Monday, December 11, 2006
The Iraq Study Group Report: Partial Evaluation
For the last several days many of those concerned with Iraq have been commenting on the Study Group report with its 79 recommendations. It is a short report, easy to read on-line. It is moderate, middle of the road, and yet immediately produced bitter criticisms, particularly from the right. Bush doesn't like it; the Iraqi government doesn't like it; the neocons don't like it. I'd say they must have it about right.
My most general conclusion is that it does a good job of pointing out problems in our present performance and in describing the state of affairs in Iraq. In making military and political suggestions of what to do in Iraq it does not get us very far beyond "stay the course". It does, however, suggest diplomatic initiatives that would offer a hope of escape from the present impasse.
As a way into a more detailed analysis, I begin with reference to the New York Times December 10 editorial on the report and a group of 12 mini-Op-Eds on the report by knowledgeable persons that the paper published the same day. The New York Times emphasizes the report's call for greater openness through making the budget process more transparent, and through intelligence reporting that gives a clearer picture of what is actually happening ( it refers especially to an underreporting of Iraqi casualties). It also calls for the creation of an "environment" in which senior military officers feel free to offer independent advice to civilian leaders.
Several of the mini-Op-Eds had useful thoughts. Larry Diamond, who has been a political advisor in Iraq, emphasizes the recommendation that we should make clear to the Iraqis that we do not seek permanent military bases. His experience is that too many Iraqis believe we are there as an occupying power. He believes that if we make clear we are leaving, and take other steps the Report recommends -- a generous amnesty, a rollback of de-Baathification, and a fixed system for the allocation of oil revenues -- we will have a basis to negotiate effectively with the leaders of the Sunni insurgency. Diamond evidently feels that our essential opponent is the nationalist insurgency and not the internecine struggles of the militias.
Leslie Gelb points out that after its gloomy assessment of the situation, the Report fails to outline a strategy that really responds to the seriousness of this assessment. We can't just urge reconciliation; we have to have a plan to make it feasible, which probably means a federal solution with power and revenue sharing spelled out more credibly than it has been. Gelb is the only commentator I have seen who makes the obvious suggestion that we should provide funds and protection for any Iraqis who want to relocate. (Our newspapers regularly report a massive and unaddressed internal and international refugee problem. I assume the Report suggests nothing to alleviate the problem because taking ethnic segregation seriously would be too defeatist.) He then goes on to say that once we make clear our intention to leave we should ally with Sunni Baathists to crush the "terrorist" in central Iraq, a job he believes the Baathists can do better than we. (Strange use of "terrorist" here; he means "the other guys".)
Note that both Diamond and Gelb appear to believe that the Baathists can extricate themselves from their temporary alliances with Jihadists, foreigners etc. and set about bringing order to the country with our assistance. I like the idea. It turns everything on its head, but just such a dramatic rethinking is what we need. The Report says our intelligence has been terrible and a new report has just come out that maintains we know remarkably little about the enemy we are facing. The take of Gelb and Diamond on the situation is probably as good as any.
One recommendation in the Report that has come in for a great deal of criticism is that we should make it clear to the Iraqi government that we will not continue to assist them if they do not make greater efforts to overcome the military and political problems we both face. This recommendation is criticized first because it seems to contradict the statement elsewhere in the report that we should not set a definite time for leaving, with the Bush-like implication that we will only leave when the "job is done". Second, it is criticized because it implicitly insults the Iraqis and particularly their Prime Minister. It implies that all would be well if they only "tried harder". Some believe this approach will make anything Maliki does seem like buckling to the demands of the Americans. One mini-Op-Ed writer in this group advocates a position opposite to that of the Report: he argues that to find a successful exit we must support Maliki or his successor no matter what they do. This is the only way to give the regime a chance to stand on its own feet in the eyes of Iraqis and the world.
This foregoing recommendation that we should hold the Iraqi government to account was singled out in the stinging critique of the Report by Iraq's President Talabani (reported in today's paper). Talabani raised a number of other questions that undercut the effectiveness of the Report. Much of his anger echoes what Barzani and other Kurds are saying in response to the Report's implication that we should decide now, without a plebiscite, on who owns Kirkuk and who gets the revenue from oil found in and around that city. This is just sectarian dueling. But what cuts deeper is his rejection of the idea that our military should emphasize training and assistance primarily through embedding large numbers of men and officers in Iraqi units so that they might fight more effectively (and be less sectarian). Talabani rejects this as an attempt to destroy the independence of Iraq's security forces. If other Iraqis see it this way, then this major recommendation will be impossible to carry out.
Another part of the Report that the critics have zeroed in on are the recommendations that negotiations be opened with all of Iraq's neighbors. There is a suggestion of one to one negotiation, but generally the discussion is of a region-wide meeting organized by the Americans. The clash of the approach to foreign affairs of the Study Group (particularly Baker) and the Bush administration is most evident in this area. Baker (indirectly in the report and personally in comments since it came out) believes that a nation negotiates with nations with which it has problems. If there were not problems in the relationship, there would be little sense in the negotiation. He does not think preconditions for negotiation are helpful. The Bush people have taken the position that a nation should negotiate primarily with countries with which it is comfortable. They regularly suggest that they would be glad to negotiate with Iran, Syria, Hamas etc. as soon as they accepted our point of view on key questions (such as nuclear development in the case of Iran). A couple of the Op-Eds support the Bush position, but more seem to welcome the open approach of the Report to negotiations.
Outside this framework, most other Op-Eds and discussions of the Report are very much in the doom and gloom category. Their comments may be summed up: "We lost, let's just get out. America does not want another American or even another Iraqi (in so far as we are directly involved) to die because of this war." Some read the Report as a clever papering over of this conclusion. Even the recommendation that we negotiate with neighboring states, including the recommendation that we must solve the Israeli-Palestinian dispute before we can make any progress in the Middle East, appear to rest on an unstated belief that the rest of the Report is merely window dressing for an as-far-as-possible graceful exit.
To me, the Report's greatest weakness is its inability to fully understand the depth of the hatred of many Iraqis for the Americans. Even those who initially welcomed us believe we have far overstayed our welcome, and have come to disbelieve in our promises of economic assistance in rebuilding. They see us as feckless and dangerous. They have found democracy to be too costly; their elected leaders to be as unaccountable as the unelected leaders before them. Diamond and Gelb sense this basic fact, and have organized their thoughts around it.
But with all this, how do we actually know where we are? I certainly believe that the situation is pretty hopeless. But is it unredeemable? Could unforeseen weaknesses in the forces arrayed against us come suddenly to light? It is now common wisdom that a country should not lightly decide on war. There are simply too many imponderables. This must also be true of our thinking about how to respond to this tragedy.
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