Iraq and Afghanistan

Excerpt from
Cordesman's CSIS report on the future of Iraq, "Iraq's Troubled Future: The
Uncertain Way Ahead", revised April 13, pages 4-5 PDF document.

Under the heading, "The American Civil-Military Threat to Iraq", Cordesman makes
the following points (quoted verbatim or paraphrased):

1. The US invaded Iraq without a valid understanding of the Iraqi government,
economy, and sectarian and ethnic differences. It did not have plans, staff, or
aid money to deal with the situation; and did not have the force strength to
provide security.

2. Our reaction to the problem was incompetent and
misdirected. We focused on national elections and paper constitutions, rather
than effective governance, and a massive aid program to "reconstruct" Iraq in
American terms. It failed to recruit, deploy, and retain competent civilians.

3. It took too long to realize that creating effective Iraqi security forces was a
critical element of stability. It rushed ill-prepared Iraqi Army units into
combat and local security missions.

4. The US military was ill=prepared for its
new focus on counterinsurgency, stability operations, and nation building. Its
military have been pushed into a wide range of new training and civil military
roles. It remains short of experts and fully qualified translators (where it may
still have less than 25% of its needs).

5.The US is only now is beginning to
understand the full limits of Iraq’s oil "wealth," the depth of the structural
problems in Iraq's economy, and the need to "reconstruct" in ways that take
account of the need for money to flow to Iraqis, rather than foreign
contractors.

6. Tactical victories and military efforts are pointless without
political success. The US supported a form of deBaathification that was bound to
alienate the Sunnis, and removed much of the nation's secular core from power.
The US insistence on national elections in a country without political parties
left a legacy of government divided along sectarian and ethnic lines. The US
pressure for a new constitution helped make "federalism" a key issue. Political
conciliation has been far more cosmetic than real, adding Arab Sunni versus Arab
Shi'ite, Shi’ite on Shi’ite, and Arab on Kurd tension and violence to the threat
posed by hard core Sunni Neo-Salafi led insurgency.

7. The "surge" strategy in
Baghdad is little more than a repeat of previous tactical efforts to bring local
security to the capital city. If it succeeds, it will probably be because the
Shi’ite militias stand down, and the US effectively helps a Shi'ite dominated
government "win." If it fails, it will probably be because US military friction
with the Shi’ite militias becomes violent. It is far from clear that the US
Congress will give either the current or the next President the necessary time
and resources to exploit "success", even if we achieve it.

8. As in Vietnam, the
US has created reporting systems designed to report success, not real progress
or the lack of it, for its Iraqi force development and political and economic
aid efforts. This reporting has slowly improved in some areas under the pressure
of events, but much of the US reporting on Iraqi force development and economic
aid efforts still lacks meaning and credibility. This includes basic data like
Iraqi force manpower, unit readiness, aid efforts relative to requirements, and
reporting on aid based on meaningful measures of effectiveness.