken, evidence that may or may not be believed.) The third is made up of highway robbers with simpler objectives. These groups are not clearly identified: some of the insurgents are not averse to making a profit.

The highway is apparently still in reasonably good condition, unlike so many in the developing world. Like a superhighway, it generally goes near but not through cities. The police and security forces along the highway appear to be scattered and outnumbered, seldom emerging from their checkpoints. (When American patrols appear, the hijackers flee, but this is not often). The American Embassy is aware that many drivers have been killed or kidnapped bringing in American goods, but its officials make little effort to ease the pain for the drivers or their families.

This is another priority mission that we are either unable to undertake because of lack of resources or are foolishly ignoring. It would not seem impossible to maintain at least a daylight aerial surveillance of this and other major arteries, with high level reconnaissance planes supplemented by quick reaction helicopters. We might even consider a convoying system such as we had across the Atlantic in two wars. Whatever the answer, responding effectively to this problem would seem to be a great deal easier than sorting out the relations of Shi'a and Sunni factions.

The United States and the Interim Government, personified by PM Allawi and the Governor of Najaf, have apparently decided once and for all to destroy the Mahdi Army of Muqtada al-Sadr. They may be succeeding in the South, unfortunately at the cost of many lives and much destruction in central Najaf. We do not hear a great deal about successes against the Mahdi Army in Baghdad. There may in fact be more than one "army", or at least the Sadrist organization is not tightly controlled. In any event, both sides have called somewhat theatrically for a war to the death.

What are we to make of this? My analysis has been that the Shi'a have much more to gain from a successful completion of the planned road to democracy than from continued fighting. Muqtada may feel, however, that the only chance for him is to make the country into a theatre for holy war before the democratic process in completed. He would then hope to emerge as a national hero who would be able to control the country, either in the traditional manner of a Middle Eastern despot or through the new democratic institutions. If Muqtada takes this approach, he would be assuming that without a holy war the more traditional and majority Shi'a parties would continue to reject him. We should note that the other Shi'a parties came together in the last few days in Karbala to condemn the fighting in Najaf and to condemn the Americans and the government. This may or may not signify a change of heart for these parties.

Another analysis would hearken back to Juan Cole's suggestion that Allawi (in spite of his Shi'a origins) may in fact want to establish something like a new Baath regime relying on the Sunni neighbors of Iraq for support. This would explain why he has been negotiating recently with his Arab neighbors while refusing to negotiate with Iran, which he condemns for interfering in Iraq's affairs. This explanation becomes a little more plausible when we note the criminal charges now being hurled at Chalabi and his nephew. Remember that although Chalabi was originally introduced to Americans as the darling of the Pentagon, he has also become increasing close to the Iranians. Indeed, he has been accused of passing state secrets to the Iranians. (He also appears to have recently purchased a vacation house above Tehran.)

This tangled tale becomes even more confused by the renewed drumbeat of accusations being hurled at the Iranians by the American government. These have included an accusation that they have allowed al-Qaida operatives to pass through the country. We have now also renewed our demand that Iran end its nuclear weapons program, a demand that may have a threat hidden there somewhere. It has been said that the real reason we are so determined to check the Iranian nuclear development (rather than the equally dangerous North Korean) is that Israel demands that we either stop it or they will (with an aerial attack such as they made on Iraq's earlier capacity much earlier).

All this is possible. But I do not see how the United States would be able to present to the world acquiescence in actions that would in effect scrap democratic development in Iraq in favor of a new authoritarian state. Of course, Egyptian-style elections with foregone conclusions could be held. But applying this fig leaf might be hard with everyone watching. I still think that such an abandonment of our original policy to bring democracy to the area would be unlikely even in the cynical world of high politics. But it could happen. Or at least this scenario may be what many Iraqis Shiites are beginning to fear.

Two Op-Eds have brought the discussion back to North Korea. One points to the responsibility that China has to bring the United States and North Korea to an agreement on dismantling whatever it has so far developed in the nuclear arms area. It suggests that China and the United States have the same interest in bringing the nuclear program to an end. But because of old ties dating back to the days when communism was really alive, only China has the trust of the North Koreans. The second editorial suggests that the "preemption strategy" that we say we used to bring the threat of Iraq to an end will not work against North Korea. In passing, it says that Libya did not actually cave under outside threats. It actually wanted to get out of the nuclear business for many other reasons having to do with a need to develop better political and economic relations with the rest of the world.

This should remind us that the so-called "preemption strategy" that we announced in regard to Iraq actually was never a strategy, since we did not preempt anything that Iraq was about to do, or even able to do. What we should talk of instead is a "hardline policy", one that uses threats to achieve objectives that we feel are in our national interest regardless of what the rest of the world thinks. We have, however, in spite of much talk, not actually taken such an approach against North Korea. Apparently the threat that North Korea holds over the South, conventional and possibly nuclear, together with the opposition in the South to any attack on the North effectively ties our hands. So we look increasingly like a helpless giant confronting a difficult and unpredictable child.

There are many other differences that are not talked about as much. First, Libya has a government that actually cares about its population and the rest of the world. North Korea does not. Second, Iraq under Saddam Hussein was a cruel authoritarian dictatorship, but not a totalitarian Brave New World. North Korea is all that the word "totalitarian" implies. This means that there is absolutely no opposition that anyone has ever heard of within the country. While many people evidently do not believe what they are told about the rest of the world — the continual drain of people taking extreme risks to escape the country attests to that, they do not have any means of knowing on a regular basis what goes on in the outside world or of knowing what their next door neighbors think. So there is absolutely no resistance movement to work with. Another result is that we have little or no idea of what would happen within the North Korean military should we take action. We can only assume they would die to the last man in defense of their atrocious system. They might, in fact, crack quickly and completely. But we certainly could not count on it. We also have no reason to count on the Russians, Japanese, Chinese, or South Koreans approving whatever forceful actions we take.

So we are completely deterred from doing anything militarily against North Korea. The only thing left is to play by their rules. These rules are to pay bribes to the North Koreans on a continuing basis, yet to pay bribes with no assurance that they will actually be bribed out of anything. They apparently do not give a damn about the world or their own people and we have to accept that at the same time as we are giving them whatever they want. In the end we may find they have preserved an ability to develop a nuclear program, or that they may actually have developed one in the interim.

North Korea is a problem for which I do not have a solution. Any ideas?

On August 6, the two most liberal Op-Ed columnists in the New York Times weighed in again on the side of pessimism on Iraqi outcomes. They both feel that the continued violence after the setting up of the interim government means that we are still sliding downhill toward a disaster. They are incensed that no one seems willing to admit to what is happening, or realizing the situation, able to come up with policies that might reverse the trends.

In our view, they are partly right and partly wrong. They are right in that there has been a continuation of violent attacks, the casualties continue to pile up, particularly of Iraqis of all stripes (police, insurgents, "civilians"). The collapse of the cease fire with the Mahdi Army is certainly a setback, as is the breakdown of the arrangements in Falluja (resulting in essentially an armed standoff between American forces on the outside of the city and insurgents of various varieties inside). Many other towns continue to be struck with suicide or roadside attacks even outside of the Sunni Triangle, especially in the Mosul area in the North. Kidnapping and holding for ransom under the threat of execution has become a common and to some extent effective tactic of at least some insurgent groups.

But the critics are wrong in not weighing the importance of positive changes in their accounting. There has been a steady increase in the participation and effectiveness of Iraqi police and other security units in the clashes that have occurred. The Americans are initiating less actions, staying mostly in their camps as a reaction force. (I see this as positive, they see this as negative.) There has been a revival of the Iraqi judicial and legal system, remarkable not in the pervasiveness of the revival but in the fact that judges and lawyers in some districts are able to go about their business with some confidence. The process leading toward an Iraqi government is continuing to unfold, even if unsteadily. The Interim Government is not as clearly independent of the Americans, or receiving as much support from the Iraqi people, as we would all like. But it is in business; it is developing an international presence; and leaders throughout the Middle East are coming to regard this government as the Government of Iraq. And, the point that we have repeatedly made in these pages, the insurgents seem deeply divided and without any clear picture of what they would like to see happen if the Americans and their "puppets" are defeated.

There is certainly enough in the arguments of the liberal editors to cause the United States to reexamine its policies, and to at least have contingency plans if things do fall apart again to the extent that they did in April. One can only hope that we have not put all our eggs in the basket of an assumption that the democratizing process will proceed on schedule. Karzai in Afghanistan and Allawi in Iraq have worked hard at developing complex nets of alliances with people and groups within and without their countries. We can only hope that we have proceeded in like manner. We should certainly reaffirm our commitments to the Kurds and the Turks, to moderate Shi'a and Sunni leaders, to leaders of the maze of old and new political parties, and to the many tribal leaders that play a cross-cutting role in the society. We must be prepared in extremis to realign our relationships, allowing others to take over responsibilities where we feel we cannot prevail without massive civilian casualties. The Falluja solution has not "worked" in Falluja as we would have liked. But it may still be a pattern that allows us to plan on exiting the country without a complete collapse of order within the next year. We should with our allies in the interim government think in terms of how we may maintain and service and secure "half a country" is we cannot reform it all. It is not in our interest, and not in that of Iraqis, for American and "coalition" forces to remain indefinitely in Iraq because the security situation in some areas is not as we would like.

In monitoring the situation, the next critical point will be whether and with what success the government can hold the elections for the National Convention and the National Assembly that its members are to select. The Convention elections were to have been held in July, but were postponed for security reasons and to increase nationwide support for the process. They are now to be held in August. If nothing happens in August to carry this process forward, it will be an serious setback, no matter how unimportant we might think the Assembly would be.

In the last few days, al-Sadr has again called for a Jihad against Americans in Iraq. This has resulted in renewed fighting in many cities, but especially in the "Sadr City" section of Baghdad and the holy city of Najaf. In Baghdad fighting has been sporadic. The Mahdi Army still seems to be in effective control of this area. However, in Najaf the governor has gotten the U.S. Marines (who recently replaced the army) to help him and his police finally drive the Mahdi Army out of the city. The U.S. reports 300 killed, which may or may not be an exaggeration. In any event, there are many more captured and it appears as though the Sadrists are once again suffering heavy casualties. (The same story on a much less intensive basis is true in the other cities.)

The reason al-Sadr should once again challenge the Americans and the new government is unclear. But he may feel that with the gradual resumption of civilian courts and with a murder accusation against him outstanding, that allowing progress toward a more secure Iraq is dangerous for him. It is also possible that the Iranians, who readers may recall are said to assist all Shiite factions in Iraq, are supporting him more than in the past, thereby encouraging his efforts. This makes sense if we believe that the hard-line Iranians fear that a non-theocratic, majority Shiite Iraq would present a challenge to their system in Iran. Remember that the Khomeini brand of Shiism teaches that the Mojtahids should be directly involved in government, a concept enshrined in the Iranian Constitution. On the other hand, the Sistani brand of Shiism, generally more popular in both countries before the rise of Khomeini, teaches that religious leaders should not take a direct part in government.

Meanwhile al-Sistani left for Beirut shortly before the Najaf Governor ordered these attacks on the Mahdi Army. He is now going to London for treatment for a heart condition, supposedly not life threatening. It is unclear whether there is a connection. But it appears likely that he wanted to be out of the country when the Sadrists were attacked so that when he returns it will be all over and he would not have been implicated in it. Relations between him and al-Sadr are said to have been getting even worse in recent weeks. On the other side, al-Sadr had a sermon delivered that called the Americans the "worst Satans" and ascribed everything that has happened in Iraq to them (including the attacks on the Christian churches. Another Shi'a organization, the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq which has been cooperating with the government and the Americans, has said it was trying to work out another cease fire.

The new government of Iraq has been promoting amnesty ever since it got into office. It wanted the amnesty to be fairly broad, but supposedly at American urging, the new amnesty law excludes anyone who has been involved in killing Americans (or perhaps just killing anyone). There is argument that this makes the amnesty fairly uninteresting to the bulk of those who have been fighting our forces or those of the interim government.

It seems to me that we either have to think of ourselves as engaged in a "war" or not. As some readers will remember, I have thought that speaking of a war against terrorism is foolishness. Terrorism is a concept; we cannot fight concepts. Also, terrorism has always been with us, so in the nature of things, this would be a war we could not win. Such an understanding of war would seem to justify the kind of eternal war footing that was the basis for rule in Huxley's Brave New World. On the other hand, we are, I believe, fighting a kind of war against al-Qaida. We were definitely fighting a war against Iraq. When we attacked we were at war. This meant that the people who opposed us were also at war. They fought us. Now when the first phase of this was over I do not believe anyone with authority surrendered Iraq to us. Clearly those who continued the fight have not seen themselves as having surrendered.

This being the case, it would seem prudent to imagine a day in which the warring parties might come together to discuss a peace. I realize no one on their side could really end it all. But they might be able to speak for certain units. This would mean that we, the interim government, and perhaps other parties should be thinking about the conditions that might be demanded or accepted at such a juncture. With such an understanding of the possibilities, it seems ill advised for the United States to demand that there be no talk of amnesty with anyone who has been involved in killing.

The number of U.S. military fatalities reported in July averaged 1.87 per day. This was a slight increase over June, but still well below May and less than half April's rate. Figures on casualties among Iraqis, military or civilian are hard to come by. One suspects from the flow of news that they have increased considerably more than the military in the last month. Most of the action now seems directed by Iraqis at Iraqis. Clearly, there have not been any breakthroughs in this war that can be documented from the figures. Psychologically, on the one hand, people, even soldiers, get used to a certain level of loss. On the other hand, many tire of the losses and simply look for a way out — as apparently have an increasing number of Christians recently. They are fleeing to Iraq where they feel welcome (Note: this is the other Baath party dictatorship, but for minorities dictators can be protectors.)

The wave of kidnappings or hostage taking continues. A few have been executed. Several suppliers of drivers etc. have ceased operations. However, as has been suggested before, the nature of the enterprise is moving in a more material and less ideological direction. A number of hostages have been let go for one or another reason. One of those freed said his kidnappers simply wanted money. The tribal leader near Falluja who has been trying to bargain for the freedom of some of the hostages has been promoting the idea of negotiations with the kidnappers. I believe this is the same tribal leader who managed (he says) to break into a house yesterday in Falluja and free four of the hostages without bloodshed.

The number of attacks in Afghanistan is steadily increasing. Most of these are against civilians, and they are largely in the Pashto areas of the East and South. Nevertheless, neither the stronger foreign nor Afghan forces in the field seem to be able to make a difference in the toll. The fact that Doctors Without Borders felt they had to leave, because of the killing of staff members and what they felt was an inadequate response, was a bad sign. It still seems safer in Kabul than in Baghdad, but outside the city it is another story.

The Taliban and their allies (Hekmatyar and al-Qaida) are obviously aided by many who sympathize with them on the Pakistani side of the border. This includes most of the tribes and some in the Pakistani military. Yet our hands are tied. Musharref is the only one able to hold Pakistan together as even a part-time ally. We can threaten and cajole, but we do not want to take on the whole of Pakistan to make the border area safer.

The problem is further complicated by the falling out between Karzai and his defense minister Fahim (actually one of the leading warlords). Fahim now says he will switch his support to an alternative candidate for President. How this split will effect an election where I assume most of the votes in each area of the country will be determined by which faction is most powerful on the ground in that area is now cast in some doubt.

