Friday, April 01, 2005
Another Critical Intelligence Report
The latest of a series of reports, the "Silberman-Robb" report makes a scathing indictment of the intelligence system both before and after 9/11, before and after the attack on Iraq. Like previous reports, it makes many suggestions for improving the performance of system or systems, many based on failures to adopt or implement successfully previous recommendations.
It is hard to know what to add to all the commentary that has poured forth on the unclassified portions of the report. (One of the problems is right here: so much is classified that judging what is really being said becomes unduly difficult.) But what strikes an outside observer most forcefully is the simple fact that too much advice is flowing forth. How can organizations that have just been restructured several times since 9/11 (several changes within each organization plus new CIA direction plus incorporation of much of the effort into Homeland Security plus the setting up of an intelligence czar over the whole intelligence community) incorporate this advice effectively?
Given this caveat, many of the suggestions seem useful in themselves. The major thrust is integration, "Let's get the different parts of the structure talking with one another." One small part of the problem in this area is illustrated by a report of a continuing feud between a new center for terrorism threat analysis and the CIA's counterterrorism unit. The government had proposed a National Counterterrorism Center. But the units that were meant to contribute to this failed to do so effectively. Its head finally reported that lack of cooperation made it unable to fulfill its mission. It is perhaps not helpful that the new Commission report proposes several more such integrative agencies or units. One gets the feeling that the problem is simply unmanageable and may only get worse. (The intelligence muddle is just one example of how hard it is for a President to actually run the country however well meaning or even however intelligent he might be.)
Before leaving the issue, let me mention a couple of recommendations that might do some good because they seem to lie outside already established turfs. One is to set up within the Director of National Intelligence's Office (DNI, remember the acronym, you'll be hearing it a lot) a long-range research and analysis group that would look into general issues more deeply than is generally the case. Second, the Silberman-Robb report recommends setting up an independent, nongovernmental think tank to play the devil's advocate, to challenge the intelligence agency's views. This seems a great idea, although how the clearances required to know what the intelligence community is reporting to the President and other top officials would be handled would be a serious problem. Ultimately, the problems of the intelligence community are several — bureaucratic intransigence, overlapping jurisdictions, inadequate humint, and relatively low general intelligence and education. The think tank might help to at least ameliorate the latter.
It is hard to know what to add to all the commentary that has poured forth on the unclassified portions of the report. (One of the problems is right here: so much is classified that judging what is really being said becomes unduly difficult.) But what strikes an outside observer most forcefully is the simple fact that too much advice is flowing forth. How can organizations that have just been restructured several times since 9/11 (several changes within each organization plus new CIA direction plus incorporation of much of the effort into Homeland Security plus the setting up of an intelligence czar over the whole intelligence community) incorporate this advice effectively?
Given this caveat, many of the suggestions seem useful in themselves. The major thrust is integration, "Let's get the different parts of the structure talking with one another." One small part of the problem in this area is illustrated by a report of a continuing feud between a new center for terrorism threat analysis and the CIA's counterterrorism unit. The government had proposed a National Counterterrorism Center. But the units that were meant to contribute to this failed to do so effectively. Its head finally reported that lack of cooperation made it unable to fulfill its mission. It is perhaps not helpful that the new Commission report proposes several more such integrative agencies or units. One gets the feeling that the problem is simply unmanageable and may only get worse. (The intelligence muddle is just one example of how hard it is for a President to actually run the country however well meaning or even however intelligent he might be.)
Before leaving the issue, let me mention a couple of recommendations that might do some good because they seem to lie outside already established turfs. One is to set up within the Director of National Intelligence's Office (DNI, remember the acronym, you'll be hearing it a lot) a long-range research and analysis group that would look into general issues more deeply than is generally the case. Second, the Silberman-Robb report recommends setting up an independent, nongovernmental think tank to play the devil's advocate, to challenge the intelligence agency's views. This seems a great idea, although how the clearances required to know what the intelligence community is reporting to the President and other top officials would be handled would be a serious problem. Ultimately, the problems of the intelligence community are several — bureaucratic intransigence, overlapping jurisdictions, inadequate humint, and relatively low general intelligence and education. The think tank might help to at least ameliorate the latter.
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