Monday, February 14, 2005
North Korea: Evil in Modern Feathers
The picture we have of North Korea is turned on its head by the internal propagandists of the DPRK. Before we discuss in what respects, readers need to recall that the people of the North are completely barred from receiving any information from the outside. All electronic means of communication, such as radios and televisions (few) are preset to bring in only government stations. The police regularly check to see whether users are altering their equipment to evade this ban. There are essentially no private organizations, schools, or churches in the country. People are not allowed to leave the country. Penalties are severe. If a person is apprehended for evading such laws, he may be tortured and killed, and his entire extended family may be sent to prison for life. (A recent article in the Observer summarizes the more general human rights situation.) Of course, in spite of this, some information gets through. If this were not so, we would not have the phenomenon of thousands risking everything to get across the river into China (and thence if lucky to South Korea). Many have tried this route more than once, thereby providing even more information.
This post is inspired by a recent Op-Ed pointing out that the people in the DPRK are given a propaganda line quite different from that beamed to the outside world. What they hear is not so much that the North is seeking peace while the rest of the world seeks war (the external line), but rather that the rest of the world is scared to death by the power and vigor of the DPRK. Both the envoys of Clinton and Bush are shown in North Korean media as groveling before the representatives of the DPRK, admitting to them that "you are also a mighty superpower". North Korea's representatives are shown receiving food aid from the outside as "atonement" for the crimes of the capitalist states. The North Koreans were certainly not surprised about the recent announcement that the country has nuclear weapons. They have been told for years that they have weapons that can destroy any foreign nation in a day. Propaganda outlets repeatedly show the U.S. Capitol under missile attack. The people are proudly told that DPRK representatives signed the nuclear nonproliferation treaty in 1985 for diplomatic reasons and then "simply ignored it". In a self-congratulatory pose, they have labeled this strategy as "attack diplomacy". Whatever else this means, there is no reason to believe that the North Koreans leave an opening in their own view of the world for meaningful concessions.
We are faced then with even more of a puzzle than we may have thought. In the 1990s after years of famine many experts were writing that the North was about to collapse. The question became what to do when it happened. (Many alternatives did not look too pretty.) Today, there is less talk of this. There have been some economic developments in North Korea in special zones close to the borders using outside money (and even labor — partly because Northerners simply are not well enough educated for a modern work force and partly because the North wants to avoid the ideological infection of having Northerners work alongside people from outside.) The hope is that this investment and opening will eventually change the North. But at the same time, by reducing the seriousness of the economic problems facing Pyongyang, it takes off some of the pressure that might otherwise cause it to break up. There is no way to know if the country actually has a nuclear weapon. By this point in weapon development, most "nuclear states" have had a test that was recorded elsewhere. As far as I know there is no record of a nuclear explosion in North Korea.
Today's paper tells us that the United States is well on its way toward developing a diplomatic strategy meant to strangle the DPRK if it does not cooperate. Many other countries are evidently willing to cooperate with us in this effort. A main area of interest is how to cut off the country's role as a supplier of drugs and arms to world, partly through increasing control over its ability to have banking and exchange facilities available to it. Japan is passing a law that requires all ships to carry liability insurance against spills and other accidents. No DPRK ships have such insurance and may be unable to obtain it. This would severely constrict trade. We are speaking in other venues of a general quarantine, often as related to the unwillingness of North Korea to accept international rules in relation to nuclear weapons. Whatever approach, when another famine occurs, we must be prepared for the same kind of criticism that accompanied similar efforts in regard to Iraq. The trouble with these programs is that absolute governments see to it that the people at the top are not affected, while the millions down below suffer. Yet in my mind, we must develop an action strategy. We say we are not pushing for regime change; perhaps we should be; certainly Pyongyang says we are. The human rights case here is much stronger than in Iraq, and unlike what the actual situation was in Iraq the ticking of the time bomb on the festering sore of this regime is much louder.