Karzai and his foreign supporters are faced with another dilemma. The Taliban forbade the growing of opium (although they greatly profited from opium already grown). Their defeat has led to an explosion of opium production to the point where the prices have collapsed. But even with these low prices, it remains the main cash crop for most Afghan farmers. The government has declared it illegal to grow. But the people continue to openly grow it, thereby weakening the government in everyone's eyes. No one in power has the will with elections in the offing to take on the unpopularity that a real anti-opium drive would entail.

Again, we have a problematic regime and people that need a major sustained effort by the outside world even to continue functioning, leave along achieve a reasonable level of democracy. Half measures and 20,000 Americans will not do it.

Terrorism and extremism have always been regarded as two sides of the same coin. The rise of Islamic extremism is only the latest chapter in this story. But unfortunately the situation worldwide seems to be getting more serious as time passes. Conservative Christianity seems to be getting stronger rather than weaker as time passes in the United States. Its adherents seem more and more fascinated with questions of heaven and hell and the end of the world through a cataclysmic return of Christ. The lack of any public education for millions of children in Muslim and part-Muslim states has led to its replacement in many areas by schools teaching a barren and fanatical Islamic education. This tendency is echoed in a small way in America, for we learn that the primary reason for the rapid growth of "home schooling" in this country is a growing desire to give children a more Christian education than the public schools offer. The problem with all extremisms is that they feed on one another: in the fifties, the rabid anticommunist was confirmed in his beliefs by the rabid communist; today the rabid Christian by the rabid Muslim.

I do not know if it was by plan or coincidence, but in today's paper an Op-Ed discussion of fundamentalism as the greatest threat to democracy in Africa, particularly in Nigeria, was echoed in an accompanying Op-Ed by a discussion of the rise of fanatic Jewish groups, particularly on the frontier between Arabs and Jews in Palestine. To the fanatics, the Arabs across the border are just not another people, but are "Amalekites", the same "snakes" that attacked Moses during the exodus. Remember that to many conservative Christians, including a high ranking General who I believe is still in the Bush administration, Muslims represent Satan, and the Jews represent a people who will rightly reclaim Palestine before Armageddon (a blessed but messy event that will save all believing Christians). To this minority the justice and inevitability of an American crusade in the Middle East is as firmly believed as the idea that our forces in Iraq are crusaders that have come to extirpate Islam is believed by many extremist Muslims.

It may seem hard for an outsider to imagine, but it seems that there are groups of Jews, particularly among the settlers and their allies who believe that Ariel Sharon by even discussing the possibility of giving up some settlements or the Gaza Strip has forfeited his right to life. For this offense against God, hundreds are evidently talking of the need to assassinate him before it is too late. These are no idle threats: Rabin was similarly charged and was killed. The point of the Op-Ed is to plead for a more active and verbal stance by American Orthodox rabbis against such talk.

In Nigeria, Pakistan, and much of the Muslim world, the problem is the rise of fanatics who demand that Islamic law be given precedent over civil law, or, indeed, become the civil law. Since Islamic Law is by no means unitary (there are many schools even within Sunnism and the Shi'a-Sunni clash is bound to be exacerbated by such preaching), this demand is a recipe for disaster even within states that are uniformly "Muslim". In a state such as Nigeria where Muslims and Christians divide up the turf fairly evenly among themselves and many less significant groups, fanaticism of any kind makes the state less governable. It also interferes with international programs such as polio vaccination or the provision of food aid that have been severely set back by fundamentalist and quite irrelevant beliefs.

Yesterday we discussed the deteriorating situation in much of Africa. Theroux concluded from his trip through the continent that being a policeman was little more than a license to steal. Although the end of apartheid has brought a advances in equality in South Africa, it has also been followed by a rise in criminal activity. Its murder and rape rates are nearly the highest in the world (Swaziland is higher). Wednesday's paper offered an extended account of the startling collapse in recent years of the Argentine police force, particularly in Buenos Aires Province. Apparently the police have organized themselves into crime squads to such an extent that some believe the only hope is to fire the entire department and start over. Much the same has been said about the police in Mexico City. Peru is again mired in corruption. A just released U.S. intelligence report tells us that Columbia's President Uribe was in the early nineties a close associate of the country's leading drug lords. The collapse of order in Haiti seems to have no solution.

These are not isolated events. There has been a great deal of international attention given recently the control of corruption, but the collapse of law in many cases takes us far beyond the usual topics of corruption analysis. We are faced with a collapse of order without which no institutions can continue to function. The result is in the first instance increased pressure on anyone with property or hopes for a better life to emigrate out of the afflicted states, with the natural result an increase of pressure on the security services in states that still have reasonably effective legal orders.

Again, taking us back to the question of terrorism, controlling the worldwide threat from al-Qaida and like-minded groups is rendered problematic to the extent that American intelligence and enforcement agencies are compelled to cooperate with failed states and criminal police forces. Here is another front that must be opened in our struggle.

I have no well thought-out suggestions. I know that USAID and other aid agencies have made efforts to improve legal and judicial systems in many countries. But again, this does not seem to have been enough. A different level of action may be needed. One idea would be to help countries that still have reasonably responsible military forces to help train them to temporarily take over police functions as a last resort. (In other countries, where the military is itself the problem and the police are reasonably responsible, the opposite might be done — but this is harder.)

As an earlier post suggested, we are unable to adequately respond to the Darfur tragedy partly because of the squandering of our resources on Middle East adventures. But a recent Op-Ed by a Somali woman reminded me once again of how much larger the problem is than Darfur. As she points out, Somalia is no longer a country. Abandoned by the outside world, the area that was once Somalia is controlled, when controlled at all, by a maze of warring groups. If they have the courage, anyone can come and go at will. Kenyans, Ethiopians, Americans and others come in for short stays for their own purposes, but are soon gone. Public education is extinct. The only education is Islamic and in Arabic, which of course is not actually their language. Everybody's property has been taken, so there is no longer any incentive for normal economic activity. One wonders how we can hope to rid the world of Islamic terrorism when this future Taliban Afghanistan festers in East Africa.

We are reminded of the larger dimensions of the problem by a review of Theroux's latest book, "Black Star Safari" by Dan Blatt at his excellent web site: Futurecasts. Theroux records a trip he recently took down the only trans-Africa road, Cairo to Cape Town. It is a dismal record of extreme poverty, failed aid programs, and hopelessly corrupt and noncaring governments. A student of Africa for forty years, Theroux sees most of the continent steady going backwards. We have known this for a long time now. Once hopeful exceptions such as Ivory Coast and Zimbabwe have recently been added to the sorry list. Congo is a running sore that will not heal. To say African countries need more democracy is hardly sufficient (Uganda with less is much more promising than Kenya with more).

What the situation cries out for is an international consortium that would devise a plan to make over Africa. This would require the commitment of large sums of men and materiel. It would require massive interference in internal affairs. The demands of the consortium would be rejected by most governments. But perhaps not all. If the consortium could get an agreement from local parties and the United Nations to take over the direction of one country and succeeded in that, it might be able to move on to others. One thinks of Somalia as a country that the world might agree to have managed in this way. But getting local agreement there would be difficult.

This may be a wrong-headed or simply impossible approach, but the usual political, economic, or financial palliatives are not working. Theroux would have us stop aiding these countries; he believes foreign aid simply makes the rich richer and the rest beggars. But his approach is also hardly a panacea.

Without responsible governments, the continent will become a haven for the worst of people and the worst of diseases. It is remarkable that in our election season neither candidate has much to say about Africa. But whoever is elected, it must be high on next year's agenda.

Today, the urgency of the latest alarm over an al-Qaida attack in the United States seems to have receded. It is now seems agreed, as many suggested earlier, that the detailed planning that had been reported was several years old.

But this time, the warning was a little more believable, because its specificity caused an Orange alert to only affect a few defined targets in New York, Newark (unlikely I would think) and Washington D.C. The emphasis was to be financial institutions and the means were to be truck bombs, whether suicidal or not we do not know.

This makes us consider response horizons for events or nonevents like this. How many times can we have such false alerts and not have everyone take them less than seriously? During an alert that seems real, what measures could or should be taken? It would depend I suppose on how the information and the subsequent scenario plays out. One could shut down a city or a large part of it (for example, close all bridges leading into Manhattan, clear the sky of all planes over the New York area). But the country cannot afford at this juncture to take such extreme actions very often or keep them up indefinitely.

One time period that they should be intensely considered, however, is while an attack may be underway. Al-Qaida seems to like to have as series of attacks grouped together. This implies that as soon as one attack is reported, the system should immediately attempt to cut off or lessen the effect of other attacks that might be on the list. This is obviously a difficult task, but it is not necessarily hopeless, as a reconsideration of 9/11 might show.

Then in the immediate aftermath, after we assume that there is no more to this "series", we must attempt to do two things. First, we must try to immediately exploit any leads that the series has opened up, stop the uncontrolled movement of people out of the country and out of certain defined areas for at least a short time. Second, we must reassure the people and get the country functioning again as soon as possible. The emphasis this time cannot be on how incomparable the tragedy is for the country. It must rather try in a thoughtful and kind manner to put the destruction that has occurred and may occur in any more near-term events in perspective. London lived through a blitz with many more deaths and injured. Pearl Harbor was destructive, but we came back rapidly. "We will this time and this is how we are going to do it."

Finally, in the period of excitement following another "event" we should take care to not make attacks on other countries based on the heated intelligence of the moment. There is very little that cannot be done as effectively after more consideration of who was directly or indirectly responsible and of the best means to attacks these actors.

Cole reports that Allawi recently cancelled his planned visit to Iran apparently because of claimed Iranian interference in Iraq. Iran's press has been attacking Iraq's Minister of Defense and vice-versa. Iran has also condemned the idea of sending a Saudi force into Iraq. Cole fears that the new PM, Defense and Interior ministers, although Shiite, are essentially seculars more able and willing to get along with Sunni Kuwaitis and Saudis than with Iran. The government also arrested one of al-Sadr's leaders in Karbala. The more religious Shiites may feel that they are being left out (although I see little evidence of that yet). We should watch to see whether this odd scenario of the Shiite government acting as a "Trojan Horse" to turn the government back over to the Baath pans out. It seems most unlikely to me. The critical issue will be whether the leading conservative Shi'a group remains an active participant in the national congress to national assembly process this month.

Today the news is of a group of coordinated attacks against churches in Iraq, four in Baghdad and one in Mosul. The attacks did not seem to be too destructive, killing perhaps as many Muslims as Christians. But they came at the time of services for maximum effect. I doubt very much whether such attacks win the insurgents many points with average Iraqis. (Most Christians in the country come from an ancient population predating Islam, so are hardly considered "foreigners" by Iraqis.) This is certain to confirm the opposition to the insurgency of the 3% or more who are Christians.

But this ties into another piece of news: the danger to terrorists of its routinization. After only a few months, even hostage taking and beheading are reported to be fading into the background of Iraqi consciousness, just as the Abu Ghraib atrocities seem to. This short attention span, a product I would argue of populations increasingly glued to their televisions, forces the terrorists to devise ever new means of gaining attention. It is probably a losing game. For instead of concentrating on what would hurt the interim government the most (such as attacks on police, political leaders, and infrastructure) they concentrate on what makes the "biggest splash", driving them into ever more questionable tactics.

The United Nations in the end got its way: the National Conference has been postponed so that more groups can be enticed into taking part. I was rather partial to the Iraqi argument that it was best to keep to a schedule, but the UN seems to have more on its side than I thought. It is also true that the more the Interim Government cooperates with the UN, the less it seems to be a tool of the United States. In theory anything that internationalizes the effort should help the image problems of both the United States and the new government.

The kidnapping campaign threatens to have a damaging psychological result, in that several countries are starting to withdraw or talk of withdrawing their small contingents. It is hard for their governments to resist, since back home the clamor of the "It's not our war" crowd is greatly intensified with each kidnapping. The effect on transportation into the country by the kidnapping of truck drivers may be more materially threatening to the new government. I have seen no estimate of how many foreign drivers there are. However, since so many Iraqis are out of work, and there seem to be long lines of those willing to join its even more dangerous security services, it should be possible to rapidly replace foreign drivers with Iraqi drivers. If training is necessary that should not take so long either. In any event, we have again to give credit to the insurgents for finding useful strategies to cause trouble if nothing else.

At the same time as some foreigners on the government side are leaving, there is talk of others coming in. The Saudis have the most talked about proposal now, but Jordanians, Bahrainis, Egyptians Pakistanis and others have also been discussed as possible sources of military forces. The Prime Minister said a little while back that he would be glad to have Muslims, but not from neighboring countries. (He said he feared "interference", which he no doubt does fear from Syria, run by another Baath party, and Iran with its special take on democracy.) Unfortunately, Saudi Arabia is also a neighboring country. Interesting to see how this all plays out. This internationalization of the effort could set the stage for an American withdrawal without loss of face, IF the foreign forces are adequately trained and motivated. There is also now an agreement to send a few NATO officers and men to conduct training in the near future. This should be all to the good.

Yesterday, the worst suicide bomber attack since the interim government was established took place in Baquba. Marked by violence in the recent past, Baquba is a town divided between Sunni and Shi'a. Many of those killed (all were Iraqis) were lining up for jobs in the police force. A policeman had evidently gone down the line just before the blast warning the people in line that they were setting up a target. It is quite possible that this was a Sunni versus Shi'a event, for the Shi'a may be more likely here to want to join the police. However, it was not so described. The Shi'a seem more inclined to the new government; the Sunni more fearful of eventual loss of status. There were apparently many Iraqis on the street who said this violence was senseless (but we do not know their affiliation). My guess would be that the suicide bomber was a Sunni, either a foreigner or one connected to the foreigners.

The bulk of the Sunni Arab population must be seriously conflicted. They hate the occupation and the loss of status that goes with Saddam's downfall. But they also want the killing to end. As long as it goes on they are in personal danger. If the new government cannot control the killing, they would be willing to consider an alternative that would stop it. They can imagine a Sunni dominated authoritarian regime emerging that might be in their long-term interest. But they know such a government can only emerge after the new government fails and the Americans leave (and how likely is the latter as long as security is not established?) They would accept nondemocracy, but would it be secular nationalist or jihadist? Most Sunni Arabs have gotten used to a secular life under Saddam and are probably loathe to give this up. The foreigner insurgents are Muslims, but they are still foreigners who do not seem to care how many Iraqis they kill.

The Sunni Kurds are conflicted in other ways. Many have gotten used to being a part of Iraq. For them, Baghdad is their capital too. The Kurds back in the enclaves, meanwhile, have gotten used to a relatively free and secular way of life outside of the control of Baghdad. Most of the violence in the enclaves is homegrown. This is not too bothersome, for they are used to that. What they have to decide is how important Iraq is for them as a community, and as individuals separately. They know they do not want to be part of a Sunni Arab state, nationalist or not. Whether they can accept being a minor part of a Shi'a dominated, more or less democratic, state is less clear. They know that whatever initial guarantees they may obtain, once their forces are dispersed in a new dispensation, these guarantees can be torn up.

I suspect that for most Shi'a, particularly outside the Sunni Triangle, issues are clearer. They know they have a chance to rule for the first time in their history if progress toward democracy continues. Although they may hate the Americans and may think the new regime is only a puppet regime, they know that the Americans do hold the Sunnis somewhat in check. For now Americans are the lesser evil. They hate most of these Arab foreigners with their suicide bombers because most of them are anti-Shi'a as well as anti-American. Some Shi'a want to recreate a secular state under democracy. But the Shi'a did not benefit from the Saddam state as much as the Sunni Arabs. So most Shi'a are probably not too sure just what the religious dimensions of the new state should be. The most aggressive leaders want a large religious component, but the most popular older generation of Shi'a leaders do not believe that the Ulema should take a direct part in running the state.

