Friday, December 01, 2006
Iraq Alternatives Revisited
The confining of military alternatives to more, the same, or less troops -- or to shifting force objectives from combat to training -- is both defeatist and overly simplistic. As I suggested in a recent blog (November 9), the institutionalization of something like the CAP system employed by the Marines in Vietnam might be helpful in some areas. I also suggested that if the problem is that mixed populations are at one another's throats, perhaps we could make it more possible to encourage and protect the further separation of people along ethnic lines. This can be accomplished even in mixed cities such as Mosul or Baghdad because of the marked tendency of different sects or ethnic groups to concentrate in certain neighborhoods.
Building on these thoughts, I want to reconsider a suggestion by American officer in Anbar province that was recently reported. He pointed out that American forces were not making progress in the province. They were apparently dying for no purpose. He said that perhaps it would be wise to remove American forces entirely.
This suggests that an alternative strategy would be based on a division of the country analytically along the following lines:
(1) Relatively peaceful except for attacks on Americans and those considered collaborators
(1a) Sunni
(1b) Shi'a
(1c) Kurd
(2) Embattled: mixed areas
The pacification effort would then proceed in two stages.
STAGE ONE
In Sunni provinces such as Anbar, it may be found that violence is largely directed at Americans and those considered to be collaborating with them or other outsiders (for example, police forces recruited in other parts of the country). In such provinces (or portions of more complex provinces), an attempt should be made to work out local peace agreements predicated on the withdrawal of American and other outside forces. Local leaders in these provinces would then be asked to guarantee the peace in the area after the withdrawals. For those persons or groups that are not satisfied that they will be protected by such arrangements, it might be agreed that the present "occupying forces" would assist in their evacuation from the province.
Some Shi'a provinces of the south and east could fit into the same category, even though at present violence levels against any "enemies" may be relatively low. Nevertheless, similar agreements should be worked out in these areas. This would have the benefit of transferring security almost entirely away from the foreigners. This kind of local guarantee of security already exists in Kurdish areas. All that would need to be done here is to make more explicit the boundaries of responsibility.
This approach should be possible in more than half the country, an area that includes perhaps half of the population.
Negotiation for full central government control in "areas under agreement" of these kinds could be left to a later stage, probably well after American and other Coalition forces have left the scene.
STAGE TWO
The rest of the country would then be analyzed, intellectually and by agreement, into smaller territorial units in which cohesive ethnic or sectarian groups (in a few areas Turkoman as well as those mentioned) would agree to take on the responsibility of ensuring the peace. In Baghdad, the units would be neighborhoods (which are steadily becoming less mixed as the fighting continues). Support for the reassortment of people on a more micro level to make this feasible would be offered along with relocation camps for those not able to benefit from such arrangements. As described in the November 9 blog, installing CAP units might make self-defense more feasible for local people who might otherwise feel surrounded by enemies. The use of foreigners in this role would be advantageous in those communities in which it has been reported that locals have come to trust government forces even less than the foreigners. Limiting CAPs to these situations would have the added advantage of keeping all foreign forces in a more limited area in which supply and reinforcement would be more feasible.
Moving from this stage to full government control in these areas would take a longer time, since the pattern of territories so defined would not fit the political units recognized by the central government. But at least the problem should be more manageable than it is at present.
IN PARALLEL
In parallel with this pacification of populated areas, Coalition forces should concentrate on the protection of infrastructure and infrastructure projects (oil and water pipelines, sewerage treatment plants, electric grid capacity etc.) These efforts would bring immediate benefits for all and would involve less need for offensive operations in highly populated areas than is now the case. It is the offensive, anti-terrorist operations that have brought the coalition forces into such a negative relationship with the population that most Iraqis are said by public opinion polls to wish the foreigners to leave as soon as possible. Unless we improve our image by more positive works and less intrusive attacks, no strategy can succeed.
Comments:
Post a Comment
Links to this post:
