Iraq and Afghanistan

The Spanish foreign policy association (FRIDA) has published a short discussion of the structure of the Iranian foreign policy decision-making apparatus, particularly as this relates to the question of nuclear weapons and/or power. It points out that:

"There are several governmental bodies within the Iranian political system with influence over foreign policy design, including 1) the Velayat al Faqih – Spiritual Leader and Chief of State (Khamenei), 2) the President (Khatami) and the Minister of Foreign Affairs (Kharrazi); 3) the National Security Council (headed by Rowhani), 4) the Expediency Discernment Council (headed by Rafsanjani), and 5) the National Security and Foreign Policy Committee of the Majlis, or Parliament. Furthermore, both the Islamic Revolutionary Guard or Pasdaran and the Ministry of Islamic Culture and Guidance have the ability to influence the decision-making process."

The recent negotiation have been led by Rowhani instead of Kharrazi, reflecting once again the relative weakness of the President and the ministers under him. However, the author suggests that Rowhani is actually representing the "Servers of Reconstruction", which is a party answerable to Rafsanjani. This is a reasonably pragmatic group, even though they, Khomenei, and even Khatami have been forced by events, such as the bellicose statements of Americans and the apparent overflights by American spy planes, to talk a tough line for the benefit of the media.

Khatami's weakness is partially the result of his lame duck status. Elections in June will bring in a new president. He will have completed the maximum of two terms. It is unlikely that anyone more liberal will be elected, unless it be his brother who nominally heads the Islamic Participation Front that brought Khatami to power. A better possibility as far as the nuclear negotiations are concerned might be a return of Rafsanjani to the Presidency. He has more stature than the alternatives and is considered a pragmatist by all concerned. He would have enough status to actually work out a deal with the Europeans and Americans in regard to nuclear energy or weapons that would be less likely to be criticized by Khamenei or the radical Islamists and extremists.

What is notable on a meta level about this analysis is its picture of a relatively open and many-layered Iranian governing system. Although not a fully functioning democracy, this picture is about as far as we can get from what we understand of North Korea. We can and should work with, and respond to, the possibilities. The advice for our policy vis-à-vis North Korea is less clear.