Two news items have dominated the last two days. First is the continuation of the kidnapping campaign that seems intended to drive out the truck drivers and other workers who are assisting the Americans and Iraqis in the country. Second is the selection of delegates to a National Conference of 1000 Iraqis that is to then turn around and select from among their number a 100 seat Transitional Council to help to balance the new interim executive until elections next year.

The kidnapping campaign seems on one level to be succeeding. The Filipinos have withdrawn their forces a few weeks before they planned to. The Jordanian truck company says it will cease operations to meet the kidnappers demand. Other countries have suggested a greater unwillingness to get their nationals involved. The situation remains confused, however, as the kidnappers let the Egyptian diplomat go. This leads to three thoughts. One, how do we and the government oppose this campaign? We can only hope that the new Iraqi intelligence agency can come up with some useful information quickly. Second, the kidnappers may well represent a variety of groups. The Indian government says it believes some are in it for the money; this may be true, as this is a development that has quickly occurred in analogous cases. Third, I know of no case where kidnapping has actually led to a victory of the kidnappers. It is more a terrorist tactic than a guerrilla or insurgency tactic. And terrorists seldom win.

The selection of delegates to the National Conference has been plagued by the abstention of a number of important groups in the country. The Muslim Scholars Association is staying out, as is Moqtada al-Sadr's group and several national factions. The United Nations has been urging delay until more groups can be brought on board. However, the Iraqi government insists on going ahead. There is evidence that the exercise has a surprising degree of support. This includes many groups that have not so far backed the interim government, including the Dawa Party, the largest Shiite party. It is also encouraging that one of the "problems" that the organizers have had is that too many(!) people have been competing for the seats in the Conference. In Baghdad, 436 are competing for 40 seats. In Kut 1200 for 22 seats, in Najaf, 920 for 20 seats. Remember that candidacies are announced publicly, names are posted, candidates work the crowds. This outpouring of candidacies shows remarkable courage, which in turn shows a great desire in the minds of a large number of people that something come of this exercise. So far the overall impression is certainly positive.

In the last two days, Richard Clarke, the government's former terrorism expert, and David Brooks, the somewhat conservative Times Op-Ed columnist, have taken off from the 9/11's report's criticism of the way in which the "war on terrorism" is understood and fought. All three point out, as we have several times here and on our terrorism site, that there cannot be a "war against terrorism", for terrorism is after all a concept or a tactic. Neither should we answer the call to wage war on all "terrorists". Rather, the government's urgent task is to oppose that group of Islamic jihadists who are loosely associated with the term al-Qaida. These writers conclude that what we are fighting is primarily an intellectual or ideological movement rather than a military one. Brooks believes we need to mount an intellectual counteroffensive, much as we did against communism in the Cold War. Clarke would emphasize the promotion of economic development and openness in the Islamic world, as well as the encouragement of Islamic scholars and others to compete more effectively with the message of the extremists.

All of this should be done. But yet we should remember that the democracies did not defeat communism by besting their ideologues. Communism collapsed because it was not able to provide for the spiritual and material needs of the people of communist countries as well as the democracies provide for these needs in the West. Communist countries failed to achieve the goals in power or territory or progress that their leaders had set for them. This suggests that the ideologies of al-Qaida, the Salafists, the Wahabis and other extremists will be defeated (1) to the extent that they fail to disestablish existing Islamic regimes, and (2) if they do disestablish such regimes, they will fail to the extent that they fail to satisfy the spiritual and material needs of their new subjects.

Afghanistan might be considered a test case. The Taliban won initially because they were able to provide the security that competing groups could not. They were in turn rather easily defeated by the United States and its Northern Alliance allies because the Taliban had failed once in power to improve the lives of average Afghans. If the Taliban comes back to power, it will be because of the continuing low level of security in the country and the relative failure (partly as a result) of economic development outside Kabul. In this real and hypothetical struggle, the ideology of the Taliban will have neither been defeated nor will it have "won". Of course, the weak moral standards of the anti-Taliban (in areas such as corruption and cooperation) has helped the Taliban's position while the moral repression that attends Taliban rule has caused many to abandon their cause.

This suggests that the first task of an anti-al Qaida struggle will be to make sure that it does not achieve another beachhead like it did in Afghanistan, and to help in the recovery of any beachheads that it does achieve. This is primarily a military and police task. The second task is to make regimes threatened by al-Qaida meet the spiritual and economic needs of their peoples. By "spiritual" we do not mean only or primarily "religious". We include needs such as those for self-expression, freedom from fear, access to education, and hope for the future. We include freedom from humiliation, a feeling of pride that is composed of a combination of feelings of national, sectarian, tribal, familial, and personal pride. These are the fronts on which we must work, fronts more educational and developmental than ideological. To achieve these we must also help in the creation and maintenance of an international order that balances the needs and aspirations of peoples in a manner that appears fairer to those affected than is often the case today. This is partly a sales job, but it is sales job whose clients are all peoples, not just those of the Islamic world.

Juan Cole in his latest thinks that another Bush administration would lead to an invasion of Iran. I do not know if this is necessarily so, but there certainly has been and continues to be a group in the White House that thinks this way, and has thought so since Iran was included in the Axis of Evil. There are also the nagging problems of Iran's continued playing with the idea of developing a nuclear weapon, a weapon that apparently many otherwise Western-oriented Iranians do not see why they should not have. There is also the matter of allowing al-Qaida agents to cross the country. This was at a time that Iran and the United States were acting like allies in bringing down the Taliban. One can only conclude that, like Pakistan, there is a group within the security services of Iran that thinks and acts quite differently than the government itself. Iran has also supported groups that the Israelis like to think of as terrorists, but are actually part of a national struggle against Israel. Their support for these groups is a major reason that the Iran haters would like to attack.

There are two major reasons that we should not attack Iran, almost no matter what the provocation. First, Iran is a much larger country than Iraq, in population in square miles, and in resources. Again, initially we might easily break through the country's defenses, but again this could lead to endless struggle against a people much larger and more united than the Iraqis.

There is also the important matter of human rights. Many people think that we were justified in going into Iraq primarily because it was under the rule of a monster and a monstrous system. Saddam was willing to sacrifice millions to his megalomania. We could find similar reasons to go into North Korea, with an even more egregiously evil government, and perhaps into Sudan and a few other states. However, Iran does not belong in this group. It is governed by a mixed theocratic-democratic system. Many liberals are being imprisoned and otherwise squelched. But it nevertheless has one of the most vibrant movie industries in the world. Unlike most of the Islamic world, its women take an active part in public life, restricted primarily by clothing requirements much less rigorous than those in Saudi Arabia or most of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Unlike North Korea and its peers, the Iranian government reacts to international pressure, relaxing its oppressions on many occasions to satisfy this audience. If we were to attack Iran for human rights violations we would have a long list of perhaps forty other states that should be on our agenda.

We cannot operate in the world in this way. Nor can we justify the casualties that inevitably accompany war in enterprises with a justification as flimsy as we would have in this case.

The 9/11 Commission Report recommends that major changes be made in our intelligence services. I have commented previously on what I think of this.

However, the key problem with the 9/11 report is how the problem is defined. The problem is in the first instance not the organization of intelligence but the organization of homeland defense. This is not the job of Tom Ridge no matter what the title of his office. Ridge was a Governor and his interests are essentially bureaucratic. He sees his job as organizing national resources of men and materiel at every level to respond to the manifold possibilities of terrorism. But in another crisis and in the weeks leading up to it what I would want to have is a military command responsible for immediate action. We that the presidential and NSC response to the actual 9/11 was chaotic and confused. The President and his office are not set up to handle this kind of emergency. We do need something new, but that new is a separate branch of the Department of Defense focusing on timely response to threats to the American homeland. This person should answer to the Chief of Staff on the one hand and to the President on the other.

This chief of this projected "Homeland Security Command" would be the person responsible if there were another 9/11 or comparable attack. The "buck would stop" at this person's doorstep. Notice the difference between this and an intelligence "czar". The intelligence czar's job would be to coordinate knowledge and reporting, not coordinate action and response. The intelligence czar would look for flaws and incompleteness in the reporting process, in the lack of communication among agencies. Such a czar could not have prevented 9/11. He might have improved the flow of information to the President and his staff. But they have such a broad agenda, and 9/11s come so intermittently, that even the best reporting might have gotten lost in the shuffle. Since the czar would not command forces, he would not be the person to demand information in a timely fashion for action. The very existence of the new Commander of Homeland Security, his responsibility, would make him demand of all the intelligence agencies the type of coordinated and useful information that they failed to provide before 9/11. If he had existed, and if this had been his only responsibility, he could easily have gathered much more actionable information than was gathered from the intelligence agencies as they already exist, and he could have acted on this information as no one else could. Whether this would have been enough to prevent the tragedy, one cannot say.

Professor Juan Cole, an authority on Shi'a history and Iraq produces a highly informative blog on Iraq and related matters. Read this at Juan Cole. As was pointed out in previous references, he is an academic who long ago decided that President Bush and company have been dreadfully wrong. His animus is great enough that he finds it hard to believe anything is going right in Iraq. Nevertheless, he has many personal contacts on the inside and continually reviews a wide variety of outside sources. What he comes up with is invaluable (I wonder if our intelligence services know as much about what is going on as he does.) Here let me just make a few comments on information gleaned from his latest posts.

First, he reports the killing of the acting Governor of Basra. His informants tell him that this is particularly important since the government of Basra has generally been supported by the people. In fact, the relatively free movement within Basra is one reason why it was so easy to pull off an assassination like this. It appears that some elements of the insurgency are uninterested in the character of the individuals killed. They only want to prove their power and sow havoc.

Second, he reports on a variety of fights within the Iraqi community, both among those who otherwise support the government and those who do not. In the Kirkuk region, the Kurds and Arabs are engaged in a particularly vicious sub-rosa struggle that involves the capturing of the children of one another's leaders. In Mosul, one of the Turkoman leaders was recently killed. The Turkoman community feels they are not being given sufficient attention and perhaps the Kurds or Arabs are fighting back. Turkey nearby is thought to be a supporter of their interests, something that may come up later. Within Baghdad and the Triangle there is continued struggle among Shi'a and Sunni, but also within both of these camps. Recently a leading Sunni divine was killed, probably by Baath or Salafist (extreme Sunnis) parties. Within the Shi'a world the standoff continues between al-Sadr and the rest, with al-Sadr apparently gaining some allies while he loses out on other fronts.

Again, I would emphasize that the insurgency seems doomed as long as it is merely destructive, sowing division and terror. They continue to operate without offering a plan to the people. Indeed, they could not have a plan when the extremist Sunni Islamists want a Sunni Shari'a-ruled state and the revolutionary Shi'a of the Mahdi Army want the same, only Shi'a, not Sunni. The nationalists, who may in fact have the most money and expertise, regardless of their numbers, simply want a modern, nationalist Iraq with themselves in charge.

There continues to be discussion in Washington of proposals to reorganize the intelligence services. The most talked about suggestion is that there should be appointed a new "czar" of intelligence with "cabinet rank". This evidently does not mean that individuals in this position would serve at the pleasure of particular administrations, since one of the proposals is that an appointee should have a guaranteed term of ten years. Yet essentially the new person would not be free of political pressure (remember Tenet was a Clinton appointee who was absorbed into the Bush administrative structure with what may have been disastrous results.)

Today, the Times reported the "amazing fact" that a relatively small intelligence agency in the State Department, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, with "only" 165 analysts (compared to over 3000 in the CIA) seemed to have understood intelligence issues during the critical period leading up to 9/11 and the Iraq War better than the larger agencies. Its staff members tend to remain in I&R for relatively long periods, and to specialize in particular fields for longer than their counterparts. Even though its staff is not privy to all the information the CIA or DIA might have, its academically recruited experts appear to do a much better job of analyzing available data.

This "amazing fact" brings me back to my favorite idea of fully funding several intelligence agencies such as I&R and then maintaining them indefinitely in a private-public sector. One might be a contract agency attached to the RAND Corporation. Another might be a special part of the GAO, and therefore funded by Congress. Another might be a purely private agency funded by extremely wealthy individuals in a consortium perhaps with leading universities. The heart of the concept is that these sources of analysis should be separate from any government or administration pressure and that they should be able to recruit as full-time employees and consultants some of the best intellects and most knowledgeable persons in the country. Some staff members or consultants would want to have clearances; others would prefer not. In any event, these are the types of people that should be regularly going over threat assessments and the quality of our responses. They should report in a variety of ways. But over time I would suspect that no administration would be able to ignore what they have to say.

With car bombs and assassinations continuing in Iraq, it seems perverse to write about "improvement". But as long as the overall direction continues to be positive, there is improvement. One can only hope that soon this "improvement" will occur quickly enough that the interim government will still have enough members to function. Let us look at the good straws:

(1) Foreign reporters feel that they can now go more freely into the field; this after several months of staying holed up in the safer Baghdad enclaves. This does not mean that it is not still dangerous in the field. It is. But the tension is going down. They particularly note that they are more likely these days to be welcomed by those they encounter than they were a few weeks ago.

(2) The Prime Minister announced that he has ordered the reopening of the newspaper of the Mahdi Army, Al Hawza. Remember that it was the closing of this paper by the Americans that sparked the al-Sadr rebellion a few months ago. This move has risks, but for now it is welcomed by many, and it seems part of a more general, if sputtering, rapprochement between the government and Moqtada al-Sadr.

(3) At a about the same time as the announcement, it was announced that the Americans had again made an air strike on what they described as an Zarqawi position in Fallujah. But this time, it was announced that the attack was made only after the interim government gave its blessing.

(4) The new American Ambassador, Negroponte, is going out of his way to be less visible, for example by excluding TV cameras from his briefings. Iraqi security personnel are taking the lead in more sweeps, especially in Baghdad. Iraq's Second Battalion now prides itself in making sweeps without any American presence. This approach appears to result in a much more welcoming public.

The latest news is that with the encouragement of the FBI, the CIA is sending a force into the field to brief local communities around the country on the terrorism threat. This is not a matter of briefing communities on which the CIA has particular information, or which are located near to a possible target (such as a nuclear power facility or a large dam). No, it is simply telling people everywhere what to watch for and how to respond when terrorism strikes.

As we have discussed before in these posts, the Homeland Security program that attempts to reach into every village and town is itself a major misplacement of priorities. Now we are adding to the CIA agenda an equally foolish job. Of course, one can say that terrorism can strike anywhere and it can. But we must spend our resources in men and materiel and attention on the higher priorities. If Homeland Security and the CIA have done all they can to protect major identifiable targets, such as the major cities, Boulder Dam and the Golden Gate Bridge, then let them gradually move down the list to less probable targets.

I try not to think that such exercises are actually undertaken to keep the entire country in a general state of low-level panic, thereby increasing the power of government and protecting the incumbency of the President. A alternate explanation is that this is just an another example of bureaucratic expansionism, fueled in part by the use of the over-general term "terrorism" (which can include high school bombers) rather than that of our real enemy today, identified loosely with the term "al-Qaida".