What happens if in spite of all this we succeed? If we succeed through a "Prague Spring" scenario, then we and the South can negotiate with the ones who replace the Juche regime. But if the result is civil war between progressive and conservative elements of the regime, and the bulk of the country becomes a revolutionary and humanitarian disaster, then who will come in? Ideally, the South Korean army would come in and reunify the country. They are a tough bunch and there would be brutality, but their invasion might be the best alternative for everyone concerned. South Korea is a modern and democratic country. But just for this reason, would China acquiesce? It invaded once before in the bad old Cold War days. Times have changed. Yet would it want a democratic, potentially much more powerful Korean state on its border? One way to avoid the problem would be with a United Nations force. But this would have to be a large force with a long-term, Bosnia-like mandate, and I do not see the United Nations stepping up to the plate.
This post is inspired by a recent Op-Ed pointing out that the people in the DPRK are given a propaganda line quite different from that beamed to the outside world. What they hear is not so much that the North is seeking peace while the rest of the world seeks war (the external line), but rather that the rest of the world is scared to death by the power and vigor of the DPRK. Both the envoys of Clinton and Bush are shown in North Korean media as groveling before the representatives of the DPRK, admitting to them that "you are also a mighty superpower". North Korea's representatives are shown receiving food aid from the outside as "atonement" for the crimes of the capitalist states. The North Koreans were certainly not surprised about the recent announcement that the country has nuclear weapons. They have been told for years that they have weapons that can destroy any foreign nation in a day. Propaganda outlets repeatedly show the U.S. Capitol under missile attack. The people are proudly told that DPRK representatives signed the nuclear nonproliferation treaty in 1985 for diplomatic reasons and then "simply ignored it". In a self-congratulatory pose, they have labeled this strategy as "attack diplomacy". Whatever else this means, there is no reason to believe that the North Koreans leave an opening in their own view of the world for meaningful concessions.
We are faced then with even more of a puzzle than we may have thought. In the 1990s after years of famine many experts were writing that the North was about to collapse. The question became what to do when it happened. (Many alternatives did not look too pretty.) Today, there is less talk of this. There have been some economic developments in North Korea in special zones close to the borders using outside money (and even labor — partly because Northerners simply are not well enough educated for a modern work force and partly because the North wants to avoid the ideological infection of having Northerners work alongside people from outside.) The hope is that this investment and opening will eventually change the North. But at the same time, by reducing the seriousness of the economic problems facing Pyongyang, it takes off some of the pressure that might otherwise cause it to break up. There is no way to know if the country actually has a nuclear weapon. By this point in weapon development, most "nuclear states" have had a test that was recorded elsewhere. As far as I know there is no record of a nuclear explosion in North Korea.
Today's paper tells us that the United States is well on its way toward developing a diplomatic strategy meant to strangle the DPRK if it does not cooperate. Many other countries are evidently willing to cooperate with us in this effort. A main area of interest is how to cut off the country's role as a supplier of drugs and arms to world, partly through increasing control over its ability to have banking and exchange facilities available to it. Japan is passing a law that requires all ships to carry liability insurance against spills and other accidents. No DPRK ships have such insurance and may be unable to obtain it. This would severely constrict trade. We are speaking in other venues of a general quarantine, often as related to the unwillingness of North Korea to accept international rules in relation to nuclear weapons. Whatever approach, when another famine occurs, we must be prepared for the same kind of criticism that accompanied similar efforts in regard to Iraq. The trouble with these programs is that absolute governments see to it that the people at the top are not affected, while the millions down below suffer. Yet in my mind, we must develop an action strategy. We say we are not pushing for regime change; perhaps we should be; certainly Pyongyang says we are. The human rights case here is much stronger than in Iraq, and unlike what the actual situation was in Iraq the ticking of the time bomb on the festering sore of this regime is much louder.
What happens if in spite of all this we succeed? If we succeed through a "Prague Spring" scenario, then we and the South can negotiate with the ones who replace the Juche regime. But if the result is civil war between progressive and conservative elements of the regime, and the bulk of the country becomes a revolutionary and humanitarian disaster, then who will come in? Ideally, the South Korean army would come in and reunify the country. They are a tough bunch and there would be brutality, but their invasion might be the best alternative for everyone concerned. South Korea is a modern and democratic country. But just for this reason, would China acquiesce? It invaded once before in the bad old Cold War days. Times have changed. Yet would it want a democratic, potentially much more powerful Korean state on its border? One way to avoid the problem would be with a United Nations force. But this would have to be a large force with a long-term, Bosnia-like mandate, and I do not see the United Nations stepping up to the plate.
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