Sunday, March 13, 2005
A Reanalysis of Iraq's Insurgency
In the latest edition of IISS's "Strategic Comments" series, a summary is offered of the state of the Iraqi insurgency as well as thoughts on how well we are doing. Let me paraphrase, and comment on, what it has to say.
First, the insurgency is continuing at a vicious rate. (The viciousness is particularly serious for the Iraqis. To put our 1500 military deaths in perspective, I note that today's paper reminds us that in 35 days, 6800 marines were killed on Iwo Jima toward the end of World War II.) Deaths of Iraqis are a much more serious problem. Leaving aside those killed in the initial invasion, the figure is probably well above 25,000. Over 3000 Iraqi security personnel have been killed since last June. Other civilian casualties continue at a high rate, with attacks increasingly targeting the Shi'a. Infrastructure attacks have also been increasing recently. The summary also points out Iraq's extraordinary murder rate (killings not directly connected to the insurgency: 90 per 100,000 — the next highest rate in the region is Jordan's 7 per 100,000). One of the reasons the Iraqis have been so against us in many areas has been the rise in ordinary crime of all kinds.
Intelligence on the size and nature of insurgent forces remains very poor. The balance between the Islamists and the Baath is unclear, as is the difference this actually makes. Many participants are simply criminals doing it for the money (and pay per incident has been greatly inflated recently). But many are also suicide bombers, and these are presumably not doing it for the money.
Clearly, the United States has decided to shift the bulk of the fighting to the Iraqis, but it has not been very successful in doing this. They still have few effective units aside for the Kurdish Peshmerga. We would also like to "fight" the war politically. American commanders are apparently trying to negotiate in secret with the Baathists, but with what results we do not know. They apparently had more success with al-Sadr. Most commentators believe that we clearly need more troops. But in view of other commitments, we do not have excess forces to send to Iraq and this situation is not about to change.
We are now in a box that is hard to get out of. Soon we are likely to be asked to come home, both by the Iraqis and by American Congressmen. Yet we have a long way to go before the violence is sufficiently under control to turn it over to the Iraqis. A consoling thought is that the problems may be as severe on the other side. According to today's Times, the "al-Qaida in Iraq" (Zarqawi) organization on its web site shows increasing concern that the Iraqis are no longer understanding their mission. They repeatedly try to explain why they are still killing. Recent arrests of Baath leaders in Syria and the possible change in Syrian willingness to cooperate also offers a glimmer of hope.
First, the insurgency is continuing at a vicious rate. (The viciousness is particularly serious for the Iraqis. To put our 1500 military deaths in perspective, I note that today's paper reminds us that in 35 days, 6800 marines were killed on Iwo Jima toward the end of World War II.) Deaths of Iraqis are a much more serious problem. Leaving aside those killed in the initial invasion, the figure is probably well above 25,000. Over 3000 Iraqi security personnel have been killed since last June. Other civilian casualties continue at a high rate, with attacks increasingly targeting the Shi'a. Infrastructure attacks have also been increasing recently. The summary also points out Iraq's extraordinary murder rate (killings not directly connected to the insurgency: 90 per 100,000 — the next highest rate in the region is Jordan's 7 per 100,000). One of the reasons the Iraqis have been so against us in many areas has been the rise in ordinary crime of all kinds.
Intelligence on the size and nature of insurgent forces remains very poor. The balance between the Islamists and the Baath is unclear, as is the difference this actually makes. Many participants are simply criminals doing it for the money (and pay per incident has been greatly inflated recently). But many are also suicide bombers, and these are presumably not doing it for the money.
Clearly, the United States has decided to shift the bulk of the fighting to the Iraqis, but it has not been very successful in doing this. They still have few effective units aside for the Kurdish Peshmerga. We would also like to "fight" the war politically. American commanders are apparently trying to negotiate in secret with the Baathists, but with what results we do not know. They apparently had more success with al-Sadr. Most commentators believe that we clearly need more troops. But in view of other commitments, we do not have excess forces to send to Iraq and this situation is not about to change.
We are now in a box that is hard to get out of. Soon we are likely to be asked to come home, both by the Iraqis and by American Congressmen. Yet we have a long way to go before the violence is sufficiently under control to turn it over to the Iraqis. A consoling thought is that the problems may be as severe on the other side. According to today's Times, the "al-Qaida in Iraq" (Zarqawi) organization on its web site shows increasing concern that the Iraqis are no longer understanding their mission. They repeatedly try to explain why they are still killing. Recent arrests of Baath leaders in Syria and the possible change in Syrian willingness to cooperate also offers a glimmer of hope.
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