Today's news from Iraq is as confusing as ever. Zarqawi was quick to claim "credit" for the assassination of the governor of Ninevah. However, this may be a false claim. His group claimed that he had been beheaded, when he was killed in an ambush. Of course, this could be just a figure of speech, but in the context of recent actual beheadings this seems unlikely.

The Mahdi Army of al-Sadr is congratulating itself on helping the police put down common criminals in their recent sweeps. In spite of their bravado and continued anti-Americanism, such cooperation can only be seen as a good sign.

The American army reports that it is involved in a complex game of measure and countermeasure with groups setting roadside bombs. Evidently, we have been steadily improving our means of detecting such devices, while the Iraqi insurgents have been steadily improving their ability to defeat our detection devices. The army's judgment is that the people behind this campaign are highly skilled technicians. The army also seems to believe (on what evidence is unclear) that some of those involved in this game are doing it simply for the money rather than out of dedication to a cause. Whatever the case, it would seem to me that this is more likely the work of the old Baath rather than Zarqawi's fanatics — but in this confusing world it is hard to be sure.

Today Kristof, the Op-Ed writer, asks us to take seriously the implications of the "Left Behind" series of evangelical thrillers based on a reading of the Christian "Book of Revelations". In the latest, "Glorious Appearing", Jesus returns to earth to kill all non-Christians, perhaps better said, to kill all persons who have not accepted him as their saviour. When Jesus speaks, the bodies of nonbelievers are ripped open in a mass extinction that causes their flesh to dissolve and their eyes to melt until they finally "rattle to the pavement". To me, this seems little more than another example of the exploitation of violence that is rampant in popular "cultural" life today. The only difference is that "Glorious Appearing", the best-selling series of adult novels in America today, has sold 60 million copies worldwide.

As Kristof points out, were such a movie to be produced in Saudi Arabia, depicting the spiritually justified and remorseless massacre of Christians or Jews as its subject matter, our press and our Congress would be infuriated, demand an investigation, perhaps even sever relations with the offending state.

To this point Kristof makes sense. We surely must remove the "motes from our eyes". We must be aware of how our literature looks to others, and we must be willing to talk about the aspects of our literature that promote intolerance at home and abroad. We must not give intolerance "a pass". But then Kristof goes on to say: "People have a right to believe in a racist God, or a God who throws millions of nonevangelicals into hell. I don't think that we should ban books that say that. But we should be embarrassed when our best-selling books gleefully celebrate religious intolerance and violence against infidels."

Is this it? We should be embarrassed? Years of dedication to absolutist positions in the media on freedom of expression and religious freedom cause Kristof to go no further. But I disagree. We are engaged in a worldwide cultural struggle that too easily degenerates into violence, so far not seriously in this country, but certainly in the Middle East, parts of Africa, and South and Southeast Asia. It is doubtful that we can continue to countenance in our society the acceptance of expressions of hatred that explicitly or implicitly advocate the death and destruction of masses of people. If the Japanese had been quicker to understand the writings of the Aum Shinrikyo, they would have avoided the Sarin attack in the subways (as well as the much more serious catastrophes that nearly occurred as a result of their doctrines). Germany after World War II decided it could not live with certain forms of the expression of Nazi ideology. It is not true, as I read today on a pedophilia web site, that "if you ban ANYTHING, it leads to tyranny!" Germany has not become a tyranny because of its anti-Nazi laws. In a world of terror we should come to the same conclusion as the Germans, for ourselves, and eventually for the international community. We can no longer live with the idea that all expression must be given a pass in a free society, no matter its implications. In the modern world, "Left Behind" is equivalent to a cry of "fire" in a crowed theatre.

Rethinking freedom of expression seriously, not in the casual manner of the Patriot Act, should be high on the liberal agenda. This does not mean checking on the reading habits of library patrons. It does not mean arresting people for their beliefs. But it does mean that certain inflammatory modes of expression and groups of ideas need to be regulated. Just exactly how this is done, and where the lines are drawn, will not be easy, and will take years of legislation and interpretation, building on decisions and laws that are a basic part of our tradition. I doubt if our society and international society can hold together if our publicists and liberals continue to espouse an absolutist position on freedom of expression or religious freedom.

The violence in Iraq continues. But it also continues to take on a more promising coloration.

First, a couple of days ago the Iraqi policemen rounded up nearly 500 persons suspected of criminal rather than insurgent/terrorist activity. Apparently in the streets of Baghdad, the fear of the average person is at least as much a fear of violent crime as it is of being caught in the crossfire of the internal warfare. This kind of crackdown is likely to be widely applauded on the streets. It is also good for morale, since while policemen were killed in the effort, it remains quite a bit easier to move against street criminals than against the better armed and motivated insurgents. Unlike insurgents in some areas, the criminals are unlikely to be able to rely on a friendly a population base.

It should be noted in passing that what is judged to be common criminality is often a spin-off of insurgent violence. For one thing, insurgent success often clears the streets of the police force that criminals would otherwise confront. In addition, in many insurgencies idealistic violence frequently degenerates into self-interested violence. Initial reasons for the change can come from the need for money and arms by any insurgent group as well as the natural rivalries of subgroup leaders (who become gang leaders) within any violent movement. To a lesser degree, this transformation also happens within the armed forces and police on the "government side". The end result in Colombia, for example, has been a transformation of the "insurgency" problem into that of controlling a variety of large gangs fighting one another largely for economic gain (fueled here by drugs), as well as a need for a widespread purging of the security forces.

Second, the suicide attack yesterday in the middle of Baghdad was directed entirely at Iraqis. Similar in nature was the ambush and killing of the new Governor of Ninevah Province (Mosul) in the North. The Governor was apparently a well-liked individual who had striven to bring together the many ethnic groups in his area. Both of these events will maintain a high level of fear. But neither is likely to be popular with more than a small segment of Iraqi public opinion.

Americans continue to be killed. They continue to become involved in fire fights, such as one yesterday in which Marines turned an attack on their position into the killing of 20 insurgents. But the overall impression is that battle casualties continue to go down, Americans are initiating fewer contacts, and, as important, fewer Iraqi civilians are being killed by American soldiers or by American support planes attacking insurgent positions. Perhaps our forces should be doing more. There is much that could be done. The Governor was ambushed on a stretch of road well known for previous attacks. Yet if we can preserve our lower, less inflammatory profile, and the Iraqis can actually take over where we left off, our prospects are promising.

The continuing tragedy of Darfur represents a challenge to American foreign and defense policy that cannot be long deferred.

As most readers are aware, the story is this. The Darfur Province of western Sudan is inhabited by a number of Muslim ethnic groups. In very general terms, the problem of the area has been that the nomadic herdsmen in the drier north have developed increasingly hostile relations with the farmers of the south. This has been exacerbated by population pressures and lack of sufficient moisture. On the political side, the larger farming community has felt neglected by the government. This feeling, as well as the knowledge of the relative success of the non-Muslim insurgency in the south, has led to the development of an independence movement in the province. Failing to put this down with government troops, the government enlisted the support of the "janjaweed", mounted ruffians recruited among the nomads, to solve their problem by driving the farmers out of the country. Together, the army and the janjaweed have succeeded in driving hundreds of thousands, if not millions, off their farms and into refugee camps near Darfur cities and across the border in Chad. Hundred of villages may have been destroyed, with the houses burned and the livestock killed. In many villages the men have been killed and the women raped before being driven out. The evidence suggests an even worse campaign than the ethnic cleansing that occurred in parts of Bosnia.

At present, the chance of hundreds of thousands of additional deaths results from the inability of the international community to reach many of the displaced before they starve or die of disease. This inability is due to terrible roads and lack of cooperation, particularly by the Sudanese government, as well as by inadequate international response. In addition, in spite of many promises, the government seems both unwilling and unable to control the janjaweed. Cleansing is apparently continuing; certainly no one is being resettled back in their former communities.

Our commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan seem to rule out any major effort, such as that which occurred in Kosovo in defense of Albanians. The size of the problem also rules out an international effort such as saved the much smaller population of East Timor. Higher on the American national and even world security agenda must be the problem of North Korea, a country that one could say treats its whole population the way Sudan treats the people of Darfur — and in addition is somewhere between knowing how to make nuclear weapons and having them. In addition, Africa is ablaze with similar problems, although at present on a smaller scale. We have only to mention the ungovernable regions of the eastern Congo and Somalia.

If the international community gets its act together, and the United States must be a major actor here, we could pour a great deal more international assistance into the area and more quickly. This would greatly reduce the immediate suffering of over one million. However, this worthwhile rescue operation is not going to prove to the Sudanese and the international community that no government in the modern world can with impunity attack and destroy peoples within or without their boundaries.

Ideally, we would work out an agreement to mount another Kosovo operation, this time with a capable international force on the ground in support of an aerial offensive. Our argument in the Security Council would be that the developed world must prove to Africans that we value African lives and rights just as much as we value European or Indonesian. It would also be based on the experience that the Sudanese government is simply not a reliable partner for a long-term relief effort. Our goals here must be much more modest than in Iraq: no talk of instituting democracy, but rather of establishing a functioning society able to support itself with long-term international aid.

The likelihood the United States would undertake such a program is quite low. It would first require a commitment to spend a great deal more worldwide than we have been willing to do on both our military capacity and our foreign assistance programs. Intervention in the Sudan is not a program for budget cutters. It would also require that major American leaders, such as John Kerry, seriously address the issue. The popular response to such a proposal would be that we were taking on another entangling obligation at a time when we are just emerging (hopefully) from Iraq and Afghanistan, and still face the challenges of North Korea and global terrorism. Many Americans are familiar with the Sudan because of its problems in the south. But here American support was fueled largely by the fact that many southern rebels were Christians. Support for Muslims in the west could undercut what many believe is a growing acceptance by both sides of peace in the south — another reason for hesitancy.

To turn this policy stance around for Darfur and the Darfurs of the future, we badly need a long-term educational campaign in this country that teaches the importance of accepting the burden of responsibility that rests on the shoulders of the most powerful people in the world. At this moment in history, we do have unrivaled power and great wealth. But our people have still not accepted the fact that this places obligations on all Americans to play a leading role in the establishment of an international order that serves the interests of all peoples.

This morning's paper brings us a long discussion of the life and activities of the Jordanian who now goes by the name "Abu Musab al Zarqawi". The picture that comes across is that of a poor and confused young man who subsequently tried a number of avenues to make something of himself. He did poorly in school, being regarded by acquaintances as barely literate. He was not particularly religious; he drank heavily and had himself tattooed. In 1989 he went to Afghanistan to fight the Russians, but got there too late, so took to interviewing recent jihadists. At this time he was actually pro-American. Back in Jordan, he began associating with militants and ended up in jail. He also began to spend much of his time with the Quran. He became so attached to the Quran that he would attack those around him for reading anything else. In prison, he was into body building. Eventually he came to be seen as a leader, a "tough guy" who could boss others around simply because they were afraid of him. Released in an amnesty in 1999, he went back to Afghanistan where he set up a terrorist training camp. Soon he was forced to leave, ending up with the Ansar al-Islam in Iraqi Kurdistan. Subsequently, he is said to have slipped in and out of Jordan. He is accused of masterminding killings there and more recently in Iraq. He was sentenced in absentia in Jordan and we now have a $25 million reward out for his capture. However, our information is confused. Many doubt he is actually an al-Qaida agent, but then "al-Qaida" is both a meaningful and extremely loose designation. We do not seem to know whether he actually was the person who beheaded the American in the well-known video, or whether he actually wrote the 6700 word letter outlining a strategy for dragging Iraq into civil war. Those who know him say he was incapable of writing so well, and was also not a thinker able to conceive of grand strategies. Perhaps "Zarqawi" is a smoke screen obscuring someone quite different.

What I find enlightening is how Zarqawi's story fits in with the stories of other terrorists as described in the government report "Who Becomes a Terrorist and Why?" (a staff report of the Library of Congress edited by Rex Hudson, 1999). The pattern that such studies find is in fact no pattern. Terrorists are well educated and poorly educated, at the top of their class, early dropouts. After a confused searching around for a direction, or, perhaps better, for a way to make something of themselves, they fall into terrorism almost by chance. Once they become involved, surrounded by a small group of persons similarly involved and similarly "wanted", they become emotionally trapped into a way of life from which there are few exits. Terrorists are not as a group distinguished by any distinctive deprivations or attacks on their egos by either "the system" or their families. They are not generally deep or consistent thinkers, people who have understood the world and chosen terrorism as the only way to "fight back". Of course, they do latch onto real or imagined "injustices" in society as a way to explain their actions to themselves or others. But it does not appear that fighting injustice is the best way to explain their actions.

We have a long way to go before we can figure out how we might reduce the incidence of such life stories in the world. An easier task is the reduce the number of people who are enticed in the short term into supporting their actions. Today in Iraq, this is what we must concentrate on.

(Incidentally, we should remember that in Iraq we are fighting both terrorists like Zarqawi and guerrillas or insurgents such as the Mahdi Army and the nationalists. Our discussion of terrorists is largely irrelevant when considering the latter.)

The House defeated by a margin of one vote (actually deadlocked) a measure to restrict the government's right to demand library records under the Patriot Act. This has always been one of the most controversial aspects of the act. Many Representatives in both parties hoped that it could be chipped away at, but the effort failed. We can take comfort in the fact that Congress has still not been willing to extend the term of the Patriot Act as the President has requested.

Unfortunately, the government's security measures through this Act, as well as in countless other ways relating to security, such as the holding of suspects indefinitely, have been at least as great a threat to our freedoms as the efforts of al-Qaida. If al-Qaida wants to attack our way of life, in this respect at least they have succeeded very well.

Yet there is no doubt that in the fight against terrorism, we will have to question whether certain freedoms can be maintained at the level to which we have become accustomed. This leads us to the question as to which fundamental rights are most important, that is to the question as to where we should we draw the line against the invasions of the security folk.

I believe that I have addressed this issue previously in this blog. But let me again suggest a guiding principle: There is more legitimate room to restrict freedoms of expression and association than there is room to restrict freedoms of thought and conscience and privacy. There are many types of "speech" (including writings, Internet web sites etc.) calling for violence against others or presenting ways to harm others (bomb manufacture, chemical weapon formulas etc.) that may reasonably be interpreted as representing immediate threats to society. In times of crisis, these should be restricted. There is, however, little legitimate reason to control or interfere with the private thoughts of people or their reading habits. One thinks and reads and listens in order to understand. It is impossible to know whether an individual's activities in these areas are directed against hurting others: they may or may not be. If I read about how to concoct a biological weapon on the Internet, I may be trying to understand the topic or simply to find out the type of information that is "out there". But if I express to others in a public manner the thought that all Jews or Muslims should be killed, or if I put my favorite bomb formulas on the Internet, I am acting in ways that are much more questionable, that can more directly harm others, and that society should consider restricting in its own defense.

The threats to libraries and library patrons incorporated in the Patriot Act fall into the category of threats against freedom of thought that should be restricted only in the most extreme circumstances.

Sunday's paper confirms the picture that has been emerging of a split in the Sunni camp between the Iraqi national resistance and the foreigner-inspired extremist resistance. The nationalist resistance is especially incensed by the widespread use of car bombs and other munitions against largely civilian targets. Surprisingly, both groups seem to have their headquarters in Falluja. Zarqawi has been attacked in opposition media, and now he lashes back with attacks on their "weakness". The goals of the nationalists have been expressed in purely patriotic terms, in terms of support for Hussein, and in terms of getting Sunnis into more positions of power. The fact Allawi is a former Baathist is causing some of this group to think again about opposition. But the one thing that unites all the opposition at present is the continued presence of American troops.

