Tuesday, March 22, 2005
Reforming the United Nations
Kofi Annan has publicized the results of a report he commissioned on reforming the United Nations. Three issues are especially important in my view. The first is the definition of terrorism. Annan wants a definition that defines all attacks on civilians as terrorism. The problem with this is that it still does not deal with the idea of state terrorism and/ or terrorism in wartime. I do not see important progress being made on this. The second is the proposal to replace the present UN Commission on Human Rights with a smaller Human Rights Council that is elected by the General Assembly by a two-thirds vote. This would replace the current system in which member states are selected on a regional basis, with the unfortunate result that some notable human rights violators, such as Sudan, have ended up on the Commission. This would be an important change if doable. (His proposal to change dramatically the amount of money the wealthy countries devote to development and other third world problems is unlikely to fly, although on the margins he might be able to make a difference.)
Annan's most important proposal is for change in the makeup of the Security Council. This is important because of the international importance of the Security Council and because this is the proposal that seems to have the most general backing among major states. He wishes to either change the number of permanent members or establish a semi-permanent member category that would allow a greater range of countries to expand their role on the Council. Greatest interest is in the first alternative. Here the proposal seems to be that there should be six new permanent members. Most agree that four of these should be Germany, Japan, Brazil, and India. These four are now actively lobbying for this change (they have been pushing something similar for a long time). Then there is the thought that two African states should be added. Possible choices would be South Africa, Egypt, and Nigeria. (Kenya appears to also want to throw its hat in this ring.)
There are several problems with this approach. The first is there seems to be little discussion of taking away the veto from the permanent members. Therefore, increasing the number of permanent members would add to opportunities for blocking UN action in crises, because blocking typically occurs when the interests of permanent members are directly or at least politically involved. The organization's paralysis would not be cured by such a change. There is the problem that no African candidate is stable or developed enough to play its part beyond a regional role (South Africa has about half the GDP of Switzerland, Egypt considerably less than that, Nigeria a third of Egypt's.)Given recent history, none of them are likely to be able to perform at a high level in regard to human rights. The same can be said of China, but this choice for a permanent member is one the UN is saddled with. It is already the case that at least two African states are represented in the Security Council at all times (on a revolving basis, with two year terms). Perhaps the need to improve representation for Africa could be addressed at least temporarily by making the OAU a permanent member.
One way to reduce these and other difficulties would be to revise the charter so that the veto powers of permanent members were reduced, with the reductions greater for the new members than the old. For example, before India can made a permanent member, Pakistan will have to be mollified. This might be accomplished if the veto power of India were lessened. India could be granted the veto except where its interests and those of its neighbors were directly involved (for example in regard to Kashmir). Without these and many other compromises, I do not see the suggested reformations going very far.
Annan's most important proposal is for change in the makeup of the Security Council. This is important because of the international importance of the Security Council and because this is the proposal that seems to have the most general backing among major states. He wishes to either change the number of permanent members or establish a semi-permanent member category that would allow a greater range of countries to expand their role on the Council. Greatest interest is in the first alternative. Here the proposal seems to be that there should be six new permanent members. Most agree that four of these should be Germany, Japan, Brazil, and India. These four are now actively lobbying for this change (they have been pushing something similar for a long time). Then there is the thought that two African states should be added. Possible choices would be South Africa, Egypt, and Nigeria. (Kenya appears to also want to throw its hat in this ring.)
There are several problems with this approach. The first is there seems to be little discussion of taking away the veto from the permanent members. Therefore, increasing the number of permanent members would add to opportunities for blocking UN action in crises, because blocking typically occurs when the interests of permanent members are directly or at least politically involved. The organization's paralysis would not be cured by such a change. There is the problem that no African candidate is stable or developed enough to play its part beyond a regional role (South Africa has about half the GDP of Switzerland, Egypt considerably less than that, Nigeria a third of Egypt's.)Given recent history, none of them are likely to be able to perform at a high level in regard to human rights. The same can be said of China, but this choice for a permanent member is one the UN is saddled with. It is already the case that at least two African states are represented in the Security Council at all times (on a revolving basis, with two year terms). Perhaps the need to improve representation for Africa could be addressed at least temporarily by making the OAU a permanent member.
One way to reduce these and other difficulties would be to revise the charter so that the veto powers of permanent members were reduced, with the reductions greater for the new members than the old. For example, before India can made a permanent member, Pakistan will have to be mollified. This might be accomplished if the veto power of India were lessened. India could be granted the veto except where its interests and those of its neighbors were directly involved (for example in regard to Kashmir). Without these and many other compromises, I do not see the suggested reformations going very far.
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