Friday, February 18, 2005
Iraq: Kurds Pressing Too Hard?
Latest report is that the Kurds are pressing their advantage very hard. They want to increase their territory considerably beyond the three provinces they controlled under Saddam. They want to keep their peshmerga military and forbid any other military forces from entering their area. They want all ministries of the central government in Kurdistan to be Kurdish, with only loose connections to the central government. They want to be able to veto any taxes that the central government might levy on Kurdistan or their citizens. They want control of the Kirkuk oil fields, etc. etc. More generally, they demand that the federal state organized under the new constitution should be a secular state. The Kurds are demanding that one of their leaders should be the new President of Iraq. If this is not done, they assert, they will feel they are being treated as second-class citizens. Some Shi'a leaders are beginning to say that the Kurds are demanding too much, as well they might say.
Apparently, the Kurds want to be independent in all but name. They do not want the "name" because they fear invasions by the Turks or Iranians who are not likely to allow an independent Kurdistan. The trouble is that the level of regional independence they are demanding is unlikely to work for very long. There are few if any examples of such a loose relationship lasting. The United States before the Civil War and Switzerland before the Sonderbund War of 1847, were not as loose confederations, yet both ended with a war. If a nation cannot exist "half-slave and half-free" perhaps it also cannot exist "half-religious and half-secular".
The logic of the situation if they keep pushing this hard is that the Shi'a will end up with little reason not to have an Islamic state if that is what they want. He may not want it, but with the Kurds living in a world of their own, there will be little in the way of political power to block Ayatollah Sistani from seeing to the writing of a Shi'a-centric constitution. Thus, by demanding separation in most of political life, the Kurds will have cut themselves off from having a role in determining the position of Islam in the state. They will then be even less likely to play a constructive role in Iraq than they are prepared to play now. This downward spiral may lead to a complete breakup and/or Civil War. Meanwhile, the Sunni Arab insurgents, no matter how religious some of them are, will not be drawn into cooperation by the vision of an Iraq even more dominated by Shi'a than it would be if the Kurds played a more active role. Without the peshmerga, the Shi'as and the governmental forces will be less able to fight Sunni insurgents — even assuming all is quiet on the Kurdish border.
What role the United States will or should play in all this is hard to say. Negroponte must be happy he is coming home.
Apparently, the Kurds want to be independent in all but name. They do not want the "name" because they fear invasions by the Turks or Iranians who are not likely to allow an independent Kurdistan. The trouble is that the level of regional independence they are demanding is unlikely to work for very long. There are few if any examples of such a loose relationship lasting. The United States before the Civil War and Switzerland before the Sonderbund War of 1847, were not as loose confederations, yet both ended with a war. If a nation cannot exist "half-slave and half-free" perhaps it also cannot exist "half-religious and half-secular".
The logic of the situation if they keep pushing this hard is that the Shi'a will end up with little reason not to have an Islamic state if that is what they want. He may not want it, but with the Kurds living in a world of their own, there will be little in the way of political power to block Ayatollah Sistani from seeing to the writing of a Shi'a-centric constitution. Thus, by demanding separation in most of political life, the Kurds will have cut themselves off from having a role in determining the position of Islam in the state. They will then be even less likely to play a constructive role in Iraq than they are prepared to play now. This downward spiral may lead to a complete breakup and/or Civil War. Meanwhile, the Sunni Arab insurgents, no matter how religious some of them are, will not be drawn into cooperation by the vision of an Iraq even more dominated by Shi'a than it would be if the Kurds played a more active role. Without the peshmerga, the Shi'as and the governmental forces will be less able to fight Sunni insurgents — even assuming all is quiet on the Kurdish border.
What role the United States will or should play in all this is hard to say. Negroponte must be happy he is coming home.
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