Would that we could simply leave. Again, we should heed the good advice to give a firm date for leaving. We have shown that we live up to other dates. Perhaps this one would be believed.

Karzai and Afghan Democracy Again There is a curious front page story in today's paper that reports President Karzai's assertion that the main enemy in Afghanistan is no longer the Taliban, but rather the "militias", which one might translate as the warlords, but this time maybe not. Attacks on workers attempting to register the population for a parliamentary vote have been so frequent lately that the parliamentary vote has had to be postponed to next year. This experience may have led to this reappraisal. However, many of these attacks have been on women, and therefore presumeably related to Taliban-like activity. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (a religious-warrior leader active in the anti-Soviet war) has often been cited as the leader of such efforts. On the other hand, the warlord leaders of at least the old Northern Alliance are thought to be major supporters of Karzai's campaign for another term as President, an election he is expected to win easily this fall. The question that bothers me is why he would have downgraded the importance of the Taliban in this situation. He is surely not about to seriously take on the major warlords that are his backers. Or is he?

Kerry and Edwards on 60 Minutes this Sunday were again asked whether they would have voted against the authorization to violently attack Iraq if they knew what they know now as reported by the Senate Intelligence Committee. They replied that they oppose the way in which the President used the authorization to go to war. Senator Rockefeller and a few other Senators have said they would not have voted for war. But our candidates hold out for a more nuanced position. The confusion is that there was no vote "for war". (Indeed, this remains an undeclared war) The vote that is referred to was an "authorization" given to President Bush in October 2002. This was actually a carefully limited grant of power to the President to use force in Iraq if necessary to ensure the security of the United States.

The difficulty is that the stance of the democratic candidates comes across as a serious case of waffling. They do oppose and reject almost everything about the war: the dismissal of the objections of allies, the use of false information (some of it known to be false) to justify the war, and the poor planning for the immediate and longer aftermaths. However, they still do not want to say they oppose the war. Evidently, they fear that opposition would be seen as opposing our military forces who have lost lives and opposing the removal of Saddam Hussein that they heartily approve of.

They need to bite the bullet. Yes, there are many good things about the war. But the fact is, as they have readily agreed in other forums, the war was the result of massively misplaced priorities. It was based on a preemptive strategy that only made sense if we were in imminent danger. We were not. So they should state clearly that had they known how the authorization would be misused, they would have voted against the war. They were misled. They made a mistake. Now admit it, and go on.

Their message should be that we have, whether for good reasons or bad, taken on a responsibility to the Iraqi people and the Americans who have sacrificed their lives or suffered grievous injury in Iraq. They intend to live up to this responsibility. While working to withdraw American soldiers from the country as soon as feasible, they will increase assistance to the Iraqi government and people so that they might very soon again take full control of their country's future. They will also make sure that the strategic and tactical mistakes that led us into this quagmire not be repeated during their term in office. In particular, they will make sure that the idea of preemptive attack is never again used to justify military actions that are not essential to the security of the United States.

Homeland Security tells us that there will be a major al-Qaida event soon. We have heard all this before, and yet one cannot help but believe that Bin Ladin and his associates will make a supreme effort to bring such an event off. There has been too great a hiatus — without something soon, we will find it hard to take them seriously any more.

Clearly, given their resources, and the small number of people they are evidently able to get into the United States, such an event, or series of coordinated events, will be difficult to successfully carry out. In spite of everyone's criticism of our intelligence services and Homeland security, they are probably more effective, more often, than we give them credit for. Since the opportunities of the opponent are so many and the gates to our country so many, this effectiveness is unlikely to be effective enough.

The main failure, the failure that is more likely than any other to contribute to another "Bin Ladin", will have been our failure to apprehend Bin Ladin and his major lieutenants, presumably living along the Afghan-Pakistani border. There is no doubt in my mind that the availability of the training and planning ground of Afghanistan was a major reason for the success of 9/11. Our invasion of Afghanistan greatly degraded this resource, but sadly it did not destroy it. Others have rightly pointed out that the worst effect of the Iraq War was that it diverted us from making a more effective effort in Afghanistan to complete the job. The border area is large and difficult to traverse, a large proportion of its people hate us, yet it is hard to believe that 100,000 American troops deployed the length of the border over the last two years could not have greatly increased our chances of eliminating this terror. I understand the difficulty of working with the Pakistanis, led by a general who could easily lose his life in a further anti-American reaction. But again, let us set our priorities where they belong, keep our focus, and do our best.

It is time now for all of us, the government, and the leaders of both parties to think through how we will respond to the next event, if it comes, and how our leaders will speak to the American people in its aftermath. The following very short list of what will have changed should be a start on thinking through this problem.

The papers the last two days have been full of the Senate Intelligence Committee Report. It condemns with exhaustive detail the failure of the intelligence community, especially the CIA, to obtain information on, analyze reasonably or report effectively on the major issues facing the country in the terrorism area, particularly as this relates to the decision to go to war with Iraq and what has happened subsequently. The Republicans want the blame to stop with the intelligence community; the Democrats want to see it as a more widespread failure involving the NSC and the White House.

It is clear that there have been failures here, partially as a result of the "business as usual attitude" that has characterized our intelligence and military efforts since Korea. The resources put into both Iraq and Afghanistan were minimal, a "just enough" approach that reminds me of the modern approach of businesses to stockpiling. An exception has been our willingness to fight from the air, in fact to do almost everything from the air. The major reasons: lower casualties and lower dollar cost. Our "9 to 5" approach was symbolized by a response of Mr. Tenet when asked why we had almost no human intelligence resources in Iraq before the war. His said it was "too dangerous to be in Iraq then". I cannot imagine this response in World War II. That war was taken seriously and we enlisted serious people in its fighting. (Incidentally, I am not personally a hero and do not mean to imply I would do any different. But this does not lessen the problem.)

In his Friday commentary on the Lehrer show, David Brooks made an apposite comment that somehow our system must take to heart. He said that whoever wins in November, the intelligence problem will remain as the biggest security hurdle we face. He reported that the ignorance appears to have not been lessened as the threat has grown. He was just back from a trip to Iraq where he had been startled to learn that we still seem to know very little about who we are fighting. He was amazed, for example, that our forces do not know if the insurgency has 5000 or 20,000 militants fighting for it.

My conclusion as I follow events from the sidelines is that the people we rely on in these areas are simply not intelligent enough to do the job that needs to be done. I do not want to say their IQs are not high enough, for intelligence useful in this business comes in many forms, some of which might not show up in an IQ test. But too often the obvious seems to be missed through reliance on SOP thinking, or reliance on computers to do the thinking. I suspect that there has been a long-term and continuing decline in the intelligence services due primarily to the quality of the people recruited to both these services and the Foreign Service. There was a time when these services recruited the best and the brightest. But this seems to be no longer the case. Two reasons might be suggested. First, young people are now more likely than in the past to see exciting and rewarding futures in other areas, for example, world business. Secondly, the attitude of one's peers toward services as the CIA, or even public service in general, has become so negative that persons choosing such a direction would be ashamed to admit it. After the gatekeeping function of recruitment, fossilized bureaucracies whose leaders seem less and less impressive are also unlikely to retain the better workers that they have managed to obtain.

Perhaps what we need in these areas, as in many others less critical, is a major effort to recruit better people, an effort that should be undertaken on many levels, including improving the environment and working conditions of recruits. Perhaps we need to develop new structures, new institutions, not so much because what we have now are organizationally inadequate, but because we need to offer new contexts where youthful idealism can be made to mature into lifetimes of effective service.

Today's paper suggests that we have been too optimistic about the retreat of the Sadrists into participation in the regular election process. They have said they would, but they also continue to say the opposite. A report from Najaf finds that the shrine of the Imam Ali and the surrounding area are under the complete control of Moqtada al-Sadr and his forces. To hear them tell it, his people are literally dying to be martyrs for Moqtada. At the same time, the lucrative pilgrimage business in the area has ground to a halt. Najaf's governor and the new administration seem as buffaloed by this as the situation in Falluja. The governor insists he needs an agreement from the Mahdi Army to disband, but at the same time he believes trying to arrest Sadr would entail too high a risk of an fanatical reaction. Stay tuned.

The trial of Saddam Hussein has an additional drawback that I had not thought of. It seems that the lawyer for Saddam intends to connect as much of Hussein's crimes to the United States as he can. It is certainly true that we helped Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War. Whether we were complicit in the crimes of that war, such as the gassing of the Kurds or the murder of Shi'as, I do not know. The accusation has been made that we helped Iraq develop its chemical weapons. I certainly do not think that we were directly involved in planning or suggesting the attacks on civilians. But a clever lawyer can put together a story that will imply that we were. This will not help our image in Iraq or the Arab world. Ideally, it would have been better to have had an international court try Hussein and his court at some date after the shooting is over. But we wanted to let the Iraqis do what they wanted to do. Perhaps the people who should have thought first, once again did not think deeply enough about this.

As we learned in Afghanistan, the United States must be extremely careful when it decides to help others in violent conflicts. Perhaps we should think out some new rules for such situations, for they will arise again.

Apparently out of a warped and unrealistic idealism, the New York Times has been campaigning against the new Iraqi prime minister ever since he was appointed. It is true that Dr. Allawi was at one time a Baathist. It is also true that he enlisted the support of the CIA in the 1990s in a failed attempt to overthrow Saddam Hussein. However, as mentioned previously here, this does not implicate him in the major crimes of the Baathists, nor does it suggest that he is uninterested in reforming Iraq. He may well have "authoritarian tendencies" as the Times believes, but this may be exactly what Iraq is looking for right now. They want someone able and willing to gather together the threads of authority in Iraq and bring them together for a new beginning. Few Iraqis understand liberal democracy, few have the background necessary for a successful liberal democracy, and liberal democracy is certainly not an Iraqi priority right now.

The latest attack by the Times is in a lead editorial "Shades of the Old Iraq" (July 8). It focuses on the chances for misuse of Allawi's new martial law decree. They fear that Allawi will use the new powers to intimidate rising groups in the society, thereby sounding the death kneel for the possibility of effective democracy, the "main rationale for the war". In doing so, they make two errors. First, they ignore the careful manner in which the degree hedges the power, limiting it in time and requiring that the leaders of the main ethnic groups sign off before it can be invoked. Second, and most important, the reasonable case for intervention in Iraq was to bring to an end the monstrous rule of a leader who egregiously ignored even the most elemental human rights standards who commanded military resources he had not been loathe to use aggressively in the past. We did not invade Jordan or Egypt or Pakistan, even though they are hardly democracies. We work with most Middle Eastern states because they are responsible members of a world community. We would like to see all of them democracies some day. We would like Iraq to be a fully functioning democracies. We might have imposed democracy with a post-World War II sized effort stretched over a period of many years. But we did it on the cheap, and we will probably leave soon, so we have to be satisfied with much less. It is finally up to the Iraqis whether our dream becomes theirs.

Since the turnover of power, there has been an only relative, yet still remarkable, lull. Not as many Iraqis or Coalition forces seem to be attacked. There was a skirmish yesterday in Baghdad involving both Iraqi and American defense forces. Yet in spite of a great deal of shooting, the casualty count remained low.

On the terrorism in Iraq front, two possibly important signs. First, the group holding the Marine seems to have released rather than decapitated him. Second, the papers yesterday reported that a new underground movement calling itself the "Salvation Front" warned Zarqawi that they would kill him unless he left the country. If there is such a group and this is not simply misinformation, this implies a breakup of the insurgency.

Another hint of change along the same line comes from Falluja. On the one hand, today's paper reports that it has become a center for organizing the resistance. Our decision to "leave it to the Iraqis" seems to have failed in this instance (however as an example of unintended consequences, it was this very decision that seemed to be copied elsewhere, such as against the Sadrists, with success). On the other hand, there are also reports that the "Falluja Brigade" (made up of Baathists and locals) may be becoming increasingly hostile to the foreigners who are using the city as a base. This would fit in with the "Salvation Front" report.

Meanwhile, as we begin to congratulate ourselves, Falluja and its environs, and perhaps some other hot spots such as Samarra, remain outside our control or that of the interim government. It does not have the requisite firepower to take Falluja yet and if we did it, it would kill too many. This is a conundrum that will have to be solved. Quarantining such places sounds fine, let them "stew in their own juices", except that it is said that bombs and missions are developed and directed from these centers.

As can be seen from the following tables, based on DoD figures, there has been a marked decline in American or coalition casualties since their high point in April. The decline in June was remarkable. Unfortunately, the decline for contractors has not been noticeable. Through June there were 106 fatalities, with no decline from the proceeding months. Unfortunately, we do not have good information on Iraqi civilian casualties. But with the intensity of the war slackening off, they are probably also down, in spite of the suicide bombings.

Military Fatalities: By Month

Period  US  UK   Other* Total  Avg Days

7-2004  9   0      2     11   1.83  6
6-2004  42  1      7     50   1.67  30
5-2004  80  0      4     84   2.71  31
4-2004  135 0      5    140   4.67  30
3-2004  52  0      0     52   1.68  31
2-2004  20  1      2     23   0.79  29
1-2004  47  5      0     52   1.68  31
12-2003 40  0      8     48   1.55  31
11-2003 82  1      27   110   3.67  30
10-2003 43  1      2     46   1.48  31
9-2003  30  1      1     32   1.07  30
8-2003  35  6      2     43   1.39  31
7-2003  47  1      0     48   1.55  31
6-2003  30  6      0     36   1.2  30
5-2003  37  4      0     41   1.32  31
4-2003  73  6      0     79   2.63  30
3-2003  65  27      0     92   7.67  12

Total       867 60 60   987    2.08 475

Wounded In Action According to The DoD

Period   Wounded

Jun-2004  197
May-2004  738
Apr-2004  1153
Mar-2004  307
Feb-2004  146
Jan-2004  186
Dec-2003  261
Nov-2003  337
Oct-2003  413
Sep-2003  247
Aug-2003  181
Jul-2003  226
Jun-2003  147
May-2003  54
Apr-2003  340
Mar-2003  205

Total    5138

A report in the New York Times Monday connected much of the violence in Iraq to members of Saddam's family and associated families. They were said to live in Iraq and provide the financing for the movement of people and arms into the country to help the insurgency. Reading down through the article, it seemed that this information was less than conclusive. For one thing, the members of the family that were implicated in this support were closely related to the relatives that Saddam had executed just a few years ago. Their story did not seem to make sense. Also, the evidence for the movement of people and arms through this door seems less than conclusive.

It has also been learned recently that both Yemen and Jordan have offered troops to the new interim government. Cole analyzes this as the attempt of moderate, nationalist Arab leaders to preempt danger to their own regimes from the same groups that are trying to destabilize Iraq. They all fear extremist Islam. The Yemen government may have another reason: they are Zaidi Shi'a and thus potentially spiritual allies of any emerging Shi'a dominated state in Iraq, whether the domination is theological or secular. So far the Iraqi government has been loathe to respond too favorably to either overture, but it clearly wants to test the waters. Cole judges, incidentally, that the "Iranian interference" in Iraq seems in fact to be a matter of helping all the factions, especially Shi'a, in the hope that they will be able to reap good relations whatever happens.

