Sunday, November 19, 2006
Understanding Iraq's Neighbors: Our Negotiating Partners?
The present discussion of how we might escape unscathed from Iraq centers around two issues: a possible increase in troop strength and negotiating more and more effectively with Iraq's neighbors.
Turning to the second issue, it would likely be helpful to involve all Iraq's neighboring stakeholders in the emergence of the future Iraq state (or group of states). Every neighbor has important interests and every neighbor has ways in which it can assist our efforts. All want a peaceful Iraq and all want (in greater or lesser degree) the Americans to leave. But what the objectives and abilities of each neighbor might be have yet to be tested.
As background to what we might say to leaders of these states as we attempt to involve them in our effort, let us consider the interests of neighboring states serially.
Beginning with Iran, we know that it has been involved with several Shi'a groups both before and during the present conflict. Iran approaches the issue from its unique background. Its leaders remember a long and ancient history of dominating what is now Iraq. Iran has a large and restive Kurdish population, and it is this Kurdish area of Iraq that has been most often under Iranian control. Iran has also frequently dominated the Basra region of the south; recent reports suggest that it has used its control over some militias to establish renewed influence in that area. While Iran has helped several Shiite militias in Iraq, its goals and those of Moqtada al-Sadr and his Mahdi Army are probably most closely aligned. The more traditional Iraqi Shi'a militias, such as the Badr Brigade, are directed by leaders who answer indirectly to al-Sistani, who is considered in Iraq, and probably in the Shi'a world as a whole, to be primer inter pares among Shi'a theologians. Al Sistani has spent his career in opposition to a political Islam, criticizing leaders such as Khomeini who believed that theologians should directly interfere in polities, a belief that Khomeini tried to enshrine in the Iranian system. Although there are democratic elements in the present Iranian system, Iranian leaders might regard a fully functioning liberal democracy in Iraq to be a bad example for their own dissidents.
Kuwait and the Gulf states want stability in Iraq, but they also want a state that will never again threaten them. Kuwait must always be nervous, because the claims of Iraq to Kuwait were not made of whole cloth. They are also not enamored of the idea of an effective liberal democracy on their door step. Saudi Arabia feels much the same way about democracy. In addition, Saudi Arabia fears a Shi'a dominated Iraq state, whether liberal or not. They have a restless Shi'a province in the north that does not need more outside support. Bahrain's Shi'a majority is held down by a Sunni royal house; Bahrain has also been a Persian possession several times in the past.
Jordan is likely to have concerns similar to its Arab neighbors. However, its royal house and civilian leadership seems more likely to accept liberal trends in the near future at home, and thus also more likely to welcome them in Iraq. Jordan is the primary destination for Iraqis wanting to escape the current violence. Both Jordan and Syria are also routes for the entry of Jihadists into Iraq. Certainly the Jordan administration is unlikely to be encouraging this movement.
Syria is an awkward state. Syria and Iraq were the two Baathist states. Thus, they were led in the post-World War II years by the same nationalist and secular revolutionary party. However, this party split up and Hafez al-Assad and Saddam Hussein achieved absolute rule in their respective countries and became bitter enemies. Hafez has more recently been succeeded by his son. Complicating the picture is the fact that although most Syrians are Sunnis, the government has for many years been in the hands of the Alawites, a secret religious sect comparable to the Druse in Lebanon. They are classed as Muslims, but actually do not pray as Muslims and do not worship in mosques. Their religion contains many Persian elements, both pre-islamic and Shi'a. Other Muslims frequently regard them as heretics, more heretical than the Shi'a themselves. (It is important to note that Syria is ruled by a sect that makes up no more than 13% of the population, a fact that certainly casts doubt on the idea that if the Americans left, the Shi'a would inevitably win out in a struggle for ascendancy in Iraq.) It should also be mentioned that the Kurds dominate a small area in Syria's northeast and have long been considered a restless minority. We conclude that the real interests of Syria's ruling class may be as obscure as their religious beliefs.
Turkey has become a major outlet for what trade there is in and out of Iraq. It is a major avenue for the export of oil. Turkey also controls the main trade routes into and out of the semi-autonomous Kurdish area. There is a thriving trade along these routes, benefiting both sides. Turks are the leading investors in the growing Kurdish economy. On the other hand, because of the continuing struggle of Kurds for independence within Turkey, the government has opposed talk of an independent Kurdistan. Another reason for this stand is that Turkey sees itself as a guarantor of the rights of the Turkoman people, a minority group in Iraq, particularly numerous in the Mosul area and other areas along the fringes of Kurdish control.
