Iraq and Afghanistan

Yesterday's newspaper offered some sobering information on the state of the insurgency. A Brooking's Institute analysis of the state of the war, regularly updated with new information, shows that in most economic, opinion, and casualty measures, there has been remarkably little gain. Of course, this is looking at January as the last data entry point and so fails to record much that is relevant about the election period and its immediate aftermath. Nevertheless, fuel availability and electricity supply have declined over the last few months. Iraqi civilian casualties have gone up. The percentage of Iraqis wanting the Americans to withdraw quickly has gone up while optimism has gone down (again this does not reflect the election results adequately). The only remarkable improvements have been in consumer items such as increases in telephone subscribers and car traffic. There has been a modest increase in the estimate of the number of actually effective Iraqi security forces. Yet the number of insurgent leaders still at large has declined only slightly.

This analysis dovetails with another report in the same paper that the insurgency has changed its focus. Concentration is now on destroying infrastructure, especially water and electricity, in Baghdad and its environs. They are striking simultaneously at so many points that it is hard for the government to keep up. All agree theirs is a markedly successful and well-planned effort, probably advised by Saddam's former officials in these sectors. Defense against this kind of attack is notably difficult and the government and American side seem somewhat confused as to how to respond. In addition to these strikes, the suicide bomb campaign now focuses mainly on Shiites, particularly those frequenting mosques. This is apparently the work of the Jihadists, intent on starting a religious war which they are sure they would win. The simultaneous reduction in attacks on Americans probably results in part from the fact that casualties taken in such actions take too high a toll on insurgent forces.

The insurgency appears to be bankrolled, and in part directed, from Syria. Most of the Jihadists recruited in Europe, especially for suicide missions, appear to come through Syria. Now we have an opportunity, especially after the revulsion in much of the world at the Lebanese bombing, and the relatively good international press leading up an elected Iraqi government, to press the Syrians much harder. More pressure should be put on them to effectively close their borders, and arrest or expel from the country those persons helping support the insurgency. The funds of the insurgents now residing in Syrian banks could also be frozen.