Monday, February 28, 2005
The Present and Possible Role of Iran in Iraq
Reading in Kenneth Pollock's excellent account of Iranian-American relations, The Persian Puzzle, and considering the account of the situation in Basra in a recent piece by George Packer in the The New Yorker I have come to realize there is another picture of American-Iranian relations than that I have expressed previously here. This one is painted in much darker colors, and has as its ground the fact that even Iran under the Pahlevis imagined itself to be a temporarily poor state that deserved to be a great power.
Long before al-Qaida declared war on America, identifying it as the enemy of Islam, Tehran had declared its own war against us. Their thinking derived from many sources, including a common Iranian misapprehension of America's attempts to influence events in Iran after World War II, an Iranian sense of thwarted greatness, and a bitter Islamic hatred of everything non-Islamic. This stance was perpetuated after the death of Ayatollah Khomeini, the person who had most deeply held these views and who had used these views as a key basis for his own power. In the jihadist mythology, America and Israel were identified, and both were labeled crusaders much as Bin Ladin was to do later. They saw America as attempting with the help of Israel to conquer all the Middle East; they saw Iran as the only country that could stand in their way. This line was perpetuated by people around Khomenei, the religious successor to Khomeini as the great leader or Faqih. Only by hewing carefully to the popular "Imam's line" could they establish their credentials to rule, because they did not have adequate religious credentials on their own.
Conceiving themselves to be in a state of war since the hostage crisis in Tehran, Iran has made a persistent effort to export its revolution throughout the area. It supported terrorism in Lebanon and Israel, and across the world even in Buenos Aires where Iranian agents made two major attacks on the Jewish community. Tehran has been the major supporter of the Hizbollah based in Lebanon, as well as a major supporter of Hamas and Islamic Jihad. It was evidently behind the killing of Israeli leaders that scuttled the peace process in the 1990s, because Iran saw the peace process as aggression against Islam. In some aspects of this effort Iran and Syria have been allies, in other aspects, not. Tehran had a hand in the attacks on Marines in Lebanon that led us to remove our forces in the 1980s, and was responsible for the explosion at the Khobar barracks in Saudi Arabia that killed many Americans.
Iran understood the Iraq-Iran War of the 1980s to be engineered by the United States with the hope of crushing the Islamic Revolution in Iran. They believed that America's accidental shooting down of a civilian airliner in the Gulf toward the end of that war (during a brief period when Tehran was throwing away its navy in a hopeless attempt to drive us from the Gulf) as a deliberate act. They saw America's abandonment of the Shiites at the end of the Gulf War as another attempt to deny Shi'as the chance to extend their revolution to Iraq. Recent Iranian actions in Iraq have not seemed particularly aggressive. However, it must be remembered that the Iranians have believed since the hostage crisis that the United States was looking for any excuse it might find to invade and punish Iran. Realizing the disparity in military force, it has talked tough when it felt it could, but calmed down when military forces seemed to be getting too close. As long as we are in Iraq, it is likely to adopt a moderate stance to the political process there. But this could change if the opportunity presents itself. It is reasonable to understand their efforts in Iraq as another chapter in what they view as their long-term struggle against the United States.
Packer's piece in the New Yorker, combined with other accounts. suggests that Iran's hands-off policy may change at any time. According to Packer, the British have allowed the Iranians and their money to flow freely across the border, setting up political and quasi-military units throughout the area. They have begun to enforce more stringent social behavior on the civilian population in the manner of the Taliban (although with much less stringent rules). Many of these Iranian efforts have not been well received by the locals. But yet the Shiite combined ticket won overwhelmingly in Basra. Even though it was put together by the quietist Sistani (originally from Iran himself), the leaders of the two major parties and even their armed militias spent the last years of the Saddam regime in Iran. Muqtada's Mahdi Army may or may not be pro-Iranian, but we know that another element on this combined ticket was put together by Chalabi, the one-time American favorite who was later accused by the Americans of passing information to the Iranians. He recently bought a house outside Tehran.
Iranians and the current Shi'a leaders of Iran have a deep sense of history. What is now Iraq was a central part of the Iranian Sassanian dynasty. The Shi'as are a "new" part of Iranian history. They forcibly converted Iran in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Gradually, with Iranian help, the Shi'a increased in Iraq until by the time it came under the British control, they formed a majority. The centers of Shi'ism are in Iraq, but the heart of Shi'ism is in Iran. The Iranians may well feel they are entitled to play a major, if not an occupying role in the country, and the Sunni Arabs may be the only ones who can stop them. Stay tuned.