Turning to the second issue, it would likely be helpful to involve all Iraq's neighboring stakeholders in the emergence of the future Iraq state (or group of states). Every neighbor has important interests and every neighbor has ways in which it can assist our efforts. All want a peaceful Iraq and all want (in greater or lesser degree) the Americans to leave. But what the objectives and abilities of each neighbor might be have yet to be tested.
As background to what we might say to leaders of these states as we attempt to involve them in our effort, let us consider the interests of neighboring states serially.
Beginning with Iran, we know that it has been involved with several Shi'a groups both before and during the present conflict. Iran approaches the issue from its unique background. Its leaders remember a long and ancient history of dominating what is now Iraq. Iran has a large and restive Kurdish population, and it is this Kurdish area of Iraq that has been most often under Iranian control. Iran has also frequently dominated the Basra region of the south; recent reports suggest that it has used its control over some militias to establish renewed influence in that area. While Iran has helped several Shiite militias in Iraq, its goals and those of Moqtada al-Sadr and his Mahdi Army are probably most closely aligned. The more traditional Iraqi Shi'a militias, such as the Badr Brigade, are directed by leaders who answer indirectly to al-Sistani, who is considered in Iraq, and probably in the Shi'a world as a whole, to be primer inter pares among Shi'a theologians. Al Sistani has spent his career in opposition to a political Islam, criticizing leaders such as Khomeini who believed that theologians should directly interfere in polities, a belief that Khomeini tried to enshrine in the Iranian system. Although there are democratic elements in the present Iranian system, Iranian leaders might regard a fully functioning liberal democracy in Iraq to be a bad example for their own dissidents.
Kuwait and the Gulf states want stability in Iraq, but they also want a state that will never again threaten them. Kuwait must always be nervous, because the claims of Iraq to Kuwait were not made of whole cloth. They are also not enamored of the idea of an effective liberal democracy on their door step. Saudi Arabia feels much the same way about democracy. In addition, Saudi Arabia fears a Shi'a dominated Iraq state, whether liberal or not. They have a restless Shi'a province in the north that does not need more outside support. Bahrain's Shi'a majority is held down by a Sunni royal house; Bahrain has also been a Persian possession several times in the past.
Jordan is likely to have concerns similar to its Arab neighbors. However, its royal house and civilian leadership seems more likely to accept liberal trends in the near future at home, and thus also more likely to welcome them in Iraq. Jordan is the primary destination for Iraqis wanting to escape the current violence. Both Jordan and Syria are also routes for the entry of Jihadists into Iraq. Certainly the Jordan administration is unlikely to be encouraging this movement.
Syria is an awkward state. Syria and Iraq were the two Baathist states. Thus, they were led in the post-World War II years by the same nationalist and secular revolutionary party. However, this party split up and Hafez al-Assad and Saddam Hussein achieved absolute rule in their respective countries and became bitter enemies. Hafez has more recently been succeeded by his son. Complicating the picture is the fact that although most Syrians are Sunnis, the government has for many years been in the hands of the Alawites, a secret religious sect comparable to the Druse in Lebanon. They are classed as Muslims, but actually do not pray as Muslims and do not worship in mosques. Their religion contains many Persian elements, both pre-islamic and Shi'a. Other Muslims frequently regard them as heretics, more heretical than the Shi'a themselves. (It is important to note that Syria is ruled by a sect that makes up no more than 13% of the population, a fact that certainly casts doubt on the idea that if the Americans left, the Shi'a would inevitably win out in a struggle for ascendancy in Iraq.) It should also be mentioned that the Kurds dominate a small area in Syria's northeast and have long been considered a restless minority. We conclude that the real interests of Syria's ruling class may be as obscure as their religious beliefs.
Turkey has become a major outlet for what trade there is in and out of Iraq. It is a major avenue for the export of oil. Turkey also controls the main trade routes into and out of the semi-autonomous Kurdish area. There is a thriving trade along these routes, benefiting both sides. Turks are the leading investors in the growing Kurdish economy. On the other hand, because of the continuing struggle of Kurds for independence within Turkey, the government has opposed talk of an independent Kurdistan. Another reason for this stand is that Turkey sees itself as a guarantor of the rights of the Turkoman people, a minority group in Iraq, particularly numerous in the Mosul area and other areas along the fringes of Kurdish control.
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