Juan Cole reports several recent clashes of Sunni and Shi'a in the Baghdad area. It seems according to one report that the Sunnis in part of the Sunni Triangle are driving out Shi'a in an attempt to develop a Shi'a-free band around Baghdad. In Samarra there have been major rallies (after televising the trial) in support of Saddam. He suspects that the Shi'as here are grumbling in silence since they suffered so much from Saddam. Mogtada al-Sadr's people have been demanding Saddam's execution from the pulpit and in marches. A Shi'a imam in Baghdad has been preaching against Saddam's lawyers, saying they will be killed if they come into the country. Cole thinks that the trial may really enflame these feelings.

The fact is that the al-Qaida, Wahhabi, and Salafi Sunnis that now dominate much of the resistance, especially in Falluja, are also bitterly opposed to Shiite doctrine and the Shi'a community. If worst comes to worst, what we could have is a struggle with the old Baathists (secular) and Arab Sunnis, on the one side (with most of the Arab world potentially behind them) and the Shi'as (religious and secular), with Iran potentially behind them.

(Incidentally, Cole, who has generally disparaged the interim government was at least quite impressed with the most recent interview with Allawi's latest interview. Allawi came across as a moderate Arab nationalist willing to work with a wide variety of interests.)

In their latest "Strategic Comments", the International Institute for Strategic Studies analyzes the interests and activities of Iran in Iraq. They naturally have had and have a variety of different interests. One simple one is to thwart the development of American power in the area as long as their relations with the United States remain at a nadir. They are said to have thousands of agents in Iraq, yet one wonders because only a handful of Iranians have been arrested and imprisoned. (Another analysis says that the "foreigners" in the insurgency are coming over the Syrian border not the Iranian. ) Iran has been holding (sheltering?) a few al-Qaida agents primarily as an irritant to the United States (according to the analysis). Incidentally, one relationship the analysis does not consider adequately is that to the Kurds. Yes, Tehran formerly supported Talabani's Kurds versus Barzani's. But the leaders in Tehran are probably as nationalistic as ever when it comes to Kurdish independence. One can only assume that they would fear and oppose an essentially independent Kurdistan, just as the Turks do.

But what I find of most interest in the analysis of the relationship of the top clerics in Tehran to Iraqi Shiism. Their ambition after Khomeini has been to lead the Shiite world, replacing effectively the leadership formerly headquartered in Najaf and Karbala. Thus, they fear a loss of religious leadership if Iraq should emerge as a stable society. Aside from the question of pride of leadership, the analysis says that the doctrine of Velayat-i-Faqih, developed by Khomeini and incorporated into the Iranian Constitution, is not accepted by any leading Shiite cleric in Iraq. This doctrine, that religious leaders should directly rule the state, is anathema to Ayatollah Sistani in Iraq. Should Sistani and those around him come to be seen again as the intellectual leaders of Shiism, this would cast doubt on the legitimacy of the Iranian state. Tehran is also concerned about the nationalism of some Iraqi clerics, such as Moqtada al-Sadr. These clerics have voiced an extreme anti-Americanism, but clothed it as more nationalist than Shiite. I would conclude that Tehran has little reason to believe that Iraq under Shiite majority rule would be an Iraq they could live with.

Knowledgeable commentators in today's New York Times, and coincidentally on this morning's Diane Riehm show, continue to speak a line of doom and gloom. Since they see little legitimacy for the interim government, they see America's forces sunk in a quagmire from which it will take years to emerge. They may be right. But I continue to see a silver lining that they are missing. In spite of an article in today's NYT claiming the contrary, the last few days have seen less violence in the country. What violence there is continues to be concentrated in the Sunni Triangle.

It seems to me we understand the mortification of Saddam before the court from the point of view of the Iraqi population as a whole.

Montefiore (Op-Ed, July 2) makes some thoughtful comparisons between Saddam Hussein and Stalin. Like Stalin, after the fact many Iraqis will treat Saddam as a national hero. However, the ways in which the comparison fails are also significant, particularly when related to the effect of Saddam's trial on the Iraqi people. Although a Georgian, Stalin became identified with the Russian people as a whole, and he did not single out any important ethnic segment of this population for oppression. Saddam, however, is reviled as their oppressor by the vast majority of the Shiites (60-65%) and Kurds (over 15-20%). He has had, and may still have, the loyalty of a majority of the Sunni Arab population (15%). This suggests that the current trial, with its attempt to further discredit Saddam, promises to help most of the country come together in support of the new government to an extent that was not possible in Russia. No matter how effective Saddam is before the court, and this effectiveness admittedly could be a problem, he is unlikely to sway more than people from the small group that felt empowered by his rule.

Thus, while we are hearing some pro-Saddam comments in interviews in Baghdad, within the Sunni community, I expect few we will hear few from outside this area. And we must remember that an important segment of the Sunni Arab community, particularly its intellectuals, also suffered under Saddam.

If anything like this interpretation is correct, then we should follow Brezezinski's suggestion and set an early time table for the departure of at least the bulk of our forces. In the interim, our forces should be concentrated in support of Iraqi security forces in the Sunni Triangle and positioned to guard major infrastructure facilities. We should then work out a much more limited presence in the rest of the country, so that in appearance and reality, these areas, at least, will no longer be "occupied" by the foreigner. On this basis, a time table should be developed to reduce and remove the American presence.

In the June 29th Science section of the NYT, the campaign of Richard Ebright against new super secure laboratories is discussed. It seems that in the wake of 9/11, some of the leading institutions and experts in the biological warfare field have argued that we need new laboratories devoted to developing, and testing the defenses against, a new class of super bugs that have not yet been developed. Ebright, now a rather lonely expert in the field, says these plans should not be realized. He argues that the proposed laboratories will be expensive, are unnecessary, and are quite likely to actually make more likely the threats they are designed to protect against. He argues that for the near future terrorist biological warfare will in all probability be devised on the basis of already existing agents. He also points out that the main source of such weapons in the past have been the existing laboratories. Thus, instead of protecting us, the laboratories, by requiring hundreds of new workers and the need to develop new procedures, could make available extremely serious agents that would otherwise not exist.

Without knowing enough to comment, I nevertheless sympathize with his case. Too often, people in a field look to the wondrous future that government funds might provide for their institutions and careers. I do not want to say that scientists and scientific entrepreneurs are often willfully dishonest. But as enthusiasts seeking new frontiers, they find it easy to convince themselves that cherished new programs are in the interest of us all. I hope Ebright's arguments are taken seriously.

We have heard of little violence for the last two days. Every respite is a welcome one, but what does this mean? It could mean that the opposition was putting all its marbles on a spectacular or series of spectaculars on June 30, and became confused or maybe just delayed by the early transition. It may be the insurgents are simply taking a breather. Or it could mean that many Iraqi anti-Americans are pulling back from the battle, waiting to see what will happen. It is significant that the Islamic Press seems to have been at least as positive about the change as our elite press has been. Official Egypt played up the transfer. Official Syria called it a positive step that they hoped would lead to full sovereignty. The reaction of the Iranian Foreign Ministry was the same. Its spokesman added: "The interim government is expected to provide grounds for the restoration of full sovereignty, the real end of the occupation and free and timely general elections."

A former CIA expert (Reuel Gerecht) in today's Op-Ed argues that for now the people will give the new government the benefit of the doubt. He says most Sunnis and Shiites are tired of the fighting and they are tired of the fundamentalists that in some areas have taken control away from the local insurgents, their traditional leaders, even from former Baathists. He suggests, however, that Allawi's approach is too heavily based on reviving the army in all its glory (five divisions). He seems altogether too comfortable with the Sunni Baathist officers with which he spent most of his career. Gerecht argues that unless Shiite militias are integrated fairly soon into top positions in this new army, the Shi'a community may see it as little more than a revival of the old Sunni state, and rise once again. He advises that we press the new government to replicate elected local government such as that in Mosul to develop a sound and believable basis for an early return to democracy, a route he sees preferable to overemphasis on security.

Nir Rosen's report in the July 5 New Yorker on several visits he made into Falluja offers a valuable glimpse into insurgency in what may be the most effectively anti-American of the Sunni centers of power. At the beginning of his tale the locals appeared very proud of the fact that they had driven the Americans out. He found Falluja full of armed groups of every description, often in competition with one another. Increasingly it appeared that the "foreigners", better armed and more cohesive were displacing the local sheikhs and imams from their positions of undisputed power. They put some areas under extreme conservative religious rule, a way of life few Iraqis want. It was no doubt they who had the Shi'a truck drivers killed. Thus, while the Falluja brigade that was supposed to bring peace eventually failed to control the area, the extreme forces that in large part defeated them seem to be in the process of alienating the general populace. (Psychologically, this is somewhat parallel to the activity in some Shi'a cities where the welcome for the Mahdi army was short-lived.)

The insurgency's fatal flaw may be that it has been unable to develop a coherent vision of how Iraq would be ruled were the Americans driven out. The Shi'a have two visions, one a replay of Iran, the other a more secular democratic state with legal space for Islam. The secular westernizers have the implicit vision of a more or less western democracy with a secular constitution, a vision that harkens back to the system developing in Iraq before the Baathists. The Baathists probably want a revived authoritarian state without the excesses of the past (although they have not spelled this out; it is this vision that Gerecht seems to fear Allawi, a former Baathist, actually has in the back of his mind). Others may have the vision of a more traditional, tribal state — this also has not been spelled out. The Kurds want either a federal state or several states. So the average Iraqi may be confused once he thinks beyond getting his nation back. Again, the interim government may be something a little more concrete than he has been offered by the insurgents.

In any event, we can hope that Zarqawi and other foreigners have overplayed their hand in many parts of Iraq, leaving the general populace willing for the time being to support the interim government as the most credible road to peace under Iraqi control that is open to them.

MoveOn spends its funds on a full-page advertisement in today's New York Times attacking the transfer of power in Iraq as a "fumble". Actually, anything Bush might have done yesterday in Iraq would have been so characterized. Echoing this, Paul Krugman entitles his Op-Ed "Who Lost Iraq?" It is another recitation of some of the well-known errors of the adventure as well as some not so well known. To me these attacks are very much like harping on the mistakes surrounding 9/11. Yes, we made mistakes. Gore would have made mistakes. Yes, it would be good to have a new Administration in a few months. But right now we have Iraq. People are dying there, Americans, Iraqis and others who have come to work Iraq. It may make us feel good to spend our energy painting new coats of disaster on the Iraq adventure, but this is not responsible citizenship.

The turnover of power in Iraq may turn out to be merely another chapter in a sorry story. But as I suggested in yesterday's entry, there are several reasons to hope for a better outcome. And for the sake of Iraqis we must help to make this more rather than less probable. The more it becomes clear to Iraqis that many Americans expect us to fail in Iraq, indeed have invested so much already in this failure that they want the United States to fail there (see Michael Moore's "documentary"), the more the resistance is encouraged to hold out and the more people on the government's side will lose heart. As we have all been taught too many times, communications media do not live in separate national boxes any more — what is expressed in one country, particularly the USA, will soon be known to observers everywhere. This is a major reason Kerry has played a very responsible role so far. Let us hope he continues.

The military exit remains tricky. Last night Zbigniew Brezezinski proposed again that we set a definite date for Coalition forces to leave. This sounds like a good idea. It will avoid an Iraqi government feeling for nationalistic reasons that it must ask us to leave. It does not mean, of course, that we have to stay until the date announced (just as it did not mean this for the turnover). Nevertheless, it is hard to tell ahead of time where we will be at any particular point in the future. We do not know now the reasons any President, Bush or Kerry, might legitimately want to keep troops in Iraq after any given date. One could say, for example, that if the Iraqis cannot control their own country by June 30, 2005, we should do as we did in Vietnam — leave and let those left behind suffer the consequences. But I do not think this is wise or just. Whatever we may think of our adventure, we started it. We brought death and destruction to the Iraqis along with some of the good that we intended. Many Iraqis hate us, but we have persuaded millions of others to support our objectives, to identify their future with our success. To these we have a responsibility that cannot be lightly dismissed, even though some day dismiss it we might.

The Iraqis have formally taken over. Paul Bremer has left the country and Ambassador Negroponte had taken over for the American side. Apparently Bremer and the Prime Minister had decided several days ago that in order to avoid violence on Wednesday, they would transfer power early. So they set up a ceremony, everyone was sworn in, and the new government is under way. It was a smart move. It avoids giving the opposition a chance to bring off a final spectacular just before and during the transfer ceremonies. Unfortunately, it may also contribute to perceptions in Iraq and abroad that the transfer is all a facade or that we are on the run from the insurgents. Many commentators, including Professor Cole, are quite dismissive of the new government and its prospects. They claim that nearly everyone is against the new regime. American military polls, for what they are worth, show the opposite. Analytically, at least, there are several reasons to be a little positive.

(1) In the last few days violence had been directed almost entirely at Iraqis and almost entirely in the Sunni Triangle or nearby. (This is not too reassuring since Baghdad is in this area.) Some of it is obviously well organized, but much of it appears to be random anti-foreign or anti-collaborator violence. Most of the country appears relatively calm.

(2) The recent insurgent emphasis on kidnapping and beheading is characteristic of a terrorist campaign rather than an insurgency or guerrilla war. It is more of the Bin Ladin type of thing, rather than a campaign to take over a country and rule it. Moreover some of the efforts have resulted in indiscriminate killing that is bound to turn off many Iraqis.

(3) The new government and its Coalition supporters are now dedicated to the idea that they can succeed only by combining political and military action. Allawi has reaffirmed keeping to the election date and he is talking of amnesty, allowing electoral participation, for some of those who have been in the opposition, particularly for the "Mahdi Army" of the Sadrists.

(4) Professor Cole reports that the new government is trying to reconstitute both Saddam's army and his secret police. He laments the latter. Yet the Americans and the interim government are in a bind. With the personnel they now have our side simply does not have the intelligence to fight this enemy. I imagine the American approach has broken down even further after the prison scandals. What we need now is an army and an intelligence group no longer identified with us that can fight back. Since nearly every member of the interim government suffered from Saddam's rule, I doubt if they are simply going to reestablish its institutions and reconstitute the horrors of the past. We must remember that Putin was a high ranking officer in the KGB before he became head of Russia. That fact helps him rule a difficult country, but it has not meant that Stalinism or anything approaching it has been reestablished in Russia. So let us monitor without jumping to conclusions what Allawi and al-Yawar are doing, hoping to help them succeed without losing their direction. (It is what we as citizens have to do in the U.S. with the Patriot Act and similar measures pushed through ostensibly to respond to our fears of terrorism.)

(5) NATO has just agreed to send aid, particularly in the form of trainers. At least, this gives a more international flavor to the effort than we have had before.

In the meantime, the Iraqi security forces have got to show that they will do more than stand by as the country goes up in flames. It will be wonderful when they are well trained and so on. But the problem is now. What is required now is an area by area agreement as to who does what. Where Iraqi forces are weak and demoralized, penetrated by insurgents etc., and there are many places in the Triangle where this is true, we must work out something better than the Falluja solution while at the same time reducing the killing and destruction incident to American interventions. Where more authority and responsibility can be given to the Iraqi forces on the ground, we should back off, while preparing to respond quickly when needed. It is my impression that working this out is what the Iraqis and Americans are in the process of doing now. One can hope.

