Iraq and Afghanistan

We left Vietnam when we realized that we had no viable theory of victory. We no longer have any viable theory of victory in Iraq. As this sinks in, we will leave. If we are leaving, the sooner we leave, the less costly for everyone. But whenever we leave, the costs for Iraqis will continue long afterwards.

Unfortunately, those who have decided that we should leave Iraq are confused as to how to get out. I suggest they should begin by agreeing on the following principles: (1) Coalition forces will be completely out of Iraq in two years. (2) Our goal in exiting will be to reduce Iraqi and coalition casualties in so far as possible, and as soon as possible.

To devise a strategy that accords with these principles, we need to first recognize that most killing is now the result of fights among ethnic groups and sects and of coalition and government efforts to controls these fights. Most violence is taking place in mixed communities or along the boundaries of areas inhabited by different communities. Relatively few deaths occur outside these areas. The best strategic alternatives will recognize this fact.

Several "wars" are taking place in Iraq. The first is between Iraqi nationalists and Jihadists fighting coalition forces. When coalition forces leave, this war will be over. The second is between Iraqi nationalists, Jihadists and several militias fighting untrusted government forces who are regarded as representatives either of other sects and ethnic groups or as foreign puppets. When coalition forces leave, the intensity of this struggle will lessen. The third war is between Shiites and Sunnis and Kurds and militias associated with these groups. When coalition forces leave, without careful preparation this war could well gain in intensity, particularly in those regions, such as Baghdad and Mosul, where people of different communities still live intermixed with one another. In such areas, the grassroots Iraqi answer today is for families to move into areas dominated by their own ethnic or religious group, or to flee the country entirely. A second answer has been for people in unmixed communities to rely on coalition forces or their own militias for defense rather than on untrusted government forces.

This suggests that our best chance to stabilize the lives of ordinary Iraqis is to intensify the internal migration that is already underway. We should strive in the short-term for an Iraq in which nearly all people live in self-sustaining unmixed communities with clear if informal boundaries, and defended by their own militias. To supplement this effort, we should establish and fund for one year unmixed refugee camps for those people unable to settle immediately in existing unmixed communities. Coalition forces would temporarily guard the camps before turning them over to militias composed exclusively of members of the their own communities.

This alternative would require a new deployment of military and police forces. Coalition forces would concentrate their attention on guarding borders, major supply routes, and infrastructure. They would no longer conduct clearing operations elsewhere in areas exclusively controlled by one or another community. Government forces would be used primarily to strengthen this deployment. They would later take over these tasks as coalition troops leave. Militias would be given the task of defending the communities with which they are identified. In some cases, they might even be given additional arms and training to accomplish this task.

This alternative would have its own costs and casualties, but American and Iraqi costs over the next few years should be far less than those of "staying" the present course.