Long before al-Qaida declared war on America, identifying it as the enemy of Islam, Tehran had declared its own war against us. Their thinking derived from many sources, including a common Iranian misapprehension of America's attempts to influence events in Iran after World War II, an Iranian sense of thwarted greatness, and a bitter Islamic hatred of everything non-Islamic. This stance was perpetuated after the death of Ayatollah Khomeini, the person who had most deeply held these views and who had used these views as a key basis for his own power. In the jihadist mythology, America and Israel were identified, and both were labeled crusaders much as Bin Ladin was to do later. They saw America as attempting with the help of Israel to conquer all the Middle East; they saw Iran as the only country that could stand in their way. This line was perpetuated by people around Khomenei, the religious successor to Khomeini as the great leader or Faqih. Only by hewing carefully to the popular "Imam's line" could they establish their credentials to rule, because they did not have adequate religious credentials on their own.
Conceiving themselves to be in a state of war since the hostage crisis in Tehran, Iran has made a persistent effort to export its revolution throughout the area. It supported terrorism in Lebanon and Israel, and across the world even in Buenos Aires where Iranian agents made two major attacks on the Jewish community. Tehran has been the major supporter of the Hizbollah based in Lebanon, as well as a major supporter of Hamas and Islamic Jihad. It was evidently behind the killing of Israeli leaders that scuttled the peace process in the 1990s, because Iran saw the peace process as aggression against Islam. In some aspects of this effort Iran and Syria have been allies, in other aspects, not. Tehran had a hand in the attacks on Marines in Lebanon that led us to remove our forces in the 1980s, and was responsible for the explosion at the Khobar barracks in Saudi Arabia that killed many Americans.
Iran understood the Iraq-Iran War of the 1980s to be engineered by the United States with the hope of crushing the Islamic Revolution in Iran. They believed that America's accidental shooting down of a civilian airliner in the Gulf toward the end of that war (during a brief period when Tehran was throwing away its navy in a hopeless attempt to drive us from the Gulf) as a deliberate act. They saw America's abandonment of the Shiites at the end of the Gulf War as another attempt to deny Shi'as the chance to extend their revolution to Iraq. Recent Iranian actions in Iraq have not seemed particularly aggressive. However, it must be remembered that the Iranians have believed since the hostage crisis that the United States was looking for any excuse it might find to invade and punish Iran. Realizing the disparity in military force, it has talked tough when it felt it could, but calmed down when military forces seemed to be getting too close. As long as we are in Iraq, it is likely to adopt a moderate stance to the political process there. But this could change if the opportunity presents itself. It is reasonable to understand their efforts in Iraq as another chapter in what they view as their long-term struggle against the United States.
Packer's piece in the New Yorker, combined with other accounts. suggests that Iran's hands-off policy may change at any time. According to Packer, the British have allowed the Iranians and their money to flow freely across the border, setting up political and quasi-military units throughout the area. They have begun to enforce more stringent social behavior on the civilian population in the manner of the Taliban (although with much less stringent rules). Many of these Iranian efforts have not been well received by the locals. But yet the Shiite combined ticket won overwhelmingly in Basra. Even though it was put together by the quietist Sistani (originally from Iran himself), the leaders of the two major parties and even their armed militias spent the last years of the Saddam regime in Iran. Muqtada's Mahdi Army may or may not be pro-Iranian, but we know that another element on this combined ticket was put together by Chalabi, the one-time American favorite who was later accused by the Americans of passing information to the Iranians. He recently bought a house outside Tehran.
Iranians and the current Shi'a leaders of Iran have a deep sense of history. What is now Iraq was a central part of the Iranian Sassanian dynasty. The Shi'as are a "new" part of Iranian history. They forcibly converted Iran in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Gradually, with Iranian help, the Shi'a increased in Iraq until by the time it came under the British control, they formed a majority. The centers of Shi'ism are in Iraq, but the heart of Shi'ism is in Iran. The Iranians may well feel they are entitled to play a major, if not an occupying role in the country, and the Sunni Arabs may be the only ones who can stop them. Stay tuned.
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