Today's paper analyzes in some detail what is said to be a new, and successful American strategy in Iraq. Their example is the effort made by the First Armored Division to stop and then destroy the Shiite militia of Moqtada al-Sadr. It combined rapid response with political action. Its units moved long distances in single days, engaging the militia in nearly every place that the Sadrist threatened to control south of Baghdad (there is no discussion here of the Sadr City area of Baghdad). The only area that they avoided attacking the Sadrists was the most holy shrine in Najaf — and this is the only area where the Sadrists are said to still have a significant presence in the South. At the same time, as it carried out this rather complex offensive, it began negotiations with all the parties that might help the effort. In particular, it made sure that after each battle money was spent, and locals were hired, to repair the damage that the fighting had entailed.

If even half this story checks out in the end, it is an important move forward. Let us hope our units can continue acting this effectively in the South. However, it may not be a strategy that can be easily transferred to the Triangle. The Falluja model seems in the end to be less than successful (although for a time it did solve our problem). (It may have actually been the Falluja example that may have inspired what the First Armored did.) The difference may be that the Sadrist militia was well-known to all involved while the forces that are striking so successfully in the Sunni regions are more amorphous, less easy to "get a handle on". Our enemies in the Triangle have so far, outside of Falluja, been less intent on taking and holding cities than the Sadrists were, making their units harder to corner and destroy. Thus, it may not be possible to replicate the First Armored's methods elsewhere.

Even before 9/11, I had concluded that there were four states in the world that the United States should move urgently to transform with the help of the world community: North Korea, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Sudan. There were many other failed states in the world, such as Haiti or Somalia, but these four states stood out in terms of egregious human rights violations, denials of freedom on a scale far beyond that found in their neighbors. I was not in this regard concerned with dangers such as WMD, but certainly North Korea and Iraq were worthy of concern on this score. Nor was I concerned with al-Qaida in Afghanistan — the oppression of its women was reason enough — the shelling of the Buddhas was the last straw.

Now, and for other reasons, we have acted against the leadership in two of the four. Neither has been, nor is likely to be, transformed quickly into a paradise. But Afghanistanis and Iraqis lead lives today that offer possibilities that they did not have before. This will be the case in Iraq even if the Americans are "thrown out" in the near future. We have, however, not yet acted effectively to alter the situation in Sudan or North Korea. Each country presents its own special problems, and to resolve these we will eventually get the assistance of the international community.

The United States has been remarkably unconcerned about North Korea. Even if it had not had a nuclear buildup, the callous and thoughtless way its regime has crushed its people and allowed hundreds of thousands to starve for ideological reasons would have been reason enough to act long before now. Now, the continual off again, on again nuclear threat, apparently engineered as part of a giant blackmail scheme, gives an additional strong reason to act with little delay. Yet two of the other main players, China and Russia, still seem unwilling to take a strong stance. More important, our ally, South Korea, the country whose entire success, indeed existence, since World War has depended on continuous American protection is carrying on as though the North were a "normal state", if only a little poorer than most. If Americans cannot imagine why Iraqis think of us as an "occupying force", they should consider South Korea where a large and vocal segment of the population also believes that we are an occupying force. They seem convinced, against all evidence, that if the Americans left, all would be peace and quiet on the Peninsula, with the North adopting the good life of the South at its own pace.

It is tempting, of course, to consider North Korea something like the Soviet Union just before Perestroika. Unfortunately, North Korea is immeasurably more repressive. Many Russians knew that they were oppressed by communism and knew that the rest of the world was leaving them behind because of their system. There is little reason to believe that such beliefs are widespread in the North — although given the right conditions there could be an explosion that would make the North another version of East Germany with the wall torn down. I raise these possibilities not because I believe them, but to suggest that Southerners who think this way should not be totally dismissed. Meanwhile, the United States has to deal with an intolerable North and a politically hard to deal with South while continuing to bear the burden of preventing major nuclear destruction in the Far East (we cannot know it is all a bluff).

What has happened in the Sudan is that the long civil war between the North and South, of Muslims in the North against Christians and Animists in the South has claimed countless lives directly and indirectly in the last thirty years. Starting in the 1980s, this conflict spilled over into Darfur in the West where there had long been unrelated struggles among tribal and ethnic groups. Even though all groups were Muslim, some considered themselves "Arab" while others were seen as "black", some were settled farmers, and some were nomads. The government at first started arming groups to resist the Southern forces that had established a base. Later, after this base disintegrated, the Westerners started a revolutionary movement of their own, particularly among the non-Arabs. (Darfur was only incorporated in Sudan in 1917.) The government sent a relief force, but was badly beaten. In response, the government then began arming the nomadic groups, particularly the "janjaweed", loosely organized brigands. These appear to have been asked to solve the regional problem by driving out or killing the members of the principal settled tribes. (All agree that with environmental degradation, there is simply not enough land for the various groups, so in a brutal way this may have made sense in Khartoum.) The result has been a humanitarian tragedy that the Sudanese government instigated and has been unwilling or unable to stop. International relief organizations have found it extremely difficult to operate in the area, as well as in neighboring Chad where many refugees have fled. The reason has been the very difficult conditions, especially transportation, and the reluctance of the Sudanese government (and perhaps to some degree the Chadian) to allow them free access. At first, the United States and other major states were unwilling to press too hard on this issue because after many years of effort they thought they had reached a working agreement among the leaders of the North and South to settle their larger war. However, the world is at last turning its attention to Darfur. We do not know yet with what result.

The tragedy in Sudan illustrates why the United States, no matter how powerful, must not waste its resources on ill-timed and poorly planned adventures. We should, for example, have waited a year before invading Iraq so that we might have maintained larger forces in Afghanistan that would have been able to provide protection for a much larger and well-protected development program for that country, and perhaps to capture Bin Ladin and Mullah Omar. Then, when we finally invaded Iraq, we should have immediately worked out an agreement with the former army that would have allowed a much quicker transfer of power to Iraqis. It would not have been to a well-formed democratic government, probably to something more on a par with that in Pakistan or Egypt. Following this script, by now our armed services would have been largely free of these extra burdens, able to be directed toward reducing the nefarious sway of the administrations of Sudan and North Korea. With this freedom, we could be far more aggressive and effective in meeting these new challenges than we are today.

Since it is being universally discussed, we too should say something about this ugly documentary. Presented in a good cause, it has few scenes that add anything to public knowledge and many that do nothing but confuse. One of the surprising for me were a group of our Representatives trying to present a petition asking for a discussion of the election results at a joint session of Congress. They failed because they did not have the single senatorial signature they needed (the Senate is almost entirely white while they were mostly black). If I had known of this episode the time, I have forgotten. (But of course it was quite irrelevant to the main thesis of the film.) Another good scene was President Bush glued to his chair in a public school reading class as news of the 9/11 talks came in. He evidently simply did not know what to do. His aides came in twice without effect.

But so much of the film is devoted to innuendo, proof that isn't proof or to wailing and weeping. One of the most egregious examples is the picturing of the happy lives of Iraqis followed immediately by bursts of bombs destroying their way of life. There is no hint that the war had any other purpose than corporate greed, the enriching of the wealthiest Americans. Most of the film had the flavor of an old Communist picture decrying the crimes of capitalism and the wealthy combined with the flavor of paranoiacs trying to "connect the dots" of vast conspiracies, as in a famous Kennedy Assassination film. But my greatest objection might be to Michael Moore himself, a coarse egotist who, as detailed by David Brooks in today's Op-Ed, goes around the world attacking not just American policy but the American people as stupid — and picturing our opponents in Iraq as the true revolutionaries of our day.

It is all too bad. There is more than enough good material (much of it in the film) to make an effective and damning picture of Bush policy over the last few years. But for me this is the wrong picture.

The last few days have seen another explosion of news about American imprisonment and torture policy since 9/11. The questions are not going to go away. And it important for our ability to operate successfully in the world in the future. And this is important for all mankind. Let us look again briefly at the issues.

First, we have to cut out attempts to work out a way that the rules do not apply to us, at least when individuals are "safely" in our control. We are in the world and the world's opinion counts, for them and for us. It may be that torture does not pay in terms of information gained. But whether it does or not, we must bite the bullet and ignore the gains that bending the rules might bring. Note that above I said once persons are in our control, such as in a detention or a prison camp. The situation on the battlefield itself is somewhat different for two reasons. First, this is where it is said in Iraq that the most useful intelligence is gained. Second, the people involved on our side are servicemen fighting for their lives. In this situation, threatening a person who has just surrendered to find out where arms are cached or where his fellows are is probably an inescapable part of human nature. Very often in this situation the surrendering person is simply killed and he knows this. We can define such as response by our soldiers as murder and reduce the incidence of such killing, but perhaps we cannot and should not stop all intimidation in this situation.

Second, we need to rethink the conditions under which persons can be held for long periods. We seem to think we are fighting a "war" against terrorists. Yet we do not have a definition of when such a war might end. This has led us to institute what are in effect indeterminate sentences without trial. Ultimately, neither world nor American opinion will accept this. On the other hand, perhaps half of those held at Guantanamo Bay would go back to trying to kill Americans if they were set free. They also may see themselves as involved in an indeterminate war. This implies two things. First, we must develop procedures that can more surely and more quickly determine who is in this dangerous group and who is not. If not, then they should be released back to the place in which they were captured. If they have been incarcerated for any length of time, then they should be compensated for this time.

The problem then becomes what to do with those who appear to be "dangerous". They should be tried in American courts (not special courts) as conspirators or worse. They should be given a chance to prove their innocence (read "peacefulness"). If proven guilty then they should be sentenced to a period of time long enough to separate their lives from the battlefield as we define it in this strange "war".

Yesterday was one of the worst days of the war for the Iraqis: 100 killed and 300 wounded according to reports. Five areas were hit in the Sunni triangle and Mosul, with the objective apparently being the killing of police, destroying police stations, demonstrating a kind of invincibility. One Times account included as an aside that this was believed to be the work of Sunnis and Shi'a together. However, I see little evidence yet of the latter. Rather the area impacted, the fact that Zarqawi and former Baathists are evidently involved makes this doubtful. Zarqawi famously sought to foment trouble between Shiites and Sunnis. Today there seem to have been no major attacks. But it is said that the insurgency threatens now to conquer at least parts of Baghdad.

The interpretations of the current efforts range from the idea this is the beginning of the end for the new government to the thought that it shows a last burst of energy before the end of the insurgency. Certainly if the insurgents expose themselves in the cities too early, they may regret it. It is significant that in the last couple of days American forces have again become active in Falluja, entering it briefly yesterday and again bombing a so-called "safe house" today. This suggests that the Falluja solution of letting the Iraqis do it has been abandoned, at least in the triangle. It is evident that the insurgents find attacking Iraqis much more productive and much less dangerous than attacking Americans directly. Of course, this forces the Americans to once again do the attacking in the cities, thereby further alienating Iraqis. It is also significant that the insurgents seem not to care how many Iraqis are killed in their war. This disregard for civilian life has happened in other similar insurgencies, as in Algeria, but the outcome does not necessarily favor the insurgents.

Clearly the insurgents are taking seriously the handing over of power to the interim government on July 1, no matter how circumscribed its power might be. If they have the men (they have the materiel), the insurgents will continue and broaden their attacks to demonstrate to all the fecklessness of Iraq's new security forces. This will then force American forces back into the field in a big way, once again proving to many Iraqis that we are merely an occupying force bent on killing Iraqis. In any event, massive insurgent attacks in the next few days are what the interim government and the American command claim they expect and are preparing for.

I am reminded of the Tet offensive in Vietnam. It was disastrous for the Viet Cong, essentially eliminating them as a fighting force (the subsequent several years war was strictly between North and American-aided South). However, the fact the Communists were able to come into all the cities and inflict massive casualties on South Vietnamese and American forces in the initial stages of their offensive, played in the United States as a Communist victory. On the basis of this interpretation, America made a decision to get out. The difference, of course, is that the Iraqi resistance does not have hundreds of thousands of troops waiting just across the border to come to their assistance. Yet the thinness of our forces in Iraq, and the way Americans feel now about this war, and with good reason, this fact may not be enough in the face of an impressive show of insurgent power — no matter what their losses.

The FBI and CIA (through an unnamed author) are reported today as giving their particular slants on the fight against al-Qaida and where we should go from here.

According to the New York Times, the CIA agent's new book, "Imperial Hubris" castigates his superiors and both administrations for mishandling the "terrorism problem". He writes: "U.S. leaders refuse to accept the obvious: We are fighting a worldwide Islamic insurgency — not criminality or terrorism — and our policy and procedures have failed to make more than a modest dent in enemy forces." The NYT reports that the author says "the threat is rooted not in opposition to American values, but to policies and actions, particularly in the Islamic world." He claims that the attack on Iraq was an unprovoked war against a foe that presented no threat, remarking that Ussama bin Ladin could not have asked for anything better than our attack on, and occupation of, Iraq. He sees us as having waged two failed half-wars, leaving behind little but seething anger. He believes al Qaida is readying another massive attack on the United states worse than the last, possibly including MWD. After this, he says, "heads will roll within the intelligence community". Overall, the remarkable fact that this man remains in the CIA, that his book was vetted by the CIA, and was evidently published with little censorship suggests that there may be considerable support for his views within Langley.

In this book, as in the recent book by the former right-hand man to Condoleezza Rice, Richard Clarke, we see righteous anger boiling over. I wish there was not so much of this, for it makes the outsider believe that where there is so much fire, there might not be much smoke. Yet he is obviously making some good points. I would agree that al-Qaida's opposition to us is more to policies than values, although it is also important to know what our opponents say they are about and give that some credit too. But I believe that our actions, and their continuation in Afghanistan, and our pressure on Islamabad, have made al-Qaida efforts much more difficult than this agent appears to think. They have lost their excellent training grounds, being reduced to perhaps something in Lebanon and some small new training bases in Afghanistan. They are now getting experience in Iraq, although not for large actions against the continental United States. In the end, if Iraq ends up dominated by Shiites and Kurds, al-Qaida may not find that a very useful haven either. One can agree that, given their propaganda objectives, they should mount a major attack on the United States. I have been thinking this for a couple of years now, but it has not happened. My conclusion is that al-Qaida has few operatives in the U.S. Our security people must be doing something right. My suspicion also is that when the fabled attack comes, it is likely not to be with WMD.

On a more hopeful note, Robert Mueller, FBI director suggests that we are in the process of forming an anti-terrorism alliance including, and parallel to, NATO. This seems to be an urgent need; one wonders why it has not acted on seriously much earlier (probably the same issue as with FBI/CIA, losing control over and suspicion of sources). He wants a new intelligence directorate within the FBI that would help prioritize what leads should be pursued — again an urgent and long overdue move. He estimates that the total number of Islamic extremists (i.e. potential al-Qaida) is in the low thousands worldwide. However, al-Qaida is recruiting "outside the Middle East" to find sympathizers better able to melt into American society.

The last few days have seen extended discussion of the U. S. State Department's report on terrorism in 2003. The first version that came out showed an improvement in terms of the number of incidents and casualties. Now a corrected report shows that the number of significant incidents and the number wounded was much greater in 2003 than 2002, while the number of fatalities has gone down to 625. However, a closer reading of the information now available suggests that the report is not very meaningful. For example, anyone killed in Iraq or Afghanistan fighting the bad guys is not considered a victim of terrorism (even though the Bush Administration argues, and to some degree correctly, that large numbers of terrorists have now come to Iraq to fight us — thereby depleting, of course, their numbers elsewhere). Since the report is on "international terrorism", it ignores terrorism that is national in character. U.S. law prohibits including in the figures the killing of people by people who are citizens of the same country. Therefore, most of the terrorism in Chechnya is presumably not included. The terrorism of the Tamils in Sri Lanka should not on this basis have been included.

Seeing these statistics as significant derives in part from the mistaken idea of a generalized "war on terror". For America today, the important issue is the war against al-Qaida, understood as an extremely loosely organized movement directing its attacks against Americans, non-Muslims, or other perceived "enemies". Losses on both sides in this war should be regularly toted up. Saudis killed in Saudi Arabia as well as foreigners killed there by persons saying they are part of al-Qaida should be added to the totals. The persons killed in Spain in the recent attack on trains should be added. All those killed in Afghanistan on either side should be added somewhere to the terrorism statistics, while Iraq should be considered a separate issue for the time being, with none of the casualties there seen as terrorist. If a foreigner is killed by a suicide bomb in Israel it is regrettable, but events there should be considered those of another war regardless of the nationality of the victims. (Statistically, the Israeli-Palestine conflict a strange case, since suicide bombings are recorded but revenge attacks against the bombers are not.) Considering the wars in Chechnya and elsewhere in Russia and the former USSR should be added to the picture, although just how will be difficult to determine. Since it is in the interest of the Russians and the Central Asian governments to call all their enemies al-Qaida, getting the right totals will be difficult. All of this discussion shows the extreme difficulty of distinguishing guerilla war, reprisals, police actions, and terrorism in mixed situations.

In an Op-Ed today, Youssef Ibrahim makes a knowledgeable argument that the United States must be more aware than it has been of the existence of an international Shi'a audience for what it does in Iraq. It is an argument that professor Cole, an authority on the Shi'a has often made. However, in the details of the argument he makes some misleading assertions that should be corrected.

(1) He compares the relationship of Ayatollah Sistani and Moqtada al-Sadr to that of (implicitly) Ayatollah Shariatmadari and Ayatollah Khomeini. It is true that like Khomeini, Moqtada is a fiery but lower ranked cleric. However, here the similarities end. First, Khomeini instigated and brought to a successful conclusion a national revolution against the Shah of Iran, a feat that Moqtada will not have an opportunity to equal regardless of what transpires in the next few months. Second, Khomeini had been a leader of Iranian religious dissidents for a generation. Third, although he was not as highly ranked as Shariatmadari, he was a man of equivalent age (important in religious circles) had attained the rank of an Ayatollah, and had published widely on religion and politics. In particular, his treatise on rule by an Islamic high jurist was considered by many a blueprint for the Iranian system that emerged. These remarks do not imply, however, that we should be careful not to take Moqtada lightly. He is positioned to play an important part. We should also be careful not to make al-Sadr a martyr, for Shi'ism was founded on martyrdom. (We can only hope that Zarqawi or someone similar doesn't try to martyr him and throw the onus on us.)

(2) In his discussion of the "Hawza", Ibrahim assumes a much more tightly knit Shi'ite world than I believe exists. While it is true that there developed over recent centuries a religious hierarchy of sorts among Shi'a communities that ignored national boundaries, this was always a flexible arrangement. The ayatollahs scattered throughout the Shi'a world might see another ayatollah or a small group of other ayatollahs as their religious superiors, but would nevertheless feel no compulsion to agree with their edicts, indeed, custom enjoined them to not copy the edicts of others. Similarly, on other more secular levels, only the loosest structures for consultation exist. It is true that Shi'as everywhere will be following what happens to Shi'as in Iraq, but they will not necessarily see themselves directly involved in these events.

(3) Ibrahim concludes by writing: "Any hopes for a secular Iraq should also be abandoned — the Shiites will dominate by force of numbers". There is actually no reason to accept the necessity of a non-secular Iraq because the Shiites will dominate numerically. Spain, for example, is dominated by Catholics, yet the Pope is very aware that it is a secular state. Ayatollah Sistani believes that his community should dominate Iraq, but he also believes that religious leaders should stay out of politics. He may wish to see some "religious principles" accepted by the new system, but the followers of President Bush and many members of the Catholic hierarchy in the United States would be likely to agree with him on many of these principles.

The recent bombing of what was said to be a "safe house" for foreign terrorists within Falluja again raises the question of the boundaries of Iraqi and American action. Apparently, the American Marines and a group of Iraqis ginned up by a Colonel Latif worked out an arrangement several weeks back that the Americans would no longer try to take control of Falluja. Instead an Iraqi force made up of former Baathists and other insurgents (or whoever) would man the barricades and police the city. Not surprisingly, the Americans have not been happy with the result. Parts of Falluja have evidently become bases for militants. The Iraqi brigade "keeps the peace" most of the time, but it does not make a great effort to interfere with insurgents as long as they do not fight them in the city. Frustrated, the Americans made the air attack. Locals said all they killed were civilians. The Iraqi government says that they did kill some serious insurgents, possible of the Zarqawi group. The Times reports today that this version now seems accepted by many of the men in the street of Falluja — they don't appreciate the foreigners anyhow. As Juan Cole says of this and similar cases, it is hard for outsiders to ever know.

The new government (not yet installed, but acting as though it is) continues to talk of martial law. It sees such things as curfews, and unlimited searches, and no-go areas as instruments to be applied on a case by case basis, starting perhaps with Sadr City and Falluja. It is significant that the leaders of the interim government now see their forces as the main forces for counterinsurgency force in the heart of the country, believing that the Americans would do better controlling the country's borders. To me this makes sense, if they can do it. But it is the exact opposite of how the Americans had imagined originally they would divide up chores (placing the new Iraqi forces on the borders). The Iraqi leaders believe they can succeed better than the Americans in urban warfare because they can more easily tell the good guys from the bad guys, and they can more easily control a situation through mediation with all the parties involved than can Americans. Thus, they hope to succeed with much less firepower. This may eventually lead to the division of the country into many fiefdoms under the effective control of tribal, sectarian, or party leaders. But this may be the best that they or we can do.

Meanwhile, to the north, the Kurds are steadily expanding their frontiers and are not about to disband their militias (peshmerga). The expansion is justified as merely righting the injustice of the Saddam years when the Kurds were relocated out of these areas. But the guys with the guns may get greedy. And those newly displaced may find their own leaders to help them fight back. It is said that the new government is cooperating with Chalabi, using him as a mediator of the dispute of the new government with the Kurds. They are also actively working in bringing Moqtada al-Sadr into the new political world, and he seems to be moving in their direction. Interim government leaders are also claiming that disbanding the army was our worst mistake and that they are going to reverse that decision — a process that in a murky way seems well under way. Clearly, the interim leaders are able in the midst of assassinations and chaos to make concessions and visualize directions that the Americans have been unable to.

The Times (indirectly) and Middle East experts such as Professor Cole continue to denigrate the new civilian leaders, believing that little has change with the establishment of the new system. But it seems to me that we will have to wait and see. The new (or newly positioned) leaders are quite active and brave. As long as they can dodge assassination bullets and build a capability to tamp down the destruction, keeping rebuilding ahead of new destruction, they will come to be taken more seriously. Shifting the burden to them was essential. We needed to do it now and we did. They are our best bet. Let us hope that they get discriminating and effective support from our military and political leaders on the ground.

On Friday (Saturday's paper), the House rejected in an urban-rural split a plan to transfer $446 million of a $33 billion Homeland Security budget from a fund generally distributed to every part of the country to high-risk cities. The Mayor of New York was rightly incensed. While New York receives $5.47 a person in anti-terrorism financing, Vermont and Wyoming receive over $30.00. The Homeland Security operation reflects another remarkable inability to prioritize. In Connecticut, for example, all of its nearly 200 towns are to get a cut of the pie, with slices so small that they are essentially meaningless. It is becoming a kind of joke, a diversion.

The priority problem stems in part from the fact that terrorism is too generally defined. While there may be a terrorist next door who is tinkering with chemical agents, what Homeland Security was established to resist was the danger from major international terrorist groups such as al-Qaida. It was not set up to stop another Oklahoma City bombing or another high school shoot-out. If this distinction could be remembered, then Homeland Security resources would be directed toward what international terrorists target, that is "symbolic targets", targets whose destruction will make a major impression throughout the world. This means its objective would be understood to prevent or ameliorate attacks on major targets in the largest cities, or at least the people of these cities, and attacks against major governmental targets, especially in Washington, D.C. At the other extreme, it would not mean attacks against people or value targets in Alpine, California or Redding, Connecticut.

Homeland Security should do an adequate target assessment from this standpoint, then distribute money in its terms. It should then give money within states to (1) large cities such as New York or Chicago, and (2) state governments, to be used, for example, by state health services or state police.

In Saturday's Op-Ed columns we find juxtaposed the priorities of ideology and responsibility. On the right side of the page, David Brooks attacks Kerry for his implicit threat to once again base American foreign policy on the realism of Bush senior and those who served him. Instead, he says we should stick to the new idealism of junior that recognizes the right of all peoples to freedom. Then on the left side of the page, we are once again treated to Kristof's reporting of the latest chapter in the tragic story of the existence of Sudan as a state. In this installment hundreds of thousands in the Darfur region are being killed or driven across its borders.

One would not want to hear Brooks tell us we will solve this latest tragedy by promoting democracy in the Sudan as we have in Iraq. The fact is there are many troubles countries in the world for which our ideology should be the last rather than the first arrow in our quiver. Sudan and North Korea and Libya, and so many other states need above all else responsible governments that can provide basic security and live by international norms. What we need now in Pakistan, and what the Pakistanis need, is not another attempt to resurrect their democratic forms. As we have found in many countries, we can work with nondemocratic leaders to achieve valuable interim goals for their peoples and for all peoples before we press on to achieve their thorough transformation. Instead of relying on ideology, we must approach each situation in its own terms. Sometimes, a determined policy for the achievement of democracy in the short term is the correct choice. Many times it will not be. We would hope that a Kerry administration might be able to make these distinctions.

A suicide car bomb today killed nearly forty recruits and wounded a hundred and forty at an army recruiting center in Baghdad. This was echoed fifty miles north by another deadly car bomb. The new interim government says that it will institute "martial law" to stop all this. But in most of Iraq I would have thought that was pretty much what already existed. The U.S. is still "letting the Iraqis handle it", and both we and they seem to like it that way. Yet in what sense can the forces of the interim government, or we, effectively reduce the carnage? Whoever is behind the attacks, they seem to have plenty of volunteers and endless supplies of weapons (as a result of an enormous stockpiling of weapons by Saddam and the failure of the United States to adequately address these stockpiles). McCain and others continue to say we need more troops. I am sure he is right. But another division would only make a difference if we were to start using it effectively. What we desperately need is for the American commanders and the new government to work out their respective responsibilities, being sure to give U.S. forces a larger role in the immediate future than they seem to have now.

Incidentally, the beheading of the American engineer in Saudi Arabia looks very much like Zarqawi's beheading of another American in Iraq a few weeks back. At least some of what is going on in Iraq appears to be tied to the al-Qaida effort in Saudi Arabia; probably both are more closely tied than we have been led to believe to Bin Ladin and company on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border.

I remain dismayed by the extent to which the Times chooses to place happenings in Iraq on inside pages while spending page after page on the 9/11 inquiry and the mistakes of the Bush administration. I think this record is important. But right now we are in a desperate struggle in Iraq and the surrounding area. Finding that Cheney sticks foolishly to the stories that led us into Iraq or that pilots and their commanders on 9/11 failed to have or understand authorization to shoot down planes until it was too late is not critical right now. I would agree that exposing all the errors and so incompetancies of the past may (and I have my doubts) help Kerry defeat Bush. Yet the fact is we must deal now with Iraq. By the time Kerry gets in, if he does, the situation will either have brightened greatly or we may irretrievably be on our way out.

Finally, is it time for despair? Probably not yet. Remember that after the disastrous losses of American lives in April many commentators, including some of the nation's top defense intellectuals, thought we had lost. Their solution was simply to get out. But instead we started to reduce our presence on the streets without leaving, and the numbers of Americans killed dropped greatly in May. June may also be low. But what has changed is that now the danger is not so much American lives lost as Iraqi lives lost. It remains to be seen whether this challenge can be met. Let us give the situation another six weeks and then see how it's going.

The daily death toll in Iraq and the success of the resistance's anti-infrastructure campaign wears down all those trying to secure the peace: the Coalition forces, the Iraqi civilians, and the interim government security forces. But who is doing what?

Recently I suggested that a pattern was developing in which the resistance was coming more and more to look like a Baath-Sunni struggle against the spectre of an emerging political system in which they will play a much diminished role. The idea that this is the emerging pattern was strengthened by the news of massive Shi'a demonstrations in Baghdad against what they said was a Sunni imam's call for the killing of six Shi'a truck drivers in Falluja. This could, of course, have been a provocation deliberately engineered by the resistance in the spirit of the much discussed letter of Zarqawi in which he proposes that the emerging system can be derailed by igniting a sectarian war of Shi'a and Sunni.

But the events of the last few days, and the increasing role of Sunni religious leaders in the resistance, also suggest that I might have been mistaken in thinking that our principal enemy was a remnant of the Baath structure. Baath was, after all, a fascist party modeled on that of the National Socialists. It was anti-religious and modernist, dedicated to moving the country forcibly into the modern world. It is true that toward the end of his rule Saddam increasingly used religious symbols and slogans to "rally the troops", but it is unlikely anyone really believed him. Yet now the actions in Iraq in which Zarqawi, a person claiming allegiance and connection to al-Qaida, and parallel actions in Saudi Arabia seem to fit better than my old assumption into an al-Qaida pattern that is fueled primarily by religious fanaticism. Zarqawi is, in fact, claiming a role in recent murders. The fact that the major efforts in the last few days have often been the product of suicide missions also fit the al-Qaida pattern better than the Baathist (although the history of the Sri Lankan Tamil movement shows that suicide missions need not have a religious component).

So where are we? First, we must remember that al-Qaida has and has had, only a handful of "card-carrying" members. Most of what the media and the government speaks of as "al-Qaida" refers to a body of extremists in many nations loosely linked together by a common overall objective (killing Americans and their allies, killing all non-Muslims that get in the way, killing all Muslims who differ with their methods in the Jihad against the foreigner). These persons labeled "al-Qaida" do not, however, necessarily take orders from Bin Ladin or his close associates. They are helped when possible by the center, and their memberships present a willing cadre of people that can be enlisted by Bin Ladin and his associates for major operations (such as the presumed to be planned attack in the near future within the United States).

Second, what started as a purely nationalist struggle (at least in the triangle) has metamorphosed into a religious-nationalist struggle. We must begin this reassessment by affirming the unsurprising conclusion of the 9/11 staff that Saddam and al-Qaida did not have a working relationship prior to 9/11. But what has happened since? We can assume that in spite of the self-serving over-estimation of the number of "foreigners" estimated by our government as having come into Iraq to fight the Coalition forces, in fact there has been a significant movement of foreigners into Iraq since our invasion, a movement instigated, aided, and abetted by al-Qaida. We may mean hundreds, perhaps more than 1000. These are well-trained, dedicated persons, some of whom have held leadership positions in other contexts. They have come to aid the Baathists because the Baathists are the group most active in killing Americans. The result has probably been an unavoidable growing together of the two movements, with the fanaticism and religious values of the newcomers serving to complement the nationalism, military background, and local know how of the old Saddam structure. At this point it might be hard to determine "who is in control". Probably no one. In many ways this makes the problem more difficult.