Iraq and Afghanistan

The continued presence of nuclear weapons and the ever-present threat that they will spread to other states, and even to terrorist groups, presents a clear, long-term danger to all peoples. It is true that more traditional, conventional weapons, as well as biological and chemical weapons, can be extremely destructive. But the potential destructiveness of nuclear weapons is of quite a different magnitude than conventional weapons. The use of one small nuclear weapon might have relatively little impact. Yet it would break the convention against using these weapons in war that has held since 1945. And a single use would open up possibilities of escalating use and counter use that might easily lead to a world that few of us would want our children to live in.

There are two primary reasons that a nation uses to justify the maintenance or acquisition of nuclear weapons. The first is to deter the use of nuclear weapons against the nation or one of its allies. The second is to deter any attack by a stronger state. In the hands of advocates of nuclear weapons, this argument was extended by an earlier generation to argue that nuclear weapons were the key to universal peace. However, the amount of war and destruction that has nevertheless occurred under this "nuclear umbrella" in the last fifty years has weakened the case for "peace through the bomb". A third, generally unspoken, reason for acquiring or maintaining nuclears is to enhance or preserve a nation's prestige and "weight" in the world. This is certainly a major reason that France developed its forces. After the demise of the Soviet Union and the emergence of a much weakened Russia, Russia's maintenance of a substantial nuclear force has stood out as one of the few ways in which it can still see itself as a major power in the world. When Iran considers developing nuclear weapons, we should remember that the present regime, just as the shah's regime that preceded it, has long searched for a way to emerge as the key regional power in southwest Asia. When it sees India and Pakistan to the east developing nuclear weapons and notes the presence of nuclear weapons in Russia to the north and Israel to the west, Iranian leaders might well feel that without nuclear weapons Iran cannot attain its goal of being taken seriously as a regional power.

The case for the possession of nuclear weapons as a means of preventing an otherwise stronger state from attacking, with or without the use of nuclear weapons, is weak when the attacking state also has nuclear weapons. If nuclear use by the attacker is deterred, all are in luck. If it is not, then the defender has to decide quickly whether or not to carry out its explicit or implicit threat to respond with a nuclear counterattack. While there are many clever scenarios that show how a defender might use nuclear weapons in a "tit-for-tat" manner that would not lead to mutual suicide for the warring states, the danger that such an exchange would get out of hand would be likely to tie the hands of the defending state, even if it were losing on the battlefield.

A deep contradiction exists between the reliance of the United States on a massive nuclear force as a means to deter nuclear (or major WMD) attacks on the United States and its allies, and the commitment of the United States to stopping growth in the number of states with usable nuclear weapons. For we are telling states without nuclear weapons that they are not to be allowed to have them because their possession would be dangerous while we are allowed to have nuclear weapons because in our hands they are not dangerous. We are also saying that these aspiring states will not be allowed the weapons even though this means that they must remain "second class" states for the foreseeable future. The argument that nuclear weapons are not dangerous in the hands of the present nuclear powers is particularly weak if we consider the problems Russia has had in maintaining and securing its weapons, and the certitude that as long as we maintain our nuclear forces, Russia will continue to maintain theirs.

The only long-run means for the world to find its way through the maze of nuclear weapon possession and hope for possession is for the leading nuclear power, the United States, to work effectively toward the goal of a nuclear-weapon free world. It should do this in two steps. First, it must reopen the argument that another use of a nuclear weapon in wartime would be a crime against humanity. Secondly, it must work with the other nuclear powers and quasi-powers to reduce over a period of years the number of nuclear weapons in their inventories to zero. Only when this process is undertaken and is sufficiently advanced that it becomes believable to all will we attain the high ground from which we can effectively tell other states that they are not to be allowed to have nuclear weapons.

The initial problem with this approach is that the major nuclear powers have taught themselves over the last fifty years that they need nuclear weapons to deter possible nuclear use or threat of use by possible enemies. The question then becomes how these powers, and particularly the United States, can unlearn this teaching. Progress in the United States will not be made by preaching to our leaders that deterrence is unnecessary. It will only be made when they begin to have confidence that we can produce and maintain highly trained and effective conventional forces that can achieve, and appear before the fact as though they can achieve, our deterrence objectives. We have developed a wide array of strategic and tactical systems for the gathering and real-time dissemination of battlefield intelligence. We have developed a catalog full of small units that can be inserted and resupplied behind enemy lines. We have shown in our last few battlefields that we can achieve remarkable results through the air with ever more accurately targeted and more effectively constructed conventional weaponry. If we were to harden this capability and increase the number and effectiveness of this weaponry, then we could hope to respond, and appear as though we could respond, to the use of nuclear weapons against us with massive but relatively surgical attacks that would not on our side break nuclear conventions.

We have a long way to go to before we can build an adequate basis for a switch to nonnuclear deterrence. Along the way, and in combination with phased nuclear weapon reductions that involve all powers, we should reach out to allies and even potential enemies with offers of assistance in the transition to reliance on nonnuclear deterrence forces. What is proposed here will be a hard sell both at home and abroad. But as the only "superpower" in the world, it is incumbent upon us to lead